

PART 3 Guidelines

Guidelines provide general assistance to response personnel, and more broadly to Parties in understanding and implementing response procedures. The following guidelines are included in PLANTPLAN¹:

- Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests
- Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline
- Delimiting surveys
- Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests
- Disinfestation and decontamination
- National talking points
- Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
- Response Plan development
- Transition to Management
- Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests
- Urban and peri-urban biosecurity

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¹ Guidelines are available individually from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two SOPs. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	Guideline developed from <i>Collection and transport of Emergency Plant Pests</i> SOP (V1 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostic Standards (SPHDS). Original SOP separated into two guideline documents. Approved by SPHDS October 2014. Endorsed by Parties November 2014.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist plant health staff/field officers when collecting suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) samples for submission to diagnostic laboratories.

2. Critical issues

Correct sample collection is central to ensuring an accurate diagnosis. Critical issues include the following:

- availability of collection tools (see Appendix 1 - Resource equipment)
- the sample is fit-for-purpose (integrity intact, adequate numbers, and all necessary components sampled)
- the sample is appropriately contained, labelled and stored

- chain of evidence is followed at all times (see *Chain of evidence* standard operating procedure; SOP)
- a sample submission form is completed at the time of sampling capturing all pertinent details
- hygiene and disinfestation protocols are followed (see *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines)
- safety of staff is considered at all times and all relevant Work, Health and Safety legislative requirements are followed.

3. Collecting and packaging samples

If necessary, consult with the laboratory to ensure the most appropriate sample is collected.

3.1 General

- Complete a sample submission form at the time of sampling (include details such as host, plant parts affected, location (GPS coordinates), sampling date, collector, property owner, contact details and any other relevant information).
- The collection point **MUST** be clearly marked in the field (e.g. with brightly coloured ribbon and/or GPS coordinates).
- Disinfect implements (e.g. with 80% v/v ethanol or 0.5% v/v available chlorine solution, as appropriate) prior to and after each sampling.
- For suspected root pests/diseases, include soil and crown (lower stem) tissues with root samples.
- Labelling of sample vials/bags must be clear and legible using an alcohol-proof and water-proof marker.
- Minimise the time between sampling and dispatch to the receiving laboratory, and store in a portable cool-box during this time.
- Use best practice biosecurity measures before entering a suspect site to avoid the potential of spread between sites.
- If possible, sample from perceived area of minimal damage to perceived area of high damage within a field/orchard and on the individual plant.
- Follow appropriate hygiene protocols for collecting samples and disinfecting hands, footwear and clothing (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).
- Follow *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pest* guidelines to send samples to the designated laboratory, including advising the laboratory of the expected arrival.

3.2 Insect samples (use pest specific protocols where available)

- i. Where possible **insect samples should be sent dead**¹, and preserved in the manner required by the laboratory (see Appendix 2 - Insect sampling procedures).
- ii. Where present collect a reasonable number of samples (commensurate with their size) of all life stages and variants, that are complete and in good condition.

¹ Note: In exceptional circumstances, the diagnostic laboratory may require live material. For example, if only immature stages are available and the diagnostic lab needs to rear material through to adult (in secure facilities). In such cases, special arrangements must be made, ensuring secure transportation, prompt collection of samples from airports etc. These circumstances will be decided by the State Coordination Centre (SCC) and/or the Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM).

- iii. Place the samples in a plastic vial, a crush-proof box, or similar, containing material to prevent damage.
- iv. Secure the lid, label clearly, and triple-bag using tamper-proof bags, disinfecting between layers, and include the completed sample submission form in the outer bag - according to chain of evidence requirements (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).

3.3 Pathogen samples (use pest specific protocols where available)

- i. Select a fresh and generous sample representing the full range of symptoms including both diseased and healthy sections, and place in a labelled zip-lock plastic bag (see also Appendix 3 - Preferred packaging methods for pathogen samples).
- ii. Inspect for insects and, if present, ensure this is recorded on the outside of the bag and the submission form so correct containment can be used.
- iii. Triple-bag using tamper-proof bags, disinfecting between layers, and include the completed sample submission form in the outer bag according to chain of evidence requirements (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).
- iv. Store samples in a cool-box until dispatched unless the suspected pathogen is likely to survive better at room temperature.

3.4 Nematode samples (use pest specific protocols where available)

Soil, plant or root samples affected should be collected and packaged as per the plant samples above.

3.5 Seed samples

Seed sampling should be undertaken by an accredited seed sampler to ensure that a representative sample is taken incorporating chain of evidence procedures (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).

4. Appendix 1 - Resource equipment

Standard kit

The Standard kit includes equipment that may be required for the investigation of a suspected emergency plant pest.

- portable cooler or sturdy, sealable plastic crate with freezer blocks for keeping samples cool
- press seal bags of suitable sizes for samples
- sample jars or vials of varying sizes (e.g. 20 ml and 50 ml)
- disposable gloves
- disposable overalls
- fresh bleach or other suitable disinfectant (e.g. domestic use with 4 - 5% available Chlorine (Cl))
- a sturdy leak proof plastic bin for a footbath
- 65% ethyl-alcohol 35% water solution (for insect sample storage)
- trowel
- spade or coring tube for sampling soil
- sealable plastic bags of suitable micron thickness for disposing of personal protective equipment
- large, strong plastic bags for sealing contaminated equipment such as boots or spades (strong garbage bags are acceptable for this)
- washable boots i.e. rubber boots
- adhesive labels (either pre-prepared with bar code/unique ID or handwritten in field)
- evidence tape (tamper proof)
- permanent markers
- pencils/pens
- book or sample sheets for recording details of site and samples
- soap
- paper towels
- water (sufficient for washing hands)
- baby wipes for cleansing hands and face
- brightly coloured ribbon
- a mobile phone²
- camera²
- sample submission forms from lab
- list of contacts (laboratories/courier/diagnosticians/CPHM for the state)
- blank key list of samples
- 80% ethanol in spray bottle
- bucket (for disinfecting tools)
- plastic containers for sample storage (e.g. lunch boxes)
- trays/crates (for disinfecting equipment)
- quarantine tape or similar available
- GPS unit

² Any equipment which may be damaged by decontamination, such as cameras or mobile phones should be protected with a sealable plastic bag or similar.

- water (sufficient to wash hands and equipment)
- magnifying glass
- masks and other PPE if dealing with chemicals
- overnight express post packs

Additional basic equipment for collecting insect samples

- variety of vials with internal seals e.g. 20mm, 70mm
- insect net (or aspirator)
- McCartney bottles
- soft tweezers
- rigid tweezers
- fine scissors
- secateurs
- alcohol 75%
- very fine brush e.g. size 0 – 000
- larger plastic jars
- paper bags
- fine forceps
- pocket knife

It is suggested that all the above items could be stored in a large toolbox for easy access.

5. Appendix 2 - Insect sampling procedures

Table 1: Insect sampling and packaging procedures

Insect type	Kill method	Live insect sampling
Moths, butterflies	Freeze for 24 hours or place in an airtight container with a tissue or cotton wool that has been soaked in nail polish remover.	
Plant feeders (e.g. scarab larvae, scale)	Do not remove mealy bugs or scale insects from the leaves or stems on which they are feeding as this will damage their mouth parts and make identification difficult. Instead, cut out leaf tissue around the insect and place this in 70% ethanol.	Plant feeders with strong jaws should be sent with a handful of soil or leaves as they may otherwise damage each other in transit
Hard bodied insects (e.g. grasshoppers, beetles)	Freeze for 24 hours.	Carefully fold sample in tissue paper and place in crush-proof plastic tube or container with several holes in the lid for ventilation. For beetles with strong jaws, send with a handful of soil or leaves as they may otherwise damage each other in transit.
Soft bodied insects (e.g. caterpillars)	Place in hot water for 10 minutes. Then preserve in 70% ethanol.	Leave insect larvae (grubs, caterpillars or maggots) in grain or other seed or fruit as this will help to preserve them.
Ants	Spray with fly spray, then stick to clear sticky tape. Stick this to a piece of paper which also records the location where caught and the collector's name and contact details. Alternatively collect with a small paint brush into 70% ethanol.	
Small and/or soft bodied insects (e.g. thrips, aphids, mites and larvae)	Place sample in 70% ethanol (use methylated spirits) and completely fill the container. NOTE: A limited amount of ethanol is permitted to be posted by Australia Post under the International Air Transport Association's "Dangerous Goods Regulations".	

6. Appendix 3 - Preferred packaging methods for pathogen samples

Table 2: Preferred packaging methods for pathogen samples

All samples should be placed in a minimum of two sealed plastic bags before the final packaging (refer to Plant Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre brochure available from

<http://plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resource-hub/documents/pbcrc-packaging-project-2010/>)

Plant material	Preferred packaging method
Fruit and vegetables	Wrap in paper towel or tissue, place in a sealed plastic bag and place in a hard sided box or screw top plastic vial with extra paper to prevent crushing or movement.
Above ground plant material (e.g. leaves, stems, or whole plants with no soil)	Wrap in dry paper towel or newspaper and seal in a plastic bag.
Roots – no soil	Wrap in moist paper towel and seal in a plastic bag with air removed.
Soil (with or without roots)	Seal in a plastic bag with air removed. Do not fill bag more than ½ full and keep to less than 1kg samples.
Seed	Seal in a plastic bag with air removed, or a material bag with secure fastening. Do not fill bag more than ½ full.

Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
draft	-	All	Issued for comment to all Parties November 2013
1.0	2 Sep 2014	All	New document. Parties' comments post May 2014 EPPRD Parties meeting included. Distributed out of session for endorsement August 2014.
2.0	29 Nov 2016	2.0, 3.1, 7.4, 7.9, 7.10, Appendix 1 & 2	<p>Definitions of financial terms and Transition to Management Phase added.</p> <p>Variations to CCEPP and NMG Terms of Reference to incorporate May 2016 approved variations to the EPPRD, including the Transition to Management Phase and COAG Council system changes.</p> <p>PHA role in drafting NMG Cost Sharing paper added and Cost Sharing terms defined.</p> <p>Reference to phased Response Plan approach added.</p> <p>Further detail provided on industry communication and CCEPP role in developing national talking points.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2016.</p>
2.1	30 Nov 2017	2, 7.1.1, 8.10.1, 9.1.1, Appendix 2	<p>Abbreviations table added as new section (section 2).</p> <p>Update regarding a nominee by the CPPO being able to chair the CCEPP.</p> <p>Talking points development revised to reflect PLANTPLAN changes.</p> <p>Emergency diagnostic protocol development inserted to reflect PLANTPLAN changes.</p> <p>Update of subcommittee name to Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2017.</p>
2.2	30 Nov 2018	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor revisions to abbreviations and terms and definitions lists. Confidentiality and requirement for all CCEPP members to complete a confidentiality deed poll and introductory Biosecurity Online Training courses. Additional details provided to clarify CCEPP membership. Clarification of Incident notification process and convening of the CCEPP. Reference added to reflect current practice that meetings may occur by email.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reference to the Biosecurity Portal CCEPP site as a repository for CCEPP documentation and means to making documents available to CCEPP members. Additional detail related to seeking of advice through SAPs. Addition of a section on engagement of international expertise (section 9.4). Reference to CCEPP and NMG job cards. Addition of details to Appendix 2 and 3. Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2018.</p>
2.3	8 Dec 2021	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor revisions to abbreviations and terms and definitions lists. Addition of the requirement for the Lead Agency to provide a situation report as a standing paper for in session meetings (section 9.7 and Appendix 1). Addition of detail on maintenance of a consolidated CCEPP meeting actions list (section 8.8). Addition of the requirement that requests for advice from PHC subcommittees are provided directly to PHC and include terms of reference (section 9.2). Addition of the requirement that where working groups are formed to provide advice, governance arrangements for the group are established by the CCEPP (section 9.7). Removal of sections 10, 11 and NMG terms of reference. Addition of CCEPP consideration on the frequency of situation and expenditure reporting (Appendix 1). Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2021.</p>
2.4	13 Dec 2022	All	<p>Full review of document and following key amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Update of terms and definitions Update of Terms of reference (section 4), CCEPP structure (section 7), Meetings (section 8) Addition of reference to 'Vector' as appropriate Corrections to EPPRD clause references <p>Minor editorial changes throughout for clarity.</p>

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1. Introduction

The Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) describes the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) as ‘the key technical coordinating body providing the link between the Commonwealth, States/Territories, Industry, Plant Health Australia (PHA) and the National Management Group (NMG) in the management of Incidents and emergency responses to them’¹. This document (the Guideline) provides detailed information to CCEPP members (the members) and observers on the operations of the CCEPP. Further information on the operational aspects of managing a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) Incident is outlined in the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN. References to these documents have been included in this Guideline where applicable.

Due to the need for rapid response by Parties to an Incident there will be occasions when CCEPP and NMG representatives are required to meet at short notice, with little time to consider their role as detailed under the EPPRD. Therefore members should use this Guideline to develop internal work instructions specific to the needs of their industry or agency, to assist them in responding effectively.

Timing for a variety of actions is mentioned in the Guideline. As the CCEPP is involved in a response to an Incident, there may not always be extended periods of time in which to distribute papers or information. Time allowed must always be reasonable in relation to the volume of material to be considered so as not to erode the value of a CCEPP. Members should be aware of this and attempt to ensure not only that information is disseminated as rapidly as possible but also consultation to support decisions and actions is carried out rapidly.

¹ EPPRD schedule 8 part 2.2

2. Abbreviations

Acronym	Term
ACPPO	Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer
BOLT	Biosecurity Online Training
BP	Biosecurity Plan
CCEPP	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests
CPHM	Chief Plant Health Manager
EPP	Emergency Plant Pest
EPPRD	Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
NBCEN	National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network
NMG	National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (National Management Group)
PHA	Plant Health Australia
PHC	Plant Health Committee
PIDS	Preliminary Information Data Sheet
SAP	Scientific Advisory Panel
SNPHS	Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance
SPHD	Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics

3. Terms and definitions

Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) that are used within this document are a reference to the defined words/terms within clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer	ACPPO	Individual holding the position of the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer of the Commonwealth of Australia.
Chief Plant Health Manager	CPHM	Individual holding the position of Chief Plant Health Manager (or equivalent role), of a State or Territory.
Confidential Information		As defined in the EPPRD. See Section 6.
Consensus		As defined in the EPPRD. See Section 8.3.
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	CCEPP	The committee of technical representatives of the Parties convened according to Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.
Emergency Plant Pest	EPP	As defined in the EPPRD.
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	EPPRD	Government and Plant Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Plant Pest Responses.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Formal Notification to the CCEPP		Occurs when a State or Territory CPHM notifies the Chair of the CCEPP, either orally or in writing, that an Incident has occurred within that State or Territory. Written notification must be used to confirm oral advice and must be in the form agreed from time to time by the Parties.
Incident		Means: (a) a confirmed occurrence of, or reasonably held suspicion of the occurrence of an EPP; or (b) the occurrence of an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including circumstances in which an investigation comes to a provisional finding or diagnosis that the Plant Pest or Vector is already established in Australia).
Lead Agency		The agency of a State or Territory responsible for leading the conduct of the response to an Incident within their State or Territory. For clarity there may be more than one Lead Agency (each from a different State or Territory) for an Incident.
National Management Group	NMG	The group with the constitution and role set out in Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.
Plant Pest		Any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest or pathogen that meets each of the following criteria: (a) It is injurious to Plant Health, Unprocessed Plant Products, Bees or Fungi. (b) It is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable. (c) It is not a genetically modified organism.
Response Plan		An integrated plan for undertaking a response to one or more EPPs that is: (a) in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the EPPRD, developed by one or more State or Territory CPHM(s), endorsed by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG; and (b) subject to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD. The Response Plan may include Emergency Containment actions so as to enable the payment of Owner Reimbursement Costs and Cost Sharing if considered appropriate by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG.
Scientific Advisory Panel	SAP	A panel of experts which may be appointed by the CCEPP to provide specific technical information on matters relating to an Incident.
Transition to Management		The undertaking of activities to transition the management of an EPP from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP under a Response Plan to management of the EPP outside of the EPPRD.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Vector		Means any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest that meets each of the following criteria: (a) It carries and transmits a Plant Pest to a Crop. (b) It is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable. (c) It is not a genetically modified organism.

4. Terms of reference

4.1 CCEPP

As noted in the Introduction the CCEPP is the key technical coordinating body for responses to Incidents, providing the link between the Commonwealth, States/Territories, industries, PHA and the NMG. Its role is to effectively and efficiently coordinate the national technical response to EPPs, and to advise meetings of the NMG on EPP issues in accordance with the EPPRD. The CCEPP is not a standing committee or a legal entity. It only convenes in relation to a known or suspect EPP and has no responsibilities outside the EPPRD.

Under the EPPRD the CCEPP has specific responsibilities. The following list is taken directly from the EPPRD²:

- *receive formal notifications from Government Parties on Incidents;*
- *determine if the Incident concerns an EPP;*
- *advise the NMG if a Response Plan is required;*
- *make recommendations to the NMG in respect of the detail of a Response Plan;*
- *consider regular reports on progress of a Response Plan and develop a Consensus³ on further actions required;*
- *having regard to any baselines of 'normal commitments' agreed pursuant to clause 14.1.2, advise the NMG as required by clause 9.1.1(b), as to the investigation and diagnostic costs that are relevant and reasonable in the circumstances of the Incident Definition Phase of the Response Plan;*
- *provide regular consolidated reports to the Affected Parties, and to the NMG, on the status of a Response Plan;*
- *in circumstances in which the CCEPP determines that eradication of an EPP is no longer feasible, provide advice and recommendations to the NMG on:*
 - *whether a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate and, if so, the scope of the Transition to Management Phase and the proposed amendments to the Response Plan for inclusion of the Transition to Management Phase; or*
 - *whether the NMG should determine that an emergency response should cease and, if so, on options for alternative arrangements outside this Deed;*
- *determine and advise the NMG when an EPP has been eradicated under a Response Plan; and*
- *recommend when proof of freedom has been achieved following the successful implementation of a Response Plan.*

² EPPRD part 2 of schedule 8

³ A Consensus decision can be made to present one or more views or courses of action to the NMG

While these specific responsibilities are listed in the EPPRD, it is not an exhaustive list and at times the CCEPP may be required to undertake other tasks relating to responses to Incidents. They may also advise NMG on economic and financial elements of a response. Further information on the roles and responsibilities of the CCEPP can be found in the [CCEPP job card](#).

4.2 NMG

The terms of reference of the NMG⁴ can be found in Schedule 8 of the EPPRD. Members of the CCEPP should be familiar with the role and responsibilities of the NMG in order to ensure issues relevant to NMG considerations are addressed to the extent possible within the CCEPP.

5. Conflict of interest

Where a CCEPP participant potentially has a material, personal or financial interest in a matter that is before the CCEPP, this should be declared at the start of the first meeting in which they participate or when a potential conflict of interest first emerges. If a conflict of interest is declared then the CCEPP Chair and members must determine what procedures should be used to manage this, for example whether it is sufficient that all participants are aware of the conflict or if there is a need to restrict access to confidential information.

6. Confidentiality

Subject to any legal obligation requiring release of information, all matters discussed at a CCEPP meeting are confidential and must not be released to the public without the approval of the CCEPP. The EPPRD defines 'Confidential Information' as:

"...all know-how and commercially valuable or sensitive information (in whatever form) disclosed by a Party to one or more other Parties for the purposes of this Deed, but does not include information that:

- (a) is already in the public domain or, after the date of this Deed, becomes part of the public domain otherwise than as a result of an unauthorised disclosure by the receiving Party or its representatives;*
- (b) is or becomes available to the receiving Party for a third party lawfully in possession of that information and which has the lawful power to disclose such information to the receiving Party on a non-confidential basis; or*
- (c) was in the lawful possession of the receiving Party without restrictions as to its use or was developed independently by the receiving Party (as shown by its written records or other evidence) prior to the date of disclosure to it under this Deed."*⁵

All representatives, observers, technical experts and other participants must sign a Confidentiality Deed Poll (planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf)⁶ prior to participation in any activities relating to the EPPRD, including that of the CCEPP and NMG. Government

⁴ EPPRD part 1 of schedule 8

⁵ EPPRD clause 1.1

⁶ EPPRD schedule 9

representatives are bound by privacy provisions under their respective public service/government employment Acts, however must sign an appropriate form of Confidentiality Deed Poll (which may be in the form of the current available Deed Poll contained in schedule 9 and available through the above link) prior to participation in any activities⁷.

7. CCEPP structure

7.1 Membership

7.1.1 Standing members

In this context 'standing member' means those persons who have membership on each CCEPP that convenes whether the Plant Pest is of immediate concern to them or not. These include⁸:

- The Chair of the CCEPP, who is the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACPPO), from the Australian Government Department responsible for biosecurity⁹. The ACPPO (or their nominee) convenes and chairs Meetings of the CCEPP and does not have the right to vote.
- All State and Territory Chief Plant Health Managers (CPHMs) (or their nominees).
- Two representatives from the Australian Government with expertise in biosecurity policy and biosecurity operations (non-voting).
- A representative from PHA (non-voting).
- A representative from the Commonwealth nominated by the ACPPO (being a different person to the chairperson of the CCEPP).

In practice from time to time standing members may need to provide a nominee to present their view and vote. This should not be undertaken lightly as the authority and policy expertise rests with the CPHMs and without that experience and authority the CCEPP may struggle to reach decisions. There is also a minimum level of training required as any personnel who participate in the CCEPP must do so in accordance with the terms of the EPPRD¹⁰. This includes the completion of the introductory Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT) courses prior to participation in CCEPP activities.

Continuity of CCEPP representative roles is important during an Incident and is particularly critical for the Lead Agency. Processes should be in place to ensure this continuity, which may be achieved through identification of one or more 'deputy' members that shadow the primary appointee throughout the response.

If there is a delegation of authority then the delegate must be notified to the CCEPP Secretariat (the Secretariat) who will inform the CCEPP. Nominees for proxy should be fully briefed and conversant with the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN and authorised to make decisions on behalf of their Party.

As custodians of the EPPRD PHA provides advice on the application of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to facilitate compliance with the provisions of the EPPRD.

⁷ EPPRD clause 11.6.2

⁸ EPPRD schedule 8

⁹ The Australian Government Department responsible for biosecurity is referred to as "the Australian Government" throughout this guideline

¹⁰ EPPRD clause 15 and clause 11.6.2

7.1.2 Affected Industry Parties

Once a CPHM notifies the ACPPO of an Incident (see Section 8.1), the Secretariat will forward a list of the known hosts for the detected pest to PHA who will then provide advice on potential Affected Industry Parties, based on this host list and drawn from EPPRD signatories. PHA will provide contact details for the potentially Affected Industry Parties as well as advice on whether the pest is a High Priority Pest and if it is an EPP listed in schedule 13 of the EPPRD.

The Affected Industry Parties are obliged to join the CCEPP for any Incident affecting their crop sector and they have the right to vote. Representatives of the Affected Industry Parties must have the appropriate training, expertise and authority to make decisions on behalf of their Party to allow them to participate fully in CCEPP¹¹. As a minimum, the introductory BOLT courses should be completed prior to participation in CCEPP activities.

7.2 Observers

The EPPRD allows for the attendance of observers at CCEPP meetings, although numbers must be kept to a minimum and observers do not have the right to vote on decisions¹². All attendees should be announced and recorded in the minutes as present. The behaviour of observers is the responsibility of the inviting CCEPP member who must ensure that the observers abide by this guideline and not interfere with the conduct of the meeting or any decision making. All observers must sign a confidentiality deed poll and lodge it with PHA prior to the CCEPP meeting. For additional information on confidentiality and the Confidentiality deed poll see Section 6.

There are four classes of observer as outlined below.

7.2.1 Industry Parties

Any Industry Parties that are not an Affected Party of the EPP and represent growers whose crops might be impacted by a Response Plan must be invited to participate as observers¹³.

7.2.2 Relevant health, environment, amenity expertise

As the EPPRD principally covers primary production in agriculture the CPHM may not have the necessary expertise to cover other affected sectors, such as human health or the environment. Therefore, the CCEPP may request the attendance of a person with appropriate expertise if it is felt that required information cannot be supplied by members.

