



Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Plan

13 December 2022

Emergency preparedness and response guidelines
for Australia's agricultural industries

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An electronic version of PLANTPLAN is available for download from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan.

Preface

PLANTPLAN provides nationally consistent guidelines covering response procedures for Emergency Plant Pests affecting the Australian plant industries.

Authority for the development and maintenance of PLANTPLAN rests with PHA. PLANTPLAN is endorsed by all signatories to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD).

Many people representing the signatories to the EPPRD have contributed to the development and review of PLANTPLAN.

The original development of PLANTPLAN was assisted by funding from the Australian Government through the department responsible for biosecurity at the time – the Department of Agriculture.

The main resource documents used in the historic development of the original PLANTPLAN document were the Australian Government Department of Agriculture's *Emergency Management Plan*, the PHA and Victorian Government commissioned report *Generic Incursion Management Plan for Plant Industries*, and the PHA commissioned report, *Optimising the Decision Making Process*.

Foreword

Australia's agricultural industries are fortunate to experience relative freedom from many pests that adversely affect plant industries worldwide. Maintaining this freedom is vital for the ongoing productivity, sustainability and quality of Australia's agricultural industries. The introduction of pests can cause serious production losses to plant industries, jeopardise exports of plants and plant products, and have a significant impact on the community, environment and economy.

Australia's geographic isolation and lack of shared borders have in the past, provided a degree of natural protection from exotic threats. Australia's national quarantine system also helps prevent the introduction of pests that can harm agricultural industries, the community and the environment.

However, no quarantine system can guarantee complete protection from the introduction of exotic pests. Rapid increases in overseas tourism, imports and exports, mail and changing transport procedures, as well as the potential for pests to enter via natural routes, mean that relying solely on quarantine measures is not adequate.

A nationally coordinated system of surveillance, inspection and control using pre-border, border and post-border measures is required to prevent the establishment and spread of unwanted pests that may have a deleterious effect on humans, plants, animals or the environment. These activities are the responsibility of the Australian Government, state and territory governments, plant industries and the wider community.

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PART 1 EPP response management

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Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separation of main PLANTPLAN document and appendices into supporting documents. • Alignment with BIMS. • Full reformat.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement restrictions • Communication and public information • Feasibility of eradication (including incorporation of technical feasibility criteria from NEBRA) • Response Plan trigger points • Accounting and reporting • Abbreviations (new table added) • Terms and Definitions (acronyms column removed, definition source added)
2.1	6 Jan 2016	All	<p>Review of sections of document. Sections/topics edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EPP categorisation (flow diagram moved to section 4.1.6) • Communication and public information • Decision on eradication or alternative action • Decision on EPP status (new section) • Terms and Definitions • Appendix 1: Register of supporting documents (update) • Minor formatting and editing throughout for clarity
3.0	29 Nov 2016	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorporation of the Transition to Management Phase (section 4.5) and reference to the phase throughout the document where relevant. • Communication and public information • Addition of reference to phased responses • Terms and Definitions • Appendix 1: Register of supporting documents (update) • Minor reformatting and editing throughout for clarity
3.1	30 Nov 2017	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource documents • National resourcing (new section) • Communication and public information • Incident termination process during the investigation and alert phase • Response Plan implementation and progress • Transition to Management Phase • Terms and Definitions • Appendix 1: Register of supporting documents (update) • Minor reformatting and editing throughout for clarity

3.2	30 Nov 2018	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management of linked and unlinked Incidents (new section) • CCEPP seeking of advice and Scientific Advisory Panels • Roles and responsibilities of Parties • Minor edits to Figure 1 to ensure consistency with BIMS • Communication and public information • Phased responses and Response Plan trigger points • Incident debriefing • Transition to Management Phase (update), and finalisation of the Transition to Management Phase (new section) • Appendix 1: Register of supporting documents (update) • Minor editing throughout for clarity
3.3	26 Nov 2019	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Industry Liaison • Confirmatory diagnosis • Technical feasibility of eradication criteria (Table 2) • Relief and recovery • Transition to Management Phase (addition of subheadings and update) • Terms and definitions (update) • Appendix 1: Register of supporting documents (update) • Minor editing throughout for clarity
4.0	8 Dec 2021	All	<p>Holistic review and restructure of entire document. Key changes include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update of copyright and disclaimer • Update of terms and definitions and acronyms • Revision to the management of PLANTPLAN with all Parts of PLANTPLAN including PLANTPLAN documentation (previously referred to as supporting documents) managed under the same process • Removal of content duplicated within the EPPRD or no longer consistent with scope of PLANTPLAN including information on EPP categorisation, biosecurity preparedness, planning and training • Removal of the stand-alone sections on roles and responsibilities of Parties and communication and integration of relevant content into the phases of a response • Expansion of existing content on the incident management system including addition of description of response centre functions • Removal of relief and recovery as a stand-alone phase and addition of a new section with expanded content on relief and recovery in each relevant phase of a response • Clarification of existing content related to the following topic areas: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Situation and expenditure reporting – Governance arrangements for implementation of Transition to Management – CCEPP processes related to seeking advice from Plant Health Committee subcommittees • Streamlining of content throughout to remove information duplicated within PLANTPLAN documents • Minor editing throughout for clarity

4.1	13 Dec 2022	All	<p>Full review and following key amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Update of terms and definitions• Updating cross references to EPPRD clauses• Clarifying that Owner Reimbursement Costs may also be applicable in the absence of a Response Plan• Adding references to 'Vector' as appropriate• Clarifying that Transition to Management may cover a period of more than 12 months under exceptional circumstance if agreed <p>Minor editorial changes throughout for clarity.</p>
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Acronyms

Acronym	Term
ACPPO	Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer
BIMS	Biosecurity Incident Management System
CPHM	Chief Plant Health Manager
CCEPP	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests
CA	Control Area
EPP	Emergency Plant Pest
EPPRD	Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
ILC	Industry Liaison Coordinator
ILO	Industry Liaison Officer
IMT	Incident Management Team
IP	Infected Premises
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
LCC	Local Control Centre
NBCEN	National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network
NCC	National Coordination Centre
NDP	National Diagnostic Protocol
NMG	National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (National Management Group)
ORC	Owner Reimbursement Costs
PIDS	Preliminary Information Data Sheet
PHA	Plant Health Australia
RA	Restricted Area
SAP	Scientific Advisory Panel
SCC	State Coordination Centre
SDQMA	Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access
SPHD	Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics

Terms and definitions

Term	Definition	Definition source
Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer	The individual, holding the position of the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer of the Commonwealth of Australia.	EPPRD
Biosecurity	A set of measures designed to protect a Crop, Crops or sub-group of Crops from Plant Pests and Vectors at national, regional and individual farm levels.	EPPRD
Chief Plant Health Manager	The individual, holding the position of Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) (or the equivalent role), of a State or Territory.	EPPRD
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	The committee of technical representatives of the Parties convened according to Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.	EPPRD
Contact Premises	Premises (or locality) containing susceptible host plants which are known to have been in direct or indirect contact with an Infected Premises.	BIMS glossary
Control Area	An area around the restricted area where movement is controlled but not restricted. The area is intended to reduce likelihood of the Plant Pest spreading beyond the Restricted Area.	BIMS glossary
Cost Sharing	The process of proportional funding of Shared Costs by Government Parties and Industry Parties, as described in the EPPRD.	EPPRD
debrief	A meeting at the end of an operation with the purpose of assessing the conduct or result of an operation.	BIMS glossary
decontamination	A combination of physical and/or chemical processes that kills or removes infectious agents from media, water, equipment and people. Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection.	BIMS glossary
delimiting survey	Surveillance conducted to establish the boundaries of an area considered to be infested by or free from a Plant Pest.	International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures 5
Emergency Containment	A set of measures (which may include the use of Quarantine) that are implemented by a Lead Agency in response to an Incident in order to try to: (a) restrict an EPP (or a Plant Pest or a Vector reasonably believed to be an EPP) to a defined area; and (b) preserve the opportunity for eradication of that EPP, Plant Pest or Vector.	EPPRD
Emergency Plant Pest	Refer to definition in clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.	EPPRD
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	Government and Plant Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Plant Pest Responses.	EPPRD

Term	Definition	Definition source
Formal Notification to the CCEPP	Occurs when a State or Territory Chief Plant Health Manager notifies the Chair of the CCEPP, either orally or in writing, that an Incident has occurred within that State or Territory. Written notification must be used to confirm oral advice and must be in the form agreed from time to time by the Parties.	EPPRD
Forward Command Post	A field operations centre, subsidiary to a Local Control Centre.	BIMS glossary
Incident	Means: (a) a confirmed occurrence of, or reasonably held suspicion of the occurrence of an EPP; or (b) the occurrence of an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including circumstances in which an investigation comes to a provisional finding or diagnosis that the Plant Pest or Vector is already established in Australia).	EPPRD
Industry Party	Any member of Plant Health Australia that both represents a Cropping Sector and is a signatory to the EPPRD, and Industry Parties means two or more of them, as determined by the context.	EPPRD
Infected Premises	Premises (or locality) at which an EPP is confirmed or believed to exist.	BIMS glossary
Lead Agency	The agency of a State(s) or Territory responsible for leading the conduct of the response to an Incident within their State or Territory. For clarity, there may be more than one Lead Agency (each from a different State or Territory) for an Incident.	EPPRD
Local Control Centre	The operations centre from which all field operations aimed at containing and eradicating the EPP are managed in a defined area.	BIMS glossary
National Coordination Centre	The centre established by the Australian Government Department responsible for biosecurity ¹ to coordinate national and international activities and resource support to jurisdictions.	BIMS glossary
National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (National Management Group)	The group with the constitution and role set out in Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.	EPPRD
Owner Reimbursement Costs	Has the meaning given in Part 4.4 of Schedule 6 of the EPPRD.	EPPRD

¹ The Australian Government Department responsible for biosecurity is referred to as "the Australian Government" throughout PLANTPLAN

Term	Definition	Definition source
pest free area	An area which a specific pest is known not to occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained.	BIMS glossary
Plant Pest	Any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest or pathogen that meets each of the following criteria: (a) It is injurious to Plant Health, Unprocessed Plant Products, Bees or Fungi. (b) It is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable. (c) It is not a genetically modified organism.	EPPRD
Response Plan	An integrated plan for undertaking a response to one or more EPPs that is: (a) in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the EPPRD, developed by one or more State or Territory CPHM(s), endorsed by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG; and (b) subject to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD. The Response Plan may include Emergency Containment actions so as to enable the payment of Owner Reimbursement Costs and Cost Sharing if considered appropriate by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG.	EPPRD
Restricted Area(s)	A relatively small area (compared to a Control Area) around an Infected Premises that is subject to intense surveillance and movement controls.	BIMS glossary
Scientific Advisory Panel	A panel of experts which may be appointed by the CCEPP to provide specific technical information on matters relating to an Incident.	
Shared Costs	Those costs that are shared by the Parties as described in clause 9 of the EPPRD.	EPPRD
State Coordination Centre	The emergency operations centre established at a state level, that coordinates the EPP control operations to be undertaken in that state or territory.	BIMS glossary
surveillance	Activities to investigate the presence or prevalence of a Plant Pest in a plant or plant product(s) (including bees and their hives) or in the environment.	BIMS glossary
Suspect Premises	Premises (or locality) containing plants which may have been exposed to an EPP and which will be subject to quarantine and intense surveillance.	BIMS glossary
tracing	The process of locating plants, plant material, persons, or things which may be implicated in the spread of an EPP.	BIMS glossary
Transition to Management	The undertaking of activities to transition the management of an EPP from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP under a Response Plan to management of the EPP outside of the EPPRD.	EPPRD

Term	Definition	Definition source
Vector	Means any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest that meets each of the following criteria: (a) It carries and transmits a Plant Pest to a Crop. (b) It is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable. (c) It is not a genetically modified organism.	EPPRD

1. Introduction

Australia is fortunate to be free of many of the world's most destructive plant pests that are common elsewhere; a benefit that confers significant advantage to Australian agriculture. An Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) could cause serious production losses, jeopardise exports of plant and plant products or have serious implications to the environment, amenity values or regional communities.

To effectively respond to an EPP, a formal and legally binding agreement – the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) – has been agreed between Plant Health Australia (PHA), the Australian Government, all state and territory governments and national plant industry body signatories (collectively EPPRD Parties; referred to hereafter as 'Parties'). The EPPRD covers the management and funding of responses to EPPs, including the potential for Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORCs) for Owners, and formalises the role of Parties in decision making as well as their contribution towards the costs. Under the EPPRD, beneficiaries of the eradication of an EPP pay an appropriate and equitable proportion to the costs of mounting a response, based on an assessment of the relative public and private benefits of eradication.

PLANTPLAN is part of schedule 5 to the EPPRD, is endorsed by all Parties and supports operational implementation of the EPPRD in response to an Incident.

1.1 Purpose

PLANTPLAN provides nationally consistent guidelines for managing a response to an Incident at national, state/territory and local levels, describing the national procedures, management structures and information flow systems. Each phase of the response (investigation and alert, operational, stand down and Transition to Management Phase) and key roles and responsibilities of Industry and government Parties during each of these phases are specified. PLANTPLAN documentation includes guidelines, job cards, procedures and forms/templates which provide more detailed nationally consistent guidance on response procedures, roles/responsibilities in an Incident or address national gaps in operational response elements.

PLANTPLAN incorporates best practice in EPP responses and is consistent with contemporary incident management systems which are widely recognised and used throughout Australia for managing incidents. This includes the approach under the *Biosecurity Incident Management System* (BIMS), endorsed by the National Biosecurity Committee for use when responding to biosecurity incidents. Further information and copies of the BIMS document are available from agriculture.gov.au.

1.2 Structure

PLANTPLAN is comprised of the following parts.

Part	Name/sections	Description/purpose
Part 1 – EPP response management	Revision history	Captures the details of key amendments made to Part 1 of PLANTPLAN.
	Acronyms	Provides a list of acronyms and related terms used within Part 1 of PLANTPLAN.
	Terms and definitions	Describes the terms and definitions used within Part 1 PLANTPLAN including the source of each.
	Introduction	Outlines the purpose, scope and management of PLANTPLAN.

	Structure and management of an EPP response	Outlines the national and state/territory arrangements and systems in place for responding to an Incident.
	Response phases	Describes the specific actions undertaken and the roles and responsibilities of Parties in each of the phases of an EPP response.
Part 2 – Job cards	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	Provide a written list of responsibilities for a specific role or function and describe the tasks to be carried out under that role or function during an EPP response.
	Industry Liaison functions	
	Local Control Centre Controller	
	National Management Group	
	Scientific Advisory Panel	
	State Coordination Centre Director	
Part 3 – Guidelines	Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests	Provide a consistent approach for personnel involved in a response, and more broadly to Parties in understanding and implementing response procedures.
	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline	
	Debriefing (<i>in draft</i>)	
	Delimiting surveys	
	Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests	
	Disinfection and decontamination	
	National talking points	
	Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	
	Response Plan development	
	Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests	
	Transition to Management	
	Urban and peri-urban biosecurity	
Part 4 – Procedures	Chain of evidence	Provide detailed actions for completion of a specific activity by response personnel and a platform for national consistency between jurisdictions and from one EPP response to another.
	Planning eradication at affected properties	
Part 5 – Forms and templates	National talking points	Provide a format for response personnel to use for a specific task and ensure that the required minimum information or data is collected in a consistent and harmonised manner.
	Preliminary Information Data Sheet	
	Response Plan for eradication	
	Response Plan for Transition to Management	

	Technical feasibility of eradication criteria	
	Situation report	

PLANTPLAN is accessible through the following formats, each of which is available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan.

- The complete manual which consists of all Parts.
- Individual Parts.
- Individual PLANTPLAN documents (job cards, guidelines, procedures and form/templates).

Online links to each individual PLANTPLAN document are also included via cross references found throughout Part 1 of PLANTPLAN.

1.3 Scope and application

PLANTPLAN must be used by all Parties to the EPPRD (Industry and government) in the management of a response to an Incident. Specific terms used in PLANTPLAN that are capitalised (excluding names) are a reference to the defined terms under the EPPRD (clause 1.1). Where there is any conflict between the terms and conditions contained in the clauses of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN, the clauses of the EPPRD will take precedence (EPPRD schedule 1).

Application of PLANTPLAN is triggered by a detection of an EPP or suspect EPP and all Response Plans must conform to PLANTPLAN unless otherwise agreed by the National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (NMG) (EPPRD clause 6.2). PLANTPLAN applies to all Incidents, regardless of whether a Response Plan proceeds.

The steps of a response outlined in PLANTPLAN may occur in a slightly different order depending upon the type and scale of the response. Some steps may also occur concurrently.

It may be possible to merge some of the roles described in PLANTPLAN, depending on the nature and size of the response, the availability and capability of personnel, and the progress of the response.

1.3.1 Application of the EPPRD for near border detections

The EPPRD (and PLANTPLAN) only applies post-border.

Details on the geographic locations that the Parties have agreed are post-border and application of the EPPRD for near border detections can be found in the *Application of the EPPRD for near border detections* guideline.

1.3.2 Management of linked and unlinked Incidents

Multiple detections of an EPP that are directly linked to one another will be managed as a single Incident under the EPPRD.

Multiple detections that are not known to be directly linked to one another should be managed as separate Incidents under the EPPRD, consistent with the requirements under clause 5.5 of the EPPRD.

1.4 Management of PLANTPLAN

Authority for the development and maintenance of PLANTPLAN rests with PHA. To ensure that PLANTPLAN and its documentation continues to represent best practice in emergency management, PLANTPLAN will be reviewed and updated as required to incorporate new information or address gaps identified through its activation, the outcomes of reviews (e.g. Incident debriefs) and/or testing in exercises

and workshops. Recommendations for amendment from Parties or requests for the development of new resources may also be forwarded to PHA for consideration.

Existing technical working groups (such as the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics (SPHD)) are expected to have a lead role in the development and review of relevant PLANTPLAN documentation. However, if no technical committee exists to develop or review documentation PHA will either:

- Coordinate the formation of a small working group with nominees from interested Parties, or
- Use internal expertise (if and where available).

Revision of PLANTPLAN (all Parts) is considered a process pursuant to the EPPRD, so formal amendments to PLANTPLAN are conducted in accordance with clause 16 of the EPPRD. PHA will seek consideration of proposed changes from Parties, generally at an EPPRD Parties' meeting. Following consultation, and if Parties endorse the amendments, formal notification will be sent to all Parties in writing and a copy of the new version of the relevant Part(s) of PLANTPLAN will be made available on the PHA website (EPPRD part 1 of schedule 5).

Endorsement may be sought for amendments to Part 1 of PLANTPLAN and individual PLANTPLAN documents in Parts 2 to 5 (job cards, guidelines etc) independently. Version control for Part 1 of PLANTPLAN will therefore be managed separately to PLANTPLAN documentation with each job card, guideline etc retaining its own individual revision history and versioning to maintain corporate knowledge of amendments.

2. Structure and management of an EPP response

Australia has well established national and state/territory arrangements for managing the response to an Incident. This section describes these arrangements and provides an overview of how responses are structured and managed at the national, state/territory and local levels. National standards for diagnostic laboratories and the management of information in a response are also described.

When a potential EPP is detected, the operational responsibility for responding to the Incident resides with the relevant state/territory government (Lead Agency). The Lead Agency will manage its responsibilities in accordance with relevant national and state/territory plant health and emergency management arrangements (including the EPPRD and biosecurity legislation). The EPPRD provides strategic direction at the national level by specifying industry and government responsibilities in decision making and how the response investment will be shared by the beneficiaries of eradication. National arrangements are also in place to support human resourcing and consistent national communications during a response to an EPP.

Together these arrangements ensure that Australia is prepared to respond as well as possible and can do so rapidly and effectively to significantly reduce the impact of the EPP.

2.1 Biosecurity legislation

Australia's biosecurity system operates under both Commonwealth and state/territory legislation administered and managed by the respective agricultural and environmental agencies. The legislation covers a range of activities involving domestic and international movement of people and goods into and around the country, and the export of agricultural commodities. Also contained within the legislation are other relevant functions relating to biosecurity emergency response and reporting.

Regulatory authority for biosecurity controls at Australia's borders is vested in the Australian Government department responsible for biosecurity (referred to hereafter as the Australian Government). Each state and territory department responsible for biosecurity has responsibility for post-border biosecurity, including prevention, detection, response and eradication of EPPs within and across its borders, and administers its own plant protection legislation.

The plant protection legislation in the states and territories provide powers for Emergency Containment and eradication actions, enabling state and territory agencies to undertake such actions as:

- Declaring pests of concern and making orders for the purpose of eradication.
- Entering properties to survey for pests including EPPs.
- Inspecting and taking samples of plants or plant products.
- Establishing and maintaining quarantine zones.
- Restricting movement of plants, plant products, equipment, vehicles and other potential sources of plant pests.
- Issuing orders for the destruction of infested plant material.

2.2 National decision making during a response

The following committees support effective and collaborative decision making during a response.

2.2.1 National Management Group

The National Management Group (NMG) makes the policy and financial decisions regarding responses to Incidents (EPPRD part 1.2 of schedule 8) and is comprised of Representatives from PHA, government and Affected Industry Parties (EPPRD part 1.1 of schedule 8). The NMG approves Response Plans including all funding requirements if it is agreed technically and economically feasible to eradicate the EPP.

Refer to the [National Management Group](#) job card for information on the roles and responsibilities of the NMG.

2.2.2 Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests

The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) is a technical committee that makes recommendations to the NMG on technical and budgetary matters related to the response to an Incident (EPPRD clause 11.2). Representatives from PHA, government and Affected Industry Parties constitute the CCEPP (EPPRD part 3 of schedule 8). Further detailed information for CCEPP members and observers on the operations of the CCEPP is described in the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#) and the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests](#) job card.

In discharging its responsibilities, the CCEPP must develop a rational process to assess the grounds for eradication of an EPP. Quality technical advice is essential for sound risk management decision making. At any stage of an EPP response, the CCEPP may determine that eradication cannot be justified and will recommend to the NMG that eradication is not technically feasible or cost beneficial and should either not be attempted or should cease. The costs of eradication, overall benefits and technical feasibility of removing the EPP from the Australian landscape are all factors to be considered by the CCEPP.

The CCEPP may need to seek technical advice on specific matters relevant to the EPP response. This will occur by default through the formation of a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) unless there is an existing government or industry mechanism that can adequately address the matter.

2.2.3 Scientific Advisory Panel

The role of the SAP is to provide expert advice on specific aspects of the Incident as identified in the terms of reference agreed by the CCEPP. This may include those related to pest biology, diagnostic methods, surveillance systems, pest epidemiology and control options that could be incorporated into a Response Plan or may be required to inform decision making.

Further information is described in the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#) and the [Scientific Advisory Panel](#) job card.

2.3 National resourcing arrangements

The Lead Agency is responsible for resourcing the response to an Incident. The following national arrangements are however in place to support resourcing biosecurity emergency responses and have been endorsed by the National Biosecurity Committee.

2.3.1 National Biosecurity Response Team

The National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) is a national pool of trained and experienced response personnel, drawn from government biosecurity agencies across Australia who can be deployed to a Lead Agency to provide additional capacity for a biosecurity emergency response. The NBRT is comprised of two cross-sectoral cohorts sourced from the plant, animal, aquatic and environmental sectors. The mentor cohort is deployed to guide less experienced staff from the Lead Agency, and the functional cohort is deployed to fill key biosecurity response functions.

2.3.2 Interstate deployment arrangements for biosecurity responses

The *Interstate Deployment Arrangements for Biosecurity Responses* are a national framework for coordinating the deployment of personnel between the jurisdictions during biosecurity emergency responses. The arrangements are intended for deployment of personnel employed by government agricultural departments (including members of the NBRT) and can be applied whether or not national Cost Sharing under an approved Response Plan is occurring. Further information is available from agriculture.gov.au.

2.4 National communication arrangements

The Lead Agency is responsible for leading response communications and ensuring the public and relevant stakeholders are kept informed of response activities. National collaboration in communications and consistency in messaging is facilitated through the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN).

2.4.1 National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network

The NBCEN supports national preparedness for communication and engagement activities during an EPP response and plays a key role ensuring consistent national messaging during a response through the development of national talking points and national coordination of communications.

Standing members of the NBCEN comprise of communication managers from agricultural health organisations (including PHA) and the Australian, state and territory government agencies responsible for biosecurity. During a response to an Incident, the NBCEN chair will invite communication managers (or an alternative contact) from Affected Industry Parties to participate in the NBCEN.

The NBCEN publishes current information on national eradication programs on the Outbreak website (outbreak.gov.au).

2.4.2 Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual

In order to guide effective communication during an EPP response, the NBCEN has developed a *Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual* which aligns to the public information function within BIMS. This manual guides the activities of personnel performing a function in public information and ensures they understand their role and how each of the jurisdictions work with industry to deliver consistent information to stakeholders and the public.

The *Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual* includes job cards/role descriptions and templates specific to the public information functions carried out in control and coordination centres. The document is available as an AUSVETPLAN resource document from the Animal Health Australia website (animalhealthaustralia.com.au).

2.5 Incident management system

During an EPP response, the Australian Government and affected states/territories (Lead Agency) will manage their operational responsibilities in accordance with relevant biosecurity legislation and emergency management arrangements. PLANTPLAN is aligned with the BIMS, which sets out the incident management system used for managing the 'on ground' response to a biosecurity incident, irrespective of its size or scale. BIMS co-exists with and complements plant sector specific and state/territory emergency management arrangements and guides personnel working within operational response centres established at national, state/territory and local levels. BIMS applies across all biosecurity sectors and is nationally endorsed through the National Biosecurity Committee. The document is available from agriculture.gov.au.

The incident management system for responding to an Incident operates in parallel with the national arrangements (EPPRD) which provides the strategic policy and direction for the response. It also recognises the 'Agency Executive' has a key role in managing an Incident and forms a vital link between the jurisdiction and the national aspects of the response. The relationship between the national committees convened under the EPPRD (NMG, CCEPP), the Agency Executive and operational response centres that may be established in an Incident are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Relationship between the CCEPP, NMG and operational response centres that may be established in response to an Incident (adapted from BIMS).

The management of an EPP response is underpinned by the following principles as specified in BIMS:

- **Management system flexibility:** Establishing coordination, control and command centres at the national, state/territory and local level according to the needs of the response as structure and staffing may vary considerably between emergency responses and during the course of a single response.
- **Management by objectives:** A process of consultative management where the Incident Management Team determines the objectives and then communicates these to those involved.
- **Span of control:** Acknowledges the number of people or groups which can be effectively supervised by each person involved in the response.
- **Functional approach:** Specific functions are identified and used to manage the response (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Incident management functions (adopted from BIMS)

Importantly it is also recognised that biosecurity incidents can vary in scale, complexity, degree of delegations required, duration and the number of individuals, groups, agencies and resources involved. Therefore, the classification or level of the biosecurity incident is identified and communicated to ensure effective coordination, resources and support during a response. These levels are described within BIMS.

The way in which the incident management system is implemented during a response to an Incident and their relevant responsibilities at the national, state/territory and local levels are described below.

2.5.1 National incident management

The centre from which the Australian Government manages its responsibilities is known as the National Coordination Centre (NCC). The NCC's role is dependent on the scale of the response though if required it provides national leadership and coordination in managing an emergency such as an EPP response. This may occur for example in a Level 4 Incident as described in BIMS as follows. Where one or more state/territory are involved in managing the response to an Incident and one or more of the jurisdiction's resources or established arrangements are insufficient for the response and the NCC is required to coordinate nationally available support to the affected jurisdiction(s). Irrespective of the level of Incident, an NCC may be operating to deal with national issues such as international trade.

2.5.2 State/Territory incident management

There are three different types of centres (state/territory, local and forward) which may be established by the Lead Agency during an Incident to manage the response at the state/territory, local and field levels. The structure and resourcing of these centres will vary according to:

- Nature of the Plant Pest incursion.
- Location of the incursion.
- Size of the incursion.
- Stage of progress of the response.

The Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) of the Lead Agency(s) will have primary carriage of a response to an Incident including to make decisions on response actions in consultation with the CCEPP and through liaising with the response centre staff.

In a multi-jurisdiction Incident (linked detections in multiple states/territories) there will be more than one Lead Agency and each will establish the required response centres and work together to lead the EPP response.

All personnel and contractors appointed to positions within the EPP response should be trained in the specifics of the role they will be performing and must go through a response specific induction process. Training is provided by a number of organisations including PHA and jurisdictions. PLANTPLAN documents (e.g. procedures, job cards) and jurisdictional specific materials should be used during training and induction as appropriate.

State Coordination Centre

The State Coordination Centre (SCC) will have primary responsibility for the coordination of activities across the state/territory. The SCC gives specific direction to the LCC however generally should not become involved in the management of on ground activities. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to combine state/territory and local operations in one centre.

Local Control Centre

The Local Control Centre (LCC) will have primary responsibility for planning, conducting and supporting all operational activities within its operational footprint. Depending on the complexity or extent of the response it may be necessary to establish more than one LCC. The LCC Incident Management Team will identify what needs to be achieved by the LCC, how this will be achieved and allocate responsibilities.

These arrangements will normally be documented in an incident action plan which is approved by the Incident Controller at the local level and disseminated to those with responsibility for implementing activities.

Forward Command Posts

Forward Command Posts may be established under the control of the LCC to manage specific field level activities. The Forward Command Post will report directly to the manager of the Operations function in the LCC.

2.5.3 Incident Management Team

The Incident Management Team (IMT) is established by the Incident Controller and works from its designated response centre (NCC, SCC or LCC). The number of personnel performing various functions will vary according to the scale of the response and may change as the response matures. Personnel may be appointed to defined functions or may work within a section of the response providing scope for flexibility. The latter approach relies on staff being multi-skilled across a range of functions. The various functions are outlined below. Further information on each is available from BIMS (agriculture.gov.au).

Incident Management: Responsible for the overall management of all activities within the response centres area of responsibility. This includes ensuring all response activities are conducted in accordance with national response arrangements and state/territory legislation. This function may be performed by one person (the Incident Controller) or in larger scale or complex responses, duties may be shared with a Deputy Incident Controller or amongst a small team of personnel. Further information is provided in the [Local Control Centre Controller](#) job card and [State Coordination Centre Director](#) job card.

Public Information: Responsible for the management of public information and perceptions via the interface between stakeholders and the media. This includes managing the public information generated from and received by the operations centre through the general public, affected individuals, businesses and the media.

Planning: Manages the collation, analysis and dissemination of information in the form of written plans and reports. The function also provides information that contributes to the situational awareness of all those involved in the response and provides operational objectives and resource projections for the timelines established by the overall response strategy.

Operations: Responsible for the tasking and application of resources required to achieve the operational objectives set out by the Incident Management function or IMT. The Operations function will monitor and manage operational performance against the set objectives.

Logistics: Responsible for the acquisition and provision of human and physical resources, facilities, services and materials required to achieve the operational objectives set by the Incident Management function or IMT.

Finance and Administration: Manages the finance, records, information flow and miscellaneous items required for the smooth and efficient running of a response centre. This includes management of and accounting for all financial transactions (those for which a claim for Cost Sharing will be submitted and non-Shared Costs/normal commitments).

Liaison: The Liaison function provides the link between the Incident Management function and external agencies and organisations. Typical groups for liaison include:

- Affected industries through the Industry Liaison functions – Industry Liaison Coordinator (ILC) and Industry Liaison Officer (ILO)
- State/territory departments for biosecurity and agriculture

- Other agencies or organisations (e.g. those that support recovery activities in a response).

The Liaison function is a member of the IMT and is responsible for facilitating access of the Industry Liaison functions and other support agencies to IMT members and promoting engagement with the response centre functional areas. In the majority of EPP responses this function will be undertaken by the Incident Controller or Deputy Incident Controller.

Industry Liaison functions

The Industry Liaison functions are vital to the EPP response and include delegates at state/territory and national levels (ILC in the SCC) as well as at the local level (ILO in the LCC and potentially the Forward Command Post).

The Lead Agency CPHM must invite the Affected Industry Party(s) to provide one or more Industry Liaison delegates to participate in the response centres (clause 11.4.3 of the EPPRD). The CPHM will engage the Affected Industry Party(s) immediately following the detection to enable delegates to be promptly identified. The Affected Industry Party has the responsibility of identifying the delegates and appointing them to the ILC and/or ILO functions.

For responses of any size the Industry Liaison functions will engage across the response centre functional areas (refer to Figure 2) to provide input and receive relevant information. This will occur through direct communication and engagement with the Incident Controller and mechanisms established to facilitate:

- Regular communication with the IMT (whether through attendance at IMT meetings or an alternative meeting mechanism); and
- Situational updates being provided (e.g. through attendance at daily response centre briefings).

More detailed information on the ILC and ILO is provided in the [Industry Liaison functions](#) job card.

2.6 Laboratories dealing with EPPs

During an EPP response it is essential that each laboratory involved in processing response related samples meets required standards and has documented procedures that ensure biological security during normal operation. Manuals containing these procedures should be readily available to all laboratory staff at all times.

2.6.1 Laboratory standards

Laboratories handling suspected EPP samples will be either Class 5.2 (Biosecurity Containment [BC] Level 2) or Class 5.3 (BC Level 3) Approved Arrangements, as appropriate to the pest in question. The Australian Government approves a BC2 or BC3 facility based on national Approved Arrangements criteria and Australian/New Zealand Standards. Further information is available from agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/import/arrival/arrangements/sites.

2.6.2 Control of access to and movements within the laboratory

The number of people allowed access to the laboratory should be tightly controlled. A log of every person entering an area and records of training given during an EPP response should be kept (both as legal defence and as a matter of good practice).

Depending on biology of the EPP there should be an exclusion period for people who have visited an infected area before being allowed to access the laboratory. Similarly, there should be an exclusion period for people exiting the laboratory before they are allowed access to a production area.

2.6.3 Managing samples and recording of data from diagnostic tests

All samples taken for diagnostic testing must be managed in accordance with relevant standards and procedures. Chain of evidence requirements for samples must also be met. An unbroken chain of evidence

must be maintained for results to be admissible in court. This requires that appropriate security measures and documentation procedures are followed at all times. Refer to the [Chain of evidence](#) procedure for directions.

The following (minimum) key points must be addressed when recording data from diagnostic tests:

- Results must record the unique sample identification number.
- Data (inclusive of such items as photographic records of gels, host symptoms from pathology tests, records from automatic analysis and sequence information) should be entered in an approved data recording system.
- All relevant data should be linked to the sample and to personnel who entered the data.
- Results should be entered into the data recording system by approved staff, checked for errors and verified by the diagnostic specialist.

2.7 Information management systems

All information critical and relevant to a response must be recorded in a manner to satisfy an audit. Information management systems and procedures for managing information must be in place to support this. An efficiency or financial audit may be required under the EPPRD. The financial audit must comply with Australian Auditing Standards (EPPRD part 2 of schedule 11) so all information should be of an auditable nature.

The information management system selected for use by agencies must allow for the collection of:

- Owner and location.
- Case number.
- Area status.
- Frequency of visits.
- Statistics for surveillance and tracing activities.
- Staff movement details.
- Reports or information provided by the public or industry.
- Records of expenditure.
- ORC valuations.
- Market access status of the affected premises.

Information management systems may also allow for:

- Tracking of samples and diagnostic progress.
- Generation of progress reports on destruction and decontamination.
- Computerised tracing models.
- Generation of forms for scheduled property visits.

3. Phases of an EPP response

Responding to an Incident is broken down into three phases in PLANTPLAN:

- Investigation and alert phase
- Operational phase
- Stand down phase.

A Transition to Management Phase may be initiated under certain circumstances (refer to section 3.4.1).

The PLANTPLAN phases are operational in nature and describe the actions which must be taken to successfully respond to an Incident. The following should be noted:

- While the phases of PLANTPLAN are depicted as separate events, they should all be viewed as part of a continuous process.
- Due to the potential urgency and evolving timeline of an Incident and response, the operational phase can be commenced prior to all activities in the investigation and alert phase being completed. This may occur for example if a phased response approach is implemented through the early development and NMG approval of a Response Plan.
- The actions described in these phases are not a definitive list and the course of an EPP response may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

3.1 Investigation and alert phase

The aim of this phase is to complete a detailed scoping of the Incident to determine the extent of the emergency and the appropriate course of action. The phase is activated when the Australian Government or relevant state/territory government (Lead Agency) is notified of the report of a suspect EPP and the detection is being investigated. Key issues to be addressed include:

- Whether the Incident relates to an EPP or not.
- Whether the EPP can be effectively contained and eradicated.
- The potential for the EPP to spread rapidly.
- The potential for the EPP to cause significant industry or wider economic and trade losses.
- The potential environmental consequences.

Activities carried out during this phase are performed as part of the Lead Agency's normal commitments. Refer to the [Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed](#) guideline for further information on agreed normal commitments.

Broadly, during the investigation and alert phase:

- The Lead Agency will provide Formal Notification to the Chair of the CCEPP (Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer; ACPPO) as required under the EPPRD.
- One or more CCEPP meetings will be convened via email, videoconference, teleconference or face-to-face and recommendations agreed.
- A NMG may be established.
- Confirmation of the diagnosis will occur by a second independent laboratory.
- Key response staff will be designated and placed on standby to respond if necessary. This includes the identification by industry of delegates to participate in response centre functions (ILC, ILO) following invitation by the CPHM immediately following the EPP detection.
- Precautionary measures will be implemented.

- Emergency Containment measures may be implemented.
- The extent of the Incident will be determined and control measures identified.
- The appropriate course of action (e.g. whether to proceed with eradication or not) will be determined and preparation of a Response Plan may occur (if required).

The activities undertaken during the investigation and alert phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events. For relevant Incidents specific consideration should be given to urban and peri urban biosecurity issues. Information is available in the [Urban and peri urban biosecurity](#) guideline.

3.1.1 Notification of an Incident and initial actions

The initial report of a potential EPP will most likely be received by a local departmental officer or diagnostic laboratory who must report it to the relevant CPHM within 24 hours. Reports may also be received directly from the public via the Exotic Plant Pest Hotline (1800 084 881) which must then be investigated. The CPHM will coordinate the collection of all relevant information and investigation of the initial report.

Where there are grounds for suspicion of an EPP, the CPHM will:

- Formally notify the ACPPO (see below).
- Establish required response centres (SCC, LCC; refer section 2.5.2).
- Coordinate collection of initial details and any urgent trace backs or trace forwards.
- Take immediate steps and adopt precautionary Emergency Containment measures to limit spread of the suspect EPP and preserve the opportunity to eradicate. This may include putting into place appropriate interim quarantine measures on affected properties. Emergency Containment measures may include:
 - Restrictions on the movement of vehicles, equipment and plant material/products on and off the affected property.
 - Interim control or containment measures.
 - Establishment of buffer zones around affected properties.
- Ensure sufficient preliminary information regarding the Incident is collected and documented, and samples collected are forwarded to an appropriate laboratory for diagnosis.

Formal notification

Under the EPPRD (clause 4.1.1), the CPHM must notify the Chair of the CCEPP (ACPPO) within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident (the detection of a suspected EPP). Failure to notify within this timeframe may lead to a situation where the jurisdiction receives no payment for their actions in relation to the detection (EPPRD clause 4.2). Notification from the CPHM may initially be provided verbally however, any verbal advice must be confirmed in writing using the form agreed by Parties (EPPRD clause 1.1 – definition of 'Formal Notification to the CCEPP'), the [Preliminary Information Data Sheet](#) (PIDS) form.

The CPHM in the Lead Agency will advise relevant Representatives from Affected Industry Parties immediately following the EPP detection, facilitating early and ongoing engagement and collaboration.

Preparation of the Preliminary Information Data Sheet

The PIDS details information relevant to the Incident and is completed by the Lead Agency. It must be provided as part of the overall notification process. However, convening a CCEPP meeting can occur prior to the PIDS being submitted to address factors including urgent information or action requirements relating to the Incident.

The PIDS should include all currently available information to help inform the CCEPP's considerations as well as informing the identification of potential Affected Industry Parties.

Notifying CCEPP representatives

The ACPPO must immediately notify the Incident to CCEPP representatives following receipt of the formal notification. This will generally be done by email distributed by the CCEPP Secretariat. PHA will provide advice to the CCEPP Secretariat regarding the potential Affected Industry Parties that will form part of the CCEPP. This advice is based on the host list of the Plant Pest in question as provided to PHA, as well as the Crops represented by the Industry Parties under the EPPRD (part 3 of schedule 7).

3.1.2 Convening the CCEPP

The ACPPO (through the CCEPP secretariat) will arrange a meeting of the CCEPP as soon as practical after receipt of the formal notification. It is not expected that all information will be available for this first meeting, however all available information must be presented. Information that should be presented and issues that should be covered at the meeting is outlined in the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#).

Subsequent CCEPP meetings will be convened as required. The information presented and factors to be considered will depend on the specific Incident and its progression. Further information is provided in the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#).

3.1.3 Situation reporting

Regular situation reports are to be provided by the Lead Agency to inform the CCEPP and the NMG. This includes a standing paper prior to each CCEPP meeting. Sufficient detail should be provided to support situational awareness, to enable the CCEPP and NMG to be informed of key changes to the situation and the progress being made with response activities. A template for situation reporting is under development (*Situation report* template).

3.1.4 Diagnostics

Required laboratory standards for diagnostics are outlined in section 2.6.1. Results from initial and confirmatory diagnostic tests may only be disclosed to the CPHM in the first instance.

Protocols for diagnosis are in section 2.6.3. Refer to the [Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests](#) guideline, [Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests](#) guideline and [Chain of evidence](#) procedure for specific directions.

Where available International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) protocols or endorsed National Diagnostic Protocols (NDP) should be used for diagnosis of samples.

NDPs are standard methodologies for the accurate identification of specific pests or groups of pests. These protocols provide transparency when comparing diagnostic results between laboratories and include information on the collection of samples, diagnostic techniques and often include detailed images. NDPs are developed by the SPHD, validated by independent specialists and endorsed by all Australian government Parties for use in the event of an Incident. The NDPs are available from plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resources.

When an NDP does not exist or a new/alternative protocol to the current NDP is considered more appropriate for diagnosing the EPP, SPHD can rapidly endorse an Emergency Diagnostic Protocol for use in the EPP response. Information on the submission and endorsement process can be found in the SPHD Reference Standard 3 available from plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/work/subcommittee-on-plant-health-diagnostics.

The CCEPP may need to determine the most appropriate diagnostic method where there are no accepted/agreed protocols available. The [Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests](#) guideline includes further information on diagnostics.

Initial diagnostics

Following the report of a suspect EPP, the Lead Agency will arrange for a diagnostic or sampling team to be dispatched to the Suspect Premises. All protocols must be followed as outlined above.

Confirmatory diagnosis

The initial diagnosis of a suspect EPP must be confirmed by a second independent laboratory to mitigate opportunities for legal action and prevent a full scale response to a false positive. Confirmatory diagnosis must be completed prior to the NMG approval of a Response Plan and is only required to occur once during an Incident.

The CCEPP may assist in determining the most appropriate laboratory to be used in confirming a diagnosis. International laboratories may be utilised for confirmatory diagnoses as positive controls may not be available in Australia for many EPPs. Samples must be sent as per the [Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests](#) guideline and the [Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests](#) guideline.

The CPHM of the Lead Agency will notify the ACPPO immediately once the identification of the suspect EPP is confirmed. Once confirmatory diagnosis is completed the detection will no longer relate to that of a 'suspect EPP'.

The CCEPP will meet to review the situation following confirmation of the diagnosis. After consultation with the CCEPP, the ACPPO will formally declare the detection at a national level concurrently with the Lead Agency.

3.1.5 Determining the extent of the Incident

The Lead Agency will coordinate delimiting surveys of the area to determine the extent of the distribution of the EPP and inform the extent of necessary quarantine zones (refer to section 3.1.6). These activities also provide important information to inform the CCEPP's discussions regarding technical feasibility and economic benefit of eradication and assist development of a Response Plan if required.

Minimum standards for surveillance will be specified by the CCEPP to determine the extent of the incursion with a reasonable degree of confidence. Where available, nationally approved surveillance protocols (developed by the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance) should be used for delimitation and to determine if the EPP is present in other areas/jurisdictions. Information to inform survey planning may also be available in pest-specific contingency plans planthealthaustralia.com.au/pidd) or the Contingency Planning Portal (portal.biosecurityportal.org.au/Pages/CPP_Landing). Further guidance on delimiting surveys is outlined in the [Delimiting surveys](#) guideline.

The CPHM will coordinate survey teams to conduct trace backs to determine where the EPP may have originated from and trace forwards to identify where the EPP may have spread. Survey teams must consult with property owners or managers to identify:

- Movement of plant materials and products that may assist in the spread of the EPP.
- Equipment which is shared between properties.
- Personnel or contractors that may have moved between affected and unaffected properties.
- Linkages between affected properties.

Decontamination and disinfection practises are critical to restrict movement of the suspect EPP. Refer to the [Disinfection and decontamination](#) guideline for further information.

The Australian Government is responsible for tracing plants and plant products that have been exported prior to or since the initial report of the Incident, and those that have entered the country which are suspected of having a role in the Incident.

3.1.6 Emergency Containment measures

In the event of an Incident it is important to implement precautionary Emergency Containment measures as soon as possible while the feasibility of eradication is investigated. This may include the establishment of quarantine zones.

Where available, relevant technical information to inform control measures may be obtained from pest-specific contingency plans (planthealthaustralia.com.au/pidd) or the Contingency Planning Portal (portal.biosecurityportal.org.au/Pages/CPPLanding).

Establishing quarantine zones

Outcomes from delimiting surveillance will inform the establishment of quarantine zones and identify the Restricted Area(s) (RA), Control Area (CA) and the pest free area. The size of quarantine zones will be determined by a number of factors, including the:

- Location of the incursion.
- Climatic conditions.
- Biology of the EPP.
- Proximity of Infected Premises (IP) to each other.

Restricted Area – Data collected from surveys and tracing will be used to identify the first quarantine zone known as the RA, which comprises all properties where the EPP has been confirmed (IP), properties which have come into direct or indirect contact with an IP or infected plants (Contact Premises) and properties which may have been exposed to the EPP. Trace back and trace forward information will be considered in defining the RA.

Control Area – A buffer zone or CA is established around an RA to control the movement of susceptible hosts and other regulated materials until the extent of the incursion is determined. There may be multiple RAs within one CA.

When the extent of the Incident has been confidently defined, the RA and CA boundaries and movement controls may need to be modified, and where possible altered in size commensurate with appropriate controls.

Establishing movement restrictions

The CCEPP may consult with the Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access (SDQMA) regarding the development and modification of movement controls out of the CA to ensure that the least restrictive conditions required to achieve successful Emergency Containment are applied. This consultation will occur through the CCEPP requesting advice directly from Plant Health Committee. Interstate movement restrictions of risk items, such as host plants, plant products and machinery, should be risk-based, applied consistent with those restrictions applied to the CA and ideally be nationally consistent².

Where interstate movement restrictions are enacted by a jurisdiction(s) a notification must be provided to the CCEPP Secretariat as soon as practicable for circulation to all Affected Parties.

Control strategies

The Lead Agency will coordinate an investigation to identify chemical controls or other control procedures which may be available for use during an EPP response. This may involve gaining permits for emergency use of unregistered products or for off-label use of registered products from the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority. The Lead Agency will also coordinate investigation of non-chemical control and monitoring strategies³.

² A *Rapid risk assessment template* is available and may inform movement restriction considerations through the assessment of pest risk pathways

³ Refer to the [Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans](#) for further considerations on control strategies.

3.1.7 Communication and public information

During an Incident the Lead Agency is responsible for ensuring the public and stakeholders are kept informed of response activities. Industry Parties also play a key role in supporting communication activities, in particular communication and engagement with growers and other industry stakeholders. Where an EPP is present in, or spreads to more than one jurisdiction, the Australian Government is responsible for the national coordination of public information.

Timely and effective communication with those affected by an Incident is key to a successful response. It supports response activities by helping the community and affected stakeholders understand how to prevent the spread of the EPP, comply with new regulations, such as movement restrictions and controlled quarantine areas and to look out for and report possible new detections. Keeping the public informed also improves the perceived effectiveness of a response and can assist with response recovery.

All communications during an Incident must occur in accordance with the confidentiality requirements of the EPPRD (clause 29). If information related to the Incident is to be communicated to the public, it must be based on the agreed national talking points. To facilitate rapid communication, it is therefore important that national talking points are developed, agreed and distributed as soon as possible following the detection of an EPP.

Advice to property owners

In the early stages of the investigation and alert phase, the Lead Agency will provide all necessary information regarding the situation to property owners or managers that are or will be affected by the response. This information should include advice:

- That diagnostic tests have identified a suspected EPP that may require quarantine controls.
- That all staff working on the Incident have been instructed to maintain strict confidentiality.
- About the need for cooperation in applying voluntary movement control on plants, plant products, equipment, and personnel. If cooperation is not offered it should be explained that a quarantine order can be placed on the property.
- What will happen in respect of national recommendations on containment and eradication and resulting impacts to the property owner.
- About availability of counselling services to assist with social, economic or other issues.
- That they will be advised of the outcome of final diagnostic tests.
- On where they can seek support and further information about the detection.

When appropriate, affected property owners should be provided with a comprehensive explanation of the intended response actions. Affected property owners need to be advised of the potential for ORCs to be paid, noting that such payments are not guaranteed and are dependent on a number of factors including the NMG agreeing to invoke national Cost Sharing arrangements under the EPPRD.

Communication strategy

To support the Response Plan, a communications strategy should be developed to guide communication and engagement activities. When an EPP is present in one jurisdiction, the communication strategy will be drafted by the Lead Agency in collaboration with the Affected Industry Parties. Where there are multiple jurisdictions affected and where the response warrants it, the Australian Government will coordinate a national communication strategy and provide it to the CCEPP for endorsement. CCEPP members must, where applicable, liaise with their NBCEN member to provide relevant technical input into the communication strategy.

The nature and extent of the communication strategy will depend on the Incident and should consider the impacts on all stakeholder groups including local and national industry groups, growers, media and the

wider community. It should also cover all relevant phases of the response and support the objectives of the response as agreed to by the CCEPP and the NMG. Guides and templates are included in the BIPIM (refer to section 2.4.2).

National talking points and media releases

National talking points are prepared to provide nationally agreed, consistent and timely information about an Incident that can be used by Affected Parties, both proactively and reactively, when communicating to stakeholders and the wider public. Approved national talking points will form the basis of the information used when developing media releases, website content, as well as in other public information materials and industry/community engagement activities.

The process for development of national talking points is coordinated through the NBCEN with participation from Affected Industry Parties. All draft national talking points are approved by the ACPPO. Further information on the process for development and approval of national talking points is included in the [National talking points](#) guideline and a [National talking points](#) template is also available.

Media releases should be shared with Affected Parties prior to release and coordinated as much as possible to enable consistent public messaging. For consistency of messaging, communications with the media will be restricted to the delegated media contacts within Affected Parties.

International trade impact and notifications

The Australian Government will consider potential international trade implications, notify relevant trading partners and commence any necessary negotiations for the continuation of trade to minimise the impact of the Incident on market access for affected Australian product(s). CCEPP members should be informed of the implications of the Incident for export trade in the affected crop(s).

In satisfying Australia's international reporting requirements, the Australian Government will also report relevant changes in national pest status through the IPPC where necessary. The CCEPP will consider draft notifications to the IPPC during the course of the Incident.

3.1.8 Decision on eradication or alternative action

There are a number of key recommendations that the CCEPP must make to the NMG in order to initiate a decision to eradicate an EPP under the EPPRD processes (refer to Figure 3). Firstly, the CCEPP must make a recommendation on whether the Incident relates to an EPP (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(a)(i)). Secondly, if the CCEPP agrees that the Incident relates to an EPP a recommendation must be made to the NMG on the feasibility of eradicating the EPP. For the CCEPP to recommend to the NMG that eradication is feasible (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(a)(ii)), the CCEPP must be satisfied that it is both:

- (a) technically feasible to eradicate the EPP; and
- (b) cost beneficial to eradicate the EPP.

The CCEPP does not need to consider the cost-benefit of eradication if the recommendation to the NMG is that the EPP is not technically feasible to eradicate.

The CCEPP is also able to provide advice to the NMG on alternative actions if it considers the EPP is not technically feasible to eradicate.

In making an initial recommendation on eradication or alternative action, some assumptions may need to be made by the CCEPP, including whether:

- Biology, dispersal and host range information is correct.
- Effective control treatments have been identified and are available.
- The cost/benefit considerations are accepted as an appropriate economic risk assessment summary.

- Survey data represents a realistic and up-to-date summary of the distribution of the incursion for risk management decisions.

The CCEPP will meet to review the situation, following confirmation and declaration of the Incident and as necessary throughout the Incident, to determine and make recommendations to the NMG regarding the feasibility of eradicating the EPP.

Decision on EPP status

The CCEPP must make a recommendation to the NMG whether the Incident relates to an EPP (refer to Figure 3); that is, the Incident relates to the occurrence of:

- a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP that is listed in schedule 13 of the EPPRD, or
- an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector that is reasonably believed to meet the definition of an EPP (EPPRD clause 1.1).

In forming a recommendation on whether an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector is reasonably believed to be an EPP, the CCEPP must consider available information against the EPP criteria listed in clause 1.1. The guideline for *Determining if an established Plant Pest is an Emergency Plant Pest under subclause (d)* provides detailed information to assist the CCEPP and NMG in determining whether an established Plant Pest meets the definition of an EPP under the criteria listed in subclause (d)(i)D of the EPPRD.

Technical feasibility

The CCEPP should reach a considered decision on a recommendation to the NMG regarding technical feasibility of eradication given the information available at the time. Where it is apparent that there are critical gaps in available information such that the CCEPP cannot make such a determination, the CCEPP may need to promptly seek further information.

Table 1 lists the criteria and underpinning factors that should be considered when assessing technical feasibility of eradication⁴. The CCEPP should consider all of the criteria, however not all the criteria (or factors within) need to be fulfilled for eradication to be considered feasible. The relative importance placed on each criterion will be dependent on the Incident in question and it will be for the CCEPP members to consider when forming a recommendation on the technical feasibility of each eradication. Assessment of the criteria will also inform development of a feasible response strategy.

An overall measure can be indicated (in column 3 of Table 1) on whether each criterion *supports* or is an *impediment* to successful eradication of the EPP or whether this is currently *unknown* and further information needs to be gathered.

The [Technical feasibility of eradication criteria](#) (as listed in Table 1) are available in template form for ease of completion.

⁴ A *technical feasibility of eradication decision making support tool* is also available and can be utilised by the CCEPP (at the discretion of the CCEPP Chair) for a more detailed and rigorous analysis of technical feasibility of eradication.




Figure 3: Flow diagram highlighting key decision points for the CCEPP and the NMG during the investigation and alert phase of a response to an Incident

Table 1: Factors to consider regarding the technical feasibility of EPP eradication⁵

Technical feasibility of eradication criteria	Factors to be considered <i>Note: not all factors listed may be relevant to the EPP or Incident and/or there may be additional factors to consider</i>	Supports or is an impediment to successful eradication or is unknown
1. Aspects of the species biology that influence the ability to eradicate the EPP		
1.1. Ability of the EPP to establish and spread	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range of climate/environmental conditions EPP can survive/reproduce in • Extent of natural (e.g. wind, rain, invertebrate vectors) and human assisted (e.g. people, equipment, machinery) pathways of spread • Broad versus narrow host range (including alternate/weed hosts) • Reproduction rate, infectivity/virulence • Lifecycle/ability to rapidly reproduce/generate offspring, ability to infect at low inoculum load 	e.g. supports successful eradication
1.2. Ability of the EPP to persist in the environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persistence in soil, water, plant debris, vectors • Dormant stage, latency period and/or asymptomatic infections 	
2. The current circumstances of the Incident that influence the ability to eradicate the EPP		
2.1. Suitability of current circumstances to establishment and spread	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current EPP prevalence/inoculum load • Likely time from introduction to initial detection • Current extent of EPP distribution • Suitability of climate/environmental conditions in the affected area to establishment and spread • EPP likely to be present and persisting in soil, water, plant debris • Extent of host distribution (how wide and densely distributed) in the affected area (including alternate/weed hosts) • Presence and distribution of natural vectors in the affected area 	
2.2. Ability of quarantine and other measures to contain the EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infected Premises quarantined • Pathways and risk mitigation measures known or can be determined • Quarantine areas can be determined and implemented 	
3. The ability to accurately diagnose the EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliability of diagnostic method/protocol 	

⁵ The [Technical feasibility of eradication criteria](#) are available as a template

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitivity of diagnostic method/protocol (can detect EPP at low levels) • Resolution of taxonomy • Availability of diagnostic equipment/expertise 	
4. The ability to find all sites in which the EPP may be present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detectability of the EPP (e.g. symptoms can be visualised or a variant form of an established pest can be easily differentiated) • Reliability of surveillance methodology • Sensitivity of surveillance methodology (e.g. detect at low expression/prevalence) • Extent of host range (wide versus narrow host range) • Extent of host distribution (density/abundance and how widely distributed) • Ability to find and identify hosts • Affected areas accessible • Ability to successfully conduct trace-back and trace-forward investigations • Pathways of movement/spread can be identified • Ability to model natural spread pathways (e.g. wind, water, vector distribution) 	
5. The presence of an effective control method that will remove or destroy all EPPs present		
5.1. An effective control method is available/accessible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Method effective at destroying/removing EPP • Chemicals, traps etc available and accessible • Control method has been used elsewhere to successfully eradicate • Availability of resistant crop varieties • Ability of EPP to rapidly develop resistance to chemicals/control • Effectiveness of control method at low prevalence levels 	
5.2. Control method can be implemented to remove the EPP at a faster rate than it can propagate/spread	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent of infestation • Extent of distribution and accessibility of hosts (including alternate/weed hosts) • Reproduction rate/virulence/infectivity • Persistence of EPP in plant debris, soil and water • Control effective during dormancy • Limitations to timely manual removal of affected hosts 	

5.3. Whether there are control methods commonly employed for endemic pests and diseases, that may limit the establishment, spread and/or impact of the EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chemicals or cultural controls commonly in use in the affected area are likely to be effective at suppressing or controlling the EPP Extent to which establishment, spread and/or impact of the EPP may be limited through common use of control methods for endemic pests and diseases 	
6. The likelihood of repeated introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ability to identify pathway of entry into Australia or out of a defined area of containment within Australia Whether likely pathway is regulated or non-regulated (e.g. entry through natural means) Effectiveness of controls in place to mitigate re-entry 	
7. The recommended response strategy is acceptable to stakeholders and the general public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Direct impacts on industry Flow on effects to allied /downstream industries Impacts on health, community and lifestyle (e.g. cultural and social impacts, amenity and landscape impacts) and public acceptability of control methods Environmental, non-target impacts Stakeholder consultation and support 	
8. Any legislative impediments to undertaking an emergency response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Impediments to use of control methods e.g. environmental impacts Ability to effectively apply legislation Ability to access properties/land 	
9. The resources e.g. chemicals, personnel etc. required to undertake an emergency response are accessible or available	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chemicals/traps etc. available Permits can be obtained Expertise available Work health and safety impediments Logistical impediments (e.g. sufficient personnel available/accessible) 	

Cost-benefit analysis

In addition to an EPP being technically feasible to eradicate, it also needs to be cost beneficial to undertake the eradication. The CCEPP will consider the cost-benefit of the proposed eradication option to assist decisions on response activities.

If necessary the CCEPP and/or the NMG can request, at any stage during an Incident, that a formal cost-benefit analysis be completed by a recognised provider of economic analysis services, such as the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences, to provide assistance with a determination of whether it is cost-beneficial to eradicate. The NMG must approve the cost of the economic analysis if it is substantial.

CCEPP recommendations to the NMG

Following analysis of both technical feasibility and cost-benefit, the CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG regarding eradication. The CCEPP may make the recommendation to do one of the following:

- attempt eradication and implement a Response Plan;
- continue with current quarantine controls pending further information being obtained; or
- take no further action under the EPPRD (refer to section 3.1.9).

The recommendation to the NMG needs to include sufficient detail and justification for the outcome of the technical and economic feasibility analysis to assist the NMG in decision making. The recommendation will take into account the relevant factors listed in Table 1.

If the recommendation to the NMG is to attempt eradication and implement a Response Plan, the recommendation must demonstrate that the Incident relates to an EPP, the EPP has been diagnostically confirmed and that based on the information available at the time, eradication is both technically feasible and cost-beneficial.

The CCEPP should endeavour to provide advice to the NMG as soon as possible to facilitate the early consideration of a Response Plan. At the early stage of an Incident the CCEPP may not know with certainty whether an EPP is technically or economically feasible to eradicate. The Lead Agency may still be gathering information on the extent of the Incident, and there may be uncertainty regarding the full scope of actions required to achieve eradication. Under these circumstances the CCEPP may recommend to the NMG that eradication be pursued through an early phase Response Plan whilst further information on the extent of the Incident is being gathered. As new information is gathered the Response Plan can be revised. Further information on the phased approach to response planning can be found below.

Development of the Response Plan and indicative budget

If the recommendation of the CCEPP is that eradication should be attempted and a Response Plan is required, the CCEPP may prepare a preliminary report to the NMG to enable the NMG to make their determination. However, generally a draft Response Plan will accompany the CCEPP paper which details the recommendations.

The draft Response Plan should be prepared by the Lead Agency in collaboration with Affected Industry Parties and reviewed by the CCEPP. The Lead Agency, with the assistance of the CCEPP Secretariat, may request the assistance from CCEPP members in the initial drafting of the Response Plan. An indicative budget for response activities must be included in the draft and provide sufficient transparency in allocation of costs proposed for Cost Sharing and normal commitments. The Lead Agency should engage with PHA early during the development of the Response Plan budget to assist with this process. The CCEPP must critique the indicative budget and advise the NMG if it represents a cost-effective means to deliver on the response strategy and if the costs proposed for Cost Sharing are above the normal commitments benchmarks specified in the [Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed](#) guideline.

Development of the Response Plan must comply with the requirements of the EPPRD (clause 6) including required content (EPPRD part 1 of schedule 4). Refer to the [Response Plan development](#) guideline and [Response Plan for eradication](#) template for additional guidance on the development of Response Plans.

Where available contingency plans should be used to support development of Response Plan content. Contingency plans provide background information on the biology of a specific pest and the control measures currently available, along with guidelines and options to be considered when developing an effective response strategy. A number of contingency plans are available from the PHA website (planthealthaustralia.com.au/pidd) and component modules are available on the Contingency Planning Portal (portal.biosecurityportal.org.au/Pages/CPP_Landing)⁶.

Phased responses

A phased approach to response planning may be implemented during the initial stage of the response when information on the extent of the Incident is still being gathered and there is uncertainty in the full extent of response activities required for the 'whole of life' response. This approach allows for rapid development of a Response Plan that contains a response strategy based on the best available information at the time facilitating rapid decision making and increasing certainty in funding. As with any Response Plan, the development of robust trigger points for review of the response strategy and agreed funding limits (consistent with the EPPRD provisions) will be crucial to effectively manage the uncertainty or unknowns in a response.

The [Response Plan development](#) guideline provides additional guidance on the phased approach to response planning and the minimum requirements of a phased approach Response Plan.

Response Plan trigger points

The Response Plan should specify clear and robust trigger points for the review of the response strategy and associated activities under the Response Plan. The trigger points are used to monitor the effectiveness of the strategy and its delivery as well as address any uncertainty and/or external factors that might suggest the response strategy will not achieve its objectives. The trigger points will depend on the particular EPP response. Each must be measurable and be monitored by the Lead Agency and CCEPP throughout the duration of the operational phase of the response. Examples of potential triggers can be found in the [Response Plan development](#) guideline.