7.2.3 Technical assistance to members

Technical advisers within jurisdictions, the Australian Government, industry and/or PHA may attend CCEPP meetings to provide advice to relevant members or when asked by a CCEPP member.

7.2.4 Capacity building

Members may invite officers from their organisation in order to ensure that knowledge of both the specific Incident and/or the conduct of a CCEPP meeting and associated processes are built up within their organisation.

¹¹ EPPRD clause 15 and clause 11.4.2

¹² EPPRD schedule 8 part 3.4

¹³ As agreed by EPPRD Parties in October 2007

7.3 Administration and Secretariat

The Secretariat manages the administration of the CCEPP and is provided by the Australian Government¹⁴. The CCEPP Secretariat is responsible for the efficient operation of CCEPP business including collation, circulation and maintenance of documentation; arranging CCEPP meetings and their agendas; preparing meeting records, minutes and action lists for each of the Affected Parties; and preparing reports for NMG.

The Secretariat, in conjunction with PHA, must ensure that all participants of a CCEPP have signed the appropriate documentation regarding confidentiality prior to participation in meetings. For additional information on confidentiality and the Confidentiality deed poll, refer to section 6.

8. Meetings

The CCEPP's role, from the EPPRD is:

*To effectively and efficiently co-ordinate the national technical response to an Incident, and to advise the NMG on matters related to an Incident in accordance with this Deed.*¹⁵

The CCEPP has a pivotal role in:

- determining if the Incident relates to an EPP;
- recommending a response be implemented or otherwise;
- ensuring the Response Plan is technically appropriate;
- reviewing progress of the response; and
- the development of consistent communication strategies.

This work is done through the medium of meetings. The term 'meeting' in this context can mean:

- email;
- teleconference;
- video link; or
- face to face meeting.

The primary focus of these meetings is the review and analysis of complex technical, policy, regulatory and industry data to construct recommendations on EPP status, feasibility, implementation of a response and confirmation of eradication.

Sections 8.4 and 8.5 as well as *Appendix 1* give some guidance on items for discussion during CCEPP meetings. Whilst there are a number of phases in a response to an Incident¹⁶ the core information required by CCEPP relates to before and after the endorsement of the Response Plan.

8.1 Incident notification/convening

The basis for convening the CCEPP is the detection of a Plant Pest or Vector confirmed or reasonably believed to meet the definition of an EPP. Under the EPPRD once a jurisdiction becomes aware of the detection of a possible EPP formal notification must be given to the Chair of the CCEPP (the ACPPO) within

¹⁴ EPPRD schedule 8 part 3.5

¹⁵ EPPRD schedule 8 part 2.1

¹⁶ PLANTPLAN section 3

24 hours¹⁷. Failure to notify within this timeframe may lead to a situation where the jurisdiction receives no payment for their actions in relation to the detection¹⁸.

The formal notification to the ACPPO occurs through the CPHM of the relevant jurisdiction. The notification may be provided orally but must be confirmed in writing in the form agreed by the Parties¹⁹ - through completion of a Preliminary Information Data Sheet (PIDS) (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan). This is sent to the Secretariat for immediate distribution to all members. Once the ACPPO has been notified and Affected Industry Parties identified, the Secretariat will then notify the CCEPP of the Incident.

There is no requirement that a PIDS must be available before the CCEPP is notified of the Incident or the meeting is convened. If there are factors such as urgent information or action requirements relating to a new Incident then the initial meeting may be held prior to the PIDS being completed and distributed. In this instance the Secretariat will make relevant information available to members prior to the meeting.

When convening a meeting the Secretariat should communicate with the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to ensure their availability.

8.2 Quorum

There is no minimum number of members (quorum) required to be in attendance before the CCEPP can conduct its business. The definition of 'Consensus'²⁰ and Schedule 8²¹ indicates that if a Party who is eligible to be present was invited appropriately and is not present, then the CCEPP is still properly constituted and can make a decision.

8.3 Decision making

The CCEPP makes decisions based on 'Consensus', defined in the EPPRD as:

"...in respect of a decision to be taken on an issue, that none of those persons present when the decision is taken are opposed to it, although:

- persons present during the discussion may have expressed contrary views;*
- achieving the consensus may have required a measure of compromise to ensure a workable outcome;*
- some may abstain from participating in the decision; and*
- some entitled to be present may not be present"*²²

While CCEPP should make every attempt to reach a decision by Consensus to a single view, where this cannot be achieved a Consensus decision can be made by the CCEPP to present more than one view or course of action to the NMG²³.

¹⁷ EPPRD clause 4.1.1 and in clause 1.1 definition of "Formal Notification to the CCEPP"

¹⁸ EPPRD clause 4.2.1

¹⁹ In clause 1.1 definition of "Formal Notification to the CCEPP"

²⁰ In clause 1.1 "those persons present" and "some entitled to be present may not be present"

²¹ Decisions by Consensus

²² EPPRD clause 1.1 Definition of 'Consensus'

²³ Part 2.2 of schedule 8

8.4 Initial meeting

The initial CCEPP meeting following notification of an Incident must be convened as soon as possible. The initial meeting of the CCEPP may be convened via an email meeting or depending on the needs of the CCEPP and Lead Agency, a teleconference/videoconference meeting may be convened in the first instance. There may not be sufficient information available at the time of the initial teleconference/videoconference meeting to formulate a Response Plan, or to make decisions about the status of the EPP or feasibility of eradication, however the following can occur:

- provision of assistance to the Lead Agency with advice on diagnostics, delimiting surveillance, extent of industry, quarantine etc;
- assurance to other Parties that necessary actions are occurring whilst diagnostics and other information are being finalised;
- advice to all Parties on international and interstate trade implications;
- advice to Industry Parties on actions and information that can be discussed with their members; and
- communications as necessary for the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to enable a consistent and agreed message to be used to inform industry, community, the media and other stakeholders. This will occur through the consideration of industry specific communication and the development of nationally agreed talking points (refer to section 8.10).

A list of issues that should be discussed or considered in the context of the initial CCEPP teleconference meeting is outlined in *Appendix 1* and may spread over a number of meetings depending on availability of information. The main items are:

- Summary of initial diagnostic results and what additional tests are required – CPHM of the Lead Agency.
- Summary of survey information and quarantine action at the property, tracing investigations and intrastate movement controls – CPHM of the Lead Agency.
- Advice on whether the pest has been identified in Biosecurity Plans (BPs) or is an EPP categorised under the EPPRD – PHA.
- Details of the biology of the pest/pathogen including its host range, economic impact and opportunities for eradication – CPHM of the Lead Agency.
- Communication requirements of Affected Parties – all members.

8.5 Subsequent CCEPP meetings

The information presented at subsequent CCEPP meetings will vary depending on the stage that the response has reached. A comprehensive list of possible information and issues that may be covered is outlined in *Appendix 1* of this Guideline.

8.6 Agenda

There is a standard CCEPP meeting agenda (*Appendix 2*) that can be amended as required and made available to members by the Secretariat. Within the dictates of a response to an Incident, members should receive sufficient notice to allow them to access any required information, as well as make changes to the agenda if necessary.

8.7 Papers

All papers and other documentation required for CCEPP considerations will be made available to members through the Secretariat uploading to the Biosecurity Portal CCEPP site, which forms the repository for all documentation related to each Incident notified to the CCEPP

(portal.biosecurityportal.org.au/Pages/CCEPPLanding.aspx). Papers should be forwarded to the Secretariat in time for them to be uploaded or distributed giving members sufficient time to consider the information and their actions. This means where possible at least 2 business days prior to a meeting. As with the agenda it is important for members to be able to access information within their jurisdiction/industry that may relate to specific issues raised in meeting papers. Where papers are distributed immediately before a meeting the possibility of not reaching a decision is greatly increased.

The Lead Agency will provide a situation report as a standing paper prior to each in session (teleconference, videoconference or face to face) CCEPP meeting.

8.8 Minutes

The Secretariat is responsible for completing a record of CCEPP meetings and may record meetings to facilitate the writing of accurate minutes. Distribution of actions, outcomes and minutes arising from a meeting is critical to the effective and efficient response to an Incident. The Secretariat should aim to meet the following timeframes:

- Actions and outcomes within 2 hours of the CCEPP meeting
- Draft Minutes within 1 business day of the CCEPP meeting
- Final Minutes within 2 business days of distribution of the draft minutes

To assist with the above timelines as well as CCEPP understanding of the actions and outcomes, the Chair should provide a brief summation of actions and outcomes at the end of each meeting.

These timelines also impact on members. If members wish to comment on draft minutes before they become final they must comment within the timeframe unless a request for an extension is provided to the Secretariat. If no comment is received, then members will have agreed to the final minutes and may not request further amendments.

To assist members awareness and tracking of progress made to address action items from previous meetings, a consolidated actions list will be maintained by the Secretariat and a summary should be provided at the beginning of each meeting of the status of action items.

8.9 Advice to NMG

NMG is the decision making authority for the commencement and cessation of eradication responses under the EPPRD and the cost-sharing arrangements that apply. Information on the roles and responsibilities of the NMG are provided in the [NMG job card](#).

The CCEPP advises the NMG in relation to Incident notifications and responses including providing recommendations on whether a response should proceed based on considerations of the technical and economic feasibility of eradication. The timing of this advice will depend on the status of the Plant Pest or Vector and the phase of the EPP response.

The initial matters for the CCEPP to address in its advice to the NMG are the diagnosis and impacts of the Plant Pest or Vector, its delimitation and likelihood of eradication. Recommendations from the CCEPP to the NMG must contain sufficient evidence and analysis to allow the NMG to reach an informed decision. For example, a recommendation that the Incident involves an EPP should detail the reasoning/EPPRD definitions/biology behind it. A recommendation to undertake a response or a request for approval for a Response Plan will be based on discussion within the CCEPP and will be provided to NMG as soon as practicable.

If there is insufficient information available to fully determine the extent of the Incident the CCEPP may recommend to the NMG that a phased Response Plan be implemented, with the inclusion of robust trigger points to manage any uncertainty at the early stage of the response. An indicative budget may be included for the first phase of the response only in the first instance and revised to include subsequent phases once further information is known regarding the extent of the Incident and response activities required to eradicate the EPP.

PHA has responsibility for developing the NMG paper relating to Cost Sharing and funding of the Response Plan. This paper provides all relevant details relating to Cost Sharing and financial limits specified in the EPPRD.

NMG will meet at the earliest time possible, having regard to the stage of the response and the matters for consideration. For example, an initial NMG at the outset of a response may proceed with some urgency with subsequent meetings regarding the ongoing response being arranged on an as needed basis. Where possible, papers should be provided to the NMG Secretariat for distribution at least 2 business days prior to the subsequent meetings regarding a response. It is recognised that during an emergency response NMG may need to proceed on the information available at the time.

Plant Pests or Vectors for which the CCEPP agrees to take no action will be notified to NMG in a biannual out of session paper in January and July. This paper will be drafted by the Secretariat and approved by the CCEPP, prior to submission to the NMG.

8.10 Public information

8.10.1 National talking points

To facilitate rapid communication, national talking points should be developed and agreed to as soon as possible following the detection of an EPP to ensure that a common message is used by all Affected Parties. These should be sufficiently detailed to meet the communication requirements of Affected Parties. The National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) Chair/Secretariat and the Lead Agency will coordinate the development of draft national talking points. Where talking points are not drafted by the NBCEN, the relevant Affected Industry Parties may develop their own draft national talking points for approval by the ACPPO. Talking points will typically be drafted either prior to or immediately after the CCEPP teleconference meeting; however, Parties may initiate their development anytime following the notification of the Incident.

All CCEPP members have a role in providing input into the development and review of draft national talking points. Where possible draft talking points must be distributed by the NBCEN Secretariat for immediate comment by NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties. NBCEN members are expected to consult with their respective CCEPP members to coordinate feedback from their Parties. All draft national talking points will be approved by the ACPPO, with the final approved version distributed by the NBCEN

Secretariat to NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties, and by the CCEPP Secretariat to CCEPP members, with an aim to distribute and use on the same day as the meeting.

Media releases from each Affected Party and resulting media from interviews should be shared with all members of the CCEPP prior to release and should be coordinated as much as possible to enable consistent public messaging.

8.10.2 Industry specific communications

During CCEPP meetings there will be an opportunity for discussion on industry specific communications so industry representatives are aware of what information is appropriate to use when discussing the response to an Incident with their members, as well as to propose messages that they would like to share with their members and should therefore be included in the draft national talking points.

8.11 International notification

The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is a multilateral treaty under the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. The IPPC requires contracting parties to cooperate in the exchange of information on plant pests, particularly the reporting of the occurrence, outbreak or spread of pests that may be of immediate or potential danger, in accordance with such procedures as may be established by the Commission. The ACPPO, as Australia's official contact point for the IPPC, is responsible for ensuring that these obligations for pest reporting are met.

To comply with reporting requirements the CCEPP will be asked to consider draft notifications to the IPPC during the course of an Incident. This is a standing agenda item for meetings and may include Incidents that don't proceed to eradication depending on the significance of the Plant Pest or Vector to Australia's pest status and its impact on trade. In the event of successful eradication the CCEPP will be asked to consider a draft notification to the IPPC advising the eradication of the EPP.

Additionally depending on protocol requirements, international trading partners may require notification of changes to Australia's plant health status. This is the responsibility of the Australian Government and not a role of the CCEPP.

8.12 Other considerations

8.12.1 Face to face meetings

Although currently emails, followed by videoconferences or teleconferences, are the most common methods of 'meeting' for the CCEPP, response debriefs have shown that consideration should be given to face to face meetings. At the beginning of a response to an Incident or at pivotal times during a response it has been found valuable to hold a face to face meeting which includes a field trip to the area/property affected by the EPP. By seeing the spread of the EPP and noting how and where it affects the host crop, situational awareness will be improved and members may be more able to determine the best possible response.

9. Scientific support and seeking advice

9.1 Scientific Advisory Panel

If the CCEPP requires advice on a particular aspect of a response, the default approach is to convene a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) unless there is an existing industry or government mechanism through which the matter can be adequately addressed. A SAP covers complex technical issues which may relate to pest biology, feasibility of eradication, surveillance, destruction, response strategy, recovery or any other area in which the CCEPP requires advice to inform technical considerations or decision making.

The SAP is chaired by PHA and comprises specialists with expertise from the required field. It is critical that SAP nominees are appropriately skilled to address the advice required. It may be appropriate for international experts or experts from non-EPPRD scientific organisations to be nominated on a SAP. In this case confidentiality and potential market access implications need to be carefully managed. Representation from all Affected Parties is by self-nomination and not obligatory. More than one SAP may be required if the advice requires input across different technical areas and therefore requires a different set of skills from nominees.

If a SAP is required then the CCEPP will develop specific questions (terms of reference) for the SAP to address. The SAP makes recommendations to the CCEPP against the terms of reference and the CCEPP will then consider these in conjunction with other aspects of the response such as policy, financial and other technical information. These are recommendations only and the CCEPP is not obliged to accept them. Once the CCEPP has reached a decision on the recommendations provided by the SAP the Secretariat will inform the SAP through the Chair of the SAP on what the outcome(s) were, and the reasons behind them.

Further details on a SAP can be found in the [Scientific Advisory Panel job card](#).

9.2 Plant Health Committee subcommittees

The CCEPP may seek specialist advice from a Plant Health Committee (PHC) subcommittee due to their skill set and responsibilities in plant health policy and technical matters. Where this occurs, requests for advice must be provided directly from the CCEPP to PHC to then action through the subcommittee, with clear terms of reference to be agreed by the CCEPP. PHC would be responsible for managing timely completion of the task and provision of advice back to the CCEPP.

9.3 Diagnostics

Information on laboratory standards for sampling procedures, protocols for transport, diagnosis and confirmation of EPPs as well as the engagement of overseas experts and chain of evidence is covered in PLANTPLAN and related documentation (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan) and must be followed by participating laboratories in all jurisdictions.

9.3.1 Protocols

Where available, IPPC protocols or endorsed National Diagnostic Protocols should be used to test samples. The CCEPP will consult with the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics (SPHD) to determine if such a protocol exists or is going through the validation process. If such a protocol does not exist then SPHD will advise on the existence of any international or draft procedure to be used. Any diagnostic protocol developed throughout the Incident should be provided to SPHD to progress through the national approval process.

When a National Diagnostic Protocol does not exist or a new/alternative protocol to the current National Diagnostic Protocol is considered more appropriate for diagnosing the EPP, SPHD can rapidly endorse an Emergency Diagnostic Protocol for use in the EPP response. Information on the submission and endorsement process can be found in the SPHD Reference Standard 3 available from: plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resources

9.3.2 Timely provision of information

Laboratory results should be provided by State/Territory or Australian Government laboratories to the Lead Agency CPHM in writing and as rapidly as possible. The Lead Agency CPHM will provide them to the Secretariat who will disseminate the results to members of the CCEPP as soon as possible.

9.4 Surveillance

Where available, nationally approved surveillance protocols should be used for delimitation and to determine if the EPP is present in other areas/jurisdictions. The CCEPP will consult with the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS) to determine if protocols exist or to request assistance in determining the appropriate level of surveillance for specific EPPs. PLANTPLAN and relevant documentation (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan) provide guidance for delimiting surveys and zoning around infested, contact and suspect premises for use when planning and conducting surveillance activities.

Where CCEPP endorses a surveillance protocol under a Response Plan, consideration should be given to referring the protocol to SNPHS as a candidate as an agreed protocol for future use.

9.5 International experts

The CCEPP should consider early in the Incident if there is a need to engage international expertise to inform aspects of the response. In its considerations the CCEPP should address effective management of confidentiality and market access sensitivities.

9.6 Research and development activities

As part of a Response Plan the CCEPP may identify research needs and facilitate and monitor completion of research projects. Such projects may include urgent research necessary to progress diagnostics and support surveillance and proof of freedom. Research and development activities may also form part of a revised Response Plan for Transition to Management. In terms of ownership of information and Intellectual Property any research carried out as part of a cost shared Response Plan is not considered the property of an individual or jurisdiction.

The release of any research carried out as part of a cost shared Response Plan requires the consent of the CCEPP.

9.7 Working groups

The CCEPP may convene a concise working group to complete a specific task (e.g. support development of the response strategy and/or specific elements of the Response Plan) or provide advice on non-scientific/technical matters. Where the CCEPP seeks to form a working group to provide advice on a specific matter, clear terms of reference, membership and reporting timelines must be established by the CCEPP.

Appendix 1 Information to be included at CCEPP meetings

This information is for guidance only. Topics and issues suggested may run across a number of meetings or not be necessary depending on the nature and length of the response.

First meeting of the CCEPP (Section 8.4)

(The initial meeting should be held as soon as possible after the detection of a suspect EPP so not all necessary information is likely to be available and some may be addressed at subsequent meetings.)

Confirm that representatives of Parties and observers have signed an appropriate confidentiality deed.

The required information for presentation at the first meeting will include:

- Lead Agency²⁴
Details of information available on the suspect EPP and actions taken to date, including:
 - biology of the suspect EPP including host range and economic impact,
 - diagnostic results including any additional work required,
 - surveillance information,
 - establishment of quarantine zones and/or intrastate movement restrictions, and
 - trace back and trace forward analysis.
- PHA
Whether the pest has been categorised or identified in Biosecurity Plans.
- Australian Government
International trade implications.
- States/Territories
Domestic trade implications.
- Affected Industry(ies)
Advice on industry extent, distribution or other aspects as required.

Issues to be discussed during the meeting include:

- Are all Affected Industry Parties represented on the CCEPP?
- Is there a diagnostic protocol available and what further diagnostics and/or support from other jurisdictions are required to confirm the suspect EPP?
- Are changes to the current quarantine arrangements relating to the affected site required?
- Is additional information required on the likely extent of dispersal (biological and mechanical) of the organism for establishment of quarantine zones?
- Has tracing (trace back and trace forward) been conducted? Is more required?
- Should additional delimiting surveys be commissioned to define the extent of the outbreak?
- Should targeted surveys be commissioned based on information from trace back and trace forward?
- Should consistent wider state/territory surveys be commissioned to confirm pest presence/absence?

²⁴ A situation report will be provided by the Lead Agency as a standing paper prior to each CCEPP meeting

- What is known about the effectiveness of controls (germplasm, chemical, or other management controls)?
- Should further information on controls used overseas be gathered and the availability of chemicals in Australia be investigated?
- Should treatment or destruction of host material be undertaken?
- Does the pest meet the definition of an EPP, or is it included under schedule 13 of the EPPRD?
- Is it possible to consider opportunities for eradication and whether it is feasible to eradicate the EPP or is more information required?
- Is technical advice required through engagement of international expertise or through the formation of a SAP?
- How will communication be coordinated at the Australian Government, state/territory government and industry levels?
- Development of talking points and possible media releases and coordination of media communications.
- Preparation of information for NMG.

Meeting of the CCEPP following confirmation of an EPP

(Note that information may come from CCEPP requests for advice from SAPs, working groups or PHC subcommittees if convened)

The following information will be presented:

- Situation Update from the Lead Agency including²⁵:
 - confirmation of diagnosis,
 - summary of methods and extent of dispersal of the organism,
 - summary of actions taken to secure the affected site,
 - summary of delimiting survey around affected property,
 - summary of targeted survey based on trace back and trace forward information,
 - analysis of possible pathway of entry based on trace back information, and
 - information on effectiveness of controls overseas and availability of pesticides/chemicals/other control methods in Australia.
- Summaries from other CCEPP members
 - summary from initial surveys in other states/territories,
 - summary of international trade restrictions and recommended actions, and
 - summary of responsibilities to develop agreed communication strategies at the Australian government, industry and state/territory level.

The anticipated issues that need to be addressed at this meeting of the CCEPP include:

- Should the confirmation of diagnosis be accepted and a new incursion formally recognised?

²⁵ A situation report will be provided by the Lead Agency as a standing paper prior to each CCEPP meeting

- Consideration of the overall response strategy and validation of the strategy through a SAP or other means.
- Is further delimiting surveillance (possibly Australia-wide) required to determine absence/presence and to support domestic/international trade?
- Are there appropriate quarantine measures in place to adequately secure the affected site?
- What should be the size of the quarantine zones surrounding affected sites and what movement controls if any should be applied to intrastate movement of hosts?
- What interstate restrictions are in place for movement of plant and plant products from the affected area?
- Should information be sought on pest free area and disinfestation requirements for current and potential international markets?
- What processes will be undertaken to ensure availability of effective controls (e.g. importation of germplasm, approval for emergency use of non-approved chemicals)?
- Should removal/destruction of affected plants take place at this stage?
- Summary of information for use in cost/benefit analysis on consequences of establishment.
- Is eradication technically feasible?
- Should a cost/benefit analysis be commissioned to assist with a final decision on eradication?
- Is additional advice required on specific aspects of the response that cannot be obtained through CCEPP members? Should a SAP be convened and/or is international or other expertise required?
- What frequency should situations reports be provided?
- Should a Response Plan be drafted? Should a small working group of CCEPP members and/or experts be formed to assist in the drafting process? Consideration should be given to a phased approach to the Response Plan if all required information has not yet been gathered to determine the extent of the Incident and response activities that will be required.
- Where a Response Plan is drafted, triggers for review of the Response Plan and expectations on the frequency of expenditure reporting should be considered by the CCEPP.
- The preparation of a recommendation and information for NMG.
- Development of talking points and possible media releases and coordination of media communications.
- Is there a need to meet face to face or via videoconference?

Subsequent meetings of the CCEPP

The content of subsequent meetings can include any of the above issues not already resolved as well as situation updates from the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties. Further information needed at these meetings will be determined by whether a Response Plan is implemented and how it progresses.

If a Response Plan is implemented and it is subsequently determined that the EPP is no longer feasible to eradicate, the CCEPP will consider if a Cost Shared Transition to Management program is required and achievable in a time period not exceeding 12 months. If Transition to Management is considered to be appropriate (i.e. a gap has been identified) the CCEPP should consider the scope and objectives of Transition to Management and potential activities that may be included in the revised Response Plan. If the NMG approves the advice of the CCEPP that the emergency response should enter a Transition to

Management Phase, the CCEPP will provide input into (and review of) the revised Response Plan drafted by the Lead Agency in collaboration with Affected Industry Parties.