Approval of the Response Plan by the NMG

The NMG is responsible for making the final decision on the action to be taken following confirmation of an EPP (refer to Figure 3). The NMG will consider the draft Response Plan provided by the Lead Agency and the CCEPP and will review the indicative budget. If the NMG approves the Response Plan, the Incident will move into the operational phase. The Response Plan and associated Cost Sharing will then be implemented.

The Response Plan indicative budget is an approximation of the likely costs of implementing the Response Plan, including the breakdown of normal commitments of the Lead Agency and shared costs. There is implied flexibility in the indicative budget so long as the Lead Agency spends the amount implementing the Response Plan and the amount spent is eligible for Cost Sharing. When approving the Response Plan the NMG must set an "Upper Limit on Expenditure", which may be the amount set out in the indicative budget or another specified amount, however it must not exceed the Agreed Limit for the Response Plan (EPPRD part 2 of schedule 10). The NMG must monitor expenditure throughout the course of the response.

In endorsing the Response Plan the NMG must also agree on a number of other Cost Sharing and financial matters. Details on the responsibilities of the NMG are contained in the [National Management Group](#) job card.

⁶ Information to support development of Response Plan content may also be found in the [Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans](#).

3.1.9 Incident termination process during the investigation and alert phase

Based on the outcomes of the investigation and alert phase, either the operational (refer to section 3.2) or stand down (refer to section 3.3) phase of PLANTPLAN will be activated.

As indicated in previous sections, the investigation and alert phase can be terminated and the stand down phase activated by the following occurrences:

- If the Incident relates to an uncategorised Plant Pest that is not reasonably believed to meet the definition of an EPP, or
- If the eradication of an EPP is not considered feasible, or
- If the investigation and alert phase indicates the EPP is no longer present (e.g. single pest find).

In the above instances, the CCEPP will advise the NMG, providing relevant and reasonable justification, that either:

- the Incident does not relate to an EPP (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(b)(i)), or
- the Incident does relate to an EPP but eradication of the EPP is not feasible (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(b)(ii)).

For the situation in which the investigation and alert phase indicates that the EPP is no longer present (e.g. single pest find), the CCEPP will provide a recommendation to the NMG that is worded specifically for the particular Incident. The recommendation should include that the Incident relates to an EPP and provide reasonable justification for why the CCEPP considers that the EPP is no longer present (e.g. as the EPP has not established).

The NMG will then make its determination (in accordance with the voting procedure outlined in part 1 of schedule 8 of the EPPRD). The resolution should include the relevant reasons for termination as identified above.

3.1.10 Relief and recovery

Relief and recovery is the coordinated approach of supporting affected individuals and communities both during and following an emergency response. Activities occur from day one and whilst some will continue throughout and following stand down of the Incident (e.g. social support/assistance services), others will be implemented directly under a Response Plan (e.g. ORCs), though associated activities should commence prior to Response Plan approval. Each jurisdiction has a responsibility to provide relief and recovery throughout an Incident and have systems and processes in place to support their delivery. Relief and recovery activities will also be delivered through industry and local communities.

Relief and recovery activities that may occur in the investigation and alert phase include:

- Providing information of the response, potential impacts and access to social support and financial counselling and assistance services.
- Working with growers to develop options to support business continuity.
- Preparing affected Owners for the potential that ORC valuations may occur and initiating associated activities in preparation.

3.2 Operational phase

The aim of this phase is to eradicate the EPP. The operational phase commences once the Response Plan is endorsed by the NMG.

The operational phase in PLANTPLAN aligns with the Emergency Response Phase in the EPPRD and where the response is successful, is also inclusive of the Proof of Freedom Phase in the EPPRD. Cost Sharing

under the EPPRD is implemented following endorsement of the Response Plan (refer section 3.2.2). Not all costs of responding to an Incident are eligible to be Cost Shared between Affected Parties. Information can be found in the *Financial management of a Response Plan* guideline and the [Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed](#) guideline.

Broadly, during the operational phase the Lead Agency will:

- implement the NMG agreed Response Plan
- provide regular written and verbal situation reports to the CCEPP
- provide regular expenditure reports to the CCEPP and the NMG
- conduct proof of freedom activities.

The NMG will declare the EPP eradicated where the Response Plan is successful and may appoint an Efficiency Auditor to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a Response Plan.

The activities undertaken during the operational phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.

3.2.1 Response Plan implementation and progress

The CPHM of the Lead Agency(s) will be responsible for overall management of the Response Plan and will lead the implementation of the plan under direction from the CCEPP. The office of the ACPPO will coordinate the national consultation and decision making in addition to any international aspects of the Incident and response.

Guidance for operational planning and implementation of eradication activities is outlined in the [Planning eradication at affected properties](#) procedure.

The CCEPP will be convened as required during the implementation of the Response Plan and will monitor its progress, provide input into communications where necessary and prepare reports for the NMG.

The NMG will be convened promptly as required, particularly during the operational phase, to make decisions based on the recommendations provided by the CCEPP, or as otherwise necessary.

Situation and expenditure reporting

The Lead Agency must provide regular written and verbal reports to the CCEPP (via the Secretariat) throughout the EPP response. This includes a written situation report as a standing paper prior to each CCEPP meeting. At each relevant CCEPP meeting convened following NMG approval of the Response Plan, the Lead Agency must also provide a written expenditure report in the form stipulated in schedule 10 of the EPPRD which sets out the budgeted, committed, and actual expenditure under the Response Plan to date (EPPRD clause 12.2.1). A relevant meeting of the CCEPP may be one that is convened prior to an upcoming NMG meeting (e.g. to consider outcomes of an efficiency audit), following the breach of a Response Plan trigger point, at a mid-Response Plan review point, or any meeting where the CCEPP has requested a report be provided. Once a Response Plan is approved situation and expenditure reporting must also occur at the frequency as specified in that Response Plan.

Situation and expenditure reporting by the Lead Agency will ensure the CCEPP and the NMG receives appropriate notice and information to evaluate the progress of the EPP response and make appropriate recommendations and determinations.

The *Financial management of a Response Plan* guideline is available to assist the Lead Agency(s) to meet the expenditure reporting obligations.

Evaluating the progress of the EPP response

In addition to considering the progress of the response through situation and expenditure reporting by the Lead Agency(s), if any of the specified trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the Lead Agency must advise the CCEPP, who will then review the Response Plan and consider whether the response strategy is still appropriate and whether eradication of the EPP continues to be feasible. Depending on the outcome, the Response Plan may be amended and resubmitted to the NMG for approval, or alternatively a recommendation made to the NMG that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP (refer section 3.2.4).

If key elements of the response strategy are being proposed for revision, the CCEPP should actively consider the need for expert review by a SAP or other means.

External reviews of the eradication program (Efficiency Auditing – EPPRD clause 12.3) may take place as determined by the NMG.

In monitoring the progress of the response, the CCEPP will determine if the eradication activities set out in the Response Plan have been successfully completed and if the response should enter the Proof of Freedom Phase under the EPPRD (clause 5.3.3). There will often be a set minimum length of time between the end of eradication activities and declaration of area freedom from the EPP. Proof of freedom activities may therefore continue for some time until eradication can be declared. The specific activities and anticipated timeframe to achieve proof of freedom must be detailed in the Response Plan⁷.

3.2.2 Coordination of Cost Sharing

Each Affected Party must initially meet its own costs arising from involvement in the implementation of an agreed Response Plan or payment of ORCs in the absence of a Response Plan (EPPRD clause 10.2). All Affected Parties must abide by the Cost Sharing principles under the EPPRD (clause 10.3). PHA is responsible for coordinating, verifying and collating claims for Cost Sharing. Details on the cost claiming process can be found in the *Financial management of a Response Plan* guideline.

3.2.3 Communication and public information

Communication and engagement during the operational phase will continue as described in the Investigation and alert phase with the Lead Agency taking the lead in ensuring the public and stakeholders are kept informed of response activities (refer section 3.1.7). The communication strategy drafted during the investigation and alert phase and implemented under the Response Plan will also provide guidance.

Advice to property owners

The Lead Agency will advise affected and other relevant property owners of the decision to implement a Response Plan and will provide updates on progress and other relevant information related to the response as outlined in section 3.1.7.

National talking points and media

National talking points will need to be reviewed and updated during the course of the eradication response to ensure the information remains up to date and supports the changing communication needs of Affected Parties. The process for review will be coordinated through the NBCEN with participation from Affected Industry Parties and approval provided by the ACPPO. Any Affected Party may request, at any time, that the talking points are updated, and may put forward proposed changes for consideration. Where agreed, the NMG will also issue its own communiqués in the course of a response. Further information on the process for review of national talking points is included in the [National talking points](#) guideline.

⁷ Refer to the [Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans](#), the [Sampling to support claims of area freedom](#) tool and where available, pest-specific contingency plans (planthealthaustralia.com.au/pidd:portal.biosecurityportal.org.au/Pages/CPP_Landing) for considerations on proof of freedom strategies.

Media updates will be provided throughout the course of the response. Where relevant, social media may also be used as a platform to support communication and engagement activities.

3.2.4 Finalisation of an eradication program

An eradication program will be finalised when the NMG agrees that the EPP has been eradicated and proof of freedom has been demonstrated, or that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP. The stand down phase will then commence.

When implementation of the Response Plan is successful and objectives are being met, there will be a progressive wind down of response activities towards the end of the operational phase and the LCC(s) and SCC will require fewer resources.

The CCEPP recommends the EPP has been successfully eradicated

When proof of freedom activities have been successfully completed, the Lead Agency will present a report to the CCEPP (and subsequently to the NMG) and seek endorsement that the criteria for successful eradication of the EPP have been met⁸.

The CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG to formally determine that the Response Plan has been successfully completed and the EPP has been eradicated (EPPRD clause 5.3.4(a)).

The CCEPP recommends that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible

If during the course of an eradication program the CCEPP concludes that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible, the CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG that eradication of the EPP is not feasible and either:

- the emergency response should come to an end, in which case the Response Plan will be terminated (EPPRD clause 5.2.4 (b)(i)), or
- the emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase (EPPRD clause 5.2.4(b)(ii); refer section 3.4).

3.2.5 Relief and recovery

Relief and recovery activities will continue in the operational phase with a focus on supporting impacted growers, businesses and the community. Specific aspects such as the availability of social support services and ORCs (where relevant) will be identified in the Response Plan.

Some of the relief and recovery activities that may occur in the operational phase include:

- Providing information on the response, potential consequences and impacts and access to / availability of industry and government support services that provide practical assistance, emotional support, referrals, counselling and financial assistance.
- Working with growers, industry and jurisdictions to support business continuity, including measures to enable continuation or resumption of trade or transition to alternate activities where required.
- Implementation of ORCs through the identification of impacted Owners and completion of valuation and payment processes.

3.3 Stand down phase

The aim of this phase is to provide guidance for moving from emergency response arrangements to normal business.

⁸ A proof of freedom framework is available to facilitate the documentation of evidence to support successful eradication. Guidance on completing the framework is provided in the *Proof of freedom framework* guideline.

The stand down phase is activated by one of the following:

- The investigation and alert phase indicates the EPP is not present (refer to section 3.1.9).
- The NMG agrees (upon advice from the CCEPP) that the Incident does not relate to an EPP (refer to section 3.1.8 and 3.1.9).
- The eradication of an EPP is determined by the NMG (upon advice by the CCEPP) not to be feasible (refer to section 3.1.8 and 3.1.9).
- Following implementation of a Response Plan, the NMG declares that the EPP has been successfully eradicated (refer to section 3.2.4).
- Following implementation of a Response Plan, the NMG formally declares that eradication is no longer considered feasible and a Transition to Management Phase is not considered appropriate (refer to section 3.2.4).

Activities carried out during the stand down phase are not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD. The one exception is the undertaking of an external financial audit of the Response Plan ledger following the completion of a Response Plan (EPPRD clause 12.4.1). A decision made to enter the stand down phase does not prevent jurisdictions and relevant industries from responding to a Plant Pest outside the EPPRD. The relevant states/territories in conjunction with the relevant industries may consider alternative strategies to adopt following stand down, such as long-term control methods, however these activities are outside of the scope of the EPPRD.

The activities undertaken during the stand down phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.

3.3.1 Review of intra and interstate quarantine arrangements

If the eradication campaign is unsuccessful or the Response Plan is terminated prior to completion, the SDQMA and the Australian Government will consider the most effective methods to support interstate and international trade respectively.

If the EPP is declared eradicated then all intra and interstate quarantine arrangements should be lifted and trading partners notified accordingly.

3.3.2 Communication and public information

The focus of communications in the stand down phase will vary depending on whether the EPP has been successfully eradicated or not. Regardless, the national talking points should be updated in a timely manner to reflect the outcome of the Incident. Where agreed, the NMG will issue a communiqué.

If the eradication campaign is successful, the Australian Government will:

- Advise relevant international trading partners.
- Provide an IPPC notification.
- Negotiate arrangements to reinstate international trade if necessary.

3.3.3 Finalisation of Cost Sharing, financial audit and determination of total costs

All Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the operational phase and provide information to enable the total cost of responding to the Incident to be determined. This includes all Affected Parties providing an estimation of the normal commitments/in-kind contribution incurred during implementation of the Response Plan and other activities associated with responding to the Incident (e.g. CCEPP/NMG/SAP meetings etc). Details on timeframes for reporting and compliance are provided in the *Financial management of a Response Plan* guideline.

The Lead Agency must also arrange for an external audit of the Response Plan ledger account following completion of the Response Plan where the total Cost Shared amount is equal to or exceeds \$500,000⁹. The cost of the financial audit is a Cost Sharable item that is specified in the Response Plan budget. Further information including timeframes for providing the audit report to Affected Parties can be found in the *Financial management of a Response Plan* guideline.

3.3.4 Incident debriefs

Incident debriefs are a critical component of the stand down phase as they provide an opportunity for participants to highlight areas requiring improvement as well as positive outcomes.

Incident debriefs will be held at local, state and national levels following termination of the EPP response. It is essential that relevant personnel involved in the response are included in the debriefing process.

PHA and the ACPPO will coordinate a debriefing in regard to the operation of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to help inform any appropriate changes to PLANTPLAN or the EPPRD.

Other committees (non EPPRD) engaged in the response including the NBCEN and SDQMA should conduct a debrief of their operation and activities during the Incident and report their findings to PHA for incorporation into the national debrief outcomes.

Further information on the EPPRD Incident debriefing process is provided in the *Debriefing* guideline.

3.3.5 Relief and Recovery

Relief and recovery activities during and following the stand down phase will depend on the specific circumstances and outcome of the Incident including whether it occurred in a rural or urban environment and if the EPP has been eradicated or not. Regardless of the outcome of the Incident recovery activities will occur through government and industry and will include continued dissemination of information regarding access to and availability of support services.

Where the EPP has been eradicated recovery activities may also include a continued focus on supporting growers and businesses return to pre-Incident levels of activity through appropriate measures. Community recovery may extend to restoration of environmental and /or amenity values.

Where the EPP is unable to be eradicated, recovery activities will change focus to supporting growers, businesses and the community to adjust to “living with” and managing the EPP. This is one of the key elements of Transition to Management (see below). Communication and extension activities to make growers and the community aware of the newly established EPP and options to manage and mitigate its impact will also be a focus of activity.

3.4 Transition to Management Phase

The EPPRD includes provisions for Cost Sharing of Transition to Management activities in the circumstance where eradication has been attempted under a Response Plan and the NMG has determined eradication is no longer feasible. Not all circumstances in which eradication is determined no longer feasible will require a nationally coordinated program of activities to Transition to Management. The need is considered on a case by case basis and will depend on the circumstances of the EPP and the stage and nature of the unsuccessful eradication program.

Transition to Management under the EPPRD is a structured process to enable transition from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP under a Response Plan to management of the EPP outside of the EPPRD. The Transition to Management Phase will only occur if the NMG determines (on advice from the CCEPP)

⁹ The amount of \$500,000 will be adjusted as at 1 July each year after 30 June 2011 using the change in the Consumer Price Index over the four quarters that have been most recently published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at that date (EPPRD part 2 of schedule 11).

that it is necessary to orderly stand down/exit from eradication, and that Transition to Management (under a revised Response Plan) is achievable within a defined and reasonable timeframe of up to 12 months. The NMG may agree to extend the time in which Transition to Management is considered achievable to a defined and reasonable timeframe exceeding 12 months, but only if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances. Some EPP responses will only require a short period of Transition to Management activity (e.g. 3 or 6 months).

3.4.1 Commencement of the Transition to Management Phase

The Transition to Management Phase commences when the NMG agrees (upon advice from the CCEPP) that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP, and that the emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase. In its recommendation to the NMG, the CCEPP will provide advice on:

- Why Transition to Management is appropriate/required - the gap that needs to be addressed to enable industry, government and the community to be best prepared for “living with” or managing the EPP.
- The potential scope and objectives of Transition to Management.
- The proposed activities to be incorporated into the revised Response Plan.

3.4.2 Revision and approval of the Response Plan

During the period following the commencement of the Transition to Management Phase the Response Plan will be revised to incorporate activities for Transition to Management. This will occur through early engagement and collaboration between the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties. The CCEPP may also assist in identifying activities required to achieve the intended Transition to Management objectives. The [Transition to Management](#) guideline, [Response Plan development](#) guideline and [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template include information on the possible additions to the Response Plan.

The revised Response Plan will be provided to the NMG for approval, on the advice of the CCEPP.

3.4.3 Response Plan implementation

Implementation of the revised Response Plan will continue in the same manner as under the operational phase (refer to section 3.2.1).

Situation reports should continue to be provided by the Lead Agency to keep the CCEPP/NMG informed and assist the CCEPP in its role to monitor the progress of Response Plan implementation. A dedicated Transition to Management reference group will be formed to support the CCEPP in this role by providing operational oversight of activities implemented under the response Plan. The convening of the reference group will also provide a mechanism to support close engagement/partnership between the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Party(s) during the period of Transition to Management. Further detail can be found in the [Transition to Management](#) guideline.

If trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the CCEPP will review the Response Plan and consider whether Transition to Management is still appropriate. Depending on the outcome, the Response Plan may be amended and resubmitted to the NMG for approval, or alternatively a recommendation made to the NMG that the Transition to Management Phase should end, in which case the Response Plan will come to an end (refer section 3.4.6).

3.4.4 Coordination of Cost Sharing

As Transition to Management will be part of an existing Response Plan, there will be no changes to the Cost Sharing arrangements. Coordination of Cost Sharing will occur in the same manner as the operational phase (section 3.2.2), with further information provided in the *Financial management of a Response Plan* guideline.

3.4.5 Communication and public information

Communication and engagement will be critical components of Transition to Management. The focus will be on providing industry and the community with the information they require to adjust to “living with” or managing the EPP. Relevant aspects should be included in the Response Plan. The national talking points should also be updated in a timely manner to reflect that the EPP is no longer feasible to eradicate and that there is a Transition to Management program being implemented under the revised Response Plan. The NMG may also issue a communique.

3.4.6 Finalisation of the Transition to Management Phase

On completion of the Transition to Management activities under the Response Plan, the Lead Agency will present a report to the CCEPP detailing the activities completed under the Response Plan. The CCEPP will then provide advice to the NMG regarding successful completion of the Response Plan. Once the NMG agrees that Transition to Management has been completed (as the activities in the Response Plan have been successfully completed) the Transition to Management Phase will end.

The Transition to Management Phase may also be finalised if the NMG determines (on advice from the CCEPP) that the Transition to Management Phase should end, in which case the Response Plan will come to an end (for example if the Response Plan has been triggered as described at section 3.4.3 above).

3.4.7 Finalisation of Cost Sharing, financial audit and determination of total costs

Finalisation of Cost Sharing arrangements, requirements for a financial audit and determination of total costs will occur as described in the stand down phase (section 3.3.3).

3.4.8 Transition to Management debrief

A debrief should be held either during, or at the finalisation of the Transition to Management Phase. The outcomes of this debrief can then be fed back into any future use of the Transition to Management Phase and to help inform any appropriate changes to PLANTPLAN or the EPPRD.

PART 2 Job cards

Job cards provide a written list of responsibilities for a specific role or function and describe the tasks to be carried out under that role or function during an EPP response. The following job cards are included in PLANTPLAN¹⁰:

- Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests
- Industry Liaison functions
- Local Control Centre Controller
- National Management Group
- Scientific Advisory Panel
- State Coordination Centre Director

¹⁰ Job cards are available individually from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests

This job card outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) during all phases of a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD). Specific details on the roles and responsibilities of individual CCEPP Representatives are also provided.

This document is provided as a guide and does not contain every action that may be required in responding to an Incident¹. Information is not presented in any particular order. Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) are a reference to the defined words/terms within the EPPRD.

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	22 May 2015	All	Developed by Job Cards Working Group. Approved by Job Cards Working Group 22 April 2015. Endorsed by Parties May 2015.
2.0	29 Nov 2016	All	Details relating to Transition to Management Phase and phased responses incorporated. Addition of CCEPP responsibility in respect of financial matters relating to a Response Plan and role of PHA in preparing NMG papers related to Cost Sharing of a Response Plan. Clarification of the role of the CCEPP in the development of national talking points. Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. Endorsed by Parties November 2016.
2.1	30 Nov 2017	Investigation and alert phase; Operational phase	Update on talking points endorsement and clarification regarding Transition to Management, consistent with changes to PLANTPLAN. Endorsed by Parties November 2017.
2.2	26 Nov 2019	All	Clarification of the role of CCEPP in development and review of the response strategy and Response Plan. Clarification of the processes for seeking of advice through SAPs and other means. Reflection of the agreed process that the ACPPO approves the national talking points.

¹ Where the term 'Incident' is used throughout this document, it refers to a confirmed occurrence of, or reasonably held suspicion of the occurrence of, an EPP; or the occurrence of an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including circumstances in which an investigation comes to a provisional finding or diagnosis that the Plant Pest or Vector is already established).

			<p>Addition of the role to determine when the response should enter the Proof of Freedom Phase.</p> <p>Clarification of requirement for all CCEPP members and other participants to complete a Confidentiality Deed Poll.</p> <p>Clarification of the distinction between Transition to Management and the Transition to Management Phase and the role of the CCEPP at this stage of the response.</p> <p>Reference to completion of introductory training courses (BOLT) before participation in CCEPP activities.</p> <p>Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2019.</p>
2.3	8 Dec 2021	All	<p>Addition of CCEPP responsibility to establish clear expectations on the frequency of situation reporting and expenditure reporting, establish appropriate governance for working groups formed and consider the trigger points required for Response Plan review.</p> <p>Addition of Lead Agency responsibility to provide a situation report as a standing paper prior to each in session CCEPP meeting.</p> <p>Clarification of the role of the CCEPP to scrutinise/critique the indicative budget.</p> <p>Removal on unnecessary detail related to national talking points process.</p> <p>Addition of CCEPP secretariat role to maintain a consolidated actions list for CCEPP meetings.</p> <p>Removal of the relief and recovery phase in line with PLANTPLAN (version 4.0).</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2021.</p>
2.4	13 Dec 2022	All	<p>Amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updated references to EPPRD clauses. • Updated definition of Incident. • Addition of reference to 'Vector' as appropriate. • Change in terminology from 'Trigger Point for review of the Agreed Limit' to 'Expenditure threshold for review of the Agreed Limit'. • Clarification that Transition to Management may cover a period exceeding 12 months in exceptional circumstances if agreed by the NMG. • Clarification that the ACPPO (Chairperson of the CCEPP) is a not-voting standing member. • Addition of the Commonwealth Representative nominated by the ACPPO as a standing member of the CCEPP (voting).

Introduction

The CCEPP is responsible for the efficient and effective coordination of the technical aspects of a response to an Incident and is the key advisor to the National Management Group (NMG). A CCEPP is formed when an EPP is detected or suspected to be present and has no responsibilities outside of the EPPRD.

Each CCEPP is unique, and representation is based on the specific pest being considered, though all CCEPPs consist of²:

- The Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACPPPO; Chairperson) or their nominee (non-voting).
- All state and territory Chief Plant Health Managers (CPHM).
- Nominated Representatives from each Affected Industry Party.
- Two Representatives with expertise in biosecurity policy and biosecurity operations from the Australian Government Department responsible for the subject matter of the EPPRD³(non-voting).
- A Representative from Plant Health Australia (PHA) (non-voting).
- A Representative from the Commonwealth nominated by the ACPPPO (being a different person to the chairperson of the CCEPP).

Meetings of the CCEPP may take place face to face, by teleconference, by video link or by email and decisions must be made by Consensus⁴. The Commonwealth provides secretariat support to the CCEPP.

Roles and responsibilities of the CCEPP as a committee

The CCEPP's role is to effectively and efficiently coordinate the national technical response to Incidents, and to provide the advice needed for the NMG to make decisions in accordance with the EPPRD. This includes providing advice to the NMG on the technical and economic feasibility of eradication and technical issues relating to a Response Plan. Detailed information on the operations of the CCEPP can be found in the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#).

The CCEPP has specific responsibilities under the EPPRD (schedule 8, part 2.2), including to:

- receive formal notifications from Government Parties on Incidents;
- determine if the Incident concerns an EPP;
- advise the NMG if a Response Plan is required;
- make recommendations to the NMG in respect of the detail of a Response Plan;
- consider regular reports on progress of a Response Plan and develop a Consensus on further actions required;
- having regard to any baselines of 'normal commitments' agreed pursuant to clause 14.1.2, advise the NMG as required by clause 9.1.1(b) as to the investigation and diagnostic costs that are relevant and reasonable in the circumstances of the Incident Definition Phase of the Response Plan;

² Part 3 of schedule 8

³ Referred to as the Department hereafter

⁴ Refer to EPPRD clause 1.1 for definition of Consensus.

- provide regular consolidated reports to the Affected Parties, and to the NMG, on the status of a Response Plan;
- in circumstances in which the CCEPP determines that eradication of an EPP is no longer feasible, provide advice and recommendations to the NMG on:
 - whether a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate and if so, the scope of the Transition to Management Phase and the proposed amendments to the Response Plan for inclusion of the Transition to Management Phase; or
 - whether the NMG should determine that an emergency response should cease and, if so, on options for alternative arrangements outside of the EPPRD.
- determine and advise the NMG when an EPP has been eradicated under a Response Plan; and
- recommend to the NMG when proof of freedom has been achieved following the successful implementation of a Response Plan.

Specific tasks through PLANTPLAN phases

Specific responsibilities of the CCEPP during phases of a response to an EPP are described below. The actions described in these phases are not a definitive list and the course of an EPP response may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

Investigation and alert phase

- The CCEPP is formed when an EPP is detected or suspected to be present. Following notification of a suspect EPP, a meeting of the CCEPP will be convened as soon as possible to address urgent information or action requirements relating to the Incident. The primary focus of these meetings is the review and analysis of technical, policy, regulatory and industry information to construct recommendations on feasibility and implementation of a response.
- One of the first considerations of the CCEPP is whether the Plant Pest or Vector is reasonably believed to be an EPP as defined under the EPPRD (clause 1.1)⁵. The CCEPP may also assist in determining the most appropriate laboratory for confirmatory diagnosis where required.
- Following confirmation and declaration of the Incident as relating to an EPP, the CCEPP will determine whether the EPP is capable of being eradicated and the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of eradication.
- The CCEPP will participate in the preparation of a Response Plan by the Lead Agency(s)⁶ if required and will review to ensure that the Response Plan is technically appropriate. This includes the following.
 - Providing input into development of the response strategy including to consider whether the strategy requires validation through formation of a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) or engagement of other expertise.
 - Consideration (in collaboration with the Lead Agency) if the formation of a concise working group of skilled members is required to support development of the response

⁵ A Plant Pest or Vector is an EPP if it is included in schedule 13 of the EPPRD or otherwise determined by the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) to meet one of the criteria listed in clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

⁶ The Lead Agency(s) is the government Party/jurisdiction in which the Incident has occurred and are combating the pest.

strategy and/or specific elements of the plan. Where a working group is formed, the CCEPP will establish appropriate governance for the group (clear terms of reference, membership and reporting timeframes).

- Assessment of the budget and whether it contains an appropriate level of detail and transparency to enable the figures to be effectively critiqued/scrutinised and inclusions determined as relevant and reasonable, and above normal commitments benchmarks.
 - The establishment of transparent and robust trigger points for review of the Response Plan.
- If required, the CCEPP may agree to the formation of a SAP to provide advice on specific technical matters. A SAP will be formed as the default for seeking advice unless another existing government or industry mechanism is available that can adequately address the matter. The CCEPP is responsible for providing the SAP with clear, well defined terms of reference. The SAP will form recommendations for consideration by the CCEPP. For information on the general responsibilities of the SAP refer to the [Scientific Advisory Panel](#) job card.
- The CCEPP should also consider early in the Incident whether engagement of international expertise is required to inform aspects of the response. This consideration must address the management of confidentiality and market access sensitivities.
- The CCEPP should establish (in collaboration with the Lead Agency) clear expectations on the frequency of situation reporting. Where a Response Plan is being prepared for NMG consideration, expectations should also be established on the frequency at which expenditure reports will be provided following Response Plan endorsement and these details captured in the Response Plan.
- The CCEPP may also provide:
 - Assistance to the Lead Agency with advice on aspects of diagnostics, delimiting surveillance, the distribution/location and impacts on Affected Industry Parties, and quarantine.
 - Assurance to other Parties that any necessary actions are occurring while diagnostics and other information are finalised and collated.
 - Advice to Affected Parties on international and interstate trade implications.
 - Advice to Affected Industry Parties on actions and information that can be discussed with their members.
- The CCEPP may provide input into the development of communications (for example national talking points, factsheets etc.) as necessary for the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to enable agreed and consistent messages to be communicated to industry and the media. This includes engagement through the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) through which national talking points will be drafted in coordination with the Lead Agency prior to distribution to the NBCEN and Affected Industry Parties for comment.
- Following considerations by the CCEPP, a recommendation will be made to the NMG regarding the most appropriate course of action for responding to the Incident. The CCEPP may make the recommendation:
 - That it is both technically feasible and cost-beneficial to eradicate the EPP.

- The CCEPP will present a Response Plan to the NMG for approval, which will include an indicative budget (approximation by the CCEPP of the costs of the Response Plan including a breakdown of the Shared Costs and normal commitments).
- The CCEPP must propose to the NMG an expenditure threshold that would trigger a review of the Agreed Limit. This expenditure threshold is a predetermined amount which, if reached, will prompt the NMG to meet to determine whether the Agreed Limit for the Response Plan will be increased or another course of action taken as set out in clause 9.9.1. The expenditure threshold must not be set higher than 90% of the Agreed Limit⁷).
- To continue with current quarantine controls pending further information being obtained. A short term or phased Response Plan may be recommended while this activity is being conducted. An indicative budget may be included for the first phase of the response only. Once further information has been gathered to fully determine the extent (and therefore cost) of activities that will be required throughout the response, a revised Response Plan may be proposed to the NMG that includes an indicative budget for subsequent phases of the response.
- That the Incident does not relate to an EPP or the Incident does relate to an EPP but it is not feasible to eradicate the EPP and therefore no further action will be taken under the EPPRD. Note that Plant Pests or Vectors for which the CCEPP recommends no further action will typically be notified to NMG in a biannual out of session paper in January and July (refer to the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#)).
- The initial matters for the CCEPP to address in its advice to NMG are the diagnosis and impacts of the Plant Pest or Vector, its delimitation, technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of eradication.
 - Recommendations from the CCEPP to the NMG must contain sufficient evidence and analysis to allow the NMG to reach an informed decision.
- To comply with reporting requirements, the CCEPP will consider draft notifications to the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) during the course of an Incident. These reports will include details of the immediate or potential danger of occurrences, outbreaks or the spread of pests. Timing of posting is decided on a case-by-case basis.