If the EPP is no longer feasible to eradicate the CCEPP may also advise the NMG on options for alternative arrangements outside of the EPPRD.

Appendix 2 Agenda template for CCEPP meetings

Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests: <PEST name> AGENDA	
Teleconference Number:	Date:
Location:	Time:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Presenter</i>
1. Opening <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Welcome and roll call Confidentiality requirements²⁶ Papers distributed prior to meeting Purpose of meeting Actions from previous meetings 	Chair
2. Situation Update <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jurisdiction report Diagnostics Trace forward/back Surveillance Future actions 	Affected jurisdiction
3. Deed consideration <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPP Technical feasibility of eradication Response Plan development (including response strategy) 	Chair/members
4. Movement and trade issues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade implications Quarantine and movement controls 	Chair/members
5. Communication <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Talking points Industry communication IPPC notification 	Chair/members
6. Suggested advice/recommendations to NMG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advice on pest occurrence EPP status and feasibility of eradication Acceptance of Response Plan as endorsed by CCEPP Communication matters 	Chair/members
7. Other business	Chair
8. Summary of CCEPP actions and outcomes	Chair
9. Next Meeting	Chair

²⁶ Note: All CCEPP meeting participants must have completed a Confidentiality Deed Poll available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf

10. Close	
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Delimiting surveys

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 10 of PLANTPLAN (V1.0 Nov 2011). Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. Figure 8 removed.
2.0	1 Dec 2015	All	Guideline developed from Delimiting surveys SOP (V1.0 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS). Approved by SNPHS August 2015. Endorsed by Parties November 2015.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist plant health staff/field officers to plan and conduct delimiting surveillance for suspect Emergency Plant Pests (EPPs). While survey methodology and operating procedures will need to be prepared that are specific to the suspect EPP and host crop, this document provides general information that can be used to inform development of such procedures.

2. Application/Scope

Data collected from surveys will be used to identify the first quarantine zone known as the Restricted Area (RA), which comprises all properties where the organism has been confirmed (Infected Premises (IPs)),

properties which have come into direct or indirect contact with an IP or infected plants (Contact Premises) and properties which may have been exposed to the EPP (Suspect Premises).

The size of the quarantine zone will be determined by a number of factors, including the location of the incursion, the climatic conditions at the time, the biology of the EPP and the proximity of the IP to other IPs.

Trace back and trace forward information will be used to define the RA. A buffer zone or Control Area (CA) is established around RAs to control the movement of susceptible hosts and other regulated materials until the extent of the incursion is determined.

3. Critical Issues

There are a number of critical considerations that must be taken into account when planning and conducting delimiting surveys:

- Delimiting survey methodology should be nationally consistent and allow for the confident identification of the boundaries of an area considered to be infected by or free from an EPP.
- Appropriate record keeping.
- Appropriate containment and labelling of suspect EPP samples collected during the survey and establishment of a chain of evidence (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Chain of Evidence* standard operating procedure).
- Adherence to disinfection and decontamination protocols (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).
- Training of personnel prior to entry to the site.
- Safety of staff is considered at all times and all relevant Work, Health and Safety (WH&S) legislative requirements are followed.
- Availability of resources including personnel and equipment.
- Availability of a National Diagnostic Protocol for accurate diagnosis of the suspect EPP.

4. Resource equipment

Equipment that may be required for a delimiting survey could include, but is not limited to:

- road and farm vehicles
- GPS loggers and/or 'smartphones' running with appropriate software
- radio communication equipment
- sampling and hygiene equipment including laminated guides to assist identification of hosts and symptoms
- hygiene equipment (e.g. disinfection agents – refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines)
- recording systems
- protective clothing and any other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), as required.

5. Description of activities

5.1 Delimiting surveys to identify restricted and control areas

5.1.1 Survey design

A survey strategy will be planned with reference to appropriate confidence limits based on the following information:

- pest biology – survival, reproductive rate, spread and dispersal and influence of environmental factors
- host plant – extent of host range, distribution of hosts around RAs and CAs, significance of growth stage of hosts
- survey and sampling methods – ease of symptom recognition, sampling strategy (this should take into account the area of expected occurrence)
- quality of data collected based on numerous factors e.g. credibility of those collecting, ability to collect/inspect representative samples, suitable training and support materials and integrity of the samples collected
- a predictive analysis of areas where the pest is likely to occur
- expected prevalence of the pest if unrestricted
- biometric methods to specify the different confidence limits for targeted and general surveillance.

Note: The above does not represent a definitive list; some surveys may require the sourcing of more information than presented above, while others may require less. Where possible the survey should be nationally consistent and calculation of confidence limits based on best available information. Responsibilities for planning surveys will differ in each jurisdiction and will be dependent on the purpose.

5.1.2 Trace back, trace forward interviews

A questionnaire will be developed to obtain some or all of the following information, depending on the requirements of the pest and the response:

- the details of planting material (such as species, size, numbers, age of plants, material type - potted, cuttings etc and source material), including when and where sourced from
- destinations of plants and plant products which have moved from the property
- location of properties which share equipment and people
- movement pathways of contracted farm labour and of contractors who have recently worked on the property
- access to any records kept by the business or domestic property owner or occupier
- movement pathways of commercial apiarists (if relevant)
- hosts that are present on the property and nearby
- other visitors to the property (including but not limited to friends, family)
- people or equipment (on the property or that have been on the property) that have recently been known to be in contact with the host, or known pest areas elsewhere
- observation of any signs/symptoms of the pest on the property.

5.1.3 Planning and resourcing

A range of tasks will be conducted around planning and resourcing to ensure consistent, effective and appropriate surveillance is conducted, including but not limited to the following:

- Survey teams and leaders will be appointed, and identification tags arranged for these personnel if required, as well as authorities under relevant Acts.
- Training sessions on surveillance programs will be run. This training will include what to look for (signs/symptoms, damage and host identification, including where appropriate, provision of a laminated guide); how to collect, label and pack samples and record sampling points and property visits; WH&S requirements, and communications for consistent messaging.
- Teams will also be trained on relevant jurisdictional plant biosecurity legislation and surveillance officer powers and limitations, introduction statements to property owners and on decontamination practices for entry and exit from properties (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).
- Use of survey equipment will be demonstrated and deployment of teams with vehicles arranged.
- The process for recording time inputs and the cost of consumables will also be explained.
- A Quality Assurance (QA) system will be designed and implemented to check the operation and recording of results by surveillance teams.
- A national diagnostic protocol (if not already developed) will be designed, and laboratories will be recommended for consignment of samples.

The personnel responsible for managing and undertaking these tasks may differ based on the jurisdictions conducting them and the requirements of each response.

5.2 Methods for initial wider surveillance

Surveys will be carried out to check for the presence of the pest outside the RAs and CAs.

5.2.1 Survey design

A nationally consistent survey strategy will be developed that may be based on, but not limited to the following information:

- pathways for movement of the pest
- pest biology – survival, reproductive rate, spread and dispersal and influence of environmental factors
- host plant – extent of host range, national distribution, area, significance of growth stage of hosts linked to climatic zones
- survey and sampling methods – symptom recognition, sampling strategy
- expected prevalence of the pest if unrestricted
- biometric methods to specify the different confidence limits for targeted and general surveillance
- timeframe available and required for surveying.

5.2.2 Planning and resourcing

A consistent surveillance and diagnostic program across production areas in Australia will be developed. Planning and resourcing considerations described in 5.1.3 will also apply to surveys conducted outside the RAs and CAs.

5.2.3 Approval process by Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests

The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) will consider/approve the proposed initial national survey (scoping survey), timeframe and proposed budgets from state(s)/territory(s) and incorporate this into a paper for consideration by the National Management Group (NMG).

5.3 Confirmatory surveys to identify the Restricted Area

5.3.1 Survey design

National information from initial surveys and trace back and trace forward interviews will be reviewed, and extended surveys may be planned incorporating:

- nationally agreed survey and sampling protocols and laboratories responsible for diagnosis - these will already have been developed for delimiting surveys
- improvements on the design for the initial survey – incorporating trapping grid for pests which respond to lures
- nationally agreed process for costing surveys and for recording results
- survey rosters, routes and methods of survey for feral hosts on survey route
- a QA system to check the operation and recording of results by surveillance teams.

5.3.2 Establishment of surveillance teams

The number of surveillance teams and resource requirements will be determined. Refer to section 4 for additional information regarding equipment requirements.

Surveillance team leaders and members will be appointed. These teams will be trained in:

- communicating with and dealing with the public, including communication and publicity statements and material to be used/disseminated for awareness for consistent messaging
- the use of equipment (including WH&S issues)
- WH&S in the field
- methods for identifying suspect plants/pests
- methods for sampling from plants, and packaging, labelling and sending samples (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines)
- correct use of data recording tools such as mapping, GPS, data fields, the types of comments to record, and what data fields mean
- decontamination and disinfestation protocols for entry and exit from properties (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines)
- methods for replacement of lures/traps etc
- survey rosters and end of day operations including delivery of results, samples and any comments
- demonstrate use of survey equipment and arrange for its deployment to teams with vehicles
- use of Powers under relevant Acts
- documentation and administration requirements.

5.4 Confirmatory surveys to identify pest free areas where hosts are not considered to be infected

Once the RAs and CAs have been defined, surveys will be required to identify areas which remain free from the pest. Interstate quarantine regulations may require the affected state(s)/territory(s) to justify area freedom status for unaffected production areas.

International trading partners which identify the pest in their phytosanitary regulations will also normally require justification of pest free areas.

Surveys will usually need to conform to the requirements listed in the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) – International Standard Phytosanitary Measure number 4 which specifies that the area must be free of the EPP as demonstrated by scientific evidence.

5.4.1 Design of survey

The Lead Agency (and if required other states/territories) will work with industries through the CCEPP to identify production areas requiring pest free status. The survey design will be consistent with nationally agreed protocols and the Chief Plant Health Manager will seek endorsement of CCEPP prior to commissioning the survey.

Information from the initial survey and trace back/trace forward interviews will also be reviewed to help identify areas for confirmatory pest free area surveys and develop plans for confirming the status based on the following points:

- the definition of the area(s) in question
- detailed maps of the known commercial production areas
- survey methods for locating feral host plants
- agreed confidence limits for detecting the organism
- laminated guides to assist identification of hosts and symptoms
- methods of survey and sampling based on the biology and dispersal of the organism, its predicted unrestricted distribution, host range, and known distribution
- design of trapping grid for pests which respond to lures
- description of survey intensity designed to satisfy agreed confidence standards
- plans for the deployment, management and sampling of sentinel plots or plants
- nationally identified laboratories responsible for diagnosis
- nationally agreed process for costing surveys and for recording results
- QA systems to minimise error.

General surveillance systems that are already in place should be documented as part of this process as these will contribute to evidence of area freedom.

5.4.2 Establishment of surveillance teams

The number of surveillance teams and their resource requirements will be determined. For information regarding equipment requirements refer to section 4.

Surveillance team leaders and members will be appointed. Training will cover the same details as described in section 5.3.2.

5.4.3 Deployment of sentinel plots, plants and lures (if required)

Sentinel plants and lures will be identified and deployed for surveying pest free areas if required. Recommendations will be made for the preferred location of sentinels and lures at agreed sites to optimise detection of the pest.

The purpose of the sentinel program will be identified, the cooperation of property owners will be sought to "host" sentinel plants, and the GPS location of sentinels/lures will be incorporated into the mapping database. An appropriate method will be used to identify sentinel plants and all surveillance teams will be trained in the management and sampling of sentinel plants and in the replacement of lures.

The following property information will need to be collected as a minimum:

- name of property owner (or leasee) and/or name of property manager
- contact details (phone, fax, e-mail) of owner and/or manager
- postal and street address including lot number (if appropriate)
- map and/or GPS reference points
- sketch map of property which identifies area, driveways, paddocks, blocks within paddocks, buildings and geographical features
- details of any linked or shared properties and lease arrangements.

The following information should be recorded on survey forms:

- date (day/month/year)
- block number within paddock (as identified on property map)
- estimated area of the block
- survey protocol (e.g. x plants within y row)
- variety, growth stage and special methods of production.

The following information should be recorded on labels of samples taken during a survey:

- date (day/month/year)
- identifying number which is linked to a number on the survey form
- host and variety
- GPS location
- name/position of person collecting the sample.

6. Appendices

Appendix 1 Property survey form

LOCATION AND PROPERTY DETAIL

District: _____

Survey round: _____

Property ID: _____

Plantation/block ID: _____

Address (lot number): _____

Owner/manager: _____

Business name: _____

Telephone: _____

Fax: _____

E-mail: _____

Access comments: _____

SURVEY RECORD

Variety/crop: _____

Developmental stage: _____

Row and sampling plan: _____

Area to be sampled: _____

Arrival time: _____

Departure time: _____

Block ID and size	Row number	Number of plants in the row	Number of plants with symptoms present	Location of affected plant	Sample taken and identifier

Diagram of block in relation to position on farm and estimated distribution of pest incidence and severity

Name and signature of property owner/manager _____ Date _____

Name and signature of surveyor _____ Date _____

Appendix 2 Minimum data standards

To be inserted

Appendix 3 Terms and definitions

Term	Definition	Definition source
Contact Premises	Premises (or locality) containing susceptible host plants which are known to have been in direct or indirect contact with an Infected Premises.	PLANTPLAN
Control Area	An area around the restricted area where movement is controlled but not restricted. The area is intended to reduce likelihood of the Plant Pest spreading beyond the Restricted Area.	PLANTPLAN
Infected Premises	Premises (or locality) at which an EPP is confirmed or believed to exist.	PLANTPLAN
Pest Free Area	An area which a specific pest is known not to occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained.	PLANTPLAN
Restricted Area	A relatively small area (compared to a Control Area) around an Infected Premises that is subject to intense surveillance and movement controls. <i>Note:</i> Movement out of the area will, in general, be prohibited, while movement into the area would only be by permit. Multiple Restricted Areas may exist within one Control Area.	PLANTPLAN
Suspect Premises	Premises (or locality) containing plants which may have been exposed to an EPP and which will be subject to quarantine and intense surveillance.	PLANTPLAN

Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two SOPs. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. "Purpose" added.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	Guideline developed from SOP (V1 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostic Standards (SPHDS). Approved by SPHDS October 2014. Endorsed by Parties November 2014.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a framework for diagnosticians to follow when receiving samples of suspect Emergency Plant Pests (EPP) for diagnosis. In all cases the laboratory standard operating procedures (SOP's) should be followed where applicable.

2. Critical issues

Correct identification is central to effective control of pests and diseases and for the detection of new EPPs. Initial identification should have the highest priority and follow (in order of precedence):

- IPPC protocols
- National Diagnostic Protocols
- Peer reviewed published procedures
- Best practise diagnostic techniques.

Chain of evidence protocols shall be followed at all times (see *Chain of evidence SOP*). The appropriate quarantine containment must be used for the sample being examined.

3. Initial diagnosis of suspect EPPs

Initial examination will be carried out by an experienced general diagnostician (e.g. pathologist/entomologist) within the agricultural department in the state/territory in which the sample was obtained. Once an initial examination has been undertaken a specialist may be engaged to carry out further diagnosis. A confirmatory diagnosis will also be undertaken by another laboratory.

3.1 Examination of symptoms by Lead Agency Diagnostic Laboratory

- Check the condition of the plant/pest to determine if it is suitable for testing. New samples should be requested immediately if the submitted sample is not suitable for testing.
- Note and record the integrity of the sample on the sample submission form.
- Digital images of symptoms and other features should be recorded.
- When initial examination indicates a high likelihood of an EPP, the sample and all digital and physical evidence (e.g. slides, DNA etc) will be kept appropriately labelled and securely stored following chain of evidence protocols (see *Chain of evidence SOP*).
- The diagnostician will observe decontamination protocols (e.g. remove laboratory coat for sterilisation, wash hands, disinfect instruments and area – see *Disinfection and decontamination guidelines*).

3.2 Initial diagnosis by specialist

- The Lead Agency will organise additional samples for testing, if required.
- Diagnosis should be carried out within a quarantine containment facility, consistent with the requirements of the pest being examined.
- Initial conclusion on diagnosis and test results should be conveyed to the submitting Diagnostic Laboratory and CPHM of the Lead Agency and only to them.
- Once diagnosis has been completed the sample should be appropriately labelled and securely stored.
- The specialist should preserve and record all digital and physical evidence (e.g. slides, DNA etc.) which supports the initial diagnosis, ensuring it is appropriately labelled and securely stored.
- The specialist will observe decontamination protocols.

3.3 Confirming diagnosis

- The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) will select a second national laboratory with the expertise for independent confirmation of the result. The CCEPP will ensure the laboratory has the appropriate quarantine containment.
- The sample will be forwarded under strict quarantine conditions with the appropriate Movement Permits from the Lead Agency CPHM to the diagnostician with an explanatory letter, observing packaging and transport guidelines (see *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines*).
- In the event that a second national laboratory cannot be located, the CCEPP may identify the requirement for an overseas expert to assist with diagnosis. Note: Selection criteria should cover availability, ease of communication and industry links.

- The Lead Agency CPHM will engage the overseas expert and confirm all arrangements for consignment of samples (e.g. paperwork required, special quarantine requirements of the importing country, payments, international courier arrangements), preferred diagnostic tests for isolation and identification of the target pest, and confidential reporting of results.
- The Lead Agency CPHM will notify the Australian Chief Plant Protection Office (ACPPPO) of the proposed movement of samples and manage any internal and international movement permits and other legislative requirements.
- The Lead Agency CPHM will negotiate any financial transaction(s) for the proposed work and confirm a pathway for confidential reporting of results.

4 Surveillance diagnosis

Samples collected from surveys will need to be tested to confirm presence of the pest. Diagnostic procedures/protocols contained in contingency plans, response plans or surveillance plans for the specific pest should be followed if available.

In the absence of predetermined plans, the CPHM will liaise with the specialist to design guides for diagnosis of samples from surveys for other diagnosticians that will be processing samples. The guides may include:

- validated tests (with quick turnaround time) for isolation of pathogen
- a standardised recording system for results of each sample
- a quality assurance (QA) system for checking veracity of results.

4.1 Training diagnosticians and technical staff

A specialist technical working group may be required to plan and implement training protocols for diagnostic labs covering:

- methods of selecting samples to maximise detection of the pest
- the selected tests for identification of the pest
- methods of recording information relating to a case and chain of evidence requirements.

5. References

Diagnostic protocols for some EPPs can be found on the web:

- IPPC protocols: <https://www.ippc.int/core-activities/standards-setting/ispm>s
- National Diagnostic protocols: <http://plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resource-hub/protocols/national-diagnostic-protocols/>
- EPPO protocols: published in EPPO Bulletin: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1365-2338](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1365-2338)

Disinfection and decontamination

Revision history

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2.0	1 Dec 2015	All	V1.0 (Dec 2013) reviewed by the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS). Approved by SNPHS August 2015. Endorsed by Parties November 2015.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist diagnosticians and surveillance field officers to safely and appropriately disinfect and decontaminate equipment and personal items in contact with suspect Emergency Plant Pests (EPPs). Please note that this document covers general information on disinfection and decontamination principles and that specific operating procedures will need to be developed to ensure that disinfection and decontamination methodology, chemical use and general hygiene methods are relevant to the suspect EPP, host crop and risks associated with a particular activity.

2. Critical issues

There are a number of critical considerations that must be taken into account to achieve effective disinfection and decontamination of equipment and personal items when dealing with suspect EPPs:

- Appropriate use, decontamination and disinfection of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other resources/equipment.
- Containment/packaging procedures for samples and disposal methods for infected material.
- Use of the appropriate disinfectant for the particular suspect EPP.

- Safety procedures for the use of chemicals:
 - All disinfectants applied to skin must be safe for use on skin/registered for this purpose and used in accordance with directions.
 - Any disinfectants used must also have inhalant risk assessments carried out.
 - Safety Data Sheets for specific disinfectants should be referred to.
- Resources taken into a contaminated area must only be those that are necessary to perform duties and/or can be disinfected after use. Cameras/mobile phones etc. can be placed in a zip-lock bag where the item can still be used without removing and the container can be disinfected.
- Decontamination procedures for leaving the site including the following considerations:
 - Set up the decontamination site prior to entering the property. Do not re-enter a vehicle or the clean area until decontaminated adequately/decontamination process completed. Work Health and Safety, PPE and decontamination must be implemented according to risk and in accordance with local instructions.
 - Park all vehicles out of the contamination zone where possible. If this is not possible, alternatives must be investigated prior to the activity so to minimise risk of contamination/spread, e.g. wash-down facilities on the site.
 - Drainage and disposal of contaminated waste water and/or chemicals for each site.
- Training of personnel in disinfection and decontamination procedures prior to visiting the site.

3. Hygiene and disinfection

The following hygiene and disinfection elements should be taken into consideration prior to and during work on the site:

- Select and set up a personal decontamination site in the 'clean area' bordering the 'dirty area' before entering the property. It must allow staff to be able to exit without re-entering a contaminated or potentially contaminated area.
- A line can be used to mark the 'clean area' and the potentially 'contaminated/dirty area'. Use a tarp in the 'clean area' to place equipment on. Position equipment for:
 1. Entry,
 2. Use on the 'dirty side' (including spare gloves, boot covers etc.), and
 3. Use on exit.
- Ensure disinfectants and equipment for personal decontamination are ready for use before entering the contaminated area. A scrub tub (which must be an appropriate size and depth to enable personnel to stand in) filled with an approved cleaning solution diluted with water as per manufacturer's instructions and approved chemical spray bottles must be prepared and ready to use, as well as brushes and wipes etc, and soap and water appropriate for skin. Some disinfectants can pose inhalant risks so appropriate risk assessments must also be carried out.

3.1 Personal protective equipment

Appropriate use of PPE is critical to prevent spread of EPPs between contaminated and non-contaminated sites. Procedures should be developed for decontamination, disinfection and disposal of PPE that are relevant to the suspect EPP, and personnel should be trained in their use. Consideration should be given to the following points:

- Disposable overalls and gloves should be worn when sampling infected material on site. Boot covers or cleanable rubber boots are advisable. Put on protective clothing in the 'clean area' before entry.
- Some equipment, such as boot covers and disposable gloves may wear quickly. Therefore it may be appropriate to wear two pairs and take a spare into the 'dirty area', if needed.
- PPE should be properly worn, ensuring all hair is covered and overalls, gloves, boot covers are sealed/held in place with duct tape.
- Once sampling is complete, remove all contaminated items and clean or double bag them prior to leaving the decontamination site. When removing PPE; where possible the gloves, overalls, boot covers etc. should be carefully rolled back, turning them inside-out.
- All disposable items (gloves, head covers, boot covers, overalls) should be double bagged and disposed of as per quarantine requirements. When double-bagging, each bag needs to be decontaminated after sealing.
- Footwear should be either removed and bagged, or thoroughly cleaned and disinfected before leaving the property.
- Scrub soil off the base of footwear before stepping into a disinfection bath containing an appropriate disinfectant (e.g. Virkon, chlorine solution, Phytoclean).
- Disinfect hands and exposed areas, then wash hands, face and disinfected skin in clean water with detergent or soap.

3.2 Portable equipment

All equipment that is brought onto the site must be decontaminated and disinfected according to appropriate procedures. The following points should be considered:

- Ensure that soil, plant material and other large contaminants are removed in the decontamination process, prior to disinfection.
- Disinfect implements immediately after use with an appropriate disinfectant (e.g. Virkon, Phytoclean, 80% v/v ethanol or 0.5% v/v available chlorine solution), as appropriate. Ensure an appropriate contact time to achieve required disinfection.
- Equipment will ideally be disinfected on-site; however if this is not possible then it must be securely bagged for later disinfection before leaving the property. When double-bagging, disinfect each bag after sealing.