Operational phase

Due to the potential urgency and evolving timeline of an Incident and response, the operational phase may be commenced prior to all activities in the investigation and alert phase being completed.

- If the NMG decides to proceed with eradication and approves the Response Plan and national Cost Sharing arrangements to fund the response, the CCEPP will provide direction to the Lead Agency(s) on the implementation of a Response Plan.
- The CCEPP will be convened as required during the implementation of the Response Plan and will review and monitor the progress of the response, approve and update communications (like talking points etc.) where necessary and prepare updates and reports for NMG.

⁷ Note that the Agreed Limit is the maximum amount which may be eligible for Cost Sharing under an NMG approved Response Plan. The amount is calculated using the applicable mechanism set out at clause 9.5.2 or 9.5.3 of the EPPRD. The Agreed Limit for a Response Plan cannot be exceeded unless otherwise agreed in writing by all of the Affected Parties.

- The Lead Agency will provide regular situation reports to enable the CCEPP fulfil its role to monitor progress on implementation, including as a standing paper prior to each in session CCEPP meeting.
- The Lead Agency(s) will provide a written expenditure report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP, which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the Response Plan. Regular expenditure reports will also be provided at a frequency described in the Response Plan. These will be reviewed by the CCEPP and provided to the NMG.
- As part of a Response Plan the CCEPP may identify research needs and may initiate, facilitate and monitor to completion appropriate research projects.
- The CCEPP may provide input into the revision of communication materials (including revised national talking points and communication plans).
- If trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the CCEPP will review the Response Plan and consider implications on the response. The CCEPP should consider if the response strategy should be reviewed through formation of a SAP or other expertise to determine if it is still appropriate. Depending on the outcome of review of the strategy and feasibility of eradication, the Response Plan may be amended and resubmitted to the NMG for approval, or alternatively a recommendation made to the NMG that the EPP is no longer feasible to eradicate.
- In accordance with clause 5.3.3 of the EPPRD, the CCEPP will determine when the eradication activities set out in the Response Plan have been successfully completed and if the response should enter the Proof of Freedom Phase.
- If during the course of an eradication program the CCEPP concludes that the EPP is no longer technically feasible and/or cost beneficial to eradicate, the CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG that it is no longer considered feasible to eradicate the EPP and provide advice on whether:
 - The EPP response should cease and the Response Plan be terminated (as a Transition to Management Phase is not considered appropriate); or
 - A Transition to Management Phase is appropriate and if so, the scope and objectives of Transition to Management and the proposed amendments to the Response Plan including the resources required and indicative budget for proposed activities. If the CCEPP is to make the recommendation for a Transition to Management Phase, it must advise the NMG that it considers the Transition to Management is achievable within a defined and reasonable timeframe not exceeding 12 months⁸ The CCEPP may alternatively recommend to the NMG that there are exceptional circumstances, and therefore that Transition to Management is achievable within a defined and reasonable period exceeding 12 months.
- Alternatively, if the CCEPP has evidence that the EPP has been successfully eradicated, a report will be provided to NMG recommending that the criteria for successful eradication of the EPP have been met, and requesting that NMG formally determine that the Response Plan has been successful and the EPP has been eradicated.

⁸ The maximum 12 month period for activities is calculated from the date of endorsement of the revised Response Plan by the NMG.

** At any stage of an EPP response, the CCEPP may determine that eradication is not technically and/or economically feasible and will recommend to NMG that eradication should either not be attempted or should cease.*

Stand down phase

There are no defined stand down actions or responsibilities for the CCEPP outlined in PLANTPLAN or the EPPRD. However, CCEPP Representatives may be engaged in certain activities that occur during this phase, such as Incident debriefing.

Further information on debriefing can be found in the [EPPRD debriefing](#) guideline.

Transition to Management Phase

- The CCEPP will contribute to the revision of the Response Plan to incorporate Transition to Management. Development of the plan will be led by the Lead Agency(s) in collaboration with the Affected Industry Parties with the CCEPP providing input. This includes input to ensure proposed activities will address the objectives of Transition to Management, assessment of the budget as relevant and reasonable and whether trigger points are sufficient.
- The CCEPP will be convened as required during the Transition to Management Phase and will review and monitor the progress of the response, approve and update communications (like national talking points etc.) where necessary and prepare updates and reports for the NMG.
- The Lead Agency will provide regular situation reports to enable the CCEPP fulfil its role to monitor progress on implementation.
- The Lead Agency(s) will provide a written expenditure report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP, which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the Response Plan. This will be reviewed by the CCEPP and provided to the NMG. Regular expenditure reports will also be provided at a frequency described in the Response Plan.
- If trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the CCEPP will provide recommendations to the NMG regarding whether the Transition to Management Phase is still appropriate and depending on the outcome:
 - possible amendments to the Response Plan; or
 - that the Transition to Management Phase should end.
- If exceptional circumstances arise during the course of the Transition to Management Phase, the CCEPP may recommend to the NMG that the timeframe to achieve Transition to Management be extended to a defined and reasonable timeframe exceeding 12 months.
- On completion of the Transition to Management activities in the Response Plan, the Lead Agency will present a report to the CCEPP and the CCEPP will formally advise the NMG that Transition to Management is completed. If the NMG agrees to this recommendation, the Transition to Management Phase will end.
- An additional Incident debrief should be held to capture information from implementation of Transition to Management. It may be most effective to hold the debrief prior to finalisation of Transition to Management to capture observations from all participants before dispersing after the

stand down and CCEPP representatives will be engaged in the process. Further information on debriefing can be found in the [EPPRD debriefing](#) guideline.

Roles and responsibilities of CCEPP Representatives (as individuals)

Specific responsibilities of CCEPP Representatives/members are described below. Note that these actions are not a definitive list and the course of an Incident may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

It is the responsibility of every CCEPP Representative to:

- Complete a Confidentiality Deed Poll⁹ and return to PHA before participating in any CCEPP activities.
- Treat information discussed at the meeting in a confidential manner.
- Be available to meet at short notice.
- Consult within their organisation to gather the required information to provide informed input.
- Prepare for meetings through reading agenda papers, situation reports, Response Plan drafts (if applicable) and other relevant information provided.
- Provide assistance to the Lead Agency in developing the draft Response Plan and other documents where required.
- Provide input into the development and review of national talking points.
- Review and endorse the minutes, action items, Response Plan, financial reports and other relevant documents.
- Respond to action items and email requests from the CCEPP by the date stated.
- Ensure they have the appropriate expertise, authority and training¹⁰ to participate fully in the CCEPP. This includes ensuring they are appropriately authorised to make decisions on behalf of their Party including the endorsement of budgets, Response Plan, judgements on technical feasibility, cost benefit of eradication and other technical matters. CCEPP members should complete introductory Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT) courses before participation in any CCEPP activities.
- Ensure any personnel from their Party who participate in CCEPP activities are adequately trained (EPPRD clause 15) and abide by the requirements of the [Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline](#). This includes ensuring staff complete the introductory BOLT courses.
- If a delegation of authority is required, provide the delegate to the CCEPP Secretariat prior to meetings of the CCEPP.

⁹ All CCEPP members, observers, technical experts and other participants must sign a Confidentiality Deed Poll (planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf) prior to participation in any activities relating to the EPPRD. Government representatives may be bound by privacy provisions under their respective public service/government employment Acts; however in accordance with clause 11.6.2 must sign an appropriate form of Confidentiality Deed Poll (which may be in the form of the current available Deed Poll contained in schedule 9 and available through the above link).

¹⁰ EPPRD clause 11.4.2, 11.6.2 and 15.

- Provide relevant and appropriately skilled nominee(s) for SAPs as required and brief their SAP nominees appropriately.
- Maintain adequate records of time spent engaged in activities relating to Cost Shared responses (normal commitments and any Cost Shared expenditure) to enable reporting of wider costs at the end of an Incident.

Additional key responsibilities of CCEPP Representatives and observers attending CCEPP meetings are summarised in the table below.

Representative/ Other	Role/Responsibility
Chair (ACPPO)	<p>Receive formal notification of Incidents from state and territory CPHMs.</p> <p>Notify CCEPP (via the Secretariat) of the Incident immediately after receiving notification from the Lead Agency and advice from PHA on Affected Industry Parties.</p> <p>Following consultation with the CCEPP, formally declare the detection at a national level concurrently with the Lead Agency.</p> <p>Liaise with the CCEPP Secretariat to ensure appropriate information, situation updates and documents are distributed to the CCEPP.</p> <p>Monitor and progress Incidents through the Secretariat from the point of notification through to formal closing out by NMG.</p> <p>Convene and Chair CCEPP meetings.</p> <p>Communicate recommendations of CCEPP at NMG meetings.</p>
Commonwealth Representative	<p>Present the position of the Commonwealth.</p> <p>Make decisions on behalf of the Commonwealth.</p>
CPHM (Lead Agency)	<p>Receive notification of Incidents in the relevant jurisdiction.</p> <p>Notify the ACPPO of the Incident within 24 hrs of receiving notification and include accurate and relevant information about the suspect EPP and its detection. Note that notification may initially be provided verbally, however any verbal advice must be confirmed in writing using the Preliminary Information Data Sheet (PIDS).</p> <p>Provide accurate and timely advice to the CCEPP.</p> <p>Provide situation reports, Response Plan drafts, expenditure reports and other relevant information to the CCEPP Secretariat for distribution to the CCEPP.</p> <p>Present the position of the Party they represent.</p> <p>Make decisions on behalf of the Party they represent.</p>
CPHM	<p>Present the position of the Party they represent.</p> <p>Make decisions on behalf of the Party they represent.</p>

	<p>Provide expertise and laboratory facilities for confirmatory diagnostics if required.</p> <p>Notify the CCEPP Secretariat if interstate movement restrictions are enacted¹¹.</p>
Affected Industry Party(s) ¹²	<p>Present the position of the Party they represent.</p> <p>Provide advice on industry specifics such as distribution/location, cropping system details and other relevant industry facts pertinent to the response.</p> <p>Make decisions on behalf of the Party they represent.</p>
Representatives from the Department ¹³	<p>Provide specific expertise and advice on international trade impacts as required.</p>
PHA ¹⁴	<p>Provide advice to the Secretariat on potentially Affected Industry Parties and provide Secretariat with up to date contact details of Industry Party Representatives.</p> <p>Present the view of PHA.</p> <p>Support compliance with the provisions of the EPPRD and provide advice to members on actions in relation to the EPPRD.</p> <p>Draft the NMG paper relating to Cost Sharing the Response Plan.</p> <p>Chair SAP meetings.</p>
Secretariat	<p>Liaise with PHA to identify potentially Affected Industry Party(s) for Incidents.</p> <p>Liaise with the ACPPO to ensure notification of Incidents is provided to the CCEPP immediately after the ACPPO receives notification from the Lead Agency and advice from PHA on Affected Industry Parties is provided. This includes distribution of the PIDS immediately upon receipt from the Lead Agency.</p> <p>Work with the ACPPO to monitor and progress Incidents from the point of notification through to formal closing out by NMG.</p> <p>In conjunction with PHA ensure all participants (members and observers) have signed appropriate documentation regarding confidentiality prior to participation in meetings.</p> <p>Inform the CCEPP of relevant delegations of authority received.</p> <p>Inform the CCEPP of notification of enactment of interstate movement restrictions by a jurisdiction.</p> <p>Organise meetings of the CCEPP and ensure all are convened in accordance with the terms specified in the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.</p>

¹¹ The CCEPP may make a decision to refer issues relating to interstate movement restrictions and quarantine to the Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access. This will occur through referral of the matter directly to Plant Health Committee.

¹² For other roles and responsibilities of Affected Industry Party Representatives during a response to an Incident refer to the [Industry Liaison functions](#) job card.

¹³ Non-voting Standing Representatives (two) with expertise in biosecurity policy and biosecurity operations.

¹⁴ Non-voting Standing Representative. Note that a more detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of PHA during an Incident are provided in the [Normal Commitments for Parties to the EPPRD](#) guideline available on the PHA website.

	<p>Inform CCEPP of any delays in processes, delivery of Action Items and reasons for any postponements or re-scheduling in a timely fashion.</p> <p>Ensure the efficient operation of CCEPP business including progression and maintenance of relevant documentation including but not limited to the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Circulate situation updates, expenditure reports, draft Response Plans, NMG papers and other relevant information to the CCEPP at least 48 hours prior to scheduled meeting date where possible.• Draft and circulate action items/outcomes, minutes, talking points, NMG papers and other information items arising from meetings to all CCEPP members.• Coordinate the completion of action items through liaison with CCEPP members, including where relevant, through maintenance of a consolidated CCEPP meetings action list.• Coordinate and collate responses to out of session meetings of the CCEPP.• Collate responses to CCEPP emails and tabulate member responses for distribution to CCEPP members.
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Further information

Further information on the roles and responsibilities of the CCEPP as a committee and its representatives can be found through the Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT)
planthealthaustralia.com.au/resources/training/biosecurity-online-training/.

Industry Liaison functions

This job card outlines the responsibilities, skills and knowledge requirements of the Industry Liaison functions during all phases of a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD).

This document is provided as a guide and does not contain every action that may be required in responding to the detection of an EPP. Information is not presented in any particular order. Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) are a reference to the defined words/terms within the EPPRD.

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	26 Nov 2019	All	New document developed by Plant Health Australia. Parties endorsed the new job card in November 2019 and noted that the <i>Industry representatives</i> job card (Version 1.0, 5 Dec 2013) would be archived.
1.1	13 Dec 2022	3.2, 8	Update name of BOLT course. Update to terms and definitions to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022.

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1. Purpose of the Industry Liaison functions

The Industry Liaison functions are vital to the EPP response and include delegates at the following levels:

- State/territory and national levels – Industry Liaison Coordinator (ILC) in the State Coordinator Centre (SCC)
- Local level – Industry Liaison Officer (ILO) in the Local Control Centre (LCC) and potentially the Forward Command Post(s) (FCP).

The primary purpose of these functions is to provide the link between the Incident Management Team (IMT) in the SCC or LCC and the affected industry Cropping Sector. Key outcomes to be achieved include:

- Contributing to decision making in the response centre(s) through providing the affected industry position on aspects of the response
- Informing the response strategy and actions through providing advice on the industry sector and potential impacts of response actions
- Supporting industry communication and engagement activities.

2. Appointment and attendance in the response centres

The Lead Agency Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) must invite the Affected Industry Party(s) to provide one or more Industry Liaison delegates to participate in the response centres (clause 11.4.3 of the EPPRD). The Affected Industry Party has the responsibility of identifying the delegates and appointing them to the ILC and/or ILO functions. Appointed delegates are responsible to the Affected Industry Party and ideally will be employed under the employment conditions of that organisation.

The scale, complexity and specific needs of the response will inform the resourcing requirements and whether one or more delegates are appointed to fulfil the ILC and/or ILO functions (refer section 6). Once appointed, the Lead Agency will arrange their attendance in the response centres as soon as practically possible, and ensure they receive an induction.

In some circumstances the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Party may discuss and determine that the responsibilities of the function can be fulfilled remotely (e.g. a small scale response with limited industry impact). Ideally however the Industry Liaison delegates will be physically present in the response centres from early in the response. This will facilitate the establishment of ongoing mechanisms of communication with the Incident Manager, IMT and other relevant staff. As the response advances it may then be more efficient for the ILC and/or ILO to fulfil their responsibilities remotely. In all cases it will be critical for the Lead Agency to work with the Industry Liaison delegates to identify and establish the mechanisms for regular engagement between the ILC/ILO and key response centre staff (refer to section 5).

3. Skills, knowledge and other requirements

3.1. Skills and knowledge

The ILC and ILO delegates must have the skills and knowledge required to effectively perform the ILC or ILO function or the ability to quickly attain them.

The following key skills and knowledge requirements relate to both the ILC and ILO functions unless specified otherwise:

- Extensive knowledge and understanding of the structure and operations of the industry nationally and in the relevant state/territory (ILC) or locally/regionally (ILO), including for example; size, distribution, cropping cycle, business practices, supply chain operations, sources of supply, marketing practices, industry capacity
- Strong leadership skills and recognition within the relevant industry groups/organisations as their appointee
- Well established networks within the industry
- Well developed interpersonal, networking and negotiation skills
- Well developed written and verbal communication and engagement skills
- Understanding of the policy making structures and processes of the industry
- Awareness of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN
- Ability to exercise initiative and determine priorities that support national and state/territory (ILC) or local/regional (ILO) industry objectives
- Where possible, basic knowledge of emergency response structures and operations and/or experience in previous responses.

3.2. Other requirements

In addition to the relevant skills and knowledge, other requirements of the delegates appointed to the ILC and ILO functions include:

- Authority to present the position/view of the Industry Party (or the ability to rapidly gain the authority or position/view from the Party)
- Availability at short notice
- Appreciation and awareness of confidentiality in a response
- Have completed the following Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT) courses:
 - Plant Biosecurity in Australia
 - National EPP Response Management
- Where possible, have completed Industry Liaison training

4. Responsibilities and tasks

The key responsibilities and tasks of the ILC and ILO functions are similar to each other, with the key difference being that the ILC is more strategically and nationally/state/territory focussed compared to the operational and local/regional focus of the ILO. This is due to the specific roles of the response centres that each function is situated in - ILC in the SCC and ILO in the LCC/FCP. Whilst the SCC sets the strategic direction of the response at the state/territory and national level, the LCC manages operational aspects at the local/regional level and the FCP manages local field activities.

The following are the key responsibilities and tasks of the Industry Liaison functions, noting that the specific activities may differ from one response to another due to variations in scale and complexity.

4.1. Industry Liaison Coordinator

The following are key responsibilities and tasks of the ILC:

- Provide information and knowledge on the industry to inform decisions on the response strategy. This may involve seeking input from industry experts. Tasks may include:
 - Provide information on the size and distribution of the industry, production systems, business practices, supply chain operations and sources of supply; locally, regionally and nationally
 - Assist with the identification of options for EPP control, methods to mitigate risk of spread, protocols to enable product movement, surveillance and tracing methods and decontamination protocols and advise on their practicality and potential resulting impacts on the industry
- Consult with industry stakeholders on the response strategy, operations/actions and progress of the response including to:
 - Identify impacts and consequences of response operations/actions (e.g. impact of control measures, movement restrictions)
 - Inform of the status and progress of the response
 - Gather feedback on the progress of the response
 - Identify emerging issues relevant to the SCC
- Present the position/view of the relevant Affected Industry Party to inform decisions on response strategy
- Participate in the development and review of the Response Plan
- Participate in implementation of aspects the Response Plan as appropriate
- Assist in the identification of operational resources nationally and at the state/territory level
- Assist with and guide national and state/territory wide communication and engagement activities to keep industry stakeholders informed and help promote support for the response and cooperation with operations/actions. Tasks may include:
 - Participate in meetings with industry stakeholders
 - Input into/advice on strategies/methods for communication and dissemination of communication materials
 - Input into/advice on communication materials
 - Advice to property owners
 - Engagement with and dissemination of information to industry stakeholders
- Work effectively with and maintain two-way information flow with the following key personnel. Note, engagement should be regular and where required structured through face to face and/or teleconference meetings.

- ILO and other ILC in a multi-jurisdictional response
 - Industry Party representatives (e.g. CCEPP, NMG representatives, media spokesperson)
 - SCC Incident Manager
 - SCC Liaison Manager
 - Other members of the IMT in the SCC (e.g. Planning Manager, Public Information Manager)
- Supporting recovery aspects throughout the response as considered relevant. This may include providing advice on industry recovery/support services available.

4.2. Industry Liaison Officer

The following are key responsibilities and tasks of the ILO:

- Provide information and knowledge on the industry to inform decisions response operations/actions. This may involve seeking input from industry experts. Tasks may include:
 - Provide information on the size and distribution of the industry, production systems, business practices, supply chain operations and sources of supply at the local/regional level
 - Assist with the identification of options for EPP control, methods to mitigate risk of spread, protocols to enable product movement, surveillance and tracing methods and decontamination protocols and advise on their practicality and potential resulting impacts on the industry
- Consult with industry stakeholders on the response strategy, operations/actions and progress of the response including to:
 - Identify impacts and consequences of response operations/actions (e.g. impact of control measures, movement restrictions)
 - Inform of the status and progress of the response
 - Gather feedback on the progress of the response
 - Identify emerging issues relevant to the LCC and/or FCP
- Present the position/view of the relevant Affected Industry Party to inform decisions on response operations/actions
- Participate in operational implementation of the Response Plan as appropriate
- Assist in the identification of operational resources at the regional/local level
- Assist with and guide local/regional communication and engagement activities to keep industry stakeholders informed, and promote support for the response and cooperation with operations/actions. Tasks may include:
 - Participate in meetings with industry stakeholders
 - Input into/advice on strategies/methods for communication and dissemination of communication materials
 - Input into/advice on communication materials

- Advice to property owners
 - Engagement with and dissemination of information to industry stakeholders
- Work effectively with and maintain two-way information flow with the following key personnel.
 - ILC and other ILOs (e.g. in FCP)
 - Industry Party CCEPP representative and media spokesperson
 - LCC Incident Manager
 - LCC Liaison Manager
 - Other members of the IMT in the LCC (e.g. Planning Manager, Public Information Manager)
- Supporting recovery aspects throughout the response as considered relevant. This may include providing advice on industry recovery/support services available.

5. Integration into the response centre structure

To effectively fulfil its responsibilities the Industry Liaison functions will be fully integrated into response centre structure and operations, including to liaise across the functional areas to provide input and receive relevant information. This will occur through working directly with the Incident Manager and Liaison Manager (if appointed) as part of the IMT and additional mechanisms established to facilitate:

- Regular communication with the IMT, either through attendance at IMT meetings or an alternative, dedicated meeting mechanism established; and
- Situational updates being provided; for example, through attendance at response centre briefings.

In addition, where both ILC and ILO delegates are appointed they must work closely together. Regular contact and clear lines of communication with the Affected Industry Party will also be critical for the ILC and ILO to effectively fulfil their responsibilities.

A potential model for liaison and engagement is dedicated scheduled meetings (teleconference, videoconference or face or face) between the Industry Liaison delegates (ILC, ILO), Affected Industry Party representatives, agency executive, the CPHM, Incident Manager and other relevant members of the IMT. This model can also be implemented for situations where the Industry Liaison functions fulfil their responsibilities remotely, for instance when the response has transitioned to a longer-term dedicated eradication program or in small scale responses.

6. Incident classification/level and organisational structures

The incident management system used for managing the national response to biosecurity incidents is flexible and accommodates variations in scale, complexity and degree of delegations, numbers and duration of individuals and resources required. To reflect the scale and complexity of the Incident and help to ensure effective coordination, resourcing and support, the classification or level of the Incident will be

identified by the Lead Agency. These levels are described in the Biosecurity Incident Management System (BIMS)¹.

The Incident level and specific needs of the response will inform the resourcing requirements for the Industry Liaison functions. For small scale responses only one delegate may be appointed to fulfil the responsibilities of both ILC and ILO functions, for example, if situated in a combined SCC/LCC (refer Figure 1). For large scale responses in which a fully functional SCC and LCC(s) are established, delegates will ideally be appointed to each of the ILC and ILO functions (refer Figure 2).

The Incident level will also inform the resourcing requirements for the Liaison function. This function is a member of the IMT and is responsible for facilitating access of the Industry Liaison functions and other support agencies to IMT members and promoting engagement with the response centre functional areas. In most responses this function is undertaken by the Incident Manager or Deputy Incident Manager (refer Figure 1); however in a large scale response dedicated personnel may be appointed to this function (refer Figure 2).




Figure 1: Potential organisational structure for a small scale (level 1) Incident (adapted from BIMS). In this example all activities are managed from a combined SCC/LCC. Only one delegate is required for the Industry Liaison function and undertakes the relevant responsibilities of both the ILC and ILO. The Incident Manager undertakes all other functions (including Liaison) except for the Public Information, Operations, Planning and Logistics functions which have been delegated to three individuals to manage, supported by additional personnel (not depicted in the Figure).

¹ Available from agriculture.gov.au




Figure 2: Potential organisational structure for a large scale (level 3) Incident (adapted from BIMS). In this example all functional areas are fully resourced with dedicated personnel in a fully operational SCC, one or more LCCs and FCPs. Dedicated staff are appointed to the Liaison function and serve to coordinate the access of the ILC and ILO to the functional areas in the SCC and LCC respectively.

7. Abbreviations

Term	Acronym
BIMS	Biosecurity Incident Management System
BOLT	Biosecurity Online Training
CCEPP	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests
CPHM	Chief Plant Health Manager
EPP	Emergency Plant Pest
EPPRD	Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
FCP	Forward Command Post
IMT	Incident Management Team
ILC	Industry Liaison Coordinator
ILO	Industry Liaison Officer
LCC	Local Control Centre
NMG	National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group
PHA	Plant Health Australia
SCC	State Coordination Centre

8. Terms and definitions

EPPRD defined terms and proper nouns have been capitalised.

Term	Definition
Chief Plant Health Manager	The individual holding the position of Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM), or the equivalent role, of a State or Territory.
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	The committee of technical representatives of the Parties convened according to Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.
Emergency Plant Pest	As defined in the EPPRD.
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	Government and Plant Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Plant Pest Responses.
Forward Command Post	A field operations centre, subsidiary to a Local Control Centre.
Incident	<p>(a) Means: a confirmed occurrence of, or reasonably held suspicion of the occurrence of an EPP; or</p> <p>(b) the occurrence of an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including circumstances in which an investigation comes to the provisional finding or diagnosis that the Plant Pest or Vector is established in Australia).</p>
Incident Management Team	<p>Normally comprises the Incident Manager, Operations Manager, Planning Manager, Logistics Manager and Public Information Manager however other specialists may be included when necessary.</p> <p>Ensures that a response to an Incident is properly planned, adequately resourced, suitably implemented, effective and efficient.</p>
Industry Party	Any member of Plant Health Australia that both represents a Cropping Sector and is a signatory to the EPPRD, and Industry Parties means two or more of them, as determined by the context.
Lead Agency	The agency of the State(s) or Territory responsible for leading the conduct of the response to an Incident within their State or Territory. For clarity, there may more than one Lead Agency (each from a different State or Territory) for an Incident.
Local Control Centre	The operations centre from which all field operations aimed at containing and eradicating the EPP are managed in a defined area.
National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (National Management Group)	The group with the constitution and role set out in Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.
Response Plan	<p>An integrated plan for undertaking a response to one or more EPPs that is:</p> <p>(a) in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the EPPRD, developed by one or more State or Territory CPHM(s), endorsed by the</p>

Term	Definition
	<p>CCEPP and approved by the NMG; and</p> <p>(b) subject to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD.</p> <p>The Response Plan may include Emergency Containment actions so as to enable the payment of Owner Reimbursement Costs and Cost Sharing if considered appropriate by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG.</p>
State Coordination Centre	<p>The emergency operations centre established at a state level, that coordinates the EPP control operations to be undertaken in that state or territory.</p>

Local Control Centre Controller

This job card outlines the responsibilities of the Local Control Centre (LCC) Controller during all phases of a response to an Emergency Plant Pest under the EPPRD.

This checklist is provided as a guide and does not contain every action that may be required in responding to an emergency/incident. The checklist is not in any particular order.

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 1 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). SPCHQ/LPCC changed to SCC/LCC, and Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.

Roles and responsibilities

- Develop a detailed program for eradication, control and surveillance activities within the Restricted Area (RA) and other areas as defined by the Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM), in accordance with PLANTPLAN and/or with plans determined by the CPHM.
- On approval from the CPHM, implement and manage the campaign in the RA (and other areas as defined) including task analysis, priority setting and resource estimation and allocation.
- Ensure that the State Coordination Centre (SCC) is advised of the progress of the program.
- Ensure that activities are technically sound, lawful and cost-effective.
- Ensure effective management of staff and resources (physical and financial).
- Monitor the progress of the campaign and obtain authorisation from the SCC for modifications as required.
- Maintain contact with emergency service organisations, industry, the local media and relevant government departments.

Specific tasks through PLANTPLAN phases

Investigation and Alert Phase

The LCC Controller is activated by the CPHM early in the Alert Phase. Specific tasks include:

- Coordinating the identification of likely LCC sites.
- Determining likely personnel requirements.
- Ensuring relevant personnel are put on standby and the LCC is scaled up to a level commensurate with the level of suspicion regarding the EPP detection.

Operational Phase

If the presence of an EPP is confirmed and an EPP Response Plan approved, the LCC Controller will:

- Coordinate establishment of the LCC.
- Ensure an incident action plan is developed for field operations (both short term and longer term).
- Ensure SCC is kept up-to-date on field operations.
- Ensure an initial briefing is given to
 - other local managers within the department that have responsibilities inside the RA
 - local government (Shire Secretary)
 - police (emergency management) coordinator for the district(s)/regions(s) of the RA
 - regional emergency services officer for the RA (they should be provided with a list of preliminary resources required)
 - appropriate industry contacts for those in the RA
 - risk enterprise managers.
- Ensure plant health consultants, departmental district staff and key industry contacts in the affected area are advised
 - that PLANTPLAN is in the Operational Phase
 - of the nature of the EPP
 - of the location(s) of the IP(s)
 - of the boundaries of the RA and Control Area (CA) and conditions that apply therein
 - of the contact details for the LCC
 - that no visits are to be carried out on properties with susceptible species within the RA unless permission has been granted by the LCC Controller
 - that any suspicions of the EPP must be reported immediately to the LCC and the person reporting must remain on the premises until permission is given by the LCC Controller or Operations Manager or Plant Health Investigations Manager to leave
 - of the contacts for all media enquiries.

The LCC Controller will also need to liaise with the SCC regarding:

- The declaration of the RA and CA and conditions, including produce standstill arrangements that apply in these areas.
- The contact details of the LCC and SCC.
- Resource requirements and their supply (personnel and equipment).
- Any urgent tracings on and off the IP that need to be referred to the SCC.

Stand Down Phase

Key tasks are to:

- Close the LCC.
- Ensure all records relating to the EPP Response are held securely so they are available for future retrieval.
- In consultation with the Chief Plant Protection Officer (CPPO) arrange for a debrief of all staff who worked in the LCC (depending on the scale of the response this may include senior department managers and/or staff from the SCC).

National Management Group

This job card outlines the roles and responsibilities of the National Management Group (NMG) during all phases of a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD). Specific detail on the roles and responsibilities of NMG Representatives is also provided.

This document is provided as a guide and does not contain every action that may be required in responding to an Incident¹. Information is not presented in any particular order. Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) are a reference to the defined words/terms within the EPPRD.

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	22 May 2015	All	Developed by Job Cards Working Group. Approved by the Job Cards Working Group 22 April 2015. Endorsed by Parties May 2015.
2.0	29 Nov 2016	All	Details relating to Transition to Management Phase and phased responses incorporated. Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. Endorsed by Parties November 2016
2.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Clarification of requirement for all NMG members and other participants to complete a Confidentiality Deed Poll. Reference to requirement for NMG members to be trained including completion of introductory training courses (BOLT) before participation in NMG. Reference to NMG members maintaining records of time spent engaged in Cost Shared Incidents for the purpose of determining wider costs. Reference to NMG considering the terms of reference for the Financial Audit. Clarification of distinction between Transition to Management and the Transition to Management Phase and the role of the NMG at this stage of the response. Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. Endorsed by Parties November 2018.
2.2	13 Dec 2022	All	Amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022, including updated clauses, definitions and terms of references for the NMG.

¹ Where the term 'Incident' is used throughout this document, it refers to a confirmed occurrence of, or reasonably held suspicion of the occurrence of an EPP; or the occurrence of an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including circumstances in which an investigation comes to a provisional finding or diagnosis that the Plant Pest or Vector is already established in Australia).

Introduction

The NMG is responsible for making key decisions on national biosecurity policy and resourcing in a response to an Incident under the EPPRD.