3.3 Samples

Samples should be managed in accordance with the *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines. Consideration should be given to the following:

- All samples should be securely packaged as required, with at least one layer of suitable packaging applied in the contamination zone.
- The samples packaged within the contamination zone should be sealed and decontaminated, adding the next layer of packaging when in the decontamination area.
- Samples should be labelled with a marker as appropriate. Be aware that if they are marked on external bags, some cleaning solutions will remove the markings in the decontamination process, so the internal bag/container should be marked.

4. Large equipment and vehicles

Large equipment and vehicles must be decontaminated prior to leaving a site that is known to be contaminated with a suspect EPP. As this requires a significant commitment of resources and time, it will be important to consider deployment of the equipment in the first place.

Nationally agreed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) from Animal Health Committee are available on the following website and provide additional information on decontamination of large equipment and vehicles:

www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/emergency-animal-disease-preparedness/nasops/

5. Resources/equipment

The standard kit includes equipment that may be required for the investigation of a suspect EPP and includes relevant equipment to ensure appropriate decontamination and disinfection:

- ground sheet/tarp
- disposable overalls
- waterproof footwear e.g. gumboots
- boot covers (if required)
- suitable, sturdy plastic bags for waste/contaminated items of appropriate sizes
- clear sealable plastic bags for paperwork and other small items such as camera/mobile phone
- disposable gloves: latex (non-chemical resistant), nitrile or/and chemical resistant (nitrile is advisable as are generally stronger and pose less allergen risk)
- chemical resistant gloves
- duct tape
- suitable respiratory protection
- eye protection (for sun protection and/or chemical use)
- ear protection
- sun protection – cleanable hat, sunscreen
- drinking water
- disinfectant suitable for the PPE, as necessary
- buckets, at least 10L each
- foot bath, large enough to stand in and fracture resistant
- tools for cleaning boots, e.g. brush, hoof pick etc
- plastic scrubbing brush and nail brush
- hand-held spraying bottles
- water, minimum 20L (10L containers)
- disinfectants specific for the potential pest
- measuring jug
- soap and/or detergent
- disposable towels

- wipes
- paper towel
- face and hand wash bowl
- sampling equipment
- sample bottles and sealable bags
- labels
- secateurs
- waterproof markers
- scissors
- signage (if required)
- cordoning tape (if required)
- camera/mobile phone
- data collection documents and equipment such as pens etc (if required)
- cable ties, or similar
- first aid kit
- authorised inspector identification card
- appropriate Standard Operating Procedure for the pest
- GPS device
- insect spray – e.g. quick knockdown action.

National talking points

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1.0	30 Nov 2017	All	New document developed by Plant Health Australia in collaboration with Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network Chair/Secretariat. Endorsed by Parties November 2017.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	Section 3.3	Minor update to reference inclusion of relevant situational information, response strategy details and information on counselling and support services available. Endorsed by Parties November 2018.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) Parties on the purpose, use and process for the development of national talking points during a response to an Incident¹ under the EPPRD. Guidance is also provided on the type of information which may be included in national talking points, with further detail on potential content included in the *National talking points* template².

¹ Where the term 'Incident' is used throughout this document, it refers to the occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an uncategorised Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).

² Available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

The process for development and approval of national talking points that is described in this document is consistent with that described in PLANTPLAN.

Capitalised terms (excluding names) used in this document are a reference to the defined terms in clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

2. Purpose of national talking points

The purpose of national talking points is to provide nationally agreed and timely information about an Incident, that can be used by Affected Parties both proactively and reactively when communicating to stakeholders and the wider public. Approved national talking points form the basis of the information used when developing media releases, website content as well as in other public information materials and for industry/community engagement activities. Information about an Incident that is not contained in the national talking points should not be communicated to those outside of the Affected Parties, unless it has been agreed by those Affected Parties.

When a suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) is detected, there is often a need for Affected Parties to provide information to stakeholders and the wider public quickly and effectively. This can include important information about how to identify and report suspected EPPs, advise the status of the Incident and how stakeholders and/or the wider public may be impacted. As there are often a number of Affected Parties communicating to their members through a variety of mechanisms, it is critical that the messages are nationally consistent and where possible coordinated to be released at the same time. The development of national talking points addresses these needs by providing a set of consistent and nationally agreed key messages. These messages can be used by media spokespeople and to develop other public content such as newsletters, website content and to address face-to-face meetings.

The specific content and level of detail in the national talking points will be driven by the specific information the Affected Parties need to communicate to stakeholders and the wider public. This may vary from one Incident to another and will be dependent on the nature, extent and stage of the specific Incident.

National talking points are typically developed for active Incidents that are under consideration by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP)/ National Management Group (NMG) or for which an agreed Response Plan is in place. They are also developed to accompany the Biannual Report from the CCEPP to the NMG for Incidents in which the recommendation is for no further action under the EPPRD (as they either do not relate to an EPP or relate to an EPP that is not feasible to eradicate). This enables Affected Parties to communicate consistent messages about the outcome of consideration of these Incidents under the EPPRD, for which government and industry may then develop awareness material to inform affected growers.

3. Process for development of national talking points

The development and approval of national talking points must be managed quickly to meet tight media deadlines and enable key awareness messages to be communicated to stakeholders and/or the wider public, as early as possible following the detection of an EPP.

3.1 Drafting national talking points

Any Affected Party can initiate the development of national talking points at any time following the notification of an Incident to the CCEPP. The general practice is for the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (through the Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network (NCN) Chair/Secretariat) and Lead Agency to jointly develop the draft national talking points, either prior to or immediately following a CCEPP teleconference being convened. Where national talking points are not developed by the NCN Secretariat/Lead Agency, an Affected Party may develop the initial draft talking points or request (through the CCEPP) that they be developed and put forward key messages they would like to be included.

All Affected Parties have a role in providing input into the development of national talking points. Key points to be covered in the talking points should be raised by CCEPP members, ideally prior to the initial draft being developed. If a CCEPP meeting has been scheduled, key points for inclusion should be raised prior to or at the CCEPP meeting to ensure specific information is included to support effective communication with stakeholders. A standing agenda item for industry communication is included in CCEPP meetings and provides industry with the opportunity to discuss industry specific communications and propose key messages that they would like to share with their members and should therefore be included in the draft national talking points.

Once developed the draft national talking points are distributed by the NCN Secretariat for immediate comment by NCN members and Affected Industry Parties. Industry Parties should nominate their relevant communication manager (where available) who will receive the talking points and coordinate their organisation's input or feedback. Where a communication manager is not available, the CCEPP representative for the Industry Party will be included on the NCN distribution list and may provide input to the talking points. A cut off time for feedback will be stated when the talking points are emailed. In most cases turnaround time is short due to the urgent need to get information out to growers and affected stakeholders.

Once the NCN member receives the talking points they are expected to consult the CCEPP member to discuss any required changes or feedback.

Once the feedback is received by the NCN Secretariat, the relevant changes are incorporated. It should be noted that not all changes are made or accepted. This is because, on occasions, feedback is conflicting, inconsistent, or the change has already been addressed by another Party. The NCN Secretariat uses best judgement to collate the changes, and to ensure that the information is correct and written in an appropriate style for the intended audiences. The NCN Secretariat will seek technical advice where necessary.

3.2 Approval of national talking points

Following the incorporation of feedback, the draft is sent to the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACPPPO) for approval. Once approved by the ACPPPO, the NCN Secretariat distributes the national talking points back out to the NCN and Affected Industry Parties. The CCEPP Secretariat also provides a final copy to all CCEPP members for their use.

3.3 Content of national talking points

The content and level of detail that is covered in national talking points will depend on the nature, extent and stage of the Incident as well as the specific information that Affected Parties need to communicate. The content can be as detailed as required to meet the communication needs of the Affected Parties. Detailed information on the potential content including standard headings and text is provided in the *National talking points* template (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan). In general terms, national talking points will typically cover the following:

- Up to date information on the current situation at the level of detail required to support stakeholder engagement.
- The actions being taken in response to the detection, including information on the underpinning response strategy being implemented. If required, a summary of data may be included to provide an indication of the scale of the response, effort involved in responding to the Incident and progress being made on specific activities (e.g. data on the number of samples collected, traces completed, surveillance events conducted, plants destroyed etc). This information will evolve as the response progresses through updated versions of the national talking points.
- Information to help growers and the public identify, prevent the spread of, and report the pest or disease.
- Any trade and market access restrictions.
- Information on counselling and support services provided by the relevant jurisdiction and nationally (if relevant).
- Standard information about the CCEPP, NMG and EPPRD. Where to get further information.

While talking points should contain specific information about the Incident, they should not contain information that would identify an individual or property, for example, the property name or street address. Whilst the suburb or region in which the detection(s) have been made is typically specified, consideration should be given to whether this is appropriate, as for some industries this level of detail may risk the identity of property owner(s) being revealed. Talking points may convey key decisions on the response course of action that have been agreed by the CCEPP or NMG; however, information regarding individual opinions or details of the discussions held by Affected Parties must not be included.

Parties should remember that national talking points need to be written in a conversational, non-bureaucratic tone. Sentences should be kept short and must be free of acronyms, technical jargon and words in brackets. Common names for pests or diseases should be used, with the scientific name also noted within the document. Long terms used throughout the document can be shortened after being used once. For example, 'Cucumber Green Mottle Mosaic Virus', can be referred to as 'the virus'.

It is important not to use numerous website addresses and phone numbers. In most cases the Outbreak website (outbreak.gov.au) should be used. This website is a portal for people to also access individual state/territory or industry website information. If using a state/territory website the web address should have a short, direct URL for example, dpi.nsw.gov.au/xvirus.

The Emergency Plant Pest Hotline 1800 084 881, should always be used in national talking points, regardless of whether the Lead Agency for the response has a separate number.

3.4 Updating national talking points

National talking points should be updated regularly so that content remains current and relevant. At a minimum, they should be updated when there are major changes to the situation or when key milestones of a response are achieved (for example completion of eradication activities). National talking points should be regularly updated for Incidents in which an agreed Response Plan is in place, even if there are no major changes to the situation or response activities. At a minimum, they should be updated annually to reflect that the response activities are ongoing and no triggers for review of the Response Plan have been met.

The process for updating national talking points is the same as when they are first developed. Any Affected Party may request that the talking points are updated, and identify the content that needs to be changed/added. The NCN Secretariat will typically then update the content and circulate to the NCN and Affected Industry Party contacts for review. After being updated and approved by the ACPPO, the national talking points are then circulated to the CCEPP for their use.

4. Use of national talking points

Approved national talking points can be used by Affected Parties to develop their own communication content/products including EPP industry alerts³, fact sheets, website and newsletter content. However, the national talking points should not be distributed in their current form as a document of the CCEPP.

The information contained in national talking points can also be used proactively by media spokespeople (e.g. during interviews) or to guide Parties on key messages that can be communicated during industry/community engagement activities (e.g. grower/industry meetings). In some cases, information about an Incident may not be released publicly, but national talking points are developed as a preparedness measure in case, for some reason, the Incident creates public or media interest.

If information needs to be communicated outside of the Affected Parties, it must be restricted to key messages contained within agreed national talking points.

National talking points are also used by the NMG or CCEPP to develop communiques during the course of an Incident.

Where possible, communications should be coordinated between Affected Parties to enable consistent public messaging. Media releases, for example, should be shared with all Affected Parties prior to release so that they can be coordinated as much as possible. For consistency of messaging, communications with the media will be restricted to the delegated media contacts within Affected Parties.

³ An EPP alert template is available as a supporting document to PLANTPLAN planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
draft	dd mm 2014	All	New guideline document incorporating Normal Commitments previously agreed by all Parties.
1.0	2 Sep 2014	-	Presented to Parties for consideration in May and August 2014. Document endorsed.
2.0	3 June 2016	2, 4 and 5	Updated to include PHA normal commitments. Restructure of document to separate Cost Sharing Parties from custodial role Endorsed by Parties at the May 2016 EPPRD meeting.

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1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to outline the agreed Normal Commitments of Parties under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) in support of decision making prior to and during a Cost Shared response.

2. Background

In establishing and signing the EPPRD, Parties agreed that they would “*work to determine existing and required resource commitments and to define the costs that a State or Territory considers to be ‘normal’ and which should be considered as a baseline above which other costs are to be shared*” (clause 14.1.2). These costs, termed ‘Normal Commitments’ would be considered as baseline and not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD.

Normal Commitments under the EPPRD were endorsed by Parties to the EPPRD in May 2008 (Industry framework) and May 2012 (state and territory framework). Normal Commitments are yet to be developed for the Australian Government.

3. Terms and definitions

Term	Acronym	Definition
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	CCEPP	<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
Cost Sharing		<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
Emergency Plant Pest	EPP	<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
First Contact Functions		Functions and actions carried out by an Affected Party associated with the First Contact Premises of an actual or potential EPP Incident. These activities are Normal Commitments and are conducted so as to provide the CCEPP with sufficient information to initiate formal national response activities.
First Contact Premises		All suspect or known Infected Premises (IPs) as identified up to and including the day of first notification of the EPP Incident to CCEPP, plus any premises known or subsequently found to have direct linkage to those IPs, where that linkage has potential to spread the EPP.
National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group	NMG	<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
Normal Commitments		Activities undertaken by EPPRD Parties that are considered by the Parties to be normal, and therefore not eligible for Cost Sharing under a Response Plan.
Project Management Transition		The point at which some Normal Commitments can be Cost Shared as a consequence of emergency response activities transitioning to a longer-term, dedicated eradication program. This can occur at the determination of the NMG.

4. Normal Commitments for Cost Sharing Parties

Normal Commitments of each Cost Sharing Party are determined in part by their different responsibilities and roles under the EPPRD, with each agreed framework containing two elements:

- **Principles** that define the agreed assumptions and basis through which the Normal Commitments of a Party is determined (refer section 2.1).
- A **Normal Commitments benchmark** which define the specific capability and capacity that comprises Normal Commitments, above which would be eligible for Cost Sharing. These define the specific EPPRD functions subject to Normal Commitments and a performance benchmark for delivery of each function. Government and Industry Parties have different Normal Commitments benchmarks.

4.1 Principles for Normal Commitments

The principles for Normal Commitments are identical for both government and Industry Parties and are consistent with those developed for the National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA) and the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA).

(a) Scope of Normal Commitments

The scope of Normal Commitments includes only the capability and capacity necessary to respond to an EPP in a manner and extent consistent with the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.

It is recognised that Parties have broader responsibilities in plant health separate to the EPPRD and these are not affected by this principle.

(b) Costs of Normal Commitments

The costs of meeting Normal Commitment obligations are not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD, regardless of how the obligations are met. Reasonable costs of Response Plan activities that exceed Normal Commitment obligations are eligible for Cost Sharing, regardless of how those activities are undertaken.

(c) Obligation to maintain capability and capacity

EPPRD Parties have an obligation to maintain the capability and capacity to respond to suspect or confirmed EPPs promptly and appropriately.

(d) Response in the national interest

EPPRD Parties must respond to EPP Incidents in the national interest, recognising that state/territory Parties cannot contravene their jurisdictional responsibilities under legislation and the Australian Constitution.

(e) Obligation for personnel to meet EPPRD requirements

EPPRD Parties will act in good faith to ensure their personnel and stakeholders understand and meet their responsibilities under the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.

(f) Obligation to have access to necessary resources

All Parties will take reasonable steps to enable them to access any resource necessary to implement their obligations under a Response Plan.

This recognises that the Normal Commitment obligation under the EPPRD binds the 'whole of government' or 'whole of industry'. Therefore, EPPRD Parties should make arrangements to enable them to draw upon key resources when necessary and where possible. This may involve resources within or beyond their direct jurisdiction. Costs arising from this may or may not be eligible for Cost Sharing, and this would be determined in accordance with the Normal Commitments benchmark.

(g) Incident Definition Phase

Subject to specified exceptions, activities required during the Incident Definition Phase, prior to endorsement of a Response Plan, are to be treated as Normal Commitments.

Normal Commitments benchmarks will define which activities could be considered for Cost Sharing at different stages. In addition, the use of short term Response Plans to cover early phases of a response (as endorsed by EPPRD Parties in October 2006), are subject to the Normal Commitments benchmark.

(h) Normal Commitments throughout a response

Some Normal Commitment functions will apply through all phases of an EPP response.

Normal Commitments benchmarks will define activities that are Normal Commitments throughout a Response Plan, and therefore not eligible for Cost Sharing.

(i) Transparency to other Parties

EPPRD Parties will provide transparency to other Parties on their ability to meet the agreed Normal Commitments.

This is expected to comprise periodic independent assessment and reporting.

4.2 State and territory government Parties

The following table defines state and territory government Party Normal Commitments and includes the following elements:

- **EPP functions** - The functions required to detect and respond to and manage suspected or confirmed EPP Incidents.
- **Base line capacity** - The ability to perform EPP Functions expressed in terms of outputs and outcomes (specifying quantity, quality and duration as appropriate), not how functions are delivered. This is the Normal Commitment for a given EPP function.

Each jurisdiction should ensure their Normal Commitments can be met by identifying arrangements within their jurisdiction to meet the Normal Commitment, and addressing identified gaps.

EPP Functions	Base line capacity
Reporting systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness programs are in place to promote reporting • Internal systems ensure incidents are reported and promptly communicated to the Chief Plant Health Manager. • Give Formal Notification to the CCEPP within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident.
Investigation of suspect or confirmed EPP incidents and activities undertaken during Incident Definition Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and deploy sufficient resources to investigate and contain all suspect or confirmed EPP Incidents commencing on the day of notification to the Chief Plant Health Manager including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Field visit/s to undertake investigations, collect and transfer necessary samples and information to establish the nature of the Incident. ○ Investigations to initially delimit the extent of the EPP and the restricted and control areas. ○ Liaison with federal, state, local government, industry and other organisations.
Tracing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake all tracing activities, consistent with the First Contact Function test, to identify movement of plants, plant products, people or any other objects which may cause the spread of the EPP. <p>For the avoidance of doubt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This also applies to tracing activities when new jurisdictions are implicated in an EPP Incident. • Applies also to a new detection within the first jurisdiction where it is determined that it is not linked or traced to the first outbreak.
Surveillance (refer to ISPM 5 Glossary of Phytosanitary Terms and ISPM 6 Guidelines for Surveillance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake Preliminary Detection Surveys consistent with the First Contact Function test, for all potentially affected areas within confidence limits agreed by CCEPP. These are surveys that aim to determine whether or not the pest is widespread. <p>For the avoidance of doubt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensive Pest Detection Surveys and Delimiting Surveys may be Cost Shared when required by the CCEPP and included in the agreed Response Plan. These

EPP Functions	Base line capacity
	<p>are surveys that aim to delimit the extent of the pest to a defined confidence level.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Surveys undertaken to demonstrate pest freedom in non-risk areas are not eligible for Cost Sharing under a Response Plan. CCEPP will determine which areas are risk and non-risk areas in relation to the EPP Incident.
Quarantine and movement restrictions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the capability and capacity to implement quarantine measures as required under jurisdictional legislation including the ability to declare Pest Quarantine Area zones. Undertake all quarantine activities to contain the EPP within the Pest Quarantine Area, consistent with the First Contact Function test.
Compliance and Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the capability and capacity to implement compliance and enforcement activities required to contain the EPP. Undertake all compliance and enforcement activities to contain the EPP within the Pest Quarantine Area, consistent with the First Contact Function test.
Diagnostic services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain access at all times to diagnostic services to undertake initial screening and/or diagnosis of potential EPP's or unknown pests. Undertake all diagnostic activities consistent with the First Contact Function test, including confirmation diagnosis (i.e. confirmation of a new occurrence of an EPP and independent confirmation as needed). Maintain the capability to activate and oversee large scale diagnostic services for significant industry sectors in the jurisdiction. Laboratory services used are approved to meet national standards as defined in PLANTPLAN where necessary (equipment and facilities) and other relevant national laboratory standards, where necessary. Nationally standardised diagnostic procedures are used where available. Collection and submission of samples to laboratories follows a documented process as described in PLANTPLAN (standard operating procedures <i>Collection and transport of Emergency Plant Pests</i>).
Notifications / communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare and distribute all notifications required under PLANTPLAN, EPPRD and state/territory legislation (e.g. ACPPO, Data sheets, Pest Alert). Prepare and distribute all progress reporting and public communications relating to the EPP Incident until the Project Management Transition (e.g. Incursion Incident Reports, Progress Reports, media releases). Take all reasonable steps to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction (including public and private plant health personnel and public and private laboratories) advise that government Party within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident.
Legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain effective legal and legislative arrangements to manage emergency responses in an effective and timely manner. Undertake all legislative functions and ensure the appropriate legal framework is in place to undertake all elements of a response.
Control centres and infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the capability to establish a State Coordination Centre (SCC) and Local Control Centres (LCCs) at short notice, including provision of the physical facility for the duration of the response. Additional infrastructure may be Cost Shared, and this must be outlined in approved Response Plan.
Personnel (Refer to EPPRD Clause 8.2 – National EPP training)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skilled and trained personnel are available to conduct field investigations, diagnosis and response activities.

EPP Functions	Base line capacity
program and national data base of accredited personnel) (Refer PLANTPLAN – responsible officer who update list of staff for key positions and provides this to ACPPO).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key functions and roles at SCC and LCC are allocated to trained personnel, where possible, and a list of personnel is maintained and provided to Plant Health Australia (PHA) for inclusion in the national database. Lead Agency(s) to provide staff to establish and operate an SCC and all LCCs until a Response Plan is agreed by NMG. Representatives on CCEPP and NMG have relevant training and are provided and supported for decision-making throughout any EPPRD activity. Representatives provided to serve on a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) when possible and required (their salary costs would not be eligible for Cost Sharing).
Chemical use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chemical Standards Branch (or equivalent) provide training, accreditation, appropriate authorisations, and any other activities as required by relevant state legislation.
Financial systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systems are in place for preparation of budgets and capture and reporting of financial information as required by Clauses 10 and 12 of the EPPRD. Jurisdiction Financial Management Preparedness Plan is in place. Oversight of financial management by a management accountant is provided throughout the response.
Information systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the ability to establish information management systems consistent with agreed national policy and operational plans (e.g. PLANTPLAN, BioSIRT or equivalent). Undertake emergency response information management requirements consistent with the First Contact Functions test.
EPP Response Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare an EPP Response Plan within a timeframe agreed by CCEPP.
Scientific advice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the ability to obtain scientific advice, assessments of potential impact (including economic and social), epidemiological analysis, and any other technical justification of activities. Provide scientific advice to the CCEPP. <p>For the avoidance of doubt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incidental costs for SAP participants could be Cost Shared under an agreed Response Plan.
Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systems and capability in place to enable audits and reports on progress of response (including efficiency and financial audits). Maintain the ability to conduct debriefs consistent with PLANTPLAN.

4.3 Commonwealth government Party

(pending development and parties' endorsement)

4.4. Industry Parties

The following table defines the Normal Commitments for Industry Parties and includes the following elements:

- Responsibility** – Summary of EPPRD responsibility.
- EPPRD reference** – Relevant clause reference to EPPRD (or PLANTPLAN).
- Description of responsibility** – Note that this is a summary only. For the full and technically accurate explanation the relevant EPPRD Clause should be consulted.

- **Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment** – The definition of what is to be considered a Normal Commitment (not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD) and what is above that (eligible for Cost Sharing).
- **Guidelines for implementation** – generic guidelines providing practical suggestions for how this might be implemented by an Industry Party.

Each Industry Party will meet their EPPRD obligations in a way appropriate to their industry. It was proposed that these requirements are implemented via the mechanism of Industry Biosecurity Planning and that an industry should have a standing budget item in their annual business (or R&D investment) plan to meet these commitments.

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
Admission of Parties to the EPPRD	Clause 3.2	Existing Parties to vote on the admission of a new Party to the EPPRD within 6 months of that Party's application.	-	-
Rapid reporting of Emergency Plant Pests	Clause 4.1.2	Take reasonable steps to advise industry of the obligation to notify the applicable State or Territory authority within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident.	Periodic communications with industry participants on the need to report potential EPP Incidents, and method for reporting.	-
Use of qualified personnel	Clause 8.2	The Parties must	Personnel are allocated against EPPRD roles who are:	-
	Part 2 of Schedule 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wherever possible use people trained / accredited under National EPP Training Program. Take appropriate steps to have personnel trained under that program. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Available at short notice. Are suitably skilled and knowledgeable (based on experience and/or training) to understand and perform their designated EPPRD role/s (below). Have completed and be accredited under the National EPP Training Program where possible. 	-
	Clause 11.4.2(b)	Roles include:	AND	-
	Schedule 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industry Liaison Officers (ILO) / Industry Liaison Coordinator/s (ILC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have significant knowledge of the affected industry sector or region Are provided throughout the Incident Definition Phase (after this stage ILO/ILC roles or backfilling of their pre-Incident roles could be considered for Cost Sharing) 	-
	Schedule 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NMG, CCEPP and Categorisation Group representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> See also "Participate in consultation and decision-making processes" (below). 	-
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Other key groups or individuals likely to be involved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not specified in EPPRD. Best practice would be to ensure key support or advisory personnel (not otherwise identified) are appropriately skilled and/or knowledgeable for EPPRD functions. 	-

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
Participate in consultation and decision-making processes	Clause 11 Clause 11.4 Schedule 8	Annually nominate properly authorised Industry Party Representatives in writing Participate effectively in consultation and decision-making processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All participation in EPPRD decision-making as necessary. Industry organisation has internal systems in place to authorise personnel to act in designated roles. NMG Representative is able to be authorised to commit funding through a Response Plan. Nominations for EPPRD roles are provided to PHA annually. All nominated Representatives have signed a confidentiality deed poll. Arrangements are in place to enable internal communication between Representatives and their organisation and stakeholders. Representatives are available and appropriately briefed for all meetings in which the industry is an Affected Party or Relevant Party. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advise PHA in October of each year using templates provided. Provide nominees for NMG, CCEPP, Categorisation Group and Industry Liaison Coordinator/Officer roles. If appropriate, provide nominees for SAPs (e.g. for expertise available to the industry). Nominees could be authorised using appropriate delegations for the roles (e.g. a Board delegation to authorise NMG Representative). Best practice would be to have a succession plan for key roles, including backup personnel nominated and available for EPPRD roles specified above.
Ensure personnel participate in accordance with EPPRD terms	Clause 15.1	Parties must ensure their personnel who participate in EPPRD functions do so in accordance with the terms of the EPPRD. This could include establishment of policies and procedures or training among other things.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Parties will have appropriate arrangements in place for personnel who may participate in any EPPRD function (as described in this Normal Commitments framework). 	This framework is intended to act as a checklist for EPPRD functions, and provide guidelines on what arrangements might be needed. However each industry and peak organisation will vary and appropriate arrangements should be developed by each Party to implement this framework.
Protection of confidential and personal information.	Clause 27 Clause 29	Protection of personal and confidential information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrangements for personnel and decision making include provisions for protecting confidential and personal information as outlined in the EPPRD. 	-

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORC)	Clause 9.2 Schedule 6 (Part 4)	PHA to work with the Parties to define the basis for calculating crop specific ORC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best practice is to provide information to PHA to ensure ORC arrangements are current. 	EPPRD requires PHA to consult with Parties in developing the guidelines (Part 4, Schedule 6).
Cost Sharing, Funding and Accounting for a Response Plan	Clause 9	Meet initial costs arising from involvement in a Response Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain sufficient financial capacity to meet costs of involvement in a Response Plan (as described in this framework) by the industry representative body. 	Note that this is not expected to be any significant amount (if at all) in most circumstances, as most costs of a response are operational costs of the Lead Agency.
	Clause 10			
	Clause 12 Schedule 6 Schedule 7	Take steps to ensure that growers meet the Cost Sharing obligations of a Response Plan agreed by NMG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish a mechanism to enable the Industry Party share of costs to be funded. All steps needed to activate the levy at an appropriate rate are taken when required. 	Usually this involves establishment of a levy set at zero initially. If necessary, the Industry Party will need to take steps to activate the levy at an appropriate rate, and meeting requirements of the Commonwealth for underwriting if this is needed. A contingency fund is one option that could also be considered to increase financial capacity of the industry.
		Ensure accounting systems allow tracking of shared and non-shared costs incurred by the Industry Party as part of the response.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accounting system can track shared and non-shared costs of involvement in an EPP Incident and Response Plan. All costs arising from an implementation of a Response Plan (shared or not) are tracked and accounted for according to EPPRD. 	Financial management system allows participation in an EPP response to be established and tracked as a separate activity.
Commitment to Biosecurity and ongoing risk mitigation	Clause 13	The Parties have committed to ongoing Biosecurity and risk mitigation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development, implementation and periodic review of risk mitigation activities are ongoing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development and implementation of an Industry Biosecurity Plan (IBP). Implement action plans for appropriate elements of an IBP. Review and update IBP at least every three years (by participating in or commissioning IBP reviews).

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain PHA membership as a contribution towards generic Biosecurity systems development and risk mitigation activities. • Raise awareness of priority pests or other Biosecurity issues. • Increase awareness and use of on-farm Biosecurity practices. • Increasing preparedness for high priority pests through preliminary categorisation and contingency plans.
Industry communications	PLANTPLAN Section 3 and 4	Communicate with the industry as part of implementing the communication strategy in the Response Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the capacity and capability to communicate with the industry. • In an EPP Incident, conduct communications as agreed by CCEPP and NMG through all phases of the response. 	-

5. Normal Commitments for Plant Health Australia (custodian of the EPPRD)

The purpose of this framework is to outline the level of normal company operations ('Normal Commitments') for Plant Health Australia (PHA) in regard to the implementation of a Cost Shared emergency response under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD), clarifying what costs incurred by PHA would be funded by all PHA members (through subscriptions) or cost recovered under the Response Plan¹.

The purpose is not to identify every specific activity or action PHA may undertake in the course of responding to an incursion of a suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP).

Principles that apply to the PHA Normal Commitments

- **Scope limited to Cost Shared emergency responses under the EPPRD**

The scope of these Normal Commitments for PHA includes only those responsibilities associated with a Cost Shared emergency response under the EPPRD, and excludes all other responsibilities and programs PHA conducts as their normal company operations, including the ongoing maintenance and improvement of the EPPRD which is funded under the *EPPRD Management* and *EPP National Training* programs by all PHA members through subscriptions.
- **Parity between normal company operations and response activities**

Costs associated with EPPRD activities undertaken during the implementation of a Response Plan that are also undertaken as part of normal company operations as custodians of the EPPRD, will be funded by subscription funds and not be sought for Cost Sharing. For example, assisting Parties in the development or review of Owner Reimbursement Costs Evidence Frameworks, or managing the categorisation process.
- **Activities during the Incident Definition Phase**

Activities undertaken by PHA following notification of an incursion of a Plant Pest but prior to the endorsement of a Cost Shared Response Plan (the Incident Definition Phase) are considered normal company operations and are funded through the *Incursion Management* program (subscription funds) of PHA's Annual Operating Plan (AOP).
- **Salary and on-costs for existing PHA staff**

Salary and on-costs (such as superannuation) of existing PHA staff members fulfilling PHA responsibilities under the EPPRD/PLANTPLAN following the implementation of a Response Plan are funded through the *Incursion Management* program (subscription funds). For example, staff time for PHA representatives preparing for or participating on the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) or the National Management Group (NMG).
- **Transparency of total PHA costs associated with a specific Response Plan**

Total costs incurred by PHA associated with the implementation of a Response Plan under the EPPRD are tracked and reported to as part of the finalisation of costs incurred by Affected Parties for a Response Plan.
- **Review of PHA's normal commitments**

¹ Clause 9.7.1 specifies that while "PHA is neither a government Party nor an Industry Party, the principles of Cost Sharing will apply to costs incurred by it in respect of a Response Plan which are additional to its ordinary operating costs".

PHA's responsibilities and Normal Commitments are applicable for the current scope of the PHA's responsibilities and strategic direction and will be reviewed by PHA for ongoing appropriateness as required. Changes to the EPPRD, PLANTPLAN or PHA Strategy would trigger such a review.

Normal commitments across key areas of responsibility for PHA

PHA's normal commitments have been consolidated into four key areas of responsibility:

- *Providing support to Affected Parties:* A central part of PHA's role during an incursion as custodian of the EPPRD is to support Affected Parties in implementing the EPPRD/PLANTPLAN and meeting their requirements.
- *Personnel:* Appropriate skilled PHA staff are required (as specified under the EPPRD or PLANTPLAN) or may be asked to participate on committees and working groups formed during a response to an incursion
- *Cost sharing and financial management:* PHA has a number of key roles in the administration and monitoring of financial aspects of a Cost Shared response.
- *Evaluation:* Evaluation activities are an important aspect of any response, enabling Parties to continuously improve the EPPRD/PLANTPLAN and other biosecurity/emergency management related aspects.

Providing support to Affected Parties

- Provide advice on the application of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to Affected Parties and where required, facilitate obtaining legal advice on the interpretation of the EPPRD.
- Provide assistance in the development or review of key response documents, such as the Response Plan, CCEPP and NMG papers, and communication material.
- Facilitate access and distribution of existing training material to Affected Parties.

For the avoidance of doubt

Legal fees incurred by PHA in instances where the matter primarily relates to the response, with limited relevance or benefit to non-Affected EPPRD Parties, may be sought for Cost Sharing. Each instance will be considered by PHA regarding the broader benefit to all EPPRD Parties prior to claiming the costs.

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Qualification of personnel (clause 8.2.1)

Personnel

- Provide representatives on the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and National Management Group (NMG) that have relevant training and are provided and supported for through any EPPRD activity.
- Provide a chair and standing member for a Categorisation Group.
- Provide the chair for Scientific Advisory Panels (SAPs).
- Provide representatives to participate on SAPs or other working groups where appropriate.
- Provide a representative for the Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network (NCN).

For the avoidance of doubt

Incidental costs (such as travel costs) for PHA committee representatives incurred as a direct result of the implementation of a Response Plan may be sought for Cost Sharing.

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Personnel (clause 15), NMG (clause 11.1 and part 1 of schedule 8), Categorisation Group (part 4 of schedule 8), CCEPP (clause 11.2 and part 2 of schedule 8), SAP (PLANTPLAN)

Cost sharing and financial management

- Convene, chair, provide secretariat support and manage the process for categorisation where required to meet the requirements of clause 9.3 of the EPPRD.
- Manage the process to determine Funding Weights in consultation with Affected Industry Parties where required to meet the requirements of clause 2.2.4 of schedule 6 of the EPPRD.
- Coordinate the development and review processes for Owner Reimbursement Cost (ORC) Evidence Frameworks where required.
- Provide assistance to the Lead Agency in implementing the ORC frameworks and reviewing individual ORC assessments.
- Coordinate and collate claims for Cost Sharing during the course of a response, including the determination of total and final costs of a response.
- Provide assistance to Industry Parties regarding the establishment of a positive PHA or EPP Response levy.

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Principles of cost sharing (clause 9 and schedule 6), Funding a response plan (clause 10 and schedule 7), Accounting for a response plan (clause 12), ORCs (part 4 of schedule 6 and schedule 17), Categorisation process (clause 7 and part 2 of schedule 3)

Evaluation

- Coordinate and/or conduct EPPRD debriefs consistent with PLANTPLAN and related guidelines.
- Provide support to Relevant Parties to enable Efficiency Audits to be undertaken, including where requested by the NMG, managing the contract(s) for the Efficiency Advocate(s).

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Efficiency audits (clause 12.3 and schedule 11), Debriefs (PLANTPLAN)

Response Plan development

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	1 June 2018	All	New document developed by Plant Health Australia. Endorsed by Parties May 2018.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Full revision of document. Key sections/areas updated include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document control versioning Reference to inclusion of assumptions underpinning the aims and objectives, technical feasibility of eradication assessment and trigger points Clarification and/or addition of information on hosts and additional impacts in the current status of the Incident section Reference to the impact of the EPP and response strategy actions on industry and the community New section on host free period/fallow under the response strategy New section on key performance indicators/program milestones under Response Plan review Transition to Management – addition to list of activities that may be undertaken, reference to responsible Parties for delivery and social support mechanisms available Endorsed by Parties November 2018.
1.2	8 Dec 2021	Sections 5.1.8, 5.1.12.1, 5.2.6, 5.2.10.1	Addition of the requirement to include the position levels for the Lead Agency response organisational structure in the Response Plan. Details regarding indicative budget cost categories removed and replaced with reference to the <i>Financial Management of a Response Plan</i> guideline. Minor edits to correct cross references and update web links. Endorsed by Parties December 2021.
1.3	13 Dec 2022	All	Full review of document and following key amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clarification that a Response Plan may be developed for one or more EPPs. Removal of reference to ORCs only being Cost Shareable once a Response Plan is approved. Clarification that Transition to Management may exceed a 12 month period if the NMG agrees there are exceptional circumstances.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Clarification on how indexation (using CPI) is applied to the threshold above which a Financial Audit of a Response Plan is required. <p>Minor editorial changes for clarity.</p>
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1. Purpose

This guideline has been developed to assist Parties in developing and revising a Response Plan for a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD).

The intent of this document is to provide guidance on the appropriate structure and format for developing a new Response Plan and revising an existing Response Plan, in accordance with the requirements of the EPPRD (clause 6 and schedule 4), PLANTPLAN and any applicable Emergency Plant Pest strategy (contingency plan).

Once a response strategy has been determined, this information will form the basis for the content of a Response Plan. However, it is not the intent of this document to provide guidance on strategic or operational planning for an eradication response. The [Biosecurity emergency management response planning guide](#) and the [Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans](#) provide guidance on operational planning and response strategy development for EPP responses.

Note that capitalised words and terms (excluding names) that are used within this document are a reference to the defined words/terms within clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

2. Introduction

A Response Plan, as defined by the EPPRD (clause 1.1), is an integrated plan for undertaking a response to one or more EPPs that is developed in accordance with clause 6 and part 1 of schedule 4 of the EPPRD and subject to Cost Sharing under the EPPRD.

Response Plans are living documents and may be developed and updated at various stages of a response. The level of detail included in the plan will vary according to the nature, extent and stage of the Incident. For instance, a Response plan developed in the early stages when the extent of the Incident is not yet known might be quite a short document that is not yet comprehensively compiled

across all sections of the document. Once further information has been gathered, this Response Plan may be revised to be a whole of life Response Plan that has all sections comprehensively populated.

This guideline will support the development and revision of a Response Plan during each iteration, including revision to incorporate Transition to Management.

2.1 Development and approval

Response Plans are developed by one or more state or territory Chief Plant Health Manager(s) of the Lead Agency(ies) in consultation with Affected Industry Parties, state and territory governments, the Commonwealth government, and Plant Health Australia (PHA), through the membership of the CCEPP. Response Plans are endorsed by the CCEPP and then approved by the NMG, subject to NMG agreement to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD requirements. The Response Plan development and approval process must not impede the initiation of a rapid response by the Lead Agency to the EPP(s). Refer to PLANTPLAN for additional information on the development and approval process for Response Plans.

2.2 Structure and content

Response Plans must be developed in accordance with the principles under clause 6 and must address all matters identified in part 1 of schedule 4 of the EPPRD. The Response Plan must reflect the nature and circumstances of the EPP(s) and Incident and include key strategies and core operational components, including to identify those that will be the subject of Cost Sharing.

The Response Plan must conform to PLANTPLAN and any applicable Emergency Plant Pest strategy (contingency plan) except as agreed by the NMG (clause 6.2). Any proposed significant variations or departures from the current version of PLANTPLAN must be clearly identified in the Response Plan so as to enable consideration of those variations or departures by the NMG as required by clause 6.2.1(a)).

Response Plan templates are available and contain the required elements to fulfil the content requirements. These templates should be utilised when developing a Response Plan for eradication (refer to the [Response Plan for eradication](#) template) or revising an existing Response Plan to incorporate Transition to Management (refer to the [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template). Additional elements that are not captured by the headings contained in the templates may also be appropriate for inclusion in a Response Plan, and the necessary inclusions will be response dependent. In addition, the amount of detail included under each heading and sub-heading will depend on the nature, extent and stage of the response.

2.3 Related resources

The following resources should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines when developing and revising a Response Plan:

- EPPRD
 - Clause 1.1 Definitions
 - Clause 6 Developing a Response Plan

- Part 1 of schedule 4 Development and Management of a Response Plan
- PLANTPLAN available from planthealthaustralia.com.au including:
 - [Response Plan for eradication](#) template
 - [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template
 - [Transition to Management](#) guideline
- The following documents may be used to inform development of the response strategy:
 - *Biosecurity emergency management response planning guide* (available from agriculture.gov.au)
 - *Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans* (available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/biosecurity/risk-mitigation)

3. Document management and control

3.1 Document title

All Response Plans are to be titled according to the following naming convention:

[Common name of pest] ([*Scientific name of pest*]) Response Plan

As a Response Plan is a national document, reference to the state/territory in which the response is being undertaken should not be used within the title.

3.2 Issue date

The Response Plan 'issue date' is the date that the Response Plan is approved by the NMG.

This date may initially be left blank in the draft Response Plan, or pre-populated with the date that the NMG will be convening a meeting to consider the Response Plan for approval.

3.3 Document control

All Response Plans must include version control through numbering/lettering and a revision history table to ensure that changes made to the document are recorded and managed appropriately.

3.3.1 Version numbering and lettering

The use of numbering for NMG approved Response Plan versions and lettering for revised drafts developed by the Lead Agency and amended through CCEPP revision will ensure clear version tracking and enable Response Plan versioning to reflect the extent/magnitude of the change made to NMG endorsed version.

Versioning should be based on the following conventions:

- **Initial drafts considered by the CCEPP** - During the initial stages of Response Plan development by the Lead Agency and review by the CCEPP (prior to approval by the NMG),

the Response Plan version should be identified through alphabetical increments, with the first version labelled 'Version 0.A'. Subsequent revised versions incorporating feedback from the CCEPP should increase alphabetically (e.g. version 0.B, version 0.C, and so on).

- **NMG approved Response Plan** - The first iteration of the Response Plan approved by the NMG should be labelled 'version 1.0'.
- **Revised drafts considered by the CCEPP** - Revised versions of the approved Response Plan updated by the Lead Agency and amended to incorporate CCEPP feedback should increase alphabetically, based on the current approved version number (e.g. version 1.0A, version 1.0B, version 1.0C and so on).
- **NMG approved revised Response Plans** – For each subsequent version approved by the NMG, the version number should increase by increments of 1.0 or 0.1 as determined by the magnitude of the changes made. For example, minor amendments will be issued by applying increments of 0.1 on the previously endorsed version, (e.g. version 1.1, version 1.2). If the subsequent version endorsed by the NMG incorporates more significant amendments (e.g. trigger breach and response strategy change), the Response Plan will be issued by applying increments of 1.0 on the previously endorsed version (e.g. version 2.0, version 3.0, and so on).

3.3.2 Revision history table

The revision history table should appear at the front of the Response Plan, and includes the version number, who proposed the change (e.g. Lead Agency, CCEPP), the date of issue of the version and the details of the specific changes made.

3.3.3 Definitions and acronyms

A definitions and acronyms table should be included at the front of the Response Plan.

4. Response Plans according to stages of a response

Response Plans are living documents, which may be updated as a response progresses through various stages. The expectations of content and level of detail for each of the required elements of the Response Plan will differ depending on the nature, extent and stage of the response. The following section is intended to provide guidance on the minimum content requirements for Response Plan development according to the stage of the Incident.

4.1 Eradication response

4.1.1 Early in the response

Response Plans are intended as a mechanism to support the eradication of one or more EPPs. During the initial stages of a response, Parties may still be gathering information on the extent of the Incident, through delimitation and tracing, and may not yet know with certainty whether the EPP is technically or economically feasible to eradicate. Under these circumstances a short, sharp Response Plan may be developed to undertake eradication and Emergency Containment actions whilst further information is being gathered to inform feasibility of eradication and future actions required. Robust triggers for

Response Plan review should be included in the plan to address the uncertainty regarding the extent of the Incident. Refer to section 5.1.11.2 for additional information.

This phased approach allows for rapid development of a Response Plan that includes a response strategy based on the best information available at the time. The timeframe identified in a phased Response Plan should, as a minimum, allow as much time as necessary to determine feasibility of eradication and does not need to address the whole life of the response. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to comprehensively complete all sections of the Response Plan. Rather, these sections should be compiled based on the knowledge available at the time and a statement added to indicate that “this section will be revised as further information becomes available”.

The [Response Plan for eradication](#) template should be used for the initial drafting of a Response Plan, and any subsequent revisions.

4.1.2 Under eradication – the duration of the response

The Response Plan may undergo revision during an eradication response. As further information becomes available, or trigger points are breached, the Response Plan may require revision to incorporate changes to the strategy or additional detail in certain areas. Any revisions must be made to the currently approved version of the Response Plan, which is based on the [Response Plan for eradication](#) template and must follow the conventions described under section 3.

4.2 Transition to Management

Following the determination by the NMG (on advice of the CCEPP) that it is no longer feasible to eradicate an EPP(s), and that the response should enter a Transition to Management Phase, the Response Plan will require amendments to incorporate Transition to Management activities.

The approach for Transition to Management will differ significantly to that for eradication of an EPP, and therefore a [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template has been developed and should be used to incorporate Transition to Management activities into the revised Response Plan.

The revised Response Plan should focus on the activities to be undertaken during Transition to Management. It is not necessary to include information on the response approach for eradication of the EPP(s) that was contained in the previous version of the Response Plan. The timeframe of a Response Plan incorporating Transition to Management must not exceed a 12-month period, unless the NMG determines (on advice of the CCEPP) that there are exceptional circumstances. This timeframe for Transition to Management activities will commence when the revised Response Plan is approved by the NMG.

5. Response Plan content

Once the response strategy has been developed, the strategic information should be used to inform the population of the Response Plan.

All sections of the Response Plan template should be included in the Response Plan and completed based on the information available at the time. The level of detail included will be at the discretion of

the Lead Agency and the CCEPP/NMG and may vary depending on the circumstances of the Incident and stage of the response.

As indicated in section 4.1, it is not necessary to fully compile the sections of the Response Plan for which the information is not yet available. Rather, these sections should be completed based on the knowledge available at the time and a statement added to indicate that “this section will be revised as further information becomes available”. For example, a sentence may be sufficient as a minimum in the early stages of a response.

5.1 Eradication response

Parties are encouraged to use the [Response Plan for eradication](#) template to develop a new Response Plan or revise an existing Response Plan for eradication to ensure alignment with the requirements of the EPPRD.

5.1.1 Aim and objectives of the Response Plan

Consideration of the aim and objectives of the response will provide focus for the Response Plan.

An aim is a broad statement of a purpose or anticipated outcome and may reflect why the Response Plan is required. For example, the aim of the Response Plan could be to ensure that an EPP is eradicated from Australia, or to contain and eradicate an EPP whilst information is being gathered to inform feasibility of eradication. The aim should also identify the indicative timeframe of the Response Plan (e.g. “the objective is to contain and eradicate the EPP whilst information is being gathered over an indicative 6-month period to inform feasibility of eradication”) and potentially also for each phase of the response.

Objectives are specific statements which reflect the course of action and/or methodology that will be undertaken to achieve the aim of the Response Plan. If ORCs are likely to be incurred through Response Plan actions, then one of the objectives should be to enable provision of ORCs to eligible Owners impacted by the Response Plan actions. It may also be relevant to include an objective that reflects the desired outcomes related to minimising the impact of the EPP on the community and industry.

The aim and the objectives may change over the course of the Response Plan as more information becomes available on the Incident and should be adjusted accordingly in each iteration of the Response Plan.

A section on assumptions underpinning the aims and objectives may also be included.

5.1.2 Current status of the Incident

Including an outline of the status of the Incident will enable Parties to quickly identify the stage and status of the response at the time of Response Plan development. The status of the Incident will likely change over the course of the response and details within this section should be adjusted accordingly if the Response Plan is revised. The following headings should be included, noting that additional headings may be required.