The NMG consists of representatives from all Affected Parties for a particular Incident, who are authorised to bind that Party under the EPPRD, and Plant Health Australia (PHA) as a non-voting member. The NMG is formed when an EPP is detected or suspected to be present and is responsible for approving (or not approving) a Response Plan, including the budget, and the application of Cost Sharing between Affected Parties where it is agreed that eradication is technically feasible and cost beneficial. The Commonwealth provides the Chair and secretariat support to the NMG. The NMG is advised on technical matters by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP). In determining the policy and financial issues associated with a response, the NMG can seek further advice from its members, the CCEPP and/or PHA on matters of EPPRD policy.

The NMG generally meets by teleconference, which can be on short notice in the event of an Incident, and reaches its decision by Consensus², except on matters of Cost Sharing which must be Unanimous. Decisions made by the NMG do not set a binding precedent for any future meeting of the NMG, nor is the NMG bound by decisions made at previous meetings of the NMG.

Roles and responsibilities of NMG as a committee

The NMG is primarily responsible for decisions with regards to responses to Incidents. Under the EPPRD (schedule 8, part 1.2), the NMG has specific responsibilities, including to:

- (a) receive advice from the CCEPP on technical issues relating to an EPP or a Response Plan;
- (b) receive regular reports from the CCEPP, including budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on a Response Plan;
- (c) determine whether there should be Cost Sharing of Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORC) in the absence of a Response Plan;
- (d) consider the application of Cost Sharing of ORCs for participants in a cropping sector that is not represented by a Party to this Deed (noting that the determination as to whether such Cost Sharing occurs will be made by the Affected Parties);
- (e) have responsibility for the key decisions relating to a Response Plan, including:
 - (i) the approval of a Response Plan, which includes an indicative budget;
 - (ii) the review of a Response Plan if the NMG believes the cost may exceed the Agreed Limit;
 - (iii) having regard to the advice of the CCEPP and pursuant to clause 9.1.1 (b), the determination of the relevant and reasonable investigation and diagnostic costs of the Incident Definition Phase;
 - (iv) the setting of an Upper Limit on Expenditure from time to time, (which must be at a level less than the Agreed Limit), below which limit Response Plan expenditure may be committed by the Lead Agency(s) without reference to the NMG;

² Refer to EPPRD clause 1.1 for definition of Consensus

- (v) the determination of whether a Party or other person has acted appropriately in the matter of reporting of an EPP;
 - (vi) a determination that an EPP has been eradicated (acting on advice from the CCEPP);
 - (vii) a determination (on advice from the CCEPP) that eradication of an EPP by means of a Response Plan is not feasible;
 - (viii) the consideration of efficiency audit reports and the Financial Audit report; and
 - (ix) a determination (on advice from the CCEPP) that an emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase and approval of amendments to the Response Plan to incorporate the Transition to Management Phase;
- (f) refer relevant issues arising out of a Response Plan to the signatories of the EPPRD for consideration;
- (g) report as necessary to the Ministers of Government Parties that are signatories to the EPPRD in regard to an Incident; and
- (h) if the NMG rejects the advice of the CCEPP on matters under sub-paragraphs (i) to (ix) of (e) above, report its reasons in writing to the Ministers of Government Parties that are signatories to the EPPRD.

Specific tasks through PLANTPLAN phases

Specific responsibilities of the NMG during phases of a response to an EPP are described below. Note that the actions described in these phases are not a definitive list and the course of an EPP response may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

Investigation and alert phase

The NMG will meet as required to:

- Consider recommendations from the CCEPP regarding:
 - Whether the Incident relates to an EPP,
 - Whether eradication of the EPP is feasible. This is informed through CCEPP recommendations on the technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of eradication for an EPP (note that at any point during an Incident, the NMG can request that a formal cost-benefit analysis be completed by a recognised provider of economic analysis services, such as the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES)).
- Determine whether appropriate reporting of the EPP has occurred in accordance with clause 4 of the EPPRD.
- Determine whether an eradication response under the EPPRD should commence.
- Consider and approve or reject the Response Plan proposed by the CCEPP (within 30 days of its receipt).
 - The Response Plan will detail the key strategies and resources required for eradication to be achieved, including the indicative budget for response activities (the indicative budget is an approximation by the CCEPP, of the cost of the Response Plan, including a breakdown of the Shared Costs and normal commitments).

- The Response Plan proposed by the CCEPP may include a phased approach to response activities and therefore the NMG may be required to approve (or reject) a Response Plan that in the first instance includes an indicative budget for the first phase of the response only. Once further information has been gathered to fully determine the extent (and therefore cost) of activities that will be required throughout the response a Response Plan will be proposed to the NMG by the CCEPP that includes an indicative budget for subsequent phases of the response.
- Approve the national Cost Sharing arrangements for the Shared Costs component of the indicative budget.
- Approve the Upper Limit on Expenditure – this is the limit determined by reference to the indicative budget and is the amount Affected Parties are willing to commit to Cost Share for the Response Plan. This amount can be equal to the Cost Shared component of the indicative budget amount or another specified amount, so long as it does not exceed the Agreed Limit³ for the response. The Lead Agency and the CCEPP may commit expenditure without reference to the NMG whilst the budgeted and actual expenditure reported to NMG is less than the Upper Limit on Expenditure and within the conditions set by the approved Response Plan. The NMG are required to specify an Upper Limit on Expenditure under part 2.1 of schedule 10 of the EPPRD.
- Approve an expenditure threshold that would trigger a review of the Agreed Limit (the expenditure threshold is a predetermined amount which, if reached, will prompt the NMG to meet to determine whether the Agreed Limit will be revised or another action taken as set out in clause 9.9. The amount must be proposed by CCEPP and approved by NMG under clause 9.8.1 and 9.8.2 to ensure that the Agreed Limit for a response is not exceeded. The expenditure threshold must not be set higher than 90% of the Agreed Limit. If no threshold is set, it will be taken to be 90% of the Agreed Limit).
- Advise the CCEPP of its determinations – this must include relevant reasons for not supporting commencement of an eradication response, and/or a proposed Response Plan. If the NMG rejects the advice of the CCEPP (see Roles and responsibilities above), it must report the reasons in writing to the Ministers of Government Parties that are signatories to the EPPRD.
- Determine whether ORCs should be subject to Cost Sharing in the absence of an agreed Response Plan (as the NMG has determined a Response Plan will not be implemented under the EPPRD).

Operational phase

- The NMG will meet as necessary to consider policy and financial issues associated with the implementation of a Response Plan and to ensure its effective management.
- If expenditure on an EPP response reaches 90% of the Agreed Limit or if a Lead Agency believes that the cost of ORCs in the absence of a Response Plan may exceed the Reimbursement Limit⁴, the NMG must meet to review funding arrangements and the continuation of the EPP response.

³ Note that the Agreed Limit is a predetermined amount which may be eligible for Cost Sharing under an NMG approved Response Plan. The amount is determined using the mechanism set out at clauses 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 of the EPPRD and may be adjusted in accordance with clauses 9.8 and 9.9. The Agreed Limit for a response cannot be exceeded unless otherwise agreed in writing by all of the Affected Parties.

⁴ Note that the Reimbursement Limit is the amount that may be eligible for Cost Sharing of ORCs in the absence of a Response Plan, determined as set out in clause 9.6. The Reimbursement Limit cannot be exceeded unless otherwise agreed in writing by all of the Affected Parties.

- The NMG may appoint an Efficiency Advocate to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a Response Plan at any point during its implementation (note the NMG may agree to an Efficiency Audit at the early stage of a response, when it first approves a Response Plan).
 - The NMG will consider the findings reported by the Efficiency Advocate and advise the CCEPP and combatant jurisdiction(s) whether the recommendations have been accepted to be implemented.
- The NMG will consider reports provided by the CCEPP during the progress of a response, such as Financial Audit reports, annual reports, and other progress reports, and provide advice on decisions relating to responses.
- The NMG may consider the application of Cost Sharing of ORCs for participants in a cropping sector that is not represented by a Party to the EPPRD (noting that the determination as to whether such Cost Sharing occurs will be made by the Affected Parties).
- The NMG may report as necessary to the Ministers of Government Parties that are signatories to the EPPRD in regard to a Response Plan. Where the NMG rejects the advice of the CCEPP it must report its reasons in writing to the Ministers of Government Parties that are signatories to the EPPRD.
- If trigger points for review (as previously agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the NMG will consider recommendations from the CCEPP regarding:
 - potential amendments to the Response Plan; or
 - that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP.
- An emergency response under an agreed Response Plan will be finalised when the NMG declares (on advice from the CCEPP) that:
 - the EPP has been eradicated and proof of freedom has been demonstrated (where the Response Plan is successful); or
 - eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible (not technically feasible and/or cost-beneficial) and either that the Response Plan will be terminated (as a Transition to Management Phase is not considered appropriate) or that the emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase in which case the Response Plan will be modified.
- To make the determination that the emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase, the NMG must consider and agree (on advice from the CCEPP) that a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate (as a gap has been identified) and that Transition to Management activities are achievable within a defined and reasonable timeframe which does not exceed 12 months. The timeframe for a Transition to Management Phase may exceed 12 months; but only if the NMG (on the advice from the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances. For Transition to Management to commence the NMG must consider and approve amendments to the Response Plan that incorporate Transition to Management activities.
- In approving the revised Response Plan incorporating Transition to Management activities, the NMG must approve the indicative budget, the Upper Limit on Expenditure and (if required) a revised expenditure threshold that would trigger a review of the Agreed Limit (as proposed by the CCEPP). As Transition to Management will be part of an existing Response Plan there will be no changes to the national Cost Sharing arrangements.

Stand down phase

Once the NMG agrees that the Incident is over (closed), the stand down phase will commence.

- The NMG is to provide the outcomes of the Efficiency Advocate's report to all Parties.
- The NMG is to receive and assess the final Financial Audit report⁵. Note that the NMG may consider the Terms of Reference for the Financial Audit prior to its commencement and advise of any specific requirements to be addressed.
- NMG Representatives may be engaged in Incident debriefing. Further information on debriefing can be found in the [EPPRD debriefing](#) guideline and *PLANTPLAN*.

Relief and recovery phase

There are no defined relief and recovery actions or responsibilities outlined in *PLANTPLAN* and activities are not subject to Cost Sharing under the EPPRD. These occur outside of an EPP Response Plan and are the responsibility of jurisdictions, industry and local communities – not the NMG.

Transition to Management Phase

The responsibilities of the NMG during the Transition to Management Phase will be similar to those in the operational phase with a few notable differences as identified below.

- If trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the NMG will consider recommendations from the CCEPP regarding whether the Transition to Management Phase is still appropriate and depending on the outcome:
 - possible amendments to the Response Plan; or
 - that the Transition to Management Phase should end.
- When all the activities of the Response Plan are completed the NMG will determine (on advice from the CCEPP) that Transition to Management has been completed and the Transition to Management Phase will end.

Roles and responsibilities of NMG Representatives

Specific responsibilities of NMG Representatives are described below. Note that these actions are not a definitive list and the course of an EPP response may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

It is the responsibility of every NMG Representative to:

- Be appropriately authorised to bind the Party they represent to decisions (supported by governance systems in place) including the commitment of funds for a Response Plan in a timely manner.
- If a delegation of authority is required, provide the delegate to the Chair prior to meetings of the NMG.

⁵ An external audit of the Response Plan ledger account is required following completion of the Response Plan where the total Cost Shared amount is equal to or exceeds \$500,000 (to be indexed annually as at 1 July each year after 30 June 2011 using the change in the Consumer Price Index over the four quarters that have been most recently published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at that date – EPPRD part 2 of schedule 11).

- Complete a Confidentiality Deed Poll and return to PHA before participating in any NMG activities⁶.
- Treat information discussed at the meeting in a confidential manner.
- Be available to meet at short notice in an emergency situation (24 hours).
- Prepare for meetings through reading agenda papers and other relevant information provided.
- Review and endorse the minutes, action items, communiqués and other relevant documents in the required time frame.
- Respond to action items and email requests from the NMG Secretariat by the date stated.
- Ensure they are appropriately trained to meet requirements of the EPPRD⁷. This includes the completion of introductory Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT) courses before participation in NMG activities.

Maintain adequate records of time spent engaged in activities relating to Cost Shared responses (normal commitments and any Cost Shared expenditure) to enable reporting of wider costs at the end of an Incident.

Additional key responsibilities of NMG Representatives and other individuals attending NMG meetings are summarised in the table below.

Representative/ other	Role/Responsibility
Chair	Present the position of the Commonwealth to the other NMG members. Make decisions on behalf of the Commonwealth. Effectively chair NMG meetings.
Government	Present the position of the Party they represent to the other NMG members. Make decisions on behalf of the Party they represent. Ensure they are appropriately trained and authorised to bind the Party they represent to decisions including the commitment of funds for a Response Plan.
Affected Industry Party(s)	Present the position of the Party they represent to the other NMG members. Make decisions on behalf of the Party they represent. Ensure they are appropriately trained and authorised to bind the Party they represent to decisions including the commitment of funds for a Response Plan.
PHA	Present the view of PHA.

⁶ All NMG members, observers, technical experts and other participants must sign a Confidentiality Deed Poll (planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf) prior to participation in any activities relating to the EPPRD. Government representatives may be bound by privacy provisions under their respective public service/government employment Acts; however in accordance with clause 11.6.2 must sign an appropriate form of Confidentiality Deed Poll (which may be in the form of the current available Deed Poll contained in schedule 9 and available through the above link).

⁷ EPPRD clause 15, clause 11.4.2 and 11.6.2.

	<p>Provide advice on the EPPRD in session where possible and in writing where necessary.</p> <p>PHA is a non-voting member of NMG.</p>
Secretariat	<p>Finalise NMG resolutions in session where possible or out of session where required.</p> <p>Prepare and circulate draft minutes to all NMG members promptly following the NMG meeting.</p> <p>Prepare and circulate draft action items to all NMG members promptly following the NMG meeting.</p> <p>Circulate final minutes to all NMG members promptly following the receipt of all responses from members on the draft minutes and final endorsement of the Chair.</p> <p>Coordinate the presentation and circulation to members of any communications material in conjunction with the National Biosecurity Communications Network.</p>
Advisors	<p>May accompany Members if their specific expertise and advice is required.</p> <p>Not involved in decision making or voting.</p> <p>Not required to endorse the resolutions, minutes, action items and communiques of the NMG meetings.</p>

Further information

Further information on the roles and responsibilities of the NMG as a committee and its representatives can be found through the Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT)
planthealthaustralia.com.au/resources/training/biosecurity-online-training/.

Scientific Advisory Panel

This job card outlines the roles and responsibilities of a scientific advisory panel (SAP) during all phases of a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD). Specific detail on the roles and responsibilities of SAP members is also provided.

This document is provided as a guide and does not contain every action that may be required in responding to an Incident¹. Information is not presented in any particular order. Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) are a reference to the defined words/terms within the EPPRD.

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	22 May 2015	All	Developed by Job Cards Working Group. Approved by Job Cards Working Group 22 April 2015. Endorsed by Parties May 2015.
2.0	29 Nov 2016	All	Addition of Transition to Management Phase. Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. Endorsed by Parties November 2016.
2.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Addition of reference that a SAP may be engaged to provide validation of the current response strategy or advice on key elements proposed for revision. Clarification that the SAP membership is skills based and not representative. Addition of reference that expertise for a SAP may be drawn from a variety of sources. Clarification of requirement for all SAP members to complete a Confidentiality Deed Poll. Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. Endorsed by Parties November 2018.

¹ Where the term 'Incident' is used throughout this document, it refers to the occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an uncategorised Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).

Introduction

A SAP is a technical group which may be convened by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) on a needs basis to review and provide advice on specific technical matters relating to an Incident. Representation and resourcing of the SAP is the responsibility of Affected Parties and terms of reference will be provided by the CCEPP to inform the activities of the SAP, its composition (of appropriately skilled nominees) and its contribution to the Incident response.

Roles and responsibilities of the SAP as a committee

The role of the SAP is to provide expert advice on specific aspects of an Incident as requested by the CCEPP through the agreed terms of reference, such as pest biology, diagnostic methods, surveillance systems, pest epidemiology, destruction methods and management options that could be incorporated in a Response Plan. The SAP may also be engaged to provide validation of the current response strategy or to provide advice when key aspects of the response strategy are proposed for revision.

The SAP membership is not representative but rather based on skills and expertise, with each member engaged to provide their individual expertise and knowledge rather than presenting a view of their Party. The skills and expertise of nominated SAP members must be relevant to the terms of reference set by the CCEPP. Roles may include:

- diagnostician/s
- surveillance person/s with local knowledge, preferably with experience in designing statistically sound surveillance strategies
- a biometrician or special modeller
- a local and/or international pest expert(s) with knowledge in identification, biology, genetics and epidemiology of the pest or other similar pests
- an agronomist who knows the host
- an emergency response expert
- an economic expert.

This list of experts can be added to as appropriate (e.g. chemical experts).

Nominees for the SAP may be drawn from a variety of sources including government (state/territory or Australian government), Industry Parties, Plant Health Australia (PHA), non-EPPRD scientific organisations (e.g. CSIRO) and/or international expertise.

The SAP is chaired by Plant Health Australia (PHA) and comprises specialists with expertise from the required field. Representation from all Affected Parties is by self-nomination and not obligatory. The Commonwealth provides the secretariat services through the CCEPP Secretariat.

The SAP is not a decision making body and will only provide technical advice on matters as defined in the terms of reference set by the CCEPP. The recommendations of the SAP are provided to the CCEPP which will then consider these in conjunction with other aspects of the response such as policy, financial and

other technical information. Once the CCEPP has reached a decision on the matter in question, the Chair of the SAP will inform the SAP through the Secretariat what that decision is and the reasons behind it.

The SAP may establish a working group, at the Chair's discretion, to progress a specific task for which some members of the SAP have the specific expertise and to report back recommendations and information to the SAP.

Specific tasks through PLANTPLAN phases

Investigation and alert phase

The CCEPP may appoint a SAP when complex technical issues arise or additional information or advice is required by the CCEPP to assist them in their initial deliberations.

During the investigation and alert phase, the SAP would likely be convened to:

- Consider complex technical issues, as identified in a list of key priority questions from the CCEPP. These phase-specific questions may include (but are not limited to) pest biology, potential pathways, the biology and distribution of hosts, establishment potential, field and laboratory diagnostics, surveillance methodologies and efficiencies, technical feasibility of eradication, impacts of environmental factors and/or destruction.
- Evaluate available pest/disease data (e.g. effectiveness of control measures) from other jurisdictions and or countries.
- Consider if the proposed response strategy is technically appropriate and will achieve eradication.

Operational phase

If required, the CCEPP may agree to the formation of a SAP to evaluate the effectiveness of a response and its implementation, and provide advice on specific technical matters.

The SAP would likely be convened to consider:

- Complex technical issues, as identified in a list of key priority questions from the CCEPP. These phase-specific questions may include (but are not limited to) to pest biology, the biology and distribution of hosts, field and laboratory diagnostics, surveillance methodologies and efficiencies, specific evaluation of the proof of freedom surveillance operations and data, requirements for fallow, impacts of environmental factors, biological or chemical control, and/or destruction.

Whether the current response strategy being implemented under the Response Plan will achieve the outcome of eradication and/or whether proposed revisions to the response strategy (or specific elements thereof) are technically appropriate.

Stand down phase

There are no defined stand down actions or responsibilities for the SAP identified in PLANTPLAN.

Relief and recovery phase

There are no defined relief and recovery actions or responsibilities outlined in PLANTPLAN and activities are not subject to Cost Sharing under the EPPRD. These occur outside of an EPP Response Plan and are the responsibility of jurisdictions, industry and local communities – not the SAP.

Transition to Management Phase

Although it is unlikely to be required, the CCEPP may agree to request that a SAP be convened to provide technical advice during a Transition to Management Phase. The SAP would likely be convened to consider similar technical matters to those in the operational phase.

Roles and responsibilities of SAP members

It is the responsibility of SAP members to:

- Complete a Confidentiality Deed Poll and return to PHA before participating in any SAP activities².
- Treat information discussed at the meeting in a confidential manner.
- Prepare for meetings through reading agenda papers and other relevant information provided.
- Prepare for meetings by accessing relevant information to be able to provide scientific input to the meeting.
- Share relevant technical information with other members of the SAP to enable informed recommendations to the CCEPP.
- Review and endorse the minutes, action items and reports to the CCEPP.
- Respond to action items and email requests from the Secretariat by the date stated.

² All SAP members and other participants must sign a Confidentiality Deed Poll (www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf) prior to participation in any activities relating to the EPPRD. SAP members from Government agencies may be bound by privacy provisions under their respective public service/government employment Acts; however in accordance with clause 11.6.2 must sign an appropriate form of Confidentiality Deed Poll (which may be in the form of the current available Deed Poll contained in schedule 9 and available through the above link).

State Coordination Centre Director

This job card outlines the responsibilities of the State Coordination Centre (SCC) Director during all phases of a response to an Emergency Plant Pest under the EPPRD.

This checklist is provided as a guide and does not contain every action that may be required in responding to an emergency/incident. The checklist is not in any particular order.

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 1 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). SPCHQ/LPCC changed to SCC/LCC, and Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.

Roles and responsibilities

The SCC Director is responsible for coordinating the response to the EPP incursion by the Lead Agency, including all day to day operational matters. The SCC Director reports to the Chief Plant Health manager (CPHM).

- Manage the eradication/control campaign in accordance with the relevant legislation, policies and PLANTPLAN strategies and procedures with due consideration of the economic, commercial and social implications of all actions taken.
- Manage the SCC.
- Provide accurate and timely advice (often via the CPHM) to the minister, Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP), the public, all departmental staff, emergency management agencies and industry.
- Establish ongoing consultative and reporting arrangements between SCC and the Local Control Centres (LCCs).
- Act as CPHM as required.

Specific tasks through PLANTPLAN phases

Investigation and Alert Phase

Key tasks in this phase include:

- Evaluating initial reports from the Plant Health Officer (PHO).
- Sending the diagnostic team to the Suspect Premises (SP).
- Immediately notifying the CPHM, both verbally and in writing, of results from all investigations.
- Advising departmental management and relevant laboratory(s)
 - that PLANTPLAN is in the Investigation Phase
 - of the nature of the suspected EPP

- of the location(s) of the SP(s)
 - of any actions required of them.
- Ensuring field staff have taken all necessary steps to limit the spread of the suspected EPP such as
 - stopping product movements into and out of the SP by the imposition of quarantine measures
 - controlling the movement of people in and out of the SP or areas
 - arranging for decontamination of people, vehicles, machinery that have already left the premises
 - quarantine risk enterprises or locations where traces have been identified
- Activating the SCC section managers.
- Analysing and evaluating information collected by the PHOs and ensuring this information is entered into the Information Management System.
- Beginning the preparation of an Incursion Incident Report for submission by the CPHM to the CCEPP.
- Initial development of the EPP Response Plan.
- Developing proposals for personnel and other resource requirements for LCC operations.
- Overseeing coordination of survey teams to:
 - conduct initial inspections and surveys of the area to determine the extent of the outbreak
 - conduct trace backs to determine where the pest might have come from and trace forward exercises to identify where the pest might have spread (pest findings outside the affected site are to be referred to the CCEPP)
 - undertaking relevant consultation to determine the boundaries for any Restricted Areas (RA) or Control Areas (CA) which may need to be proclaimed if the diagnosis proves positive.
- Preparing documentation/forms for the proclamation of quarantine areas in conjunction with the agencies senior legal officer.
- Assisting, as required, the LCC Controller and state/territory emergency services in selecting a suitable site for the LCC.

Operational Phase

If the presence of an EPP is confirmed and an EPP Response Plan approved, the SCC Director will:

- Expand the management of the SCC and appoint personnel to key positions.
- Instruct the LCC Controller to establish the LCC and take charge of eradication or control activities in the RA.
- Advise key departmental staff of the EPP situation, the controls and movement restrictions on plants and plant products, vehicles and people and the potential need to provide staff to the LCC and SCC
- Work with the Public Information Section to arrange preparation of media releases, including technical information, and initiate press conferences. In some cases joint state/territory and Australian Government media releases may need to be issued.
- Ensure key contacts (as above) are advised:
 - that PLANTPLAN is in the Operational Phase
 - of the nature of the EPP
 - of the location of the Infected Premises (IPs)
 - of the boundaries of the RA and CA and conditions that apply therein

- of the location and contact details of the LCC and SCC
 - that no visits are to be carried out on premises with susceptible species within the RA unless permission has been granted by the LCC Controller
 - that urgent premises visits may be carried out in the CA only by taking full decontamination procedures on entering and leaving all premises (dependent on the specific threat)
 - that any suspicions of the target pest must be reported immediately to the LCC
 - of any actions required of them
 - of the name of media contacts and key spokespersons
- Arrange for the appointment (gazettal) of interstate and other appropriate personnel as inspectors under the relevant legislation
- Arrange for approved valuers to be appointed under the relevant legislation.

Stand Down Phase

Key tasks are to:

- Close the SCC.
- Ensure all records relating to the EPP response are held securely so they are available for future retrieval.
- In consultation with the Chief PLANT Protection Officer (CPPO) arrange for a debrief of all staff who worked in the SCC (depending on the scale of the response this may include senior department managers and/or staff from the LCC).

PART 3 Guidelines

Guidelines provide general assistance to response personnel, and more broadly to Parties in understanding and implementing response procedures. The following guidelines are included in PLANTPLAN¹:

- Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests
- Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline
- Delimiting surveys
- Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests
- Disinfestation and decontamination
- National talking points
- Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
- Response Plan development
- Transition to Management
- Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests
- Urban and peri-urban biosecurity

¹ Guidelines are available individually from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two SOPs. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	Guideline developed from <i>Collection and transport of Emergency Plant Pests</i> SOP (V1 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostic Standards (SPHDS). Original SOP separated into two guideline documents. Approved by SPHDS October 2014. Endorsed by Parties November 2014.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist plant health staff/field officers when collecting suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) samples for submission to diagnostic laboratories.

2. Critical issues

Correct sample collection is central to ensuring an accurate diagnosis. Critical issues include the following:

- availability of collection tools (see Appendix 1 - Resource equipment)
- the sample is fit-for-purpose (integrity intact, adequate numbers, and all necessary components sampled)
- the sample is appropriately contained, labelled and stored

- chain of evidence is followed at all times (see *Chain of evidence* standard operating procedure; SOP)
- a sample submission form is completed at the time of sampling capturing all pertinent details
- hygiene and disinfestation protocols are followed (see *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines)
- safety of staff is considered at all times and all relevant Work, Health and Safety legislative requirements are followed.

3. Collecting and packaging samples

If necessary, consult with the laboratory to ensure the most appropriate sample is collected.

3.1 General

- Complete a sample submission form at the time of sampling (include details such as host, plant parts affected, location (GPS coordinates), sampling date, collector, property owner, contact details and any other relevant information).
- The collection point **MUST** be clearly marked in the field (e.g. with brightly coloured ribbon and/or GPS coordinates).
- Disinfect implements (e.g. with 80% v/v ethanol or 0.5% v/v available chlorine solution, as appropriate) prior to and after each sampling.
- For suspected root pests/diseases, include soil and crown (lower stem) tissues with root samples.
- Labelling of sample vials/bags must be clear and legible using an alcohol-proof and water-proof marker.
- Minimise the time between sampling and dispatch to the receiving laboratory, and store in a portable cool-box during this time.
- Use best practice biosecurity measures before entering a suspect site to avoid the potential of spread between sites.
- If possible, sample from perceived area of minimal damage to perceived area of high damage within a field/orchard and on the individual plant.
- Follow appropriate hygiene protocols for collecting samples and disinfecting hands, footwear and clothing (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).
- Follow *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pest* guidelines to send samples to the designated laboratory, including advising the laboratory of the expected arrival.

3.2 Insect samples (use pest specific protocols where available)

- i. Where possible **insect samples should be sent dead**¹, and preserved in the manner required by the laboratory (see Appendix 2 - Insect sampling procedures).
- ii. Where present collect a reasonable number of samples (commensurate with their size) of all life stages and variants, that are complete and in good condition.

¹ Note: In exceptional circumstances, the diagnostic laboratory may require live material. For example, if only immature stages are available and the diagnostic lab needs to rear material through to adult (in secure facilities). In such cases, special arrangements must be made, ensuring secure transportation, prompt collection of samples from airports etc. These circumstances will be decided by the State Coordination Centre (SCC) and/or the Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM).

- iii. Place the samples in a plastic vial, a crush-proof box, or similar, containing material to prevent damage.
- iv. Secure the lid, label clearly, and triple-bag using tamper-proof bags, disinfecting between layers, and include the completed sample submission form in the outer bag - according to chain of evidence requirements (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).

3.3 Pathogen samples (use pest specific protocols where available)

- i. Select a fresh and generous sample representing the full range of symptoms including both diseased and healthy sections, and place in a labelled zip-lock plastic bag (see also Appendix 3 - Preferred packaging methods for pathogen samples).
- ii. Inspect for insects and, if present, ensure this is recorded on the outside of the bag and the submission form so correct containment can be used.
- iii. Triple-bag using tamper-proof bags, disinfecting between layers, and include the completed sample submission form in the outer bag according to chain of evidence requirements (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).
- iv. Store samples in a cool-box until dispatched unless the suspected pathogen is likely to survive better at room temperature.

3.4 Nematode samples (use pest specific protocols where available)

Soil, plant or root samples affected should be collected and packaged as per the plant samples above.

3.5 Seed samples

Seed sampling should be undertaken by an accredited seed sampler to ensure that a representative sample is taken incorporating chain of evidence procedures (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).

4. Appendix 1 - Resource equipment

Standard kit

The Standard kit includes equipment that may be required for the investigation of a suspected emergency plant pest.

- portable cooler or sturdy, sealable plastic crate with freezer blocks for keeping samples cool
- press seal bags of suitable sizes for samples
- sample jars or vials of varying sizes (e.g. 20 ml and 50 ml)
- disposable gloves
- disposable overalls
- fresh bleach or other suitable disinfectant (e.g. domestic use with 4 - 5% available Chlorine (Cl))
- a sturdy leak proof plastic bin for a footbath
- 65% ethyl-alcohol 35% water solution (for insect sample storage)
- trowel
- spade or coring tube for sampling soil
- sealable plastic bags of suitable micron thickness for disposing of personal protective equipment
- large, strong plastic bags for sealing contaminated equipment such as boots or spades (strong garbage bags are acceptable for this)
- washable boots i.e. rubber boots
- adhesive labels (either pre-prepared with bar code/unique ID or handwritten in field)
- evidence tape (tamper proof)
- permanent markers
- pencils/pens
- book or sample sheets for recording details of site and samples
- soap
- paper towels
- water (sufficient for washing hands)
- baby wipes for cleansing hands and face
- brightly coloured ribbon
- a mobile phone²
- camera²
- sample submission forms from lab
- list of contacts (laboratories/courier/diagnosticians/CPHM for the state)
- blank key list of samples
- 80% ethanol in spray bottle
- bucket (for disinfecting tools)
- plastic containers for sample storage (e.g. lunch boxes)
- trays/crates (for disinfecting equipment)
- quarantine tape or similar available
- GPS unit

² Any equipment which may be damaged by decontamination, such as cameras or mobile phones should be protected with a sealable plastic bag or similar.

- water (sufficient to wash hands and equipment)
- magnifying glass
- masks and other PPE if dealing with chemicals
- overnight express post packs

Additional basic equipment for collecting insect samples

- variety of vials with internal seals e.g. 20mm, 70mm
- insect net (or aspirator)
- McCartney bottles
- soft tweezers
- rigid tweezers
- fine scissors
- secateurs
- alcohol 75%
- very fine brush e.g. size 0 – 000
- larger plastic jars
- paper bags
- fine forceps
- pocket knife

It is suggested that all the above items could be stored in a large toolbox for easy access.