- *EPP details*
Include the common and scientific names of the EPP(s). A concise description of the biology and life cycle of the EPP(s) can be included, with more detailed information included as an appendix to the Response Plan, if required.
- *Affected host(s)*
Include the common and scientific name(s) of affected host(s) for which the EPP(s) has been found to affect in this specific Incident.
- *Other known hosts in the affected area*
List any other known hosts of the EPP(s) present in the affected area to inform the risk of spread and the response activities. This includes any alternate or native hosts known to be present in the affected area. The complete list of hosts could be included as an appendix to the Response Plan if extensive.
- *Diagnostic details*
Provide an outline of the diagnostic process used to identify the EPP(s), including whether any approved national or international diagnostic protocols were utilised. Note whether both the initial and independent secondary confirmatory diagnoses have been completed.
- *Description and effect*
Relating specifically to the Incident, briefly provide details of the EPP's effect on the host when infested or infected (i.e. symptoms). Details on the broader known and potential impacts on different hosts or the environment or amenity value could be provided as an appendix if this information is considered required.
- *Extent of Incident*
A concise summary of the immediate extent of the Incident should be provided here. Outline the geographic area currently known to be affected by the EPP(s) and the incidence/density of infection/infestation. Include the current status of the Incident in terms of number, locations and types (e.g. residential, commercial etc) of Infected Premises, Suspect Premises and any other relevant premises classifications.
- *Additional impacts*
Identify any potential flow-on affects that may be incurred by the response, beyond those impacting on the Affected Industry Parties (e.g. impacts on the community, and/or supporting industries).
- Any other relevant information, such as description of the affected industry and its distribution nationally and in the affected state/territory.

5.1.3 Feasibility of eradication

A statement must be included demonstrating that Parties consider it both technically feasible and cost-beneficial to eradicate the EPP(s) from the known affected area, within an identified timeframe. If it is very early in the response and the feasibility of eradication has not yet been considered, this

should be stated here along with the timeline for determining technical and economic feasibility and any specific considerations.

Further details should be included under the following sub-headings:

5.1.3.1 *Technical feasibility of eradication*

The information provided in this section of the Response Plan should be based on the considerations of the CCEPP and should be informed by the *Factors to consider regarding the technical feasibility of EPP eradication* (technical feasibility criteria) provided in Table 1 of PLANTPLAN. It may be appropriate to provide these considerations in table form, noting that not all the criteria listed in PLANTPLAN need to be fulfilled for eradication to be considered technically feasible. The relative importance placed on each criterion will be dependent on the specific Incident.

If the assessment against the technical feasibility criteria changes over the course of the response, this section should be updated accordingly in any revised iteration of the Response Plan, based on the determinations of the CCEPP.

Assumptions underpinning the technical feasibility criteria assessment may also be identified under this section of the Response Plan and linked to specific trigger points (section 5.1.11.2).

5.1.3.2 *Economic feasibility of eradication*

For some EPPs, the economic feasibility of eradication may be relatively easy to compile; while for others, a formal and detailed benefit cost analysis may be required.

This section does not have to be comprehensive in the first instance but should at least include preliminary considerations of the benefits and costs of eradicating the EPP under the Response Plan strategy. The CCEPP may determine that a full benefit cost analysis should be undertaken, which can then be added to the Response Plan in this section of a revised version or as an appendix if required.

5.1.4 *Response activities for Emergency Containment and eradication*

This section should provide a detailed outline of the response strategy and activities that will be undertaken to achieve the aim and objectives of the Response Plan. It must also identify who will undertake each action, and the timelines for each activity.

This section is not a replacement for a situation report and as such does not need to be regularly updated unless the response strategy changes through the duration of the response.

Content of this section may include:

5.1.4.1 *Overall response strategy*

A summary of the overall response strategy must be included. This may include, for example, that eradication will occur through destruction of all host material in a specified area, followed by a specified host free period and proof of freedom activities. A section may also be included here on the impacts of the strategy on the community and industry, how this may influence the response and measures that will be taken to manage the risk.

As the response progresses, the strategy may evolve, and should be updated in this section of the revised Response Plan accordingly.

5.1.4.2 *Zoning, quarantine and movement controls*

This section should outline zoning, quarantine and movement controls on plants, plant products, people, machinery and other items including the timing for implementation and details of the activities, for example:

- Destruction, quarantine and buffer zones.
- Restricted and control areas.
- Movement of host material into, within, and out of quarantine areas.
- Movement of host material outside of quarantine areas.
- Compliance regulations.
- Legislative authorities (complete legislative orders do not need to be detailed; it is sufficient to simply state the names of the Act(s) and order(s) that will be in operation).
- Future quarantine requirements.

5.1.4.3 *Diagnostics and scientific support*

This section should provide a summary of the diagnostic and/or scientific resources required to support the eradication response. This may include details on:

- Whether a National Diagnostic Protocol (NDP) is available, or in the case where a NDP isn't available, best practice diagnostic protocols that could be used nationwide to support the response.
- Resource requirements for laboratory testing, such as how the testing will be carried out, and whether the Lead Agency is able to maintain the level of testing necessary to support a successful response.

5.1.4.4 *Trace forward and traceback*

This section should outline the tracing activities yet to be undertaken. Outcomes of tracing activities to date do not need to be included here as these will be reported to the CCEPP through situation reporting. Depending on the pathways and pest biology, the tracing activities that may be included in the Response Plan could be influenced by:

- Tracking pest movement on produce, equipment, containers or in/on plants/seed/fruit and soil.
- Tracking pest movement along water courses, irrigation lines/channels and run off, and identifying water sources.
- Identifying hitch hiking opportunities for spores or life stages of invertebrates.

5.1.4.5 *Surveillance and monitoring*

This section should provide a summary of the surveillance and monitoring requirements of the response, including:

- The surveillance strategy, including the purpose of the surveillance activities (e.g. delimitation), method (general, targeted, national), frequency, sampling levels and procedures.
- Resource requirements and availability for the surveillance strategy to be undertaken.
- The detailed methodology should not be included in this section but rather provided as an appendix if required.

5.1.4.6 *Decontamination, destruction and disposal*

This section should outline the activities required to achieve effective eradication, including any required control treatments, destruction, decontamination and disposal of affected host material, capital items, and/or personnel. The detail in this section will vary depending on the EPP's biology and the type and extent of the Incident.

The following may potentially be included:

- Eradication control techniques (e.g. chemical treatments)
- Destruction strategy.
- Planning and priorities.
- Method of removal and destruction of infected plants and host plants within the quarantine area.
- Processing of plants, and plant products, including by-products and waste (hygiene protocols).
- Site clean-up and disinfestation (hygiene protocols).
- Any issues with disposal.
- Environmental impacts of host plant removal such as soil erosion and whether cover crops will be planted at affected sites to prevent erosion during any host free period

The ability to perform these activities may not always exist or may be difficult to achieve. Where this would be critical to the success of the Response Plan, this should be noted and included as a trigger point (refer to section 5.1.11.2).

5.1.4.7 *Host free/fallow period*

Details of the host free/fallow period and replanting/restocking requirements must be included in the Response Plan if relevant, including activities that will be undertaken to demonstrate premises remain host free during the required period (e.g. regrowth surveillance specifications and frequency).

Potential environmental and biological impacts of host plant removal and host free periods should also be detailed, and explanation provided for how these impacts will be mitigated. For instance, whether cover crops are to be planted to prevent soil erosion and/or prevent spread of the EPP through soil runoff (if the EPP persists in soil). Any specific requirements for the type/species of cover crop that can be planted should also be detailed in this section.

5.1.4.8 *Owner Reimbursement Costs*

If ORCs are expected to be incurred as a result of implementation of the Response Plan, comprehensive details of the activities to be undertaken that will incur ORCs must be included in the

Response Plan. This includes specific and retrospective identification of response activities already undertaken that have incurred ORCs. Unless the Response Plan specifically identifies these activities, the ORCs will not be Cost Shared.

Examples of response activities are as follows:

- Destruction of host Crops – including whether only infested/infected Crops will be destroyed or all host Crops.
- Destruction of stored product – including whether only infested/infected stored product will be destroyed or all host product.
- The type of properties/premises on which the activities will occur (e.g. production nursery, commercial orchard).
- Emergency Containment activities that may prevent a Crop from moving from a premises and therefore devalue the Crop.
- Any host free/fallow periods that will be imposed.

Information related to the estimated costs of ORCs, appointment of an ORC assessor and associated assessor costs should be included in the financial management section.

5.1.5 Proof of freedom activities

The Response Plan must clearly articulate the activities that will be undertaken to demonstrate that the response strategy has been successful and the EPP(s) has been eradicated. It must also clearly articulate what would constitute evidence of freedom for the response.

Planning how proof of freedom will be achieved should occur at the beginning of a response. It is dependent on the biology of the EPP(s) and the capacity for surveillance and ongoing monitoring to prove absence of the pest over a defined period.

For an early stage Response Plan, this section may not be able to be comprehensively developed until further information has been gathered. An early indication of how proof of freedom will be achieved could be included along with a statement to indicate that this section will be further populated in the next version of the Response Plan.

Elements of proof of freedom may include:

- Trapping
- Placement of sentinel host plants

The information provided should also be consistent with International Plant Protection Convention requirements for proving area freedom. This will help to enable any international restrictions to be lifted once eradication is declared.

As the response progresses the strategy for proving freedom may require further clarification, or additional time requirements. These changes should be made to this section, as appropriate if the Response Plan is revised.

5.1.6 Public relations and communication activities

The Response Plan should articulate the overall communication strategy, as well as details of industry consultation and liaison and community engagement activities.

5.1.7 Social support mechanisms

The Response Plan should include advice on social support schemes and/or mechanisms available through the Lead Agency or nationally, to assist stakeholders that are impacted by the response (e.g. support or financial assistance/advice helplines).

5.1.8 Response Plan management and governance

The response structure and staffing (resource) requirements, including position levels, should be captured in this section of the Response Plan. Greater detail will be captured in the Lead Agency's Incident Action Plan. However, Parties may consider the following matters useful additional information for inclusion under this heading, or as an appendix to the Response Plan:

- Local Control Centre (LCC)
 - LCC site
 - Structure, management and staffing
 - Equipment
 - Operations
 - Planning
 - Logistics
 - Infected premises operations teams
 - Forward command post (if necessary)
 - Industry Liaison
- State Coordination Centre (SCC)
 - SCC site
 - Structure, management and staffing
 - Planning
 - Operations
 - Logistics
 - Communications

5.1.9 Information systems and services

Details of the systems used for recording response details should be noted in the Response Plan, including consistency with any nationally agreed systems. This may include a description of:

- Software to assist the management of EPP information, including systems to record surveillance and diagnostic results data, geographical information systems and database system development.
- Control centre information management
 - Message forms and log sheets
 - Mapping
 - Databases
 - Files
 - Personnel
 - Information boards
 - Staff information briefings
- Information dissemination

5.1.10 Reporting

The Response Plan must articulate the reporting requirements and methods that will be used, including situation reports, expenditure reports and other forms of reporting to the CCEPP and NMG, as well as international notifications.

5.1.10.1 CCEPP and NMG reporting

Situation reports (SITREPS) should be provided during the course of the response to inform the CCEPP and NMG on the progress of the response. Details on the frequency that these reports will be distributed by the Lead Agency should be provided here. If quarterly and/or annual reports will also be provided, this should also be detailed in this section.

The Lead Agency also has an obligation to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure of the Response Plan¹. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section including the frequency with which these reports will be provided. This section should also refer to the *Accounting and reporting expenditure* section for further detail on financial reporting.

5.1.10.2 International notifications

This section should include details of notifications to trading partners as well as to the International Plant Protection Convention.

5.1.11 Response Plan review

5.1.11.1 Key performance indicators/program milestones

A list of key performance indicators or program milestones may be included in this section.

5.1.11.2 Trigger points to review the Response Plan

The Response Plan must clearly identify all relevant trigger points for the review of response activities and these should be informed by discussions of the CCEPP. Triggers should be formatted as a table in

¹ EPPRD clause 12.2 and schedule 10

the Response Plan and may include details on the assumptions underpinning each trigger and explanation for how the triggers will be monitored. Triggers will be dependent on the type of Incident, the individual EPP's biology and the Response Plan aims/objectives and may change over the course of a response.

Potential triggers may include:

- Key performance indicators or agreed milestones not met.
- Financial triggers such as reaching a specific point in the indicative budget or towards the Agreed Limit or Upper Limit on Expenditure.
- EPP related changes, such as:
 - New detections outside of control areas or in another jurisdiction
 - Change in expected EPP behaviour
 - Change in EPP impact
 - New vector discovered.
- Indicators of the effectiveness of the Response Plan activities, for example operational matters such as control methods not successful in achieving eradication.
- Indicators that it may no longer be technically feasible to eradicate.
- Maintenance of quarantine areas no longer possible due to legal/ political/ technical issues.

As the response progresses, the trigger points may be reviewed and amended as required.

5.1.11.3 Efficiency audit

A statement should be included under this heading if an efficiency audit will be conducted during the course of the response.

5.1.12 Financial management of the Response Plan

The following section provides initial guidance on aspects of financial management of the Response Plan.

Note that further detail to guide the development of the indicative budget, including guidance on normal commitments and costs eligible for cost sharing, accounting and reporting expenditure and cost claims processes will be provided in the guidance material currently under development by PHA. The financial management section of this document will be reviewed following the development of this guidance material.

5.1.12.1 Indicative budget

The indicative budget needs to provide the Affected Parties with a clear and transparent indication of the costs of implementing the Response Plan. Sufficient detail must be provided to justify the costs being proposed for cost sharing. This detail should be provided in the form of text and supported by a table reflecting the indicative dollar amounts broken down into specific categories as indicated below.

If the Response Plan budget covers multiple financial years, then the indicative amounts should be split across each financial year.

If there is more than one Lead Agency implementing the Response Plan, it is suggested that an indicative budget is included for each jurisdiction's activities along with an overall total indicative budget for the Response Plan.

If a Response Plan has been revised, the indicative budget should reflect the total cost across all iterations (versions) of the Response Plan, not just the revised version.

The budget must be broken down into line items and must specify both the Lead Agency's normal commitments and cost shared amounts. Guidance on the approach for presenting the indicative budget including details on the minimum level line item breakdown can be found in the [Financial management of a Response Plan](#) guideline.

Sufficient detail should be provided in the budget text that demonstrates the basis upon which the figures have been calculated (e.g. full-time equivalents for personnel and their positions).

The following should be considered in preparing the section on the ORC budget:

- The specific response activities that will incur ORCs must be detailed. This includes specifically describing any response activities that either will take place following approval of the Response Plan or have taken place retrospectively and incurred ORCs (for example during the Incident Definition Phase). If these are not specified, then ORCs may not be cost shareable. Response activities that will incur ORCs are detailed in section 5.1.4.8 and could either be repeated here or that section of the Response Plan referred to.
- Provide an indication of the number and types of premises that are anticipated to incur ORCs.
- Provide details on who the ORC assessor will be, or if one has not been identified, on the process for appointment. Note that the indicative cost of the ORC assessor should not be included within the total ORC budget cost and must be specified under the 'operational costs' category.
- Provide an indication of the administrative burden on the Lead Agency in terms of resource implications for managing the ORCs claims, payments, disputes and other associated processes. Although the resource implications can be described in this section, the indicative administrative costs should be specified under the 'operational costs' category. These must be broken into normal commitments and Cost Shared components as relevant for operational costs.

5.1.12.2 Accounting and reporting expenditure

Response Plan expenditure report

The Lead Agency has an obligation under clause 12.2 of the EPPRD to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP in the form of schedule 10 which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the Response Plan. These should be provided to the NMG in a timely manner. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section

including the frequency with which these reports will be provided (e.g. on every meeting of the CCEPP and NMG or another timeframe).

Accounting and cost claims processes

A statement should be included to indicate that cost claims coordination will be undertaken by PHA in accordance with the requirements of the EPPRD and that all Affected Parties must submit their cost claims quarterly to PHA in accordance with clause 12 of the EPPRD unless otherwise agreed by NMG. If requesting of NMG a different time frame, this should also be specified here.

5.1.12.3 Financial audit

A financial audit is required when the total cost shared amount is equal to or exceeds \$500,000² (clause 12.4 and part 2 of schedule 11). A statement on whether a financial audit is or is not required should be included in this section. If a financial audit is required, it should be acknowledged that a final audit report will be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties). The cost of the financial audit should be included in the 'operational costs' category of the indicative budget.

5.1.13 Appendices

Any additional supporting information that is critical to the Response Plan, but too detailed or extensive to be included within the body of the Response Plan, may be included in an appendix. Examples of information that may be provided in an appendix could include, but are not limited to:

- Maps (e.g. eradication, quarantine and surveillance zones, known areas of infection, or trap locations).
- Ecology and lifecycle of the pest.
- Comprehensive host list.
- Surveillance plans.
- Communication strategies.
- Risk analyses.
- Benefit: cost analysis report.
- Quarantine notices and movement control orders.
- Control options (e.g. chemicals).
- Guidelines (e.g. for trapping).
- Protocols (e.g. for the destruction and disposal of host material).
- Organisational charts.
- References.

Each separate appendix should be numbered and titled (e.g. *Appendix 1: Map of known areas of infection*).

² The amount of \$500,000 will be adjusted as at 1 July each year after 30 June 2011 using the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the four quarters that have been most recently published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at that date.

As the response progresses, some appendices may no longer be appropriate for inclusion and should therefore be removed, and/or additional appendices should be added to encompass new information requirements for the Response Plan.

5.2 Transition to Management

The [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template should be used to develop an updated Response Plan that incorporates Transition to Management. The previous iteration of the Response Plan for eradication of the pest (the current approved Response Plan) should be used to help inform the content of relevant sections of this template.

5.2.1 Aim and objectives of the Response Plan

Consideration of the aim and objectives of the response under this section will provide focus for the Response Plan and should justify the need for Transition to Management and clearly reflect the outcome Parties are aiming to achieve.

The aim is a broad statement of a purpose or anticipated outcome that Transition to Management will achieve. The aim should also identify the timeframe of the Response Plan (which in the case of Transition to Management cannot exceed a period of 12 months from the NMG's approval of the Response Plan except if the NMG determines there are exceptional circumstances³).

Objectives are specific statements which broadly describe the activities that will be undertaken to achieve the Transition to Management aim/outcome. Examples of objectives taken from the [Transition to Management](#) guideline include:

- Build capacity and capability in industry and/or the community to manage the pest.
- Develop understanding of the pest's biology and behaviour.
- Develop potential control options.
- Extend knowledge and expertise regarding the pest.
- Maintain domestic and international market access.

5.2.2 Current status of the Incident

This information can be taken from the eradication Response Plan and updated where necessary. A statement should be added under *Decision on feasibility of eradication* to indicate that the NMG agreed, on advice of the CCEPP, that the EPP is no longer considered technically feasible and/or cost beneficial to eradicate. This should include the reasons why and date of decision. The decision by the NMG, on advice of the CCEPP, that a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate could also be referenced in this section.

The following sub-headings should be maintained in the Response Plan for Transition to Management:

- *EPP details*

³ EPPRD clause 5.4

- *Affected host(s)*
- *Other known hosts in the affected area*
- *Diagnostic details*
- *Description and affect*
- *Extent of Incident*
- *Additional impacts*
- *Decision on feasibility of eradication.*

Refer to section 5.1.2 for additional information on the information to include with each sub-heading.

5.2.3 Transition to Management activities

This section should provide a detailed outline of activities that will be undertaken to deliver on the aim and objectives of the revised Response Plan. This section must also identify who will undertake each action/activity and a timeline for each activity (e.g. the number of days, weeks or months to complete each activity).

Subheadings under this section will be dependent on the specific Incident and required activities to achieve the Transition to Management aims and objectives. Examples for sub-headings for Transition to Management activities may include:

- *Development of regulations and associated legislation*
- *Research activities/projects*
- *Communication, engagement and training*
- *Registration of chemicals*
- *Industry contingency and/or enterprise management plans*
- *Development of a national management plan*
- *Development or review of existing codes of practice, on-farm biosecurity plans, market access protocols or Industry enterprise management plans*
- *Consolidation and publishing of outcomes and results arising from the response*
- *Details of formal handover arrangements to share information and knowledge from the response.*

Each Transition to Management activity identified should also clearly articulate the Party(s) responsible for undertaking that action.

5.2.4 Public relations and communication activities

The Response Plan should articulate the overall communication strategy for the period of Transition to Management, as well as details of industry liaison/consultation and community engagement activities.

5.2.5 Social support mechanisms

The Response Plan should include advice on social support schemes and/or mechanisms available through the Lead Agency or nationally, to assist impacted stakeholders (e.g. support or financial assistance/advice helplines).

5.2.6 Response Plan management and governance

The Transition to Management staffing structure and personnel (resource) requirements, including position levels, should be included under this section of the Response Plan.

5.2.7 Information systems and services

Details of the systems used for recording response details should be noted in the Response Plan, including consistency with any nationally agreed systems. Refer to section 5.1.9 for further detail on what to include in this section.

5.2.8 Reporting

5.2.8.1 CCEPP and NMG reporting

Situation reports should continue to be provided during implementation of Transition to Management. Details of the frequency that situation reports will be developed and provided to the CCEPP/NMG by the Lead Agency should be noted under this heading. If quarterly and/or annual reports will also be provided, this should also be detailed in this section.

The Lead Agency also has an obligation to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure of the Response Plan. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section including the frequency with which these reports will be provided. This section should also refer to the *Accounting and reporting expenditure* section for further detail on financial reporting.

5.2.8.2 International notifications

This section should include details of notifications to trading partners and to the International Plant Protection Convention. This section is likely to require updating from the Response Plan for eradication as the status will change from the EPP being under eradication to, for example, being present in some areas.

5.2.9 Trigger points for Response Plan review

The Response Plan must clearly identify any relevant trigger points for the review of response activities and these should be informed by discussions of the CCEPP. Triggers should be formatted as a table in the Response Plan and include details on how these will be monitored. Triggers will be dependent on the Transition to Management aims/objectives and specific activities being undertaken.

Potential triggers may include:

- Key performance indicators or agreed milestones not being met.
- Financial triggers such as the point when expenditure is projected to exceed the indicative budget or approaches the Agreed Limit or Upper Limit on Expenditure.

- Emergence of new knowledge (including science or technical advice) that impacts the Transition to Management aims/objectives.
- Any other events that may result in activities identified in the Response Plan no longer being considered appropriate or capable of achieving the agreed outcome.

5.2.10 Financial management of the Response Plan

The following section provides initial guidance on aspects of financial management of the Response Plan.

Note that further detail to guide the development of the indicative budget, including guidance on normal commitments and costs eligible for cost sharing, accounting and reporting expenditure and cost claims processes will be provided in the guidance material being developed by PHA. The financial management section of this document will be reviewed following the development of this guidance material.

The content of the following sub-sections will differ to the eradication stage of the response and will depend on the activities that are required for Transition to Management.

5.2.10.1 Indicative budget

The indicative budget needs to provide the Affected Parties with a clear and transparent indication of the costs of implementing the Response Plan. Sufficient detail must be provided to justify the costs being proposed for cost sharing. This detail should be provided in the form of text and supported by a table reflecting the indicative dollar amounts broken down into clearly defined and transparent categories.

The budget categories included in the Response Plan for eradication will not all be appropriate for inclusion in Transition to Management and additional and/or different categories will be required to transparently reflect the costs of Response Plan activities. For this reason, it is appropriate to provide a specific indicative budget for Transition to Management that is separate to the overall total budget across all iterations of the Response Plan. However, a total budget across all iterations (versions) of the Response Plan to date must also be provided to reflect the total cost of the response (cost shared and normal commitments).

The Transition to Management budget must be broken down into line items and must specify both the normal commitments and cost shared amounts. Guidance on the approach for presenting the indicative budget including minimum requirements for line item breakdown can be found in the [Financial management of a Response Plan](#) guideline.

Sufficient detail should be provided in the text that demonstrates the basis upon which the figures have been calculated (e.g. full-time equivalents for personnel and their positions).

Note: If any costs associated with administering ORCS are still being incurred during Transition to Management (i.e. as ORC assessments for ORCs incurred during the Emergency Response Phase have not yet been completed), then the specific activities and costs must be specified in the indicative budget (for example, assessor costs and Lead Agency administration).

5.2.10.2 Accounting and reporting expenditure

Response Plan expenditure report

The Lead Agency has an obligation under clause 12.2 of the EPPRD to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP in the form of schedule 10 which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the Response Plan. These should be provided to the NMG in a timely manner. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section including the frequency with which these reports will be provided (e.g. on every meeting of the CCEPP and NMG or another timeframe).

Accounting and cost claims processes

A statement should be included to indicate that cost claims coordination will be undertaken by PHA in accordance with the requirements of the EPPRD and that all Affected Parties must submit their cost claims quarterly to PHA in accordance with clause 12 of the EPPRD unless otherwise agreed by NMG. If requesting of NMG a different time frame, this should also be specified here.

5.2.10.3 Financial audit

As indicated in section 5.1.12.3, a statement must be included to indicate whether a financial audit is or is not required. If a financial audit is required, it should be acknowledged that a final audit report will be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties). The cost of the financial audit should be included in the operational section of the indicative budget.

5.2.11 Appendices

Any additional supporting information that is critical to the Response Plan, but too detailed or extensive to be included within the body of the Response Plan, may be included in an appendix.

When incorporating Transition to Management into the Response Plan, some appendices from earlier iterations of the document may no longer be appropriate for inclusion and should therefore be removed or updated.

Each separate appendix should be numbered and titled (e.g. *Appendix 1: Map of known areas of infestation*).

Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two SOPs. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	Guideline developed from <i>Collection and transport of Emergency Plant Pests</i> SOP (V1 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostic Standards (SPHDS). Original SOP separated into two guideline documents. Approved by SPHDS October 2014. Endorsed by Parties November 2014.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist diagnosticians and field officers to safely transport suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) material to the diagnostic laboratory.

2. Critical issues

Transport of infested/diseased material to the diagnostic laboratory presents a potential risk of escape of exotic pests to the environment and deterioration of the sample. Critical issues include:

- The sample is appropriately contained, packaged and labelled (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines).
- The sample is transported in a way that will minimise the risk of escape of the pest during transit.
- The sample needs to arrive at the destination in the best possible condition to enable effective diagnosis.
- The transport meets any legislative requirements.

- Chain of evidence is followed at all times (refer to *Chain of evidence* standard operating procedure; SOP).
- Hygiene and disinfection protocols are followed (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).

3. Transport criteria

If necessary, consult with the receiving laboratory to ensure the most appropriate transport method is used for the sample.

3.1 General

- The Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) will select the preferred laboratory for sample diagnosis.
- The quarantine officer or CPHM will confirm with the manager of the diagnostic laboratory that they are prepared to accept the sample(s), and if required organise any permits to comply with jurisdictional biosecurity legislation.
- For submission to an overseas laboratory, the Lead Agency CPHM:
 - will notify the Department of Agriculture of the intended movement of a suspect EPP and obtain movement permits for transfer to the port and for export to the receiving country;
 - will confirm international courier arrangements and any special quarantine requirements of the importing country.

3.2 Notification

- Notify the receiving laboratory when intending to submit a sample of an EPP and advise whether it will be preserved or a live/viable sample.
- This should be done prior to packaging to ensure there are no additional precautions that should be taken and that staff will be available to take receipt of the consignment on its arrival.
- The diagnostician should be informed of any additional precautions that may be required on arrival, e.g. open the consignment in appropriate containment facilities.
- If samples are being sent interstate or by an overnight commercial courier or Australia Post (only Express Parcel Service is acceptable because this is traceable), advise the receiving laboratory of the tracking number.
- Request the receiving laboratory to confirm sample receipt.

3.3 Packaging

Quarantinable material being sent for analysis must be triple packaged using the appropriate packaging (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines).

- The receiving lab should be contacted to determine whether the sample should be sent in an insulated container with a coolant such as dry ice with appropriate International Air Transport Association (IATA 650) labelling.
- Any identifying document information required for biosecurity clearance should be placed between the outer two packaging layers or taped to the outer package.
- Sample submission information should be placed between the outer two packaging layers.
- The internal packaging should be securely sealed with 'Hold Quarantine' tape or tamper-proof evidence tape where required.

- Clearly label all samples and store securely (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).

The outer package should be labelled with:

- "Urgent – Diagnostic sample. Keep cool"
- the recipient's name, address and telephone number
- the sender's name, address and telephone number
- an emergency contact name, address and telephone number
- other labelling as required by legislation.

A label should also be included inside the outer packaging in case the outer label is destroyed.

3.4 Transport

- It is essential that the time between sampling and dispatch of the sample for identification be kept to a minimum.
- Do not send samples on a Friday unless first consulting with the receiving laboratory.
- Requirements for preserving samples for identification differ according to taxa, and those collection and preservation protocols appropriate to taxa need to be followed.
- Requirements for live samples differ from those for dead preserved samples.
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) requirements should be followed for safe transport of samples. These requirements may be accessed via the CASA website: www.casa.gov.au. There may be requirements that a suitably authorised person be responsible for preparing and sending material via air.

3.5 Resource equipment

Possible equipment required will depend on the sample and whether IATA or CASA packaging rules are to be followed:

- insulated, sealable container with freezer blocks for keeping samples cool
- pre-ordered tamper-proof plastic bags or zip lock plastic bags of suitable sizes for samples
- sealable (e.g. screw top with rubber seals) sample containers or vials of varying sizes (e.g. Bio-bottles)
- quarantine tape, tamper-proof tape or similar
- overnight express post packs or equivalent, corrugated cardboard packing boxes
- sample tracking spreadsheet or evidence register (refer to *Chain of evidence* standard operating procedure)
- list of contacts for the laboratory/courier/CPHM for the state.

Transition to Management

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	27 May 2016	All	<p>New document developed in conjunction with the Issue Resolution Group on Transition to Management.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties May 2015 subject to the relevant formal variations to the EPPRD being signed off by all Parties.</p> <p>Variations to the EPPRD approved by all Parties and incorporated into new version of the EPPRD 27 May 2016.</p>
2.0	30 Nov 2018	All	<p>Full revision of document. Changes made to provide clarity in the following key areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key decision points, timing and sequence of events associated with Transition to Management including the addition of Figure 1. • Processes and activities undertaken during intervening periods of the key decision points. • Distinction between the Transition to Management Phase and Transition to Management activities under the revised Response Plan. • Further explanation of completion of Transition to Management and the Transition to Management Phase, as well as activities that follow, including addition of new sections/headings (sections 10, 12 and 13). • Minor changes to provide clarity and consistency in terminology throughout. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2018.</p>
2.1	8 December 2021	Sections 1, 9 and 13	<p>Full revision of document. Changes made include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Addition of the approach to convene a Transition to Management reference group (section 9). • Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency within PLANTPLAN. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2021.</p>
2.2	13 December 2021	All	<p>Full review of document and the following key amendments made to incorporate variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explanation that Transition to Management may exceed a 12 month period if the NMG agrees there are exceptional circumstances. • Clarification that Transition to Management may follow an unsuccessful Proof of Freedom Phase (in addition to an unsuccessful Emergency Response Phase).

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance on the application of the provisions of the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) related to Transition to Management (T2M). These guidelines are provided to Parties for use in determining whether a T2M phase is appropriate, subsequent to a decision that eradication of an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under an agreed Response Plan is no longer feasible. These guidelines provide information on the aim and intent of T2M, key decision points, timing and potential scope and activities that may form part of a Response Plan for T2M.

The relevant sections of the EPPRD that should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines are:

- Clause 1.1 Definitions¹
- Clause 5 Phases of an Emergency Plant Pest Response
- Schedule 4 Development and Management of a Response Plan

The relevant sections of PLANTPLAN that should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines are:

- Part 1, Chapter 3 Phases of an EPP Response

The relevant PLANTPLAN documents that should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines are:

- [Response Plan development](#) guideline
- [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template

The latest version of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN can be downloaded from the PHA website at planthealthaustralia.com.au.

2. Background

Prior to the inclusion of a T2M phase in the EPPRD, once a decision was made that an EPP was not eradicable the processes of the EPPRD ceased and there was no clear path for decision making and cost sharing of any further programs that may be in the national interest. Parties identified this gap between the mechanism for emergency response (the EPPRD) and the mechanisms for pest management outside emergency response as an issue.

Parties agreed to formalise arrangements to fill this gap by including the option for T2M within the EPPRD, ensuring that the governance and Cost Sharing arrangements currently in place under the EPPRD would apply to T2M, including:

- governance and decision making through the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and the National Management Group (NMG),
- Cost Sharing by established formulae between Affected Parties,
- mechanisms for Industry Parties to meet their Cost Sharing obligations,
- current funding limits (Agreed Limits), and
- management processes for Response Plans.

¹ Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) are a reference to the defined words/terms within the EPPRD

Parties agreed that the T2M phase in the EPPRD would only apply in a situation where an eradication program fails; that is where a Response Plan has been agreed and implemented and subsequently the NMG has determined that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP. While governments and industries are free to participate in other types of T2M programs, the only time the EPPRD may be used for a T2M program is when a Response Plan is in place and the attempted eradication is deemed no longer feasible.

In developing the T2M arrangements to apply under the EPPRD, regard was had to the National Transition Program Policy Framework (national framework) including containment to allow future management options to be determined and for activities for industry and/or the community to manage the EPP. However, a T2M phase under the EPPRD may not always lead to containment of an EPP but rather the ability to manage that EPP within production systems.

3. Scope

The scope of these guidelines covers an EPP that is subject to a Response Plan and has reached a point where the NMG has determined that it is no longer technically feasible or cost beneficial to eradicate. How the NMG determines a Response Plan should no longer continue is subject to review triggers that are part of the Response Plan and will not be dealt with in this document.

These guidelines take into account existing principles and decision thresholds developed for the national framework.

These guidelines do not apply to:

- containment programs undertaken to preserve the opportunity to eradicate an EPP, or
- programs that may (from time to time) be developed for pests other than those subject to a Response Plan.

4. Definition and aim of T2M

T2M is defined as *"the undertaking of activities to transition the management of an EPP from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP under a Response Plan to management of the EPP outside the EPPRD"*. The T2M provisions of the EPPRD enable a short term (up to 12 months) nationally Cost Shared program during which national management of an EPP is formalised. The NMG may agree to extend the time in which T2M is considered achievable to a defined and reasonable timeframe exceeding 12 months, but only if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances. Activities that make up T2M will be included in the Response Plan which will be updated for NMG endorsement if CCEPP recommends to NMG that a T2M phase is appropriate.

The aim of T2M should be to address identified gaps in knowledge and information required to enable an orderly stand down from a state of eradication to ongoing management of the particular EPP outside of the EPPRD. This will assist industry, government and the community to be best prepared for 'living with' or 'managing' the EPP.

5. Timing and summary of key decision points

As noted above, a T2M program (activities under the Response Plan) may not exceed 12 months, unless the NMG agrees to extend the timeframe if it determines there are exceptional circumstances. However,

the program of activities does not officially commence until the NMG has endorsed the updated Response Plan – therefore time expended on discussions and development of the updated Response Plan is not included in the period of T2M (timeframe to implement activities under the revised Response Plan).

An overview of the timing, key decision points and activities associated with T2M are provided in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Key decision points, timing and activities associated with T2M

[#] Note: During this period a financial audit may need to be completed and the final audit report provided to Affected Parties within 60 days after the NMG agrees T2M is completed (refer to point 4 below).

^{##} Note: The NMG may agree to extend the time in which T2M is considered achievable to a defined and reasonable timeframe exceeding 12 months, but only if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances.

1. The T2M Phase commences when the NMG agrees (on advice of the CCEPP) that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP and that the response should enter a T2M Phase. During the period that follows the NMG decision to enter a T2M Phase, the Response Plan is revised to incorporate T2M activities.

2. The NMG approves the revised Response Plan and T2M formally commences. The delivery/implementation timeframe of the Response Plan (and Cost Sharing of eligible costs) may not exceed a period of 12 consecutive months, unless the NMG agrees to extend the timeframe if it determines there are exceptional circumstances.

3. T2M activities under the Response Plan are completed within the agreed timeframe for T2M. The Lead Agency will then prepare a report on the activities completed under the Response Plan for consideration by the CCEPP and NMG.

4. The T2M Phase ends when the NMG agrees (on advice of the CCEPP) that T2M has been completed; or alternatively that the T2M Phase should end, in which case the Response Plan will come to an end. The date on which agreement by the NMG is achieved identifies the Response Plan Completion Date.

Following finalisation of the Response Plan by the NMG:

- All Affected Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the operational phase and T2M. This includes determining the total shared costs of implementing the Response Plan as well as the wider (non-shared) costs incurred by them in responding to the Incident. Affected Parties must provide all required information to Plant Health Australia (PHA) within 6 months of the Response Plan Completion Date (refer to section 12.1).
- Depending on the total Cost Shared amount of the Response Plan, a financial audit may need to be arranged by the Lead Agency. The final audit report must be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date, or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties (refer to section 12.2).

5. Once Cost Sharing has been completed and wider costs reported by Affected Parties, PHA will consolidate the information and advise all EPPRD Parties of the total and wider costs incurred in responding to the Incident.

6. Decision making and commencement of the T2M Phase

If the activities detailed in the Response Plan fail to eradicate an EPP, then CCEPP have the option to recommend to the NMG that the response enters a T2M Phase. To determine whether the EPP becomes the subject of a T2M Phase the following criteria must be met.

1. *The pest must be an EPP currently subject to a Response Plan.*
Only an EPP currently subject to a Response Plan will be considered a candidate for a T2M Phase under the EPPRD.
2. *Eradication is no longer considered to be technically feasible or cost-beneficial.*
If a Response Plan is reviewed and CCEPP recommends that the EPP is no longer technically feasible to eradicate then that EPP may be considered for a T2M program. This will always be on a case by case basis as not all situations or EPPs will be appropriate for a T2M program.
3. *CCEPP considers that a T2M program is appropriate.* As part of this, they will confirm that the current management measures and activities will be insufficient to manage the pest or disease and that this gap can be adequately addressed through a T2M program under the EPPRD.

Once a pest is considered an EPP and has triggered development of a Response Plan, it has already met criteria determining its national significance. This need not be revisited. In addition, the cost-benefit analysis undertaken to support the original response can be used, or updated, to provide an economic case for T2M.

Once the CCEPP has reached agreement on the need for a T2M Phase, it will make a recommendation to the NMG that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP and that the response should enter a T2M Phase. If the NMG agrees to this recommendation, the T2M Phase will commence. The NMG can only make this determination if it considers T2M is achievable within a defined and reasonable timeframe not exceeding 12 months; or exceeding 12 months if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances.

As there may not be sufficient time to prepare a revised Response Plan prior to informing the NMG that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible and that T2M is considered appropriate, the CCEPP will present

to the NMG the potential scope and objectives of the T2M as well as proposed T2M activities that will be included in the amended Response Plan.

7. Objectives and activities under T2M

The objectives and activities undertaken during T2M will depend on the biology of the pest and the circumstances relating to the stage of the response and will be considered on a case by case basis. The Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties should engage and collaborate early to identify the scope and objectives and set the expectations for T2M. The T2M activities then need to be developed to meet these objectives.

The objectives of T2M may include:

- build capacity and capability in industry and/or the community to manage the pest
- develop understanding of the pest's biology and behaviour
- develop potential control options
- extend knowledge and expertise regarding the pest
- maintain domestic and international market access.

Activities which may be undertaken during T2M include:

- research
- registration of chemicals
- introduction of improved or resistant varieties of host plants
- development of regulations and associated legislation
- development of trading protocols
- development or review of existing codes of practice, on-farm biosecurity plans or guidelines
- communication, engagement and training
- consolidation and publishing outcomes and results arising from the response.

To support the objectives of T2M, it may also be necessary to cost share:

- administrative support (above normal commitments) and/or a national coordinator to manage the program
- actions to finalise the Response if the Response Plan is terminated early.

8. The Response Plan - T2M

Once a decision is made to enter a T2M Phase, the Lead Agency will work with Affected Industry Parties to update the Response Plan with the operational details of T2M. It is important that the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties collaborate early in the development of the revised Response Plan.

The updated Response Plan must:

1. contain an update of all relevant sections of the Response Plan including:

- a. aims and objectives
 - b. proposed activities
 - c. indicative budget
 - d. public relations
 - e. triggers for review
2. contain justification for undertaking T2M,
3. describe all activities both Cost Shared and those to be funded through normal commitments,
4. contain consideration of whether new detections of the Plant Pest could be considered to meet the definition of an EPP for a Plant Pest already found in Australia (clause 1.1 of the EPPRD) once the T2M phase is complete,
5. be achievable, that is each Party must have the capability to implement the agreed program, for example jurisdictions must have the ability to put any required legislation in place,
6. have an indicative date for completion of T2M activities no later than 12 months from the approval of the revised Response Plan by the NMG (or other defined timeframe as agreed by the NMG), and
7. be consistent with Australia's international obligations.

The Response Plan must not include cost sharing for any ongoing activities (such as containment) after T2M is complete. All activities under the Response Plan must be able to be completed within the defined timeframe (no longer than a period of 12 consecutive months unless the NMG agrees to an extended timeframe due to exceptional circumstances). For some EPPs, a 3 or 6 month T2M may be sufficient. During development of the updated Response Plan it should be kept in mind that T2M is transitioning management of the EPP away from eradication to management systems outside the EPPRD.

Refer to the [Response Plan development](#) guideline and the [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template for further information on revision of the Response Plan.

9. Response Plan implementation

Once the CCEPP endorses the revised Response Plan, it is provided to the NMG for consideration. When the NMG endorses the revised Response Plan, the T2M program of activity (and start of the defined T2M timeframe) formally commences. It is then the responsibility of the Lead Agency to lead the implementation of the plan under direction from the CCEPP, in the same manner as for the operational phase and in accordance with PLANTPLAN section 3.4.3.

A dedicated T2M reference group will be formed to support the CCEPP in its role to monitor Response Plan progress by providing operational oversight of the activities implemented under the Response Plan. Convening of the group will also provide a mechanism to support close engagement/partnership between the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Party(s) during the period of T2M. Membership could include nominees from the Lead Agency, Affected Industry Parties and PHA. If issues arise during the course of Response Plan implementation these would be reported back to the CCEPP/NMG to consider as required.

9.1 Coordination of Cost Sharing

As T2M will be part of an existing Response Plan, there are no changes to the Cost Sharing provisions. Cost Sharing arrangements will occur in the same manner as for the operational phase, in accordance with PLANTPLAN section 3.2.2.

10. Completion of T2M activities

Once the T2M activities under the Response Plan are completed (within the agreed timeframe for T2M), the Lead Agency will prepare a report to the CCEPP and NMG detailing the activities that have been completed in accordance with the Response Plan.

The CCEPP will consider the report and outcomes of T2M and provide a recommendation to the NMG on successful completion of T2M.

11. Completion of the T2M Phase

The T2M Phase is complete when:

- the NMG agrees (on advice of the CCEPP) that T2M has been completed (as all activities from the Response Plan are completed), or
- a trigger for review has been reached and subsequent to the review, the NMG formally declares that the T2M Phase will no longer continue in which case the Response Plan will come to an end.

The date on which agreement by the NMG is achieved identifies the Response Plan Completion Date.

12. Completion of Cost Sharing and reporting total and wider costs

Following completion of the T2M Phase, there are several activities that are required to stand down the response.

12.1 Completion of Cost Sharing and reporting of total and wider costs

Following the completion of the Response Plan, all Affected Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the operational phase and T2M. As part of this process (and as described in section 3.3.3 of PLANTPLAN) all Affected Parties must, within 6 months of the Response Plan Completion Date, provide information to PHA to enable it to determine the total cost of implementation of the Response Plan and the wider costs incurred by them in responding to the Incident. Once this process is complete, PHA will report to all EPPRD Parties on the total and wider costs incurred in responding to the Incident.

12.2 Financial audit

At the completion of the Response Plan, if the total Cost Shared amount is expected to be equal to or exceed \$500,000 indexed annually (refer to part 2 of Schedule 11 of the EPPRD), an external financial audit of the Response Plan ledger account must be arranged by the Lead Agency. The final audit report must be provided to the Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date agreed by the Affected Parties).

13. T2M debrief

An Incident debrief should have been held prior to the commencement of the T2M Phase to capture any relevant information from the attempted eradication response. An additional debrief may occur either during, or at the finalisation of the T2M Phase. This will capture information from the T2M Phase only and may be used to inform any future use of T2M. It may be more valuable to hold the T2M debrief prior to the completion of T2M activities, to capture observations from participants before dispersing after the completion of the Response Plan.

Urban and peri-urban biosecurity guidelines

These guidelines were initially developed by Res Eng (Australia) Limited in 2006 as a project commissioned by the Department of Agriculture. These guidelines were designed to encourage the enhancement pest response in urban and peri-urban areas and were included as an Appendix in previous versions of PLANTPLAN.

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 19 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). SPCHQ/LPCC changed to SCC/LCC, and Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. "Communications" changed to "Public Information"

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the Control Function throughout the phases of a response

Control in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- An initial examination of the Control function is required to ensure that workload and skill-set are appropriate for an urban or peri-urban response. Although it may be difficult, it is imperative that the functions within PLANTPLAN are properly assigned. Initially it is likely that an individual will be undertaking each function, and it is important to recognize that escalation will require delegation and transition to formal arrangements during establishment. In this case, the Rapid Response Team (RRT) is a valuable resource and should be considered for any urban or peri-urban response.
- The Investigation Phase for urban and peri-urban response will be initially characterised by potentially large rates of change, rapid escalation, and bulk enquiry from the community and industry.
- This Phase will be influenced by political activities, media, and community. Community interest groups may become a focal point and must be properly considered.
- PLANTPLAN requires that a SCC Director be appointed at the beginning of the Investigation Phase. In appointing the Director for an urban or peri-urban response, the candidate's knowledge of the community and local issues should be considered.
- Depending upon pest, scale, and rate of escalation, the Director may be changed at different times within the response. This concept should be understood at the outset to ensure that change of Controller is not seen as lack of confidence in the leadership team, but rather a strategy to recognize that skill needs change. For example, the individual responsible for establishment of the campaign (Investigation) may be different from the individual responsible for the Operations Phase.
- Strategy for disease investigation must be developed with particular reference to urban and peri-urban access issues, number and types of properties to be visited, information needs, privacy

considerations, as well as consideration of issues of impact on land value and discovery of illegal activities during surveillance.

- Movement controls must consider long-term impact on other commercial activities not directly associated with the campaign or the primary industry activity directly associated with the response.
- PLANTPLAN requires stakeholders to be briefed at various stages. During the Alert Phase, the Control function has a specific leadership role. In an urban or peri-urban campaign this includes engagement of property owners as well as occupiers. A specific strategy must be established. This may include using specific cultural based media, real-estate agents, local government, religious conduits, or other appropriate mechanisms.
- During this time, media enquiries may outpace technical knowledge and a "Holding Statement" may be required to ensure that expectations for media information are met.
- It is appropriate that the Controller places SCC staff, and at least 2 LCC controllers, on standby during any Alert Phase within an urban or peri-urban area.
- A range of technical advisories and briefings must occur. For urban and peri-urban response, this must include Local Government Areas (LGA's) and local representatives, as well as the specific identification of local/active community groups and potentially impacted industries and businesses. In this case, businesses may simply represent a vector for the pest, rather than be directly impacted. Examples may include excavation contractors, earth-moving equipment transport, nursery, and allied industry in the case of a soil resident pest.
- The Control function must establish and then liaise with the Planning Manager, Logistics Manager, Communications Manager and Industry Liaison Manager to assess personnel and resources required should the response be elevated to the Operational Phase. This should then be handed to the Logistics Manager.

Control in the Operational Phase:

- In the case that planning has been comprehensive and anticipated most risks, the Controller's role in the Operational Phase is one of oversight and approval. Initially this requires the direction to enter the Operational Phase of PLANTPLAN.
- In terms of oversight, a process must be established to provide ongoing consultative and reporting arrangements between SCC and the LCC(s). In the case of urban and peri-urban response, it is likely that multiple LCC(s) will be established, increasing this management activity.
- As urban and peri-urban areas are likely to involve a large number of locally elected representatives, it is imperative that the control function provides advice to the relevant stakeholders, including mayors, ministers, departmental and industry executives.
- The Control function must also initiate emergency response by liaising with other states/territories as necessary, including the provision of briefings associated with the Operational Phase.
- Leadership must be maintained by way of active encouragement of communications strategies including media releases, technical information, press conferences, and potentially novel approaches to encourage the interest of urban and peri-urban dwellers. In some cases joint media releases may need to be issued or "local identities" employed.