5. Appendix 2 - Insect sampling procedures

Table 1: Insect sampling and packaging procedures

Insect type	Kill method	Live insect sampling
Moths, butterflies	Freeze for 24 hours or place in an airtight container with a tissue or cotton wool that has been soaked in nail polish remover.	
Plant feeders (e.g. scarab larvae, scale)	Do not remove mealy bugs or scale insects from the leaves or stems on which they are feeding as this will damage their mouth parts and make identification difficult. Instead, cut out leaf tissue around the insect and place this in 70% ethanol.	Plant feeders with strong jaws should be sent with a handful of soil or leaves as they may otherwise damage each other in transit
Hard bodied insects (e.g. grasshoppers, beetles)	Freeze for 24 hours.	Carefully fold sample in tissue paper and place in crush-proof plastic tube or container with several holes in the lid for ventilation. For beetles with strong jaws, send with a handful of soil or leaves as they may otherwise damage each other in transit.
Soft bodied insects (e.g. caterpillars)	Place in hot water for 10 minutes. Then preserve in 70% ethanol.	Leave insect larvae (grubs, caterpillars or maggots) in grain or other seed or fruit as this will help to preserve them.
Ants	Spray with fly spray, then stick to clear sticky tape. Stick this to a piece of paper which also records the location where caught and the collector's name and contact details. Alternatively collect with a small paint brush into 70% ethanol.	
Small and/or soft bodied insects (e.g. thrips, aphids, mites and larvae)	Place sample in 70% ethanol (use methylated spirits) and completely fill the container. NOTE: A limited amount of ethanol is permitted to be posted by Australia Post under the International Air Transport Association's "Dangerous Goods Regulations".	

6. Appendix 3 - Preferred packaging methods for pathogen samples

Table 2: Preferred packaging methods for pathogen samples

All samples should be placed in a minimum of two sealed plastic bags before the final packaging (refer to Plant Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre brochure available from

<http://plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resource-hub/documents/pbcrc-packaging-project-2010/>)

Plant material	Preferred packaging method
Fruit and vegetables	Wrap in paper towel or tissue, place in a sealed plastic bag and place in a hard sided box or screw top plastic vial with extra paper to prevent crushing or movement.
Above ground plant material (e.g. leaves, stems, or whole plants with no soil)	Wrap in dry paper towel or newspaper and seal in a plastic bag.
Roots – no soil	Wrap in moist paper towel and seal in a plastic bag with air removed.
Soil (with or without roots)	Seal in a plastic bag with air removed. Do not fill bag more than ½ full and keep to less than 1kg samples.
Seed	Seal in a plastic bag with air removed, or a material bag with secure fastening. Do not fill bag more than ½ full.

Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests operating guideline

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
draft	-	All	Issued for comment to all Parties November 2013
1.0	2 Sep 2014	All	New document. Parties' comments post May 2014 EPPRD Parties meeting included. Distributed out of session for endorsement August 2014.
2.0	29 Nov 2016	2.0, 3.1, 7.4, 7.9, 7.10, Appendix 1 & 2	<p>Definitions of financial terms and Transition to Management Phase added.</p> <p>Variations to CCEPP and NMG Terms of Reference to incorporate May 2016 approved variations to the EPPRD, including the Transition to Management Phase and COAG Council system changes.</p> <p>PHA role in drafting NMG Cost Sharing paper added and Cost Sharing terms defined.</p> <p>Reference to phased Response Plan approach added.</p> <p>Further detail provided on industry communication and CCEPP role in developing national talking points.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2016.</p>
2.1	30 Nov 2017	2, 7.1.1, 8.10.1, 9.1.1, Appendix 2	<p>Abbreviations table added as new section (section 2).</p> <p>Update regarding a nominee by the CPPO being able to chair the CCEPP.</p> <p>Talking points development revised to reflect PLANTPLAN changes.</p> <p>Emergency diagnostic protocol development inserted to reflect PLANTPLAN changes.</p> <p>Update of subcommittee name to Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2017.</p>
2.2	30 Nov 2018	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minor revisions to abbreviations and terms and definitions lists. Confidentiality and requirement for all CCEPP members to complete a confidentiality deed poll and introductory Biosecurity Online Training courses. Additional details provided to clarify CCEPP membership. Clarification of Incident notification process and convening of the CCEPP. Reference added to reflect current practice that meetings may occur by email.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reference to the Biosecurity Portal CCEPP site as a repository for CCEPP documentation and means to making documents available to CCEPP members. • Additional detail related to seeking of advice through SAPs. • Addition of a section on engagement of international expertise (section 9.4). • Reference to CCEPP and NMG job cards. • Addition of details to Appendix 2 and 3. • Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2018.</p>
2.3	8 Dec 2021	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minor revisions to abbreviations and terms and definitions lists. • Addition of the requirement for the Lead Agency to provide a situation report as a standing paper for in session meetings (section 9.7 and Appendix 1). • Addition of detail on maintenance of a consolidated CCEPP meeting actions list (section 8.8). • Addition of the requirement that requests for advice from PHC subcommittees are provided directly to PHC and include terms of reference (section 9.2). • Addition of the requirement that where working groups are formed to provide advice, governance arrangements for the group are established by the CCEPP (section 9.7). • Removal of sections 10, 11 and NMG terms of reference. • Addition of CCEPP consideration on the frequency of situation and expenditure reporting (Appendix 1). • Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency with PLANTPLAN. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2021.</p>
2.4	13 Dec 2022	All	<p>Full review of document and following key amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update of terms and definitions • Update of Terms of reference (section 4), CCEPP structure (section 7), Meetings (section 8) • Addition of reference to 'Vector' as appropriate • Corrections to EPPRD clause references <p>Minor editorial changes throughout for clarity.</p>

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1. Introduction

The Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) describes the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) as ‘the key technical coordinating body providing the link between the Commonwealth, States/Territories, Industry, Plant Health Australia (PHA) and the National Management Group (NMG) in the management of Incidents and emergency responses to them’¹. This document (the Guideline) provides detailed information to CCEPP members (the members) and observers on the operations of the CCEPP. Further information on the operational aspects of managing a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) Incident is outlined in the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN. References to these documents have been included in this Guideline where applicable.

Due to the need for rapid response by Parties to an Incident there will be occasions when CCEPP and NMG representatives are required to meet at short notice, with little time to consider their role as detailed under the EPPRD. Therefore members should use this Guideline to develop internal work instructions specific to the needs of their industry or agency, to assist them in responding effectively.

Timing for a variety of actions is mentioned in the Guideline. As the CCEPP is involved in a response to an Incident, there may not always be extended periods of time in which to distribute papers or information. Time allowed must always be reasonable in relation to the volume of material to be considered so as not to erode the value of a CCEPP. Members should be aware of this and attempt to ensure not only that information is disseminated as rapidly as possible but also consultation to support decisions and actions is carried out rapidly.

¹ EPPRD schedule 8 part 2.2

2. Abbreviations

Acronym	Term
ACPPO	Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer
BOLT	Biosecurity Online Training
BP	Biosecurity Plan
CCEPP	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests
CPHM	Chief Plant Health Manager
EPP	Emergency Plant Pest
EPPRD	Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
NBCEN	National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network
NMG	National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (National Management Group)
PHA	Plant Health Australia
PHC	Plant Health Committee
PIDS	Preliminary Information Data Sheet
SAP	Scientific Advisory Panel
SNPHS	Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance
SPHD	Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics

3. Terms and definitions

Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) that are used within this document are a reference to the defined words/terms within clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer	ACPPO	Individual holding the position of the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer of the Commonwealth of Australia.
Chief Plant Health Manager	CPHM	Individual holding the position of Chief Plant Health Manager (or equivalent role), of a State or Territory.
Confidential Information		As defined in the EPPRD. See Section 6.
Consensus		As defined in the EPPRD. See Section 8.3.
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	CCEPP	The committee of technical representatives of the Parties convened according to Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.
Emergency Plant Pest	EPP	As defined in the EPPRD.
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	EPPRD	Government and Plant Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Plant Pest Responses.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Formal Notification to the CCEPP		Occurs when a State or Territory CPHM notifies the Chair of the CCEPP, either orally or in writing, that an Incident has occurred within that State or Territory. Written notification must be used to confirm oral advice and must be in the form agreed from time to time by the Parties.
Incident		Means: (a) a confirmed occurrence of, or reasonably held suspicion of the occurrence of an EPP; or (b) the occurrence of an uncategorised Plant Pest or Vector which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including circumstances in which an investigation comes to a provisional finding or diagnosis that the Plant Pest or Vector is already established in Australia).
Lead Agency		The agency of a State or Territory responsible for leading the conduct of the response to an Incident within their State or Territory. For clarity there may be more than one Lead Agency (each from a different State or Territory) for an Incident.
National Management Group	NMG	The group with the constitution and role set out in Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD.
Plant Pest		Any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest or pathogen that meets each of the following criteria: (a) It is injurious to Plant Health, Unprocessed Plant Products, Bees or Fungi. (b) It is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable. (c) It is not a genetically modified organism.
Response Plan		An integrated plan for undertaking a response to one or more EPPs that is: (a) in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 4 of the EPPRD, developed by one or more State or Territory CPHM(s), endorsed by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG; and (b) subject to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD. The Response Plan may include Emergency Containment actions so as to enable the payment of Owner Reimbursement Costs and Cost Sharing if considered appropriate by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG.
Scientific Advisory Panel	SAP	A panel of experts which may be appointed by the CCEPP to provide specific technical information on matters relating to an Incident.
Transition to Management		The undertaking of activities to transition the management of an EPP from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP under a Response Plan to management of the EPP outside of the EPPRD.

Term	Acronym	Definition
Vector		Means any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest that meets each of the following criteria: (a) It carries and transmits a Plant Pest to a Crop. (b) It is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable. (c) It is not a genetically modified organism.

4. Terms of reference

4.1 CCEPP

As noted in the Introduction the CCEPP is the key technical coordinating body for responses to Incidents, providing the link between the Commonwealth, States/Territories, industries, PHA and the NMG. Its role is to effectively and efficiently coordinate the national technical response to EPPs, and to advise meetings of the NMG on EPP issues in accordance with the EPPRD. The CCEPP is not a standing committee or a legal entity. It only convenes in relation to a known or suspect EPP and has no responsibilities outside the EPPRD.

Under the EPPRD the CCEPP has specific responsibilities. The following list is taken directly from the EPPRD²:

- *receive formal notifications from Government Parties on Incidents;*
- *determine if the Incident concerns an EPP;*
- *advise the NMG if a Response Plan is required;*
- *make recommendations to the NMG in respect of the detail of a Response Plan;*
- *consider regular reports on progress of a Response Plan and develop a Consensus³ on further actions required;*
- *having regard to any baselines of 'normal commitments' agreed pursuant to clause 14.1.2, advise the NMG as required by clause 9.1.1(b), as to the investigation and diagnostic costs that are relevant and reasonable in the circumstances of the Incident Definition Phase of the Response Plan;*
- *provide regular consolidated reports to the Affected Parties, and to the NMG, on the status of a Response Plan;*
- *in circumstances in which the CCEPP determines that eradication of an EPP is no longer feasible, provide advice and recommendations to the NMG on:*
 - *whether a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate and, if so, the scope of the Transition to Management Phase and the proposed amendments to the Response Plan for inclusion of the Transition to Management Phase; or*
 - *whether the NMG should determine that an emergency response should cease and, if so, on options for alternative arrangements outside this Deed;*
- *determine and advise the NMG when an EPP has been eradicated under a Response Plan; and*
- *recommend when proof of freedom has been achieved following the successful implementation of a Response Plan.*

² EPPRD part 2 of schedule 8

³ A Consensus decision can be made to present one or more views or courses of action to the NMG

While these specific responsibilities are listed in the EPPRD, it is not an exhaustive list and at times the CCEPP may be required to undertake other tasks relating to responses to Incidents. They may also advise NMG on economic and financial elements of a response. Further information on the roles and responsibilities of the CCEPP can be found in the [CCEPP job card](#).

4.2 NMG

The terms of reference of the NMG⁴ can be found in Schedule 8 of the EPPRD. Members of the CCEPP should be familiar with the role and responsibilities of the NMG in order to ensure issues relevant to NMG considerations are addressed to the extent possible within the CCEPP.

5. Conflict of interest

Where a CCEPP participant potentially has a material, personal or financial interest in a matter that is before the CCEPP, this should be declared at the start of the first meeting in which they participate or when a potential conflict of interest first emerges. If a conflict of interest is declared then the CCEPP Chair and members must determine what procedures should be used to manage this, for example whether it is sufficient that all participants are aware of the conflict or if there is a need to restrict access to confidential information.

6. Confidentiality

Subject to any legal obligation requiring release of information, all matters discussed at a CCEPP meeting are confidential and must not be released to the public without the approval of the CCEPP. The EPPRD defines 'Confidential Information' as:

"...all know-how and commercially valuable or sensitive information (in whatever form) disclosed by a Party to one or more other Parties for the purposes of this Deed, but does not include information that:

- (a) is already in the public domain or, after the date of this Deed, becomes part of the public domain otherwise than as a result of an unauthorised disclosure by the receiving Party or its representatives;*
- (b) is or becomes available to the receiving Party for a third party lawfully in possession of that information and which has the lawful power to disclose such information to the receiving Party on a non-confidential basis; or*
- (c) was in the lawful possession of the receiving Party without restrictions as to its use or was developed independently by the receiving Party (as shown by its written records or other evidence) prior to the date of disclosure to it under this Deed."*⁵

All representatives, observers, technical experts and other participants must sign a Confidentiality Deed Poll (planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf)⁶ prior to participation in any activities relating to the EPPRD, including that of the CCEPP and NMG. Government

⁴ EPPRD part 1 of schedule 8

⁵ EPPRD clause 1.1

⁶ EPPRD schedule 9

representatives are bound by privacy provisions under their respective public service/government employment Acts, however must sign an appropriate form of Confidentiality Deed Poll (which may be in the form of the current available Deed Poll contained in schedule 9 and available through the above link) prior to participation in any activities⁷.

7. CCEPP structure

7.1 Membership

7.1.1 Standing members

In this context 'standing member' means those persons who have membership on each CCEPP that convenes whether the Plant Pest is of immediate concern to them or not. These include⁸:

- The Chair of the CCEPP, who is the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACPPO), from the Australian Government Department responsible for biosecurity⁹. The ACPPO (or their nominee) convenes and chairs Meetings of the CCEPP and does not have the right to vote.
- All State and Territory Chief Plant Health Managers (CPHMs) (or their nominees).
- Two representatives from the Australian Government with expertise in biosecurity policy and biosecurity operations (non-voting).
- A representative from PHA (non-voting).
- A representative from the Commonwealth nominated by the ACPPO (being a different person to the chairperson of the CCEPP).

In practice from time to time standing members may need to provide a nominee to present their view and vote. This should not be undertaken lightly as the authority and policy expertise rests with the CPHMs and without that experience and authority the CCEPP may struggle to reach decisions. There is also a minimum level of training required as any personnel who participate in the CCEPP must do so in accordance with the terms of the EPPRD¹⁰. This includes the completion of the introductory Biosecurity Online Training (BOLT) courses prior to participation in CCEPP activities.

Continuity of CCEPP representative roles is important during an Incident and is particularly critical for the Lead Agency. Processes should be in place to ensure this continuity, which may be achieved through identification of one or more 'deputy' members that shadow the primary appointee throughout the response.

If there is a delegation of authority then the delegate must be notified to the CCEPP Secretariat (the Secretariat) who will inform the CCEPP. Nominees for proxy should be fully briefed and conversant with the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN and authorised to make decisions on behalf of their Party.

As custodians of the EPPRD PHA provides advice on the application of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to facilitate compliance with the provisions of the EPPRD.

⁷ EPPRD clause 11.6.2

⁸ EPPRD schedule 8

⁹ The Australian Government Department responsible for biosecurity is referred to as "the Australian Government" throughout this guideline

¹⁰ EPPRD clause 15 and clause 11.6.2

7.1.2 Affected Industry Parties

Once a CPHM notifies the ACPPO of an Incident (see Section 8.1), the Secretariat will forward a list of the known hosts for the detected pest to PHA who will then provide advice on potential Affected Industry Parties, based on this host list and drawn from EPPRD signatories. PHA will provide contact details for the potentially Affected Industry Parties as well as advice on whether the pest is a High Priority Pest and if it is an EPP listed in schedule 13 of the EPPRD.

The Affected Industry Parties are obliged to join the CCEPP for any Incident affecting their crop sector and they have the right to vote. Representatives of the Affected Industry Parties must have the appropriate training, expertise and authority to make decisions on behalf of their Party to allow them to participate fully in CCEPP¹¹. As a minimum, the introductory BOLT courses should be completed prior to participation in CCEPP activities.

7.2 Observers

The EPPRD allows for the attendance of observers at CCEPP meetings, although numbers must be kept to a minimum and observers do not have the right to vote on decisions¹². All attendees should be announced and recorded in the minutes as present. The behaviour of observers is the responsibility of the inviting CCEPP member who must ensure that the observers abide by this guideline and not interfere with the conduct of the meeting or any decision making. All observers must sign a confidentiality deed poll and lodge it with PHA prior to the CCEPP meeting. For additional information on confidentiality and the Confidentiality deed poll see Section 6.

There are four classes of observer as outlined below.

7.2.1 Industry Parties

Any Industry Parties that are not an Affected Party of the EPP and represent growers whose crops might be impacted by a Response Plan must be invited to participate as observers¹³.

7.2.2 Relevant health, environment, amenity expertise

As the EPPRD principally covers primary production in agriculture the CPHM may not have the necessary expertise to cover other affected sectors, such as human health or the environment. Therefore, the CCEPP may request the attendance of a person with appropriate expertise if it is felt that required information cannot be supplied by members.

7.2.3 Technical assistance to members

Technical advisers within jurisdictions, the Australian Government, industry and/or PHA may attend CCEPP meetings to provide advice to relevant members or when asked by a CCEPP member.

7.2.4 Capacity building

Members may invite officers from their organisation in order to ensure that knowledge of both the specific Incident and/or the conduct of a CCEPP meeting and associated processes are built up within their organisation.

¹¹ EPPRD clause 15 and clause 11.4.2

¹² EPPRD schedule 8 part 3.4

¹³ As agreed by EPPRD Parties in October 2007

7.3 Administration and Secretariat

The Secretariat manages the administration of the CCEPP and is provided by the Australian Government¹⁴. The CCEPP Secretariat is responsible for the efficient operation of CCEPP business including collation, circulation and maintenance of documentation; arranging CCEPP meetings and their agendas; preparing meeting records, minutes and action lists for each of the Affected Parties; and preparing reports for NMG.

The Secretariat, in conjunction with PHA, must ensure that all participants of a CCEPP have signed the appropriate documentation regarding confidentiality prior to participation in meetings. For additional information on confidentiality and the Confidentiality deed poll, refer to section 6.

8. Meetings

The CCEPP's role, from the EPPRD is:

*To effectively and efficiently co-ordinate the national technical response to an Incident, and to advise the NMG on matters related to an Incident in accordance with this Deed.*¹⁵

The CCEPP has a pivotal role in:

- determining if the Incident relates to an EPP;
- recommending a response be implemented or otherwise;
- ensuring the Response Plan is technically appropriate;
- reviewing progress of the response; and
- the development of consistent communication strategies.

This work is done through the medium of meetings. The term 'meeting' in this context can mean:

- email;
- teleconference;
- video link; or
- face to face meeting.

The primary focus of these meetings is the review and analysis of complex technical, policy, regulatory and industry data to construct recommendations on EPP status, feasibility, implementation of a response and confirmation of eradication.

Sections 8.4 and 8.5 as well as *Appendix 1* give some guidance on items for discussion during CCEPP meetings. Whilst there are a number of phases in a response to an Incident¹⁶ the core information required by CCEPP relates to before and after the endorsement of the Response Plan.

8.1 Incident notification/convening

The basis for convening the CCEPP is the detection of a Plant Pest or Vector confirmed or reasonably believed to meet the definition of an EPP. Under the EPPRD once a jurisdiction becomes aware of the detection of a possible EPP formal notification must be given to the Chair of the CCEPP (the ACPPO) within

¹⁴ EPPRD schedule 8 part 3.5

¹⁵ EPPRD schedule 8 part 2.1

¹⁶ PLANTPLAN section 3

24 hours¹⁷. Failure to notify within this timeframe may lead to a situation where the jurisdiction receives no payment for their actions in relation to the detection¹⁸.

The formal notification to the ACPPO occurs through the CPHM of the relevant jurisdiction. The notification may be provided orally but must be confirmed in writing in the form agreed by the Parties¹⁹ - through completion of a Preliminary Information Data Sheet (PIDS) (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan). This is sent to the Secretariat for immediate distribution to all members. Once the ACPPO has been notified and Affected Industry Parties identified, the Secretariat will then notify the CCEPP of the Incident.

There is no requirement that a PIDS must be available before the CCEPP is notified of the Incident or the meeting is convened. If there are factors such as urgent information or action requirements relating to a new Incident then the initial meeting may be held prior to the PIDS being completed and distributed. In this instance the Secretariat will make relevant information available to members prior to the meeting.

When convening a meeting the Secretariat should communicate with the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to ensure their availability.

8.2 Quorum

There is no minimum number of members (quorum) required to be in attendance before the CCEPP can conduct its business. The definition of 'Consensus'²⁰ and Schedule 8²¹ indicates that if a Party who is eligible to be present was invited appropriately and is not present, then the CCEPP is still properly constituted and can make a decision.

8.3 Decision making

The CCEPP makes decisions based on 'Consensus', defined in the EPPRD as:

"...in respect of a decision to be taken on an issue, that none of those persons present when the decision is taken are opposed to it, although:

- *persons present during the discussion may have expressed contrary views;*
- *achieving the consensus may have required a measure of compromise to ensure a workable outcome;*
- *some may abstain from participating in the decision; and*
- *some entitled to be present may not be present"*²²

While CCEPP should make every attempt to reach a decision by Consensus to a single view, where this cannot be achieved a Consensus decision can be made by the CCEPP to present more than one view or course of action to the NMG²³.

¹⁷ EPPRD clause 4.1.1 and in clause 1.1 definition of "Formal Notification to the CCEPP"

¹⁸ EPPRD clause 4.2.1

¹⁹ In clause 1.1 definition of "Formal Notification to the CCEPP"

²⁰ In clause 1.1 "those persons present" and "some entitled to be present may not be present"

²¹ Decisions by Consensus

²² EPPRD clause 1.1 Definition of 'Consensus'

²³ Part 2.2 of schedule 8

8.4 Initial meeting

The initial CCEPP meeting following notification of an Incident must be convened as soon as possible. The initial meeting of the CCEPP may be convened via an email meeting or depending on the needs of the CCEPP and Lead Agency, a teleconference/videoconference meeting may be convened in the first instance. There may not be sufficient information available at the time of the initial teleconference/videoconference meeting to formulate a Response Plan, or to make decisions about the status of the EPP or feasibility of eradication, however the following can occur:

- provision of assistance to the Lead Agency with advice on diagnostics, delimiting surveillance, extent of industry, quarantine etc;
- assurance to other Parties that necessary actions are occurring whilst diagnostics and other information are being finalised;
- advice to all Parties on international and interstate trade implications;
- advice to Industry Parties on actions and information that can be discussed with their members; and
- communications as necessary for the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to enable a consistent and agreed message to be used to inform industry, community, the media and other stakeholders. This will occur through the consideration of industry specific communication and the development of nationally agreed talking points (refer to section 8.10).

A list of issues that should be discussed or considered in the context of the initial CCEPP teleconference meeting is outlined in *Appendix 1* and may spread over a number of meetings depending on availability of information. The main items are:

- Summary of initial diagnostic results and what additional tests are required – CPHM of the Lead Agency.
- Summary of survey information and quarantine action at the property, tracing investigations and intrastate movement controls – CPHM of the Lead Agency.
- Advice on whether the pest has been identified in Biosecurity Plans (BPs) or is an EPP categorised under the EPPRD – PHA.
- Details of the biology of the pest/pathogen including its host range, economic impact and opportunities for eradication – CPHM of the Lead Agency.
- Communication requirements of Affected Parties – all members.

8.5 Subsequent CCEPP meetings

The information presented at subsequent CCEPP meetings will vary depending on the stage that the response has reached. A comprehensive list of possible information and issues that may be covered is outlined in *Appendix 1* of this Guideline.

8.6 Agenda

There is a standard CCEPP meeting agenda (*Appendix 2*) that can be amended as required and made available to members by the Secretariat. Within the dictates of a response to an Incident, members should receive sufficient notice to allow them to access any required information, as well as make changes to the agenda if necessary.

8.7 Papers

All papers and other documentation required for CCEPP considerations will be made available to members through the Secretariat uploading to the Biosecurity Portal CCEPP site, which forms the repository for all documentation related to each Incident notified to the CCEPP

(portal.biosecurityportal.org.au/Pages/CCEPPLanding.aspx). Papers should be forwarded to the Secretariat in time for them to be uploaded or distributed giving members sufficient time to consider the information and their actions. This means where possible at least 2 business days prior to a meeting. As with the agenda it is important for members to be able to access information within their jurisdiction/industry that may relate to specific issues raised in meeting papers. Where papers are distributed immediately before a meeting the possibility of not reaching a decision is greatly increased.

The Lead Agency will provide a situation report as a standing paper prior to each in session (teleconference, videoconference or face to face) CCEPP meeting.

8.8 Minutes

The Secretariat is responsible for completing a record of CCEPP meetings and may record meetings to facilitate the writing of accurate minutes. Distribution of actions, outcomes and minutes arising from a meeting is critical to the effective and efficient response to an Incident. The Secretariat should aim to meet the following timeframes:

- Actions and outcomes within 2 hours of the CCEPP meeting
- Draft Minutes within 1 business day of the CCEPP meeting
- Final Minutes within 2 business days of distribution of the draft minutes

To assist with the above timelines as well as CCEPP understanding of the actions and outcomes, the Chair should provide a brief summation of actions and outcomes at the end of each meeting.

These timelines also impact on members. If members wish to comment on draft minutes before they become final they must comment within the timeframe unless a request for an extension is provided to the Secretariat. If no comment is received, then members will have agreed to the final minutes and may not request further amendments.

To assist members awareness and tracking of progress made to address action items from previous meetings, a consolidated actions list will be maintained by the Secretariat and a summary should be provided at the beginning of each meeting of the status of action items.

8.9 Advice to NMG

NMG is the decision making authority for the commencement and cessation of eradication responses under the EPPRD and the cost-sharing arrangements that apply. Information on the roles and responsibilities of the NMG are provided in the [NMG job card](#).

The CCEPP advises the NMG in relation to Incident notifications and responses including providing recommendations on whether a response should proceed based on considerations of the technical and economic feasibility of eradication. The timing of this advice will depend on the status of the Plant Pest or Vector and the phase of the EPP response.

The initial matters for the CCEPP to address in its advice to the NMG are the diagnosis and impacts of the Plant Pest or Vector, its delimitation and likelihood of eradication. Recommendations from the CCEPP to the NMG must contain sufficient evidence and analysis to allow the NMG to reach an informed decision. For example, a recommendation that the Incident involves an EPP should detail the reasoning/EPPRD definitions/biology behind it. A recommendation to undertake a response or a request for approval for a Response Plan will be based on discussion within the CCEPP and will be provided to NMG as soon as practicable.

If there is insufficient information available to fully determine the extent of the Incident the CCEPP may recommend to the NMG that a phased Response Plan be implemented, with the inclusion of robust trigger points to manage any uncertainty at the early stage of the response. An indicative budget may be included for the first phase of the response only in the first instance and revised to include subsequent phases once further information is known regarding the extent of the Incident and response activities required to eradicate the EPP.

PHA has responsibility for developing the NMG paper relating to Cost Sharing and funding of the Response Plan. This paper provides all relevant details relating to Cost Sharing and financial limits specified in the EPPRD.

NMG will meet at the earliest time possible, having regard to the stage of the response and the matters for consideration. For example, an initial NMG at the outset of a response may proceed with some urgency with subsequent meetings regarding the ongoing response being arranged on an as needed basis. Where possible, papers should be provided to the NMG Secretariat for distribution at least 2 business days prior to the subsequent meetings regarding a response. It is recognised that during an emergency response NMG may need to proceed on the information available at the time.

Plant Pests or Vectors for which the CCEPP agrees to take no action will be notified to NMG in a biannual out of session paper in January and July. This paper will be drafted by the Secretariat and approved by the CCEPP, prior to submission to the NMG.

8.10 Public information

8.10.1 National talking points

To facilitate rapid communication, national talking points should be developed and agreed to as soon as possible following the detection of an EPP to ensure that a common message is used by all Affected Parties. These should be sufficiently detailed to meet the communication requirements of Affected Parties. The National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) Chair/Secretariat and the Lead Agency will coordinate the development of draft national talking points. Where talking points are not drafted by the NBCEN, the relevant Affected Industry Parties may develop their own draft national talking points for approval by the ACPPO. Talking points will typically be drafted either prior to or immediately after the CCEPP teleconference meeting; however, Parties may initiate their development anytime following the notification of the Incident.

All CCEPP members have a role in providing input into the development and review of draft national talking points. Where possible draft talking points must be distributed by the NBCEN Secretariat for immediate comment by NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties. NBCEN members are expected to consult with their respective CCEPP members to coordinate feedback from their Parties. All draft national talking points will be approved by the ACPPO, with the final approved version distributed by the NBCEN

Secretariat to NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties, and by the CCEPP Secretariat to CCEPP members, with an aim to distribute and use on the same day as the meeting.

Media releases from each Affected Party and resulting media from interviews should be shared with all members of the CCEPP prior to release and should be coordinated as much as possible to enable consistent public messaging.

8.10.2 Industry specific communications

During CCEPP meetings there will be an opportunity for discussion on industry specific communications so industry representatives are aware of what information is appropriate to use when discussing the response to an Incident with their members, as well as to propose messages that they would like to share with their members and should therefore be included in the draft national talking points.

8.11 International notification

The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is a multilateral treaty under the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. The IPPC requires contracting parties to cooperate in the exchange of information on plant pests, particularly the reporting of the occurrence, outbreak or spread of pests that may be of immediate or potential danger, in accordance with such procedures as may be established by the Commission. The ACPPO, as Australia's official contact point for the IPPC, is responsible for ensuring that these obligations for pest reporting are met.

To comply with reporting requirements the CCEPP will be asked to consider draft notifications to the IPPC during the course of an Incident. This is a standing agenda item for meetings and may include Incidents that don't proceed to eradication depending on the significance of the Plant Pest or Vector to Australia's pest status and its impact on trade. In the event of successful eradication the CCEPP will be asked to consider a draft notification to the IPPC advising the eradication of the EPP.

Additionally depending on protocol requirements, international trading partners may require notification of changes to Australia's plant health status. This is the responsibility of the Australian Government and not a role of the CCEPP.

8.12 Other considerations

8.12.1 Face to face meetings

Although currently emails, followed by videoconferences or teleconferences, are the most common methods of 'meeting' for the CCEPP, response debriefs have shown that consideration should be given to face to face meetings. At the beginning of a response to an Incident or at pivotal times during a response it has been found valuable to hold a face to face meeting which includes a field trip to the area/property affected by the EPP. By seeing the spread of the EPP and noting how and where it affects the host crop, situational awareness will be improved and members may be more able to determine the best possible response.

9. Scientific support and seeking advice

9.1 Scientific Advisory Panel

If the CCEPP requires advice on a particular aspect of a response, the default approach is to convene a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) unless there is an existing industry or government mechanism through which the matter can be adequately addressed. A SAP covers complex technical issues which may relate to pest biology, feasibility of eradication, surveillance, destruction, response strategy, recovery or any other area in which the CCEPP requires advice to inform technical considerations or decision making.

The SAP is chaired by PHA and comprises specialists with expertise from the required field. It is critical that SAP nominees are appropriately skilled to address the advice required. It may be appropriate for international experts or experts from non-EPPRD scientific organisations to be nominated on a SAP. In this case confidentiality and potential market access implications need to be carefully managed. Representation from all Affected Parties is by self-nomination and not obligatory. More than one SAP may be required if the advice requires input across different technical areas and therefore requires a different set of skills from nominees.

If a SAP is required then the CCEPP will develop specific questions (terms of reference) for the SAP to address. The SAP makes recommendations to the CCEPP against the terms of reference and the CCEPP will then consider these in conjunction with other aspects of the response such as policy, financial and other technical information. These are recommendations only and the CCEPP is not obliged to accept them. Once the CCEPP has reached a decision on the recommendations provided by the SAP the Secretariat will inform the SAP through the Chair of the SAP on what the outcome(s) were, and the reasons behind them.

Further details on a SAP can be found in the [Scientific Advisory Panel job card](#).

9.2 Plant Health Committee subcommittees

The CCEPP may seek specialist advice from a Plant Health Committee (PHC) subcommittee due to their skill set and responsibilities in plant health policy and technical matters. Where this occurs, requests for advice must be provided directly from the CCEPP to PHC to then action through the subcommittee, with clear terms of reference to be agreed by the CCEPP. PHC would be responsible for managing timely completion of the task and provision of advice back to the CCEPP.

9.3 Diagnostics

Information on laboratory standards for sampling procedures, protocols for transport, diagnosis and confirmation of EPPs as well as the engagement of overseas experts and chain of evidence is covered in PLANTPLAN and related documentation (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan) and must be followed by participating laboratories in all jurisdictions.

9.3.1 Protocols

Where available, IPPC protocols or endorsed National Diagnostic Protocols should be used to test samples. The CCEPP will consult with the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics (SPHD) to determine if such a protocol exists or is going through the validation process. If such a protocol does not exist then SPHD will advise on the existence of any international or draft procedure to be used. Any diagnostic protocol developed throughout the Incident should be provided to SPHD to progress through the national approval process.

When a National Diagnostic Protocol does not exist or a new/alternative protocol to the current National Diagnostic Protocol is considered more appropriate for diagnosing the EPP, SPHD can rapidly endorse an Emergency Diagnostic Protocol for use in the EPP response. Information on the submission and endorsement process can be found in the SPHD Reference Standard 3 available from: plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resources

9.3.2 Timely provision of information

Laboratory results should be provided by State/Territory or Australian Government laboratories to the Lead Agency CPHM in writing and as rapidly as possible. The Lead Agency CPHM will provide them to the Secretariat who will disseminate the results to members of the CCEPP as soon as possible.

9.4 Surveillance

Where available, nationally approved surveillance protocols should be used for delimitation and to determine if the EPP is present in other areas/jurisdictions. The CCEPP will consult with the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS) to determine if protocols exist or to request assistance in determining the appropriate level of surveillance for specific EPPs. PLANTPLAN and relevant documentation (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan) provide guidance for delimiting surveys and zoning around infested, contact and suspect premises for use when planning and conducting surveillance activities.

Where CCEPP endorses a surveillance protocol under a Response Plan, consideration should be given to referring the protocol to SNPHS as a candidate as an agreed protocol for future use.

9.5 International experts

The CCEPP should consider early in the Incident if there is a need to engage international expertise to inform aspects of the response. In its considerations the CCEPP should address effective management of confidentiality and market access sensitivities.

9.6 Research and development activities

As part of a Response Plan the CCEPP may identify research needs and facilitate and monitor completion of research projects. Such projects may include urgent research necessary to progress diagnostics and support surveillance and proof of freedom. Research and development activities may also form part of a revised Response Plan for Transition to Management. In terms of ownership of information and Intellectual Property any research carried out as part of a cost shared Response Plan is not considered the property of an individual or jurisdiction.

The release of any research carried out as part of a cost shared Response Plan requires the consent of the CCEPP.

9.7 Working groups

The CCEPP may convene a concise working group to complete a specific task (e.g. support development of the response strategy and/or specific elements of the Response Plan) or provide advice on non-scientific/technical matters. Where the CCEPP seeks to form a working group to provide advice on a specific matter, clear terms of reference, membership and reporting timelines must be established by the CCEPP.

Appendix 1 Information to be included at CCEPP meetings

This information is for guidance only. Topics and issues suggested may run across a number of meetings or not be necessary depending on the nature and length of the response.

First meeting of the CCEPP (Section 8.4)

(The initial meeting should be held as soon as possible after the detection of a suspect EPP so not all necessary information is likely to be available and some may be addressed at subsequent meetings.)

Confirm that representatives of Parties and observers have signed an appropriate confidentiality deed.

The required information for presentation at the first meeting will include:

- Lead Agency²⁴
Details of information available on the suspect EPP and actions taken to date, including:
 - biology of the suspect EPP including host range and economic impact,
 - diagnostic results including any additional work required,
 - surveillance information,
 - establishment of quarantine zones and/or intrastate movement restrictions, and
 - trace back and trace forward analysis.
- PHA
Whether the pest has been categorised or identified in Biosecurity Plans.
- Australian Government
International trade implications.
- States/Territories
Domestic trade implications.
- Affected Industry(ies)
Advice on industry extent, distribution or other aspects as required.

Issues to be discussed during the meeting include:

- Are all Affected Industry Parties represented on the CCEPP?
- Is there a diagnostic protocol available and what further diagnostics and/or support from other jurisdictions are required to confirm the suspect EPP?
- Are changes to the current quarantine arrangements relating to the affected site required?
- Is additional information required on the likely extent of dispersal (biological and mechanical) of the organism for establishment of quarantine zones?
- Has tracing (trace back and trace forward) been conducted? Is more required?
- Should additional delimiting surveys be commissioned to define the extent of the outbreak?
- Should targeted surveys be commissioned based on information from trace back and trace forward?
- Should consistent wider state/territory surveys be commissioned to confirm pest presence/absence?

²⁴ A situation report will be provided by the Lead Agency as a standing paper prior to each CCEPP meeting

- What is known about the effectiveness of controls (germplasm, chemical, or other management controls)?
- Should further information on controls used overseas be gathered and the availability of chemicals in Australia be investigated?
- Should treatment or destruction of host material be undertaken?
- Does the pest meet the definition of an EPP, or is it included under schedule 13 of the EPPRD?
- Is it possible to consider opportunities for eradication and whether it is feasible to eradicate the EPP or is more information required?
- Is technical advice required through engagement of international expertise or through the formation of a SAP?
- How will communication be coordinated at the Australian Government, state/territory government and industry levels?
- Development of talking points and possible media releases and coordination of media communications.
- Preparation of information for NMG.

Meeting of the CCEPP following confirmation of an EPP

(Note that information may come from CCEPP requests for advice from SAPs, working groups or PHC subcommittees if convened)

The following information will be presented:

- Situation Update from the Lead Agency including²⁵:
 - confirmation of diagnosis,
 - summary of methods and extent of dispersal of the organism,
 - summary of actions taken to secure the affected site,
 - summary of delimiting survey around affected property,
 - summary of targeted survey based on trace back and trace forward information,
 - analysis of possible pathway of entry based on trace back information, and
 - information on effectiveness of controls overseas and availability of pesticides/chemicals/other control methods in Australia.
- Summaries from other CCEPP members
 - summary from initial surveys in other states/territories,
 - summary of international trade restrictions and recommended actions, and
 - summary of responsibilities to develop agreed communication strategies at the Australian government, industry and state/territory level.

The anticipated issues that need to be addressed at this meeting of the CCEPP include:

- Should the confirmation of diagnosis be accepted and a new incursion formally recognised?

²⁵ A situation report will be provided by the Lead Agency as a standing paper prior to each CCEPP meeting

- Consideration of the overall response strategy and validation of the strategy through a SAP or other means.
- Is further delimiting surveillance (possibly Australia-wide) required to determine absence/presence and to support domestic/international trade?
- Are there appropriate quarantine measures in place to adequately secure the affected site?
- What should be the size of the quarantine zones surrounding affected sites and what movement controls if any should be applied to intrastate movement of hosts?
- What interstate restrictions are in place for movement of plant and plant products from the affected area?
- Should information be sought on pest free area and disinfestation requirements for current and potential international markets?
- What processes will be undertaken to ensure availability of effective controls (e.g. importation of germplasm, approval for emergency use of non-approved chemicals)?
- Should removal/destruction of affected plants take place at this stage?
- Summary of information for use in cost/benefit analysis on consequences of establishment.
- Is eradication technically feasible?
- Should a cost/benefit analysis be commissioned to assist with a final decision on eradication?
- Is additional advice required on specific aspects of the response that cannot be obtained through CCEPP members? Should a SAP be convened and/or is international or other expertise required?
- What frequency should situations reports be provided?
- Should a Response Plan be drafted? Should a small working group of CCEPP members and/or experts be formed to assist in the drafting process? Consideration should be given to a phased approach to the Response Plan if all required information has not yet been gathered to determine the extent of the Incident and response activities that will be required.
- Where a Response Plan is drafted, triggers for review of the Response Plan and expectations on the frequency of expenditure reporting should be considered by the CCEPP.
- The preparation of a recommendation and information for NMG.
- Development of talking points and possible media releases and coordination of media communications.
- Is there a need to meet face to face or via videoconference?

Subsequent meetings of the CCEPP

The content of subsequent meetings can include any of the above issues not already resolved as well as situation updates from the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties. Further information needed at these meetings will be determined by whether a Response Plan is implemented and how it progresses.

If a Response Plan is implemented and it is subsequently determined that the EPP is no longer feasible to eradicate, the CCEPP will consider if a Cost Shared Transition to Management program is required and achievable in a time period not exceeding 12 months. If Transition to Management is considered to be appropriate (i.e. a gap has been identified) the CCEPP should consider the scope and objectives of Transition to Management and potential activities that may be included in the revised Response Plan. If the NMG approves the advice of the CCEPP that the emergency response should enter a Transition to

Management Phase, the CCEPP will provide input into (and review of) the revised Response Plan drafted by the Lead Agency in collaboration with Affected Industry Parties.

If the EPP is no longer feasible to eradicate the CCEPP may also advise the NMG on options for alternative arrangements outside of the EPPRD.

Appendix 2 Agenda template for CCEPP meetings

Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests: <PEST name> AGENDA	
Teleconference Number:	Date:
Location:	Time:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Presenter</i>
1. Opening <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Welcome and roll call Confidentiality requirements²⁶ Papers distributed prior to meeting Purpose of meeting Actions from previous meetings 	Chair
2. Situation Update <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jurisdiction report Diagnostics Trace forward/back Surveillance Future actions 	Affected jurisdiction
3. Deed consideration <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EPP Technical feasibility of eradication Response Plan development (including response strategy) 	Chair/members
4. Movement and trade issues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade implications Quarantine and movement controls 	Chair/members
5. Communication <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Talking points Industry communication IPPC notification 	Chair/members
6. Suggested advice/recommendations to NMG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advice on pest occurrence EPP status and feasibility of eradication Acceptance of Response Plan as endorsed by CCEPP Communication matters 	Chair/members
7. Other business	Chair
8. Summary of CCEPP actions and outcomes	Chair
9. Next Meeting	Chair

²⁶ Note: All CCEPP meeting participants must have completed a Confidentiality Deed Poll available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Confidentiality-Deed-poll.pdf

10. Close	
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Delimiting surveys

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 10 of PLANTPLAN (V1.0 Nov 2011). Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. Figure 8 removed.
2.0	1 Dec 2015	All	Guideline developed from Delimiting surveys SOP (V1.0 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS). Approved by SNPHS August 2015. Endorsed by Parties November 2015.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist plant health staff/field officers to plan and conduct delimiting surveillance for suspect Emergency Plant Pests (EPPs). While survey methodology and operating procedures will need to be prepared that are specific to the suspect EPP and host crop, this document provides general information that can be used to inform development of such procedures.

2. Application/Scope

Data collected from surveys will be used to identify the first quarantine zone known as the Restricted Area (RA), which comprises all properties where the organism has been confirmed (Infected Premises (IPs)),

properties which have come into direct or indirect contact with an IP or infected plants (Contact Premises) and properties which may have been exposed to the EPP (Suspect Premises).

The size of the quarantine zone will be determined by a number of factors, including the location of the incursion, the climatic conditions at the time, the biology of the EPP and the proximity of the IP to other IPs.

Trace back and trace forward information will be used to define the RA. A buffer zone or Control Area (CA) is established around RAs to control the movement of susceptible hosts and other regulated materials until the extent of the incursion is determined.

3. Critical Issues

There are a number of critical considerations that must be taken into account when planning and conducting delimiting surveys:

- Delimiting survey methodology should be nationally consistent and allow for the confident identification of the boundaries of an area considered to be infected by or free from an EPP.
- Appropriate record keeping.
- Appropriate containment and labelling of suspect EPP samples collected during the survey and establishment of a chain of evidence (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Chain of Evidence* standard operating procedure).
- Adherence to disinfection and decontamination protocols (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).
- Training of personnel prior to entry to the site.
- Safety of staff is considered at all times and all relevant Work, Health and Safety (WH&S) legislative requirements are followed.
- Availability of resources including personnel and equipment.
- Availability of a National Diagnostic Protocol for accurate diagnosis of the suspect EPP.

4. Resource equipment

Equipment that may be required for a delimiting survey could include, but is not limited to:

- road and farm vehicles
- GPS loggers and/or 'smartphones' running with appropriate software
- radio communication equipment
- sampling and hygiene equipment including laminated guides to assist identification of hosts and symptoms
- hygiene equipment (e.g. disinfection agents – refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines)
- recording systems
- protective clothing and any other Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), as required.

5. Description of activities

5.1 Delimiting surveys to identify restricted and control areas

5.1.1 Survey design

A survey strategy will be planned with reference to appropriate confidence limits based on the following information:

- pest biology – survival, reproductive rate, spread and dispersal and influence of environmental factors
- host plant – extent of host range, distribution of hosts around RAs and CAs, significance of growth stage of hosts
- survey and sampling methods – ease of symptom recognition, sampling strategy (this should take into account the area of expected occurrence)
- quality of data collected based on numerous factors e.g. credibility of those collecting, ability to collect/inspect representative samples, suitable training and support materials and integrity of the samples collected
- a predictive analysis of areas where the pest is likely to occur
- expected prevalence of the pest if unrestricted
- biometric methods to specify the different confidence limits for targeted and general surveillance.

Note: The above does not represent a definitive list; some surveys may require the sourcing of more information than presented above, while others may require less. Where possible the survey should be nationally consistent and calculation of confidence limits based on best available information. Responsibilities for planning surveys will differ in each jurisdiction and will be dependent on the purpose.

5.1.2 Trace back, trace forward interviews

A questionnaire will be developed to obtain some or all of the following information, depending on the requirements of the pest and the response:

- the details of planting material (such as species, size, numbers, age of plants, material type - potted, cuttings etc and source material), including when and where sourced from
- destinations of plants and plant products which have moved from the property
- location of properties which share equipment and people
- movement pathways of contracted farm labour and of contractors who have recently worked on the property
- access to any records kept by the business or domestic property owner or occupier
- movement pathways of commercial apiarists (if relevant)
- hosts that are present on the property and nearby
- other visitors to the property (including but not limited to friends, family)
- people or equipment (on the property or that have been on the property) that have recently been known to be in contact with the host, or known pest areas elsewhere
- observation of any signs/symptoms of the pest on the property.

5.1.3 Planning and resourcing

A range of tasks will be conducted around planning and resourcing to ensure consistent, effective and appropriate surveillance is conducted, including but not limited to the following:

- Survey teams and leaders will be appointed, and identification tags arranged for these personnel if required, as well as authorities under relevant Acts.
- Training sessions on surveillance programs will be run. This training will include what to look for (signs/symptoms, damage and host identification, including where appropriate, provision of a laminated guide); how to collect, label and pack samples and record sampling points and property visits; WH&S requirements, and communications for consistent messaging.
- Teams will also be trained on relevant jurisdictional plant biosecurity legislation and surveillance officer powers and limitations, introduction statements to property owners and on decontamination practices for entry and exit from properties (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).
- Use of survey equipment will be demonstrated and deployment of teams with vehicles arranged.
- The process for recording time inputs and the cost of consumables will also be explained.
- A Quality Assurance (QA) system will be designed and implemented to check the operation and recording of results by surveillance teams.
- A national diagnostic protocol (if not already developed) will be designed, and laboratories will be recommended for consignment of samples.

The personnel responsible for managing and undertaking these tasks may differ based on the jurisdictions conducting them and the requirements of each response.

5.2 Methods for initial wider surveillance

Surveys will be carried out to check for the presence of the pest outside the RAs and CAs.

5.2.1 Survey design

A nationally consistent survey strategy will be developed that may be based on, but not limited to the following information:

- pathways for movement of the pest
- pest biology – survival, reproductive rate, spread and dispersal and influence of environmental factors
- host plant – extent of host range, national distribution, area, significance of growth stage of hosts linked to climatic zones
- survey and sampling methods – symptom recognition, sampling strategy
- expected prevalence of the pest if unrestricted
- biometric methods to specify the different confidence limits for targeted and general surveillance
- timeframe available and required for surveying.

5.2.2 Planning and resourcing

A consistent surveillance and diagnostic program across production areas in Australia will be developed. Planning and resourcing considerations described in 5.1.3 will also apply to surveys conducted outside the RAs and CAs.

5.2.3 Approval process by Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests

The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) will consider/approve the proposed initial national survey (scoping survey), timeframe and proposed budgets from state(s)/territory(s) and incorporate this into a paper for consideration by the National Management Group (NMG).

5.3 Confirmatory surveys to identify the Restricted Area

5.3.1 Survey design

National information from initial surveys and trace back and trace forward interviews will be reviewed, and extended surveys may be planned incorporating:

- nationally agreed survey and sampling protocols and laboratories responsible for diagnosis - these will already have been developed for delimiting surveys
- improvements on the design for the initial survey – incorporating trapping grid for pests which respond to lures
- nationally agreed process for costing surveys and for recording results
- survey rosters, routes and methods of survey for feral hosts on survey route
- a QA system to check the operation and recording of results by surveillance teams.

5.3.2 Establishment of surveillance teams

The number of surveillance teams and resource requirements will be determined. Refer to section 4 for additional information regarding equipment requirements.

Surveillance team leaders and members will be appointed. These teams will be trained in:

- communicating with and dealing with the public, including communication and publicity statements and material to be used/disseminated for awareness for consistent messaging
- the use of equipment (including WH&S issues)
- WH&S in the field
- methods for identifying suspect plants/pests
- methods for sampling from plants, and packaging, labelling and sending samples (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines)
- correct use of data recording tools such as mapping, GPS, data fields, the types of comments to record, and what data fields mean
- decontamination and disinfestation protocols for entry and exit from properties (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines)
- methods for replacement of lures/traps etc
- survey rosters and end of day operations including delivery of results, samples and any comments
- demonstrate use of survey equipment and arrange for its deployment to teams with vehicles
- use of Powers under relevant Acts
- documentation and administration requirements.

5.4 Confirmatory surveys to identify pest free areas where hosts are not considered to be infected

Once the RAs and CAs have been defined, surveys will be required to identify areas which remain free from the pest. Interstate quarantine regulations may require the affected state(s)/territory(s) to justify area freedom status for unaffected production areas.

International trading partners which identify the pest in their phytosanitary regulations will also normally require justification of pest free areas.

Surveys will usually need to conform to the requirements listed in the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) – International Standard Phytosanitary Measure number 4 which specifies that the area must be free of the EPP as demonstrated by scientific evidence.

5.4.1 Design of survey

The Lead Agency (and if required other states/territories) will work with industries through the CCEPP to identify production areas requiring pest free status. The survey design will be consistent with nationally agreed protocols and the Chief Plant Health Manager will seek endorsement of CCEPP prior to commissioning the survey.

Information from the initial survey and trace back/trace forward interviews will also be reviewed to help identify areas for confirmatory pest free area surveys and develop plans for confirming the status based on the following points:

- the definition of the area(s) in question
- detailed maps of the known commercial production areas
- survey methods for locating feral host plants
- agreed confidence limits for detecting the organism
- laminated guides to assist identification of hosts and symptoms
- methods of survey and sampling based on the biology and dispersal of the organism, its predicted unrestricted distribution, host range, and known distribution
- design of trapping grid for pests which respond to lures
- description of survey intensity designed to satisfy agreed confidence standards
- plans for the deployment, management and sampling of sentinel plots or plants
- nationally identified laboratories responsible for diagnosis
- nationally agreed process for costing surveys and for recording results
- QA systems to minimise error.

General surveillance systems that are already in place should be documented as part of this process as these will contribute to evidence of area freedom.

5.4.2 Establishment of surveillance teams

The number of surveillance teams and their resource requirements will be determined. For information regarding equipment requirements refer to section 4.

Surveillance team leaders and members will be appointed. Training will cover the same details as described in section 5.3.2.

5.4.3 Deployment of sentinel plots, plants and lures (if required)

Sentinel plants and lures will be identified and deployed for surveying pest free areas if required. Recommendations will be made for the preferred location of sentinels and lures at agreed sites to optimise detection of the pest.

The purpose of the sentinel program will be identified, the cooperation of property owners will be sought to "host" sentinel plants, and the GPS location of sentinels/lures will be incorporated into the mapping database. An appropriate method will be used to identify sentinel plants and all surveillance teams will be trained in the management and sampling of sentinel plants and in the replacement of lures.

The following property information will need to be collected as a minimum:

- name of property owner (or leasee) and/or name of property manager
- contact details (phone, fax, e-mail) of owner and/or manager
- postal and street address including lot number (if appropriate)
- map and/or GPS reference points
- sketch map of property which identifies area, driveways, paddocks, blocks within paddocks, buildings and geographical features
- details of any linked or shared properties and lease arrangements.

The following information should be recorded on survey forms:

- date (day/month/year)
- block number within paddock (as identified on property map)
- estimated area of the block
- survey protocol (e.g. x plants within y row)
- variety, growth stage and special methods of production.

The following information should be recorded on labels of samples taken during a survey:

- date (day/month/year)
- identifying number which is linked to a number on the survey form
- host and variety
- GPS location
- name/position of person collecting the sample.

6. Appendices

Appendix 1 Property survey form

LOCATION AND PROPERTY DETAIL

District: _____

Survey round: _____

Property ID: _____

Plantation/block ID: _____

Address (lot number): _____

Owner/manager: _____

Business name: _____

Telephone: _____

Fax: _____

E-mail: _____

Access comments: _____

SURVEY RECORD

Variety/crop: _____

Developmental stage: _____

Row and sampling plan: _____

Area to be sampled: _____

Arrival time: _____

Departure time: _____

Block ID and size	Row number	Number of plants in the row	Number of plants with symptoms present	Location of affected plant	Sample taken and identifier

Diagram of block in relation to position on farm and estimated distribution of pest incidence and severity

Name and signature of property owner/manager _____ Date _____

Name and signature of surveyor _____ Date _____

Appendix 2 Minimum data standards

To be inserted

Appendix 3 Terms and definitions

Term	Definition	Definition source
Contact Premises	Premises (or locality) containing susceptible host plants which are known to have been in direct or indirect contact with an Infected Premises.	PLANTPLAN
Control Area	An area around the restricted area where movement is controlled but not restricted. The area is intended to reduce likelihood of the Plant Pest spreading beyond the Restricted Area.	PLANTPLAN
Infected Premises	Premises (or locality) at which an EPP is confirmed or believed to exist.	PLANTPLAN
Pest Free Area	An area which a specific pest is known not to occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained.	PLANTPLAN
Restricted Area	A relatively small area (compared to a Control Area) around an Infected Premises that is subject to intense surveillance and movement controls. <i>Note:</i> Movement out of the area will, in general, be prohibited, while movement into the area would only be by permit. Multiple Restricted Areas may exist within one Control Area.	PLANTPLAN
Suspect Premises	Premises (or locality) containing plants which may have been exposed to an EPP and which will be subject to quarantine and intense surveillance.	PLANTPLAN

Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two SOPs. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. "Purpose" added.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	Guideline developed from SOP (V1 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostic Standards (SPHDS). Approved by SPHDS October 2014. Endorsed by Parties November 2014.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a framework for diagnosticians to follow when receiving samples of suspect Emergency Plant Pests (EPP) for diagnosis. In all cases the laboratory standard operating procedures (SOP's) should be followed where applicable.

2. Critical issues

Correct identification is central to effective control of pests and diseases and for the detection of new EPPs. Initial identification should have the highest priority and follow (in order of precedence):

- IPPC protocols
- National Diagnostic Protocols
- Peer reviewed published procedures
- Best practise diagnostic techniques.

Chain of evidence protocols shall be followed at all times (see *Chain of evidence SOP*). The appropriate quarantine containment must be used for the sample being examined.

3. Initial diagnosis of suspect EPPs

Initial examination will be carried out by an experienced general diagnostician (e.g. pathologist/entomologist) within the agricultural department in the state/territory in which the sample was obtained. Once an initial examination has been undertaken a specialist may be engaged to carry out further diagnosis. A confirmatory diagnosis will also be undertaken by another laboratory.

3.1 Examination of symptoms by Lead Agency Diagnostic Laboratory

- Check the condition of the plant/pest to determine if it is suitable for testing. New samples should be requested immediately if the submitted sample is not suitable for testing.
- Note and record the integrity of the sample on the sample submission form.
- Digital images of symptoms and other features should be recorded.
- When initial examination indicates a high likelihood of an EPP, the sample and all digital and physical evidence (e.g. slides, DNA etc) will be kept appropriately labelled and securely stored following chain of evidence protocols (see *Chain of evidence SOP*).
- The diagnostician will observe decontamination protocols (e.g. remove laboratory coat for sterilisation, wash hands, disinfect instruments and area – see *Disinfection and decontamination guidelines*).

3.2 Initial diagnosis by specialist

- The Lead Agency will organise additional samples for testing, if required.
- Diagnosis should be carried out within a quarantine containment facility, consistent with the requirements of the pest being examined.
- Initial conclusion on diagnosis and test results should be conveyed to the submitting Diagnostic Laboratory and CPHM of the Lead Agency and only to them.
- Once diagnosis has been completed the sample should be appropriately labelled and securely stored.
- The specialist should preserve and record all digital and physical evidence (e.g. slides, DNA etc.) which supports the initial diagnosis, ensuring it is appropriately labelled and securely stored.
- The specialist will observe decontamination protocols.

3.3 Confirming diagnosis

- The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) will select a second national laboratory with the expertise for independent confirmation of the result. The CCEPP will ensure the laboratory has the appropriate quarantine containment.
- The sample will be forwarded under strict quarantine conditions with the appropriate Movement Permits from the Lead Agency CPHM to the diagnostician with an explanatory letter, observing packaging and transport guidelines (see *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines*).
- In the event that a second national laboratory cannot be located, the CCEPP may identify the requirement for an overseas expert to assist with diagnosis. Note: Selection criteria should cover availability, ease of communication and industry links.

- The Lead Agency CPHM will engage the overseas expert and confirm all arrangements for consignment of samples (e.g. paperwork required, special quarantine requirements of the importing country, payments, international courier arrangements), preferred diagnostic tests for isolation and identification of the target pest, and confidential reporting of results.
- The Lead Agency CPHM will notify the Australian Chief Plant Protection Office (ACPPPO) of the proposed movement of samples and manage any internal and international movement permits and other legislative requirements.
- The Lead Agency CPHM will negotiate any financial transaction(s) for the proposed work and confirm a pathway for confidential reporting of results.

4 Surveillance diagnosis

Samples collected from surveys will need to be tested to confirm presence of the pest. Diagnostic procedures/protocols contained in contingency plans, response plans or surveillance plans for the specific pest should be followed if available.

In the absence of predetermined plans, the CPHM will liaise with the specialist to design guides for diagnosis of samples from surveys for other diagnosticians that will be processing samples. The guides may include:

- validated tests (with quick turnaround time) for isolation of pathogen
- a standardised recording system for results of each sample
- a quality assurance (QA) system for checking veracity of results.

4.1 Training diagnosticians and technical staff

A specialist technical working group may be required to plan and implement training protocols for diagnostic labs covering:

- methods of selecting samples to maximise detection of the pest
- the selected tests for identification of the pest
- methods of recording information relating to a case and chain of evidence requirements.

5. References

Diagnostic protocols for some EPPs can be found on the web:

- IPPC protocols: <https://www.ippc.int/core-activities/standards-setting/ispm>s
- National Diagnostic protocols: <http://plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resource-hub/protocols/national-diagnostic-protocols/>
- EPPO protocols: published in EPPO Bulletin: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1365-2338](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1365-2338)

Disinfection and decontamination

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1.0 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two Guidelines. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.
2.0	1 Dec 2015	All	V1.0 (Dec 2013) reviewed by the Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS). Approved by SNPHS August 2015. Endorsed by Parties November 2015.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist diagnosticians and surveillance field officers to safely and appropriately disinfect and decontaminate equipment and personal items in contact with suspect Emergency Plant Pests (EPPs). Please note that this document covers general information on disinfection and decontamination principles and that specific operating procedures will need to be developed to ensure that disinfection and decontamination methodology, chemical use and general hygiene methods are relevant to the suspect EPP, host crop and risks associated with a particular activity.

2. Critical issues

There are a number of critical considerations that must be taken into account to achieve effective disinfection and decontamination of equipment and personal items when dealing with suspect EPPs:

- Appropriate use, decontamination and disinfection of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other resources/equipment.
- Containment/packaging procedures for samples and disposal methods for infected material.
- Use of the appropriate disinfectant for the particular suspect EPP.

- Safety procedures for the use of chemicals:
 - All disinfectants applied to skin must be safe for use on skin/registered for this purpose and used in accordance with directions.
 - Any disinfectants used must also have inhalant risk assessments carried out.
 - Safety Data Sheets for specific disinfectants should be referred to.
- Resources taken into a contaminated area must only be those that are necessary to perform duties and/or can be disinfected after use. Cameras/mobile phones etc. can be placed in a zip-lock bag where the item can still be used without removing and the container can be disinfected.
- Decontamination procedures for leaving the site including the following considerations:
 - Set up the decontamination site prior to entering the property. Do not re-enter a vehicle or the clean area until decontaminated adequately/decontamination process completed. Work Health and Safety, PPE and decontamination must be implemented according to risk and in accordance with local instructions.
 - Park all vehicles out of the contamination zone where possible. If this is not possible, alternatives must be investigated prior to the activity so to minimise risk of contamination/spread, e.g. wash-down facilities on the site.
 - Drainage and disposal of contaminated waste water and/or chemicals for each site.
- Training of personnel in disinfection and decontamination procedures prior to visiting the site.

3. Hygiene and disinfection

The following hygiene and disinfection elements should be taken into consideration prior to and during work on the site:

- Select and set up a personal decontamination site in the 'clean area' bordering the 'dirty area' before entering the property. It must allow staff to be able to exit without re-entering a contaminated or potentially contaminated area.
- A line can be used to mark the 'clean area' and the potentially 'contaminated/dirty area'. Use a tarp in the 'clean area' to place equipment on. Position equipment for:
 1. Entry,
 2. Use on the 'dirty side' (including spare gloves, boot covers etc.), and
 3. Use on exit.
- Ensure disinfectants and equipment for personal decontamination are ready for use before entering the contaminated area. A scrub tub (which must be an appropriate size and depth to enable personnel to stand in) filled with an approved cleaning solution diluted with water as per manufacturer's instructions and approved chemical spray bottles must be prepared and ready to use, as well as brushes and wipes etc, and soap and water appropriate for skin. Some disinfectants can pose inhalant risks so appropriate risk assessments must also be carried out.