Control in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Significant complications may arise with respect to the Stand-Down Phase. In particular, decommissioning of significant resources and definitional issues associated with eradication requires strict control.

- It may be useful to acknowledge the possibility of re-infestation and non-detection to prepare urban or peri-urban communities of future incursions or limit any misunderstandings in relation to the declaration of “area freedom”.
- Prior experience with urban and peri-urban programmes has highlighted the potential for vandalism and tampering of traps and or surveillance equipment. Asset protection strategies may need to be considered.
- Useful tools include debriefing of all participants as well as appropriate transfer or integration of on-going activities to responsible agencies. This is particularly the case in relation to on-going health monitoring requirements in the case that such monitoring was a requirement of the application of chemical controls.
- In relation to the increased potential for litigation, it is also imperative that all records relating to the EPP response are held securely so they are available for future retrieval in accordance with the relevant archival regulations and any statutes of limitations.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the Planning Function throughout the phases of a response

Planning in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- Taking into consideration the potential for extended durations and large resource numbers in an urban and peri-urban response, locations and timing of planning meetings must be properly addressed.
- Situation and resource briefings will be complicated by the possibility of a range of latent planning risks. In particular, these relate to increased movement control activities, interference with normal day-to-day business practices of remotely or non-affected individuals or enterprises, as well as increased opportunities for conflict at many levels.
- It may be difficult to properly establish resource estimates, particularly during the initial period of the Investigation Phase. For urban and peri-urban response it is appropriate to seek information of resource availability from appropriate agencies at the earliest time.
- Definition of the operational period will bring a range of complications associated with resource acquisition and deployment. Issues such as travel times, seasonal considerations, infrastructure interdependencies may need to be considered when establishing operational periods. In extended responses, the Planning function must consider the back-filling of positions and the strain placed on those agencies from where resources have been obtained.
- Collection and submission of samples must consider potential volume of volunteered samples or samples not directly collected by diagnostic teams. Use of “enthusiasts” such as topic specific associations or clubs may be considered.
- Incident definition must consider boundary conditions such as Local Government Areas (LGAs), State/Territory borders, and/or catchments for example. In particular, delineation, quarantine or potential movement controls should use land-marks or boundaries able to be recognised by community members.
- Allocation of resources must assume multiple visits to each property (as urban and peri-urban dwellers are generally not on the property during working hours) and property numbers. An initial indication may be 10 persons per 1000 residents.
- Information and management systems dealing with community contact information must be activated immediately to support establishment and assume significant data (both spatial and textual) volumes.

- A review of legislative, regulatory and contractual obligations must occur. In particular, this must include access and treatment rights (this is particularly important in relation to multiple consolidated dwellings) as well as liability issues.
- A review of local or significant social or cultural events should also be undertaken to examine coincident issues.
- Planning should consider that political and social reaction may overtake epidemiological modelling in terms of timing, forcing decisions to be made using less than perfect information. In particular, Planning must be prepared to provide summary diagnostics and what additional tests are required, summary of survey information and quarantine action, potential movement controls on a large scale, and using boundaries based on parameters other than pest biology.
- That being said, details of the biology of the pest including its host range, economic impact and opportunities for eradication or containment (included in the Incursion Incident Report) must also be developed, including whether the pest has been identified in IBPs or Categorised as part of the EPPRD.
- Examination of affected industries must be extended to industries other than those directly associated with the pest.
- Examination of information and effectiveness of controls, and availability of pesticides/chemicals/other control methods in Australia and overseas, should be undertaken with a focus on community reaction in urban and peri-urban areas. This extends to “regional” quarantine measures and movement control issues.
- It will be imperative to develop a rationale for the size of the quarantine zones surrounding affected sites and what movement controls should be applied to intra- and interstate trade, including interstate trade restrictions. Such restrictions must consider the right to free trade between states, particularly from those industries that may not at first directly appreciate their connection with the campaign or the impact of the pest.
- The human population density associated with an urban or peri-urban biosecurity emergency will magnify any issues associated with the existing emergency management protocols and any issues associated with administrative or managerial processes.
- A declared emergency does not automatically remove the obligations of existing legislative instruments and regulation, requiring emergency management staff to meet all occupational health and safety requirements, for example.
- There is an increased need to formally engage and liaise with emergency services to ensure access to required resources and up-to-date urban or peri-urban survey and response information (such as occupier information).
- Examination of applicable science and the development of a needs profile for laboratory resources will be essential. In particular, specialists who have gained urban and peri-urban operational experience should be sought.
- In addition to privately owned and occupied land, Planning must also develop an approach for Government landholders to ensure that timely access to public lands is possible during the Operational Phase. Pre-prepared protocols should also be developed for sensitive facilities (such as military installations and consulates etc) to ensure timely access, or assessments by their own teams.
- As general rule, compensation schemes should be avoided in urban and peri-urban situations, as it is considered that the management effort, the maintenance of equity, and the temptation for abuse of compensation, far outweighs any advantage or incentive such a scheme may create.
- Specific multi-jurisdictional planning and associated protocols for the urban and peri-urban centres of Tweed Heads/Coolangatta, Albury/Wodonga, and Canberra/Queanbeyan should be established prior to an outbreak in these centres.

- An exit strategy must be planned as a component of the Alert Phase. Such a strategy must consider the process of “Area Freedom” declaration and the possibility of coincident or recurrent infestation, independent of the eradication campaign. This is imperative with respect to the development of expectations within the urban and peri-urban communities.
- At the commencement of the Alert Phase, it should be anticipated that a range of reports will need to be kept up-to-date. The information demand will be great, and this particularly relates to situation reports (SITREPS).
- Proclamation of quarantine areas will require detailed planning of movement and security controls. Planning must consider these controls in the context of a large population base needing to undertake day-to-day activities.

Planning in the Operations Phase:

- As discussed previously, an urban or peri-urban response will magnify resource requirements. In particular, Planning must consider issues such as the availability of approved valuers, resources with appropriate approvals or appropriate licences for the application of chemicals or administration of drugs etc. In this regards, Planning’s role during Operations will be pest or host specific.
- Planning must also be aware that destruction techniques may come under significant scrutiny and be different for the operational response in urban and peri-urban area.
- Links with the Local Government(s) must also be properly considered by Planning to ensure appropriate local regulations are met (for example, use of local waste transfer stations, working times within in urban and peri-urban areas, and traffic management issues associated with works and movement controls. This also extends to issues such as the compatibility of plant and equipment for local areas.

Planning in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Depending on the scale of the response, Planning will be required to maintain situation reports during the Stand-Down Phase as well as provide decommissioning and de-escalation plans. Within the context of urban and peri-urban response, these will be pest or host specific.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the Operations Function throughout the phases of a response

Operations in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- Peri-urban areas dominated by “hobby farms” or similar present a major challenge as property owners or occupiers may not be connected with the established primary industry extension frameworks or may sell produce through less defined processes than established market environments. In addition, sales may not be recorded.
- Collection of initial details and any urgent tracing (backwards or forwards) may be frustrated by either lack of records or simply the number of small producers that may need to be visited.
- Pests that require “real-time” observation (such as European Wasps) present an even greater operational challenge during the Investigation Phase in an urban area. Immediate access rights to land or ability to access lands may be severely restricted, effectively limiting traceability.
- Although immediate steps to limit spread of the pest may be taken by imposing quarantine to stop the movement of material, people, machinery and equipment into, and out of, the suspect property or area, a large and dense population will present difficulties. In particular, communities

from some ethnic backgrounds may attach specific stigmas to being involved in such activities and their cooperation may be very limited.

- When there is a significant probability that an EPP incursion has occurred, the CPHM or SCC Director will arrange for a diagnostic team to be dispatched to the Suspect Premises (SP). The diagnostic team must consist of at least two officers for legal and Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) reasons. The collection of samples must also be handled with sensitivity, as cultural and other prejudices may create issues for the occupiers or owners (for example in the case where an occupier is looking for an excuse to break a lease). Such samples should be managed and forwarded to an appropriate laboratory that meets the required standards to handle quarantine samples and within a process that maintains the forensic chain of evidence. In the case where a technical expert accompanies the team to ensure the sampling protocol, and that all details associated with the incident are recorded, it is imperative that appropriate identification be provided and that the personnel have been trained in relation to dealing with the public. Initial advice from Operational managers from past events indicates that the least said by the diagnostic team(s) the better.
- Tracing (backwards and forwards) may prove a difficult exercise in urban and peri-urban areas. In particular, registers of animals and plant activities are minimal, although enthusiast associations and clubs may be able to assist.
- Trace forward and trace back must also acknowledge the high degree of movement within an urban or peri-urban community. Rent and lease rotations are frequent (rental churn rate), and real-estate agents or removalist companies may be an effective information gathering and dissemination source relating to tracing.
- Pest or disease specific processes may be best understood by liaising with affected local people. Although industry bodies represent a range of members, effective tracing relies upon detailed knowledge of movements, normally beyond the scope of industry representative bodies.
- All information must be treated as confidential, and the initial diagnostic team must be aware of the need for confidentiality.
- The timeframe for a biosecurity emergency may extend into years. Generally, emergencies may be understood by the staff and community to be short events. As a result, the focus of staff and the community may reduce overtime, and any eradication campaign must acknowledge the need to maintain urgency in response – particularly during the Alert Phase.
- Urgency may be best maintained through effective leadership, and overt senior management commitment. The establishment of defined milestones, or sub-objectives may be advantageous during the Alert Phase.

Operations in the Operations Phase:

- Ensure an incident action plan is developed for field operations (both short term and longer term) considering the complexity of the urban or peri-urban environment involved. These complexities range from occupier or owner availability, security systems, savage dogs, access rights, conflict with land-holders, dealing with diverse societies, and many aspects of logistical planning.
- Although action plans may be best based on moving through areas in “fronts”, such an approach in an urban or peri-urban environment will require a process of addressing the premises which could not be accessed or where access was denied.
- Eradication is the objective of an eradication campaign. Although the role of research and science will be significant, an eradication program must focus on the primary objective. Research and science provides the tools to aid eradication, and is not an objective in its own right.
- As the eradication campaign may continue for years, it is imperative that the campaign resists pressures to conduct itself as an on-going programme of events. Although a programme

approach may fit well with existing lead agency protocols and budget cycles, the structure and span of control elements of an emergency response are deliberately based along functional lines to ensure objectives are set and achieved. An eradication campaign has a distinct end point. The operational need is to keep a focus on the eradication of the pest.

- Local knowledge and expertise must be sourced for operational tasks and supported by robust administrative and management systems. Biosecurity emergencies have a tendency to escalate, particularly during the Investigation Phase, as a result of the discovery of further infestations, beyond that which are already known. This process of escalation is accompanied by an increase in human and other resources. This increase in resources requires robust administrative and management systems. Any flaws in such systems will create significant rework and divert operational resources from the eradication objective.
- Resources will be required on a temporary basis for specific functions and to meet specific objectives. These resources are best acquired in a manner that allows effective disposal at the required time. That being said, operational focus will be difficult to maintain towards the end of the campaign, when the discovery of infestations is rare or non-existent and team members begin seeking other employment. Indeed training of new staff may prove difficult, as it may not be possible to provide field examples of the pest or disease towards the end of the campaign.
- Operational security is paramount, including security of examples of the pest or disease. Security of samples is required to avoid deliberate and fraudulent/criminal reinfection.
- Unlike rural biosecurity emergencies, urban and peri-urban survey and eradication may need to be conducted over more than 100,000 properties, with a range of owners and usage. Information must be current, requiring significant resources and technology to maintain data accuracy. There is a need to align processes with existing information sources used by other emergency services, to reduce the need for customised data collection and entry process.
- Movement control and permits work when those required to use them understand the reason for their use and understand how to use the administrative process that has been established.
- Surveillance of urban and peri-urban environments may also uncover illegal plantings or activities. The eradication campaign must have a very clear policy on the appropriate actions to take with respect to such discoveries.
- Laboratory resources may become overwhelmed if large numbers of samples continually require identification or confirmation. A range of contingency and support plans should be developed for laboratory support.
- Spatial information will be critical to support operational decision-making. Map production, quality and accuracy will impact the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. If in-house systems must be developed, these should complement and be compatible with the lead agencies existing systems.
- Urban and peri-urban response requires cooperation between agencies for surveillance, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Resources, data in particular, owned by Government must be made readily available to contribute to any eradication campaign. This need is more pronounced where complex internal transfer pricing and funding arrangements are established. The community expectation is that resources owned by the Crown (in whatever administrative or custodial framework), be available as and when required during emergency response.
- The use and impact of volunteers may also be considered. Like other resources, volunteers range in skill, levels of training, knowledge, as well as motivation. They may be engaged to undertake a range of roles, including information dissemination at local shopping centres, or surveillance of parks or other public lands. In an operational context, it is important to understand the motivation of volunteers to ensure that their input is recognised and their energies used in appropriate ways. Disgruntled volunteers can present both operational and communications issues.

- In the area of logistics, these guidelines do highlight that in-kind support may be limited or non-existent in urban and peri-urban campaigns, and as a result there is a need to assume that the campaign will need to be self-sufficient. However, it may be the case that the campaign does receive donations. These donations may include time (such as volunteers), or resources such as use of car parking, or supplies, or free advertising. From an operational context, these donations may prove of considerable value and their use must be recognised and handled with appropriate sensitivities associated with the motivations of those providing the donations. Once again, disgruntled givers can present both operational and communications issues.

Operations in the Stand-Down Phase:

- On-going surveillance will be required. This will be particularly difficult with respect to the declaration of area freedoms and the lifting of movement controls. This aspect of campaign will be heavily dependent upon operational considerations being taken into account during the Investigations Phase and the development of the exit strategy.
- In terms of on-going surveillance, and in the context of operations, it is important to recognise the potential for vandalism and the potential need for security in urban and peri-urban areas.
- Stand-Down of volunteers and dealing with the disposal of donations will also require specific operational considerations.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the logistics Function throughout the phases of a response

Logistics in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- As an urban or peri-urban eradication campaign escalates, the need to appropriate SCC facilities may become great. Large office space, or facilities for parking many vehicles etc., may not be easily acquired in an urban area (this is particularly the case with respect to marshalling of a large number of vehicles).
- Jurisdictions may consider pre-determination of a Pest Control Headquarters in major urban centres, before an outbreak occurs. This process may be mapped to the jurisdiction's emergency management framework, and the activities of other emergency services.
- Administration and management requires particular attention for an eradication campaign. Poor administration will hinder any campaign, and lead to the inefficient and ineffective use of resources. The administrative structure of the campaign should be an initial priority upon activation of the Pest Control Head Quarters.
- Administrative processes for financial delegations and payments should be prearranged, critical resources should be pre-identified, and personnel issues dealt with using professional Human Resources expertise. The role of the administrative function must also include insurance reviews as well as the establishment of file and archive systems complimentary with the lead agencies existing systems.
- Logistics should become aware of "out of jurisdiction" resources. This particularly includes personnel and laboratory resources. A formal and active biosecurity peer-networking programme would support such a need.
- A significant role for Logistics during the Alert is to also coordinate the identification of likely LCC sites. This is particularly difficult for urban and peri-urban response due to the potentially large number of vehicles and personnel. In some case, a large influx of personnel can impact the

economics of an urban community during the Stand Down Phase. Such issues should be anticipated.

- Occupational health and safety (OH&S) requirements cannot be underestimated. Specific training will be required for all team members and must be appropriate for the duties undertaken (including personal protection and dealing with issues that may be faced when interacting with the community including public relations and assault).

Logistics in the Operations Phase:

- Provide treatment resources applicable to urban and peri-urban areas. In particular, these may be novel or at least different than those generally used in rural environments.
- Unlike rural responses, where land holders may be willing to provide basic resources or plant or equipment, it must be assumed that there will be little or no “in-kind” support from urban and peri-urban communities. That is, the campaign should be fully self-supporting.
- Although it is often assumed that communications networks in urban areas may be better than rural areas, response campaigns do create communication issues, particularly if large numbers of GSM mobile telephones are used simultaneously, or large amounts of data consume available band-width. Logistics must be fully aware of communications short-falls.
- Due to the complexity of urban and peri-urban response, and the potential for novel approaches to eradication, Logistics should be aware that Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements, and associated training, may differ from a purely rural response.
- Logistics should be aware that the male / female mix of the response workforce may guide logistical issues including such issues as PPE, washing and decontamination facilities and the like.
- Due to the complexity of urban and peri-urban response, particular attention must be paid to ensure employment conditions are satisfied. This includes the need to provide a safe and secure environment, as well as acknowledging the variety of premises that staff may visit and any particular requirements that may result. For example, this may include security checks for correctional centres, or gender restrictions to certain facilities such as women’s refuges.
- Appropriate records and processes must exist in relation to work place incidents. It must be remembered that the declaration of an emergency does not remove the OH&S obligations of an employer, including such activities as site risk assessments and first aid training and appropriate supervision.
- Human resources management and robust supporting systems must be used. Team members should be appropriately scrutinised before engagement (via whatever process), including appropriate reference and police checks. In the case where legislation requires, this should also include “working with minors” requirements.
- It is imperative for a rapid response in the Operational Phase that links are established with existing systems and structures, and that reinventing systems is kept to a minimum. These links can be maintained by effective peer group networking, scenario training and the use of campaign establishment teams, who carry with them experience and knowledge of biosecurity emergency response functions, and who can aid and coach local staff during the establishment period.
- The role of technical and administrative audit and quality assurance is essential. Particularly peer group audit of technical and scientific activities, which provides opportunities for improved eradication campaigns.

Logistics in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Logistics must anticipate the need to terminate personnel, dispose of assets and resources, and reinstate or transfer resources to their point of origin. In urban or peri-urban environments this

may create unusual behaviour during Stand-Down, which should be anticipated. Unusual behaviour may include deliberate re-infestations in an effort to remain employed, or misappropriation of campaign resources for example.

- Stand-Down of volunteers and dealing with the disposal of donations will also require specific logistical considerations to ensure that expectations of the “givers” are met, and to limit any potential for back-lash through inappropriate Stand-Down or disposal.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the public information Function throughout the phases of a response

Public information in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- In accordance with PLANTPLAN, the CPHM assumes sole responsibility as spokesperson during the Investigation Phase.
- In urban and peri-urban environments, it would also be wise to assume that other information conduits may be created which would need to be addressed as a component of the Communications function. In this case, the CPHM may be playing both a pro-active and reactive role, requiring specific engagement strategies and a degree of flexibility. This must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- PLANTPLAN highlights that if symptoms or the diagnosis indicate the presence of an EPP the CPHM will advise the property owner or manager [occupier]:
- That diagnostic tests have identified a possible EPP that may require quarantine controls;
- That all staff working on the incident have been instructed to maintain strict confidentiality regarding the event;
- Of the need for cooperation in applying voluntary movement control on plants, plant products, personnel. If cooperation is not offered the CPHM should explain that a quarantine order can be placed on the property which imposes mandatory control on the movement of people, plants and equipment;
- Of what will happen in respect of national recommendations on eradication and containment;
- Of any financial arrangements;
- That counselling services can be made available to assist with social, economic or other issues; and
- That they will be advised of the outcome of final diagnostic tests.
- At this point, the Controller must anticipate communications initiatives that deal with the owner or manager [occupier] approaching the media, their legal advisors, or local political representatives in the case that they feel aggrieved, threatened, or disadvantaged. A crisis communications strategy may be an advantage in this regard.
- Appointment of appropriate media spokesperson(s) considering the demographics of the urban and peri-urban areas. This could include language or cultural based decision criteria.
- A range of specific urban or peri-urban focused briefings should be conducted. These include briefings to directly impacted industry, police, emergency services and local governments as well as those listed in the Investigation Phase, to inform them that PLANTPLAN has entered the Alert Phase. It is possible that many of the attendees at such briefings may never have heard of PLANTPLAN and its objectives.
- Specific media kits should be developed at this stage, recognizing the variety of media outlets and information conduits available within urban and peri-urban areas. In this instance, it may be valid

to assume that initial contacts from the community will be via the local government authorities, requiring sophisticated liaison between the campaign and local government. The establishment of a dedicated local government communication or liaison function should be considered.

Public information in the Operations Phase:

- There is a need to identify alternative information conduits as established, or “normal” industry based approaches such as agricultural extension officers, these may not exist or be limited within urban and peri-urban areas.
- Eradication campaigns in urban and peri-urban situations rely upon community support. Campaigns must be in constant contact with the community, as well as the affected industry(s), and all levels of Government.
- Briefings must recognise the diversity of the audience and their potential “separation” or different perspectives or belief systems on issues of pest response, such as the use of agricultural chemical in urban areas.
- Activities must include listening to concerns, providing information, and acting upon the information needs as they arise. These activities must recognise the diversity of cultural and educational backgrounds. It is also important to understand that a community is not homogenous, and that a mixture of broad spectrum and individual specific communication activities may be required.
- There will be a need to prepare a range of communications materials, including technical information, interpretive materials, materials in different languages or for the vision or hearing impaired, press conference materials, electronic media etc. In addition, joint state/territory and Australian Government media releases, or industry, or local government, communications materials may be needed.
- Urban and peri-urban communities may also present a broader range of interests and experiences. This will likely include individuals with specific technical and legal training, those with high computer literacy skills, others with political and social connections. These individuals provide both an extensive resource if properly engaged, but also a source of conflict for the eradication campaign.
- Importantly, urban and peri-urban areas combine a range of land uses, population density, demographic (in terms of the elderly, infant and cultural diversity), and complications of day-to-day living. These characteristics present an environment where mass media alone will not suffice.
- Added to these complications will also be a range of existing social and community issues, which may take resources and energy away from an eradication program. It is also considered that whereas a rural community may be more understanding of the need for pest or disease eradication, urban and peri-urban dwellers may not be as understanding and require specific education relating to the impacts of the pest or disease, particularly as it relates to them as individuals.
- Local political representatives have specific community links and also offer a range of existing resources, such as meeting rooms, which may be used to the advantage of an eradication campaign.
- Whatever communications and engagement strategies are employed, on-going evaluation of the effectiveness of the strategies is required, to enable fine-tuning of messages and feed-back to the stakeholders.
- If volunteers have been utilised, then it is imperative that specific communications strategies be developed to recognise the contributions of the volunteers.

Public information in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Communications during the Stand-Down Phase will largely depend on the exit strategy. In particular, Communications must acknowledge issues that may arise from the differences between control, eradication and elimination. Understanding the stakeholders expectations in terms of the performance criteria will be paramount with respect to a successful closure of the campaign.

**Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the industry liaison
Function throughout the phases of a response****Industry Liaison in the Investigation Phase:**

- In the context of urban and peri-urban response, Industry Liaison during the Alert Phase includes educational and engagement activities associated with movement controls and other control techniques, which may be deployed during the Operational Phase.
- Industry participants may have access to a variety of resources and cooperative engagement may create a range of opportunities with respect to novel or innovative approaches to control.

Industry Liaison in the Operations Phase:

- An informed and active industry may be able to assist in addressing community concerns and provide motivation for individual sacrifices. If the community is made aware of the potential personal and industry impacts, a higher degree of acceptance and cooperation may be created for the Operational Phase.
- Taking into consideration the potential range of industry types, industry may also be able to make contributions other than financial support, but expertise, product or other resources. These are issues that may be addressed through effective and comprehensive Industry Liaison.

Industry Liaison in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Effective Industry Liaison during the Stand-Down Phase will be critical to minimising potential negative feedback. This is particularly the case where the industry mix may be significantly varied.
- An effective exit strategy will be enhanced by engagement of industry and management of their expectations, particularly in relation to lifting of movement controls.
- Disadvantages to other industries may occur as a result of Stand-Down. That is, if it has been an extended campaign in a regional urban area, then local businesses such as accommodation suppliers may have come to rely on the income generated by the response activities.