3.1 Personal protective equipment

Appropriate use of PPE is critical to prevent spread of EPPs between contaminated and non-contaminated sites. Procedures should be developed for decontamination, disinfection and disposal of PPE that are relevant to the suspect EPP, and personnel should be trained in their use. Consideration should be given to the following points:

- Disposable overalls and gloves should be worn when sampling infected material on site. Boot covers or cleanable rubber boots are advisable. Put on protective clothing in the 'clean area' before entry.
- Some equipment, such as boot covers and disposable gloves may wear quickly. Therefore it may be appropriate to wear two pairs and take a spare into the 'dirty area', if needed.
- PPE should be properly worn, ensuring all hair is covered and overalls, gloves, boot covers are sealed/held in place with duct tape.
- Once sampling is complete, remove all contaminated items and clean or double bag them prior to leaving the decontamination site. When removing PPE; where possible the gloves, overalls, boot covers etc. should be carefully rolled back, turning them inside-out.
- All disposable items (gloves, head covers, boot covers, overalls) should be double bagged and disposed of as per quarantine requirements. When double-bagging, each bag needs to be decontaminated after sealing.
- Footwear should be either removed and bagged, or thoroughly cleaned and disinfected before leaving the property.
- Scrub soil off the base of footwear before stepping into a disinfection bath containing an appropriate disinfectant (e.g. Virkon, chlorine solution, Phytoclean).
- Disinfect hands and exposed areas, then wash hands, face and disinfected skin in clean water with detergent or soap.

3.2 Portable equipment

All equipment that is brought onto the site must be decontaminated and disinfected according to appropriate procedures. The following points should be considered:

- Ensure that soil, plant material and other large contaminants are removed in the decontamination process, prior to disinfection.
- Disinfect implements immediately after use with an appropriate disinfectant (e.g. Virkon, Phytoclean, 80% v/v ethanol or 0.5% v/v available chlorine solution), as appropriate. Ensure an appropriate contact time to achieve required disinfection.
- Equipment will ideally be disinfected on-site; however if this is not possible then it must be securely bagged for later disinfection before leaving the property. When double-bagging, disinfect each bag after sealing.

3.3 Samples

Samples should be managed in accordance with the *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines. Consideration should be given to the following:

- All samples should be securely packaged as required, with at least one layer of suitable packaging applied in the contamination zone.
- The samples packaged within the contamination zone should be sealed and decontaminated, adding the next layer of packaging when in the decontamination area.
- Samples should be labelled with a marker as appropriate. Be aware that if they are marked on external bags, some cleaning solutions will remove the markings in the decontamination process, so the internal bag/container should be marked.

4. Large equipment and vehicles

Large equipment and vehicles must be decontaminated prior to leaving a site that is known to be contaminated with a suspect EPP. As this requires a significant commitment of resources and time, it will be important to consider deployment of the equipment in the first place.

Nationally agreed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) from Animal Health Committee are available on the following website and provide additional information on decontamination of large equipment and vehicles:

www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au/programs/emergency-animal-disease-preparedness/nasops/

5. Resources/equipment

The standard kit includes equipment that may be required for the investigation of a suspect EPP and includes relevant equipment to ensure appropriate decontamination and disinfection:

- ground sheet/tarp
- disposable overalls
- waterproof footwear e.g. gumboots
- boot covers (if required)
- suitable, sturdy plastic bags for waste/contaminated items of appropriate sizes
- clear sealable plastic bags for paperwork and other small items such as camera/mobile phone
- disposable gloves: latex (non-chemical resistant), nitrile or/and chemical resistant (nitrile is advisable as are generally stronger and pose less allergen risk)
- chemical resistant gloves
- duct tape
- suitable respiratory protection
- eye protection (for sun protection and/or chemical use)
- ear protection
- sun protection – cleanable hat, sunscreen
- drinking water
- disinfectant suitable for the PPE, as necessary
- buckets, at least 10L each
- foot bath, large enough to stand in and fracture resistant
- tools for cleaning boots, e.g. brush, hoof pick etc
- plastic scrubbing brush and nail brush
- hand-held spraying bottles
- water, minimum 20L (10L containers)
- disinfectants specific for the potential pest
- measuring jug
- soap and/or detergent
- disposable towels

- wipes
- paper towel
- face and hand wash bowl
- sampling equipment
- sample bottles and sealable bags
- labels
- secateurs
- waterproof markers
- scissors
- signage (if required)
- cordoning tape (if required)
- camera/mobile phone
- data collection documents and equipment such as pens etc (if required)
- cable ties, or similar
- first aid kit
- authorised inspector identification card
- appropriate Standard Operating Procedure for the pest
- GPS device
- insect spray – e.g. quick knockdown action.

National talking points

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	30 Nov 2017	All	New document developed by Plant Health Australia in collaboration with Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network Chair/Secretariat. Endorsed by Parties November 2017.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	Section 3.3	Minor update to reference inclusion of relevant situational information, response strategy details and information on counselling and support services available. Endorsed by Parties November 2018.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) Parties on the purpose, use and process for the development of national talking points during a response to an Incident¹ under the EPPRD. Guidance is also provided on the type of information which may be included in national talking points, with further detail on potential content included in the *National talking points* template².

¹ Where the term 'Incident' is used throughout this document, it refers to the occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an uncategorised Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).

² Available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

The process for development and approval of national talking points that is described in this document is consistent with that described in PLANTPLAN.

Capitalised terms (excluding names) used in this document are a reference to the defined terms in clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

2. Purpose of national talking points

The purpose of national talking points is to provide nationally agreed and timely information about an Incident, that can be used by Affected Parties both proactively and reactively when communicating to stakeholders and the wider public. Approved national talking points form the basis of the information used when developing media releases, website content as well as in other public information materials and for industry/community engagement activities. Information about an Incident that is not contained in the national talking points should not be communicated to those outside of the Affected Parties, unless it has been agreed by those Affected Parties.

When a suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) is detected, there is often a need for Affected Parties to provide information to stakeholders and the wider public quickly and effectively. This can include important information about how to identify and report suspected EPPs, advise the status of the Incident and how stakeholders and/or the wider public may be impacted. As there are often a number of Affected Parties communicating to their members through a variety of mechanisms, it is critical that the messages are nationally consistent and where possible coordinated to be released at the same time. The development of national talking points addresses these needs by providing a set of consistent and nationally agreed key messages. These messages can be used by media spokespeople and to develop other public content such as newsletters, website content and to address face-to-face meetings.

The specific content and level of detail in the national talking points will be driven by the specific information the Affected Parties need to communicate to stakeholders and the wider public. This may vary from one Incident to another and will be dependent on the nature, extent and stage of the specific Incident.

National talking points are typically developed for active Incidents that are under consideration by the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP)/ National Management Group (NMG) or for which an agreed Response Plan is in place. They are also developed to accompany the Biannual Report from the CCEPP to the NMG for Incidents in which the recommendation is for no further action under the EPPRD (as they either do not relate to an EPP or relate to an EPP that is not feasible to eradicate). This enables Affected Parties to communicate consistent messages about the outcome of consideration of these Incidents under the EPPRD, for which government and industry may then develop awareness material to inform affected growers.

3. Process for development of national talking points

The development and approval of national talking points must be managed quickly to meet tight media deadlines and enable key awareness messages to be communicated to stakeholders and/or the wider public, as early as possible following the detection of an EPP.

3.1 Drafting national talking points

Any Affected Party can initiate the development of national talking points at any time following the notification of an Incident to the CCEPP. The general practice is for the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (through the Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network (NCN) Chair/Secretariat) and Lead Agency to jointly develop the draft national talking points, either prior to or immediately following a CCEPP teleconference being convened. Where national talking points are not developed by the NCN Secretariat/Lead Agency, an Affected Party may develop the initial draft talking points or request (through the CCEPP) that they be developed and put forward key messages they would like to be included.

All Affected Parties have a role in providing input into the development of national talking points. Key points to be covered in the talking points should be raised by CCEPP members, ideally prior to the initial draft being developed. If a CCEPP meeting has been scheduled, key points for inclusion should be raised prior to or at the CCEPP meeting to ensure specific information is included to support effective communication with stakeholders. A standing agenda item for industry communication is included in CCEPP meetings and provides industry with the opportunity to discuss industry specific communications and propose key messages that they would like to share with their members and should therefore be included in the draft national talking points.

Once developed the draft national talking points are distributed by the NCN Secretariat for immediate comment by NCN members and Affected Industry Parties. Industry Parties should nominate their relevant communication manager (where available) who will receive the talking points and coordinate their organisation's input or feedback. Where a communication manager is not available, the CCEPP representative for the Industry Party will be included on the NCN distribution list and may provide input to the talking points. A cut off time for feedback will be stated when the talking points are emailed. In most cases turnaround time is short due to the urgent need to get information out to growers and affected stakeholders.

Once the NCN member receives the talking points they are expected to consult the CCEPP member to discuss any required changes or feedback.

Once the feedback is received by the NCN Secretariat, the relevant changes are incorporated. It should be noted that not all changes are made or accepted. This is because, on occasions, feedback is conflicting, inconsistent, or the change has already been addressed by another Party. The NCN Secretariat uses best judgement to collate the changes, and to ensure that the information is correct and written in an appropriate style for the intended audiences. The NCN Secretariat will seek technical advice where necessary.

3.2 Approval of national talking points

Following the incorporation of feedback, the draft is sent to the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer (ACPPPO) for approval. Once approved by the ACPPPO, the NCN Secretariat distributes the national talking points back out to the NCN and Affected Industry Parties. The CCEPP Secretariat also provides a final copy to all CCEPP members for their use.

3.3 Content of national talking points

The content and level of detail that is covered in national talking points will depend on the nature, extent and stage of the Incident as well as the specific information that Affected Parties need to communicate. The content can be as detailed as required to meet the communication needs of the Affected Parties. Detailed information on the potential content including standard headings and text is provided in the *National talking points* template (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan). In general terms, national talking points will typically cover the following:

- Up to date information on the current situation at the level of detail required to support stakeholder engagement.
- The actions being taken in response to the detection, including information on the underpinning response strategy being implemented. If required, a summary of data may be included to provide an indication of the scale of the response, effort involved in responding to the Incident and progress being made on specific activities (e.g. data on the number of samples collected, traces completed, surveillance events conducted, plants destroyed etc). This information will evolve as the response progresses through updated versions of the national talking points.
- Information to help growers and the public identify, prevent the spread of, and report the pest or disease.
- Any trade and market access restrictions.
- Information on counselling and support services provided by the relevant jurisdiction and nationally (if relevant).
- Standard information about the CCEPP, NMG and EPPRD. Where to get further information.

While talking points should contain specific information about the Incident, they should not contain information that would identify an individual or property, for example, the property name or street address. Whilst the suburb or region in which the detection(s) have been made is typically specified, consideration should be given to whether this is appropriate, as for some industries this level of detail may risk the identity of property owner(s) being revealed. Talking points may convey key decisions on the response course of action that have been agreed by the CCEPP or NMG; however, information regarding individual opinions or details of the discussions held by Affected Parties must not be included.

Parties should remember that national talking points need to be written in a conversational, non-bureaucratic tone. Sentences should be kept short and must be free of acronyms, technical jargon and words in brackets. Common names for pests or diseases should be used, with the scientific name also noted within the document. Long terms used throughout the document can be shortened after being used once. For example, 'Cucumber Green Mottle Mosaic Virus', can be referred to as 'the virus'.

It is important not to use numerous website addresses and phone numbers. In most cases the Outbreak website (outbreak.gov.au) should be used. This website is a portal for people to also access individual state/territory or industry website information. If using a state/territory website the web address should have a short, direct URL for example, dpi.nsw.gov.au/xvirus.

The Emergency Plant Pest Hotline 1800 084 881, should always be used in national talking points, regardless of whether the Lead Agency for the response has a separate number.

3.4 Updating national talking points

National talking points should be updated regularly so that content remains current and relevant. At a minimum, they should be updated when there are major changes to the situation or when key milestones of a response are achieved (for example completion of eradication activities). National talking points should be regularly updated for Incidents in which an agreed Response Plan is in place, even if there are no major changes to the situation or response activities. At a minimum, they should be updated annually to reflect that the response activities are ongoing and no triggers for review of the Response Plan have been met.

The process for updating national talking points is the same as when they are first developed. Any Affected Party may request that the talking points are updated, and identify the content that needs to be changed/added. The NCN Secretariat will typically then update the content and circulate to the NCN and Affected Industry Party contacts for review. After being updated and approved by the ACPPO, the national talking points are then circulated to the CCEPP for their use.

4. Use of national talking points

Approved national talking points can be used by Affected Parties to develop their own communication content/products including EPP industry alerts³, fact sheets, website and newsletter content. However, the national talking points should not be distributed in their current form as a document of the CCEPP.

The information contained in national talking points can also be used proactively by media spokespeople (e.g. during interviews) or to guide Parties on key messages that can be communicated during industry/community engagement activities (e.g. grower/industry meetings). In some cases, information about an Incident may not be released publicly, but national talking points are developed as a preparedness measure in case, for some reason, the Incident creates public or media interest.

If information needs to be communicated outside of the Affected Parties, it must be restricted to key messages contained within agreed national talking points.

National talking points are also used by the NMG or CCEPP to develop communiques during the course of an Incident.

Where possible, communications should be coordinated between Affected Parties to enable consistent public messaging. Media releases, for example, should be shared with all Affected Parties prior to release so that they can be coordinated as much as possible. For consistency of messaging, communications with the media will be restricted to the delegated media contacts within Affected Parties.

³ An EPP alert template is available as a supporting document to PLANTPLAN planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
draft	dd mm 2014	All	New guideline document incorporating Normal Commitments previously agreed by all Parties.
1.0	2 Sep 2014	-	Presented to Parties for consideration in May and August 2014. Document endorsed.
2.0	3 June 2016	2, 4 and 5	Updated to include PHA normal commitments. Restructure of document to separate Cost Sharing Parties from custodial role Endorsed by Parties at the May 2016 EPPRD meeting.

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1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to outline the agreed Normal Commitments of Parties under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) in support of decision making prior to and during a Cost Shared response.

2. Background

In establishing and signing the EPPRD, Parties agreed that they would “work to determine existing and required resource commitments and to define the costs that a State or Territory considers to be ‘normal’ and which should be considered as a baseline above which other costs are to be shared” (clause 14.1.2). These costs, termed ‘Normal Commitments’ would be considered as baseline and not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD.

Normal Commitments under the EPPRD were endorsed by Parties to the EPPRD in May 2008 (Industry framework) and May 2012 (state and territory framework). Normal Commitments are yet to be developed for the Australian Government.

3. Terms and definitions

Term	Acronym	Definition
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	CCEPP	<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
Cost Sharing		<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
Emergency Plant Pest	EPP	<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
First Contact Functions		Functions and actions carried out by an Affected Party associated with the First Contact Premises of an actual or potential EPP Incident. These activities are Normal Commitments and are conducted so as to provide the CCEPP with sufficient information to initiate formal national response activities.
First Contact Premises		All suspect or known Infected Premises (IPs) as identified up to and including the day of first notification of the EPP Incident to CCEPP, plus any premises known or subsequently found to have direct linkage to those IPs, where that linkage has potential to spread the EPP.
National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group	NMG	<i>as defined in the EPPRD</i>
Normal Commitments		Activities undertaken by EPPRD Parties that are considered by the Parties to be normal, and therefore not eligible for Cost Sharing under a Response Plan.
Project Management Transition		The point at which some Normal Commitments can be Cost Shared as a consequence of emergency response activities transitioning to a longer-term, dedicated eradication program. This can occur at the determination of the NMG.

4. Normal Commitments for Cost Sharing Parties

Normal Commitments of each Cost Sharing Party are determined in part by their different responsibilities and roles under the EPPRD, with each agreed framework containing two elements:

- **Principles** that define the agreed assumptions and basis through which the Normal Commitments of a Party is determined (refer section 2.1).
- A **Normal Commitments benchmark** which define the specific capability and capacity that comprises Normal Commitments, above which would be eligible for Cost Sharing. These define the specific EPPRD functions subject to Normal Commitments and a performance benchmark for delivery of each function. Government and Industry Parties have different Normal Commitments benchmarks.

4.1 Principles for Normal Commitments

The principles for Normal Commitments are identical for both government and Industry Parties and are consistent with those developed for the National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA) and the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA).

(a) Scope of Normal Commitments

The scope of Normal Commitments includes only the capability and capacity necessary to respond to an EPP in a manner and extent consistent with the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.

It is recognised that Parties have broader responsibilities in plant health separate to the EPPRD and these are not affected by this principle.

(b) Costs of Normal Commitments

The costs of meeting Normal Commitment obligations are not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD, regardless of how the obligations are met. Reasonable costs of Response Plan activities that exceed Normal Commitment obligations are eligible for Cost Sharing, regardless of how those activities are undertaken.

(c) Obligation to maintain capability and capacity

EPPRD Parties have an obligation to maintain the capability and capacity to respond to suspect or confirmed EPPs promptly and appropriately.

(d) Response in the national interest

EPPRD Parties must respond to EPP Incidents in the national interest, recognising that state/territory Parties cannot contravene their jurisdictional responsibilities under legislation and the Australian Constitution.

(e) Obligation for personnel to meet EPPRD requirements

EPPRD Parties will act in good faith to ensure their personnel and stakeholders understand and meet their responsibilities under the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.

(f) Obligation to have access to necessary resources

All Parties will take reasonable steps to enable them to access any resource necessary to implement their obligations under a Response Plan.

This recognises that the Normal Commitment obligation under the EPPRD binds the 'whole of government' or 'whole of industry'. Therefore, EPPRD Parties should make arrangements to enable them to draw upon key resources when necessary and where possible. This may involve resources within or beyond their direct jurisdiction. Costs arising from this may or may not be eligible for Cost Sharing, and this would be determined in accordance with the Normal Commitments benchmark.

(g) Incident Definition Phase

Subject to specified exceptions, activities required during the Incident Definition Phase, prior to endorsement of a Response Plan, are to be treated as Normal Commitments.

Normal Commitments benchmarks will define which activities could be considered for Cost Sharing at different stages. In addition, the use of short term Response Plans to cover early phases of a response (as endorsed by EPPRD Parties in October 2006), are subject to the Normal Commitments benchmark.

(h) Normal Commitments throughout a response

Some Normal Commitment functions will apply through all phases of an EPP response.

Normal Commitments benchmarks will define activities that are Normal Commitments throughout a Response Plan, and therefore not eligible for Cost Sharing.

(i) Transparency to other Parties

EPPRD Parties will provide transparency to other Parties on their ability to meet the agreed Normal Commitments.

This is expected to comprise periodic independent assessment and reporting.

4.2 State and territory government Parties

The following table defines state and territory government Party Normal Commitments and includes the following elements:

- **EPP functions** - The functions required to detect and respond to and manage suspected or confirmed EPP Incidents.
- **Base line capacity** - The ability to perform EPP Functions expressed in terms of outputs and outcomes (specifying quantity, quality and duration as appropriate), not how functions are delivered. This is the Normal Commitment for a given EPP function.

Each jurisdiction should ensure their Normal Commitments can be met by identifying arrangements within their jurisdiction to meet the Normal Commitment, and addressing identified gaps.

EPP Functions	Base line capacity
Reporting systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness programs are in place to promote reporting • Internal systems ensure incidents are reported and promptly communicated to the Chief Plant Health Manager. • Give Formal Notification to the CCEPP within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident.
Investigation of suspect or confirmed EPP incidents and activities undertaken during Incident Definition Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and deploy sufficient resources to investigate and contain all suspect or confirmed EPP Incidents commencing on the day of notification to the Chief Plant Health Manager including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Field visit/s to undertake investigations, collect and transfer necessary samples and information to establish the nature of the Incident. ○ Investigations to initially delimit the extent of the EPP and the restricted and control areas. ○ Liaison with federal, state, local government, industry and other organisations.
Tracing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake all tracing activities, consistent with the First Contact Function test, to identify movement of plants, plant products, people or any other objects which may cause the spread of the EPP. <p>For the avoidance of doubt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This also applies to tracing activities when new jurisdictions are implicated in an EPP Incident. • Applies also to a new detection within the first jurisdiction where it is determined that it is not linked or traced to the first outbreak.
Surveillance (refer to ISPM 5 Glossary of Phytosanitary Terms and ISPM 6 Guidelines for Surveillance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake Preliminary Detection Surveys consistent with the First Contact Function test, for all potentially affected areas within confidence limits agreed by CCEPP. These are surveys that aim to determine whether or not the pest is widespread. <p>For the avoidance of doubt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intensive Pest Detection Surveys and Delimiting Surveys may be Cost Shared when required by the CCEPP and included in the agreed Response Plan. These

EPP Functions	Base line capacity
	<p>are surveys that aim to delimit the extent of the pest to a defined confidence level.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Surveys undertaken to demonstrate pest freedom in non-risk areas are not eligible for Cost Sharing under a Response Plan. CCEPP will determine which areas are risk and non-risk areas in relation to the EPP Incident.
Quarantine and movement restrictions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the capability and capacity to implement quarantine measures as required under jurisdictional legislation including the ability to declare Pest Quarantine Area zones. Undertake all quarantine activities to contain the EPP within the Pest Quarantine Area, consistent with the First Contact Function test.
Compliance and Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the capability and capacity to implement compliance and enforcement activities required to contain the EPP. Undertake all compliance and enforcement activities to contain the EPP within the Pest Quarantine Area, consistent with the First Contact Function test.
Diagnostic services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain access at all times to diagnostic services to undertake initial screening and/or diagnosis of potential EPP's or unknown pests. Undertake all diagnostic activities consistent with the First Contact Function test, including confirmation diagnosis (i.e. confirmation of a new occurrence of an EPP and independent confirmation as needed). Maintain the capability to activate and oversee large scale diagnostic services for significant industry sectors in the jurisdiction. Laboratory services used are approved to meet national standards as defined in PLANTPLAN where necessary (equipment and facilities) and other relevant national laboratory standards, where necessary. Nationally standardised diagnostic procedures are used where available. Collection and submission of samples to laboratories follows a documented process as described in PLANTPLAN (standard operating procedures <i>Collection and transport of Emergency Plant Pests</i>).
Notifications / communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare and distribute all notifications required under PLANTPLAN, EPPRD and state/territory legislation (e.g. ACPPO, Data sheets, Pest Alert). Prepare and distribute all progress reporting and public communications relating to the EPP Incident until the Project Management Transition (e.g. Incursion Incident Reports, Progress Reports, media releases). Take all reasonable steps to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction (including public and private plant health personnel and public and private laboratories) advise that government Party within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident.
Legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain effective legal and legislative arrangements to manage emergency responses in an effective and timely manner. Undertake all legislative functions and ensure the appropriate legal framework is in place to undertake all elements of a response.
Control centres and infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the capability to establish a State Coordination Centre (SCC) and Local Control Centres (LCCs) at short notice, including provision of the physical facility for the duration of the response. Additional infrastructure may be Cost Shared, and this must be outlined in approved Response Plan.
Personnel (Refer to EPPRD Clause 8.2 – National EPP training)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Skilled and trained personnel are available to conduct field investigations, diagnosis and response activities.

EPP Functions	Base line capacity
program and national data base of accredited personnel) (Refer PLANTPLAN – responsible officer who update list of staff for key positions and provides this to ACPPO).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key functions and roles at SCC and LCC are allocated to trained personnel, where possible, and a list of personnel is maintained and provided to Plant Health Australia (PHA) for inclusion in the national database. Lead Agency(s) to provide staff to establish and operate an SCC and all LCCs until a Response Plan is agreed by NMG. Representatives on CCEPP and NMG have relevant training and are provided and supported for decision-making throughout any EPPRD activity. Representatives provided to serve on a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) when possible and required (their salary costs would not be eligible for Cost Sharing).
Chemical use	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chemical Standards Branch (or equivalent) provide training, accreditation, appropriate authorisations, and any other activities as required by relevant state legislation.
Financial systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systems are in place for preparation of budgets and capture and reporting of financial information as required by Clauses 10 and 12 of the EPPRD. Jurisdiction Financial Management Preparedness Plan is in place. Oversight of financial management by a management accountant is provided throughout the response.
Information systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the ability to establish information management systems consistent with agreed national policy and operational plans (e.g. PLANTPLAN, BioSIRT or equivalent). Undertake emergency response information management requirements consistent with the First Contact Functions test.
EPP Response Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare an EPP Response Plan within a timeframe agreed by CCEPP.
Scientific advice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the ability to obtain scientific advice, assessments of potential impact (including economic and social), epidemiological analysis, and any other technical justification of activities. Provide scientific advice to the CCEPP. <p>For the avoidance of doubt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incidental costs for SAP participants could be Cost Shared under an agreed Response Plan.
Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systems and capability in place to enable audits and reports on progress of response (including efficiency and financial audits). Maintain the ability to conduct debriefs consistent with PLANTPLAN.

4.3 Commonwealth government Party

(pending development and parties' endorsement)

4.4. Industry Parties

The following table defines the Normal Commitments for Industry Parties and includes the following elements:

- Responsibility** – Summary of EPPRD responsibility.
- EPPRD reference** – Relevant clause reference to EPPRD (or PLANTPLAN).
- Description of responsibility** – Note that this is a summary only. For the full and technically accurate explanation the relevant EPPRD Clause should be consulted.

- **Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment** – The definition of what is to be considered a Normal Commitment (not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD) and what is above that (eligible for Cost Sharing).
- **Guidelines for implementation** – generic guidelines providing practical suggestions for how this might be implemented by an Industry Party.

Each Industry Party will meet their EPPRD obligations in a way appropriate to their industry. It was proposed that these requirements are implemented via the mechanism of Industry Biosecurity Planning and that an industry should have a standing budget item in their annual business (or R&D investment) plan to meet these commitments.

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
Admission of Parties to the EPPRD	Clause 3.2	Existing Parties to vote on the admission of a new Party to the EPPRD within 6 months of that Party's application.	-	-
Rapid reporting of Emergency Plant Pests	Clause 4.1.2	Take reasonable steps to advise industry of the obligation to notify the applicable State or Territory authority within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident.	Periodic communications with industry participants on the need to report potential EPP Incidents, and method for reporting.	-
Use of qualified personnel	Clause 8.2	The Parties must	Personnel are allocated against EPPRD roles who are:	-
	Part 2 of Schedule 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wherever possible use people trained / accredited under National EPP Training Program. Take appropriate steps to have personnel trained under that program. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Available at short notice. Are suitably skilled and knowledgeable (based on experience and/or training) to understand and perform their designated EPPRD role/s (below). Have completed and be accredited under the National EPP Training Program where possible. 	-
	Clause 11.4.2(b)	Roles include:	AND	-
	Schedule 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Industry Liaison Officers (ILO) / Industry Liaison Coordinator/s (ILC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have significant knowledge of the affected industry sector or region Are provided throughout the Incident Definition Phase (after this stage ILO/ILC roles or backfilling of their pre-Incident roles could be considered for Cost Sharing) 	-
	Schedule 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NMG, CCEPP and Categorisation Group representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> See also "Participate in consultation and decision-making processes" (below). 	-
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Other key groups or individuals likely to be involved 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not specified in EPPRD. Best practice would be to ensure key support or advisory personnel (not otherwise identified) are appropriately skilled and/or knowledgeable for EPPRD functions. 	-

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
Participate in consultation and decision-making processes	Clause 11 Clause 11.4 Schedule 8	Annually nominate properly authorised Industry Party Representatives in writing Participate effectively in consultation and decision-making processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All participation in EPPRD decision-making as necessary. Industry organisation has internal systems in place to authorise personnel to act in designated roles. NMG Representative is able to be authorised to commit funding through a Response Plan. Nominations for EPPRD roles are provided to PHA annually. All nominated Representatives have signed a confidentiality deed poll. Arrangements are in place to enable internal communication between Representatives and their organisation and stakeholders. Representatives are available and appropriately briefed for all meetings in which the industry is an Affected Party or Relevant Party. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advise PHA in October of each year using templates provided. Provide nominees for NMG, CCEPP, Categorisation Group and Industry Liaison Coordinator/Officer roles. If appropriate, provide nominees for SAPs (e.g. for expertise available to the industry). Nominees could be authorised using appropriate delegations for the roles (e.g. a Board delegation to authorise NMG Representative). Best practice would be to have a succession plan for key roles, including backup personnel nominated and available for EPPRD roles specified above.
Ensure personnel participate in accordance with EPPRD terms	Clause 15.1	Parties must ensure their personnel who participate in EPPRD functions do so in accordance with the terms of the EPPRD. This could include establishment of policies and procedures or training among other things.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Parties will have appropriate arrangements in place for personnel who may participate in any EPPRD function (as described in this Normal Commitments framework). 	This framework is intended to act as a checklist for EPPRD functions, and provide guidelines on what arrangements might be needed. However each industry and peak organisation will vary and appropriate arrangements should be developed by each Party to implement this framework.
Protection of confidential and personal information.	Clause 27 Clause 29	Protection of personal and confidential information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrangements for personnel and decision making include provisions for protecting confidential and personal information as outlined in the EPPRD. 	-

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORC)	Clause 9.2 Schedule 6 (Part 4)	PHA to work with the Parties to define the basis for calculating crop specific ORC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Best practice is to provide information to PHA to ensure ORC arrangements are current. 	EPPRD requires PHA to consult with Parties in developing the guidelines (Part 4, Schedule 6).
Cost Sharing, Funding and Accounting for a Response Plan	Clause 9	Meet initial costs arising from involvement in a Response Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain sufficient financial capacity to meet costs of involvement in a Response Plan (as described in this framework) by the industry representative body. 	Note that this is not expected to be any significant amount (if at all) in most circumstances, as most costs of a response are operational costs of the Lead Agency.
	Clause 10			
	Clause 12 Schedule 6 Schedule 7	Take steps to ensure that growers meet the Cost Sharing obligations of a Response Plan agreed by NMG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish a mechanism to enable the Industry Party share of costs to be funded. All steps needed to activate the levy at an appropriate rate are taken when required. 	Usually this involves establishment of a levy set at zero initially. If necessary, the Industry Party will need to take steps to activate the levy at an appropriate rate, and meeting requirements of the Commonwealth for underwriting if this is needed. A contingency fund is one option that could also be considered to increase financial capacity of the industry.
		Ensure accounting systems allow tracking of shared and non-shared costs incurred by the Industry Party as part of the response.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accounting system can track shared and non-shared costs of involvement in an EPP Incident and Response Plan. All costs arising from an implementation of a Response Plan (shared or not) are tracked and accounted for according to EPPRD. 	Financial management system allows participation in an EPP response to be established and tracked as a separate activity.
Commitment to Biosecurity and ongoing risk mitigation	Clause 13	The Parties have committed to ongoing Biosecurity and risk mitigation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development, implementation and periodic review of risk mitigation activities are ongoing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Development and implementation of an Industry Biosecurity Plan (IBP). Implement action plans for appropriate elements of an IBP. Review and update IBP at least every three years (by participating in or commissioning IBP reviews).

Responsibility	EPPRD Reference	Description of responsibility	Performance benchmark for Normal Commitment	Guidelines for implementation
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain PHA membership as a contribution towards generic Biosecurity systems development and risk mitigation activities. • Raise awareness of priority pests or other Biosecurity issues. • Increase awareness and use of on-farm Biosecurity practices. • Increasing preparedness for high priority pests through preliminary categorisation and contingency plans.
Industry communications	PLANTPLAN Section 3 and 4	Communicate with the industry as part of implementing the communication strategy in the Response Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain the capacity and capability to communicate with the industry. • In an EPP Incident, conduct communications as agreed by CCEPP and NMG through all phases of the response. 	-

5. Normal Commitments for Plant Health Australia (custodian of the EPPRD)

The purpose of this framework is to outline the level of normal company operations ('Normal Commitments') for Plant Health Australia (PHA) in regard to the implementation of a Cost Shared emergency response under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD), clarifying what costs incurred by PHA would be funded by all PHA members (through subscriptions) or cost recovered under the Response Plan¹.

The purpose is not to identify every specific activity or action PHA may undertake in the course of responding to an incursion of a suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP).

Principles that apply to the PHA Normal Commitments

- **Scope limited to Cost Shared emergency responses under the EPPRD**
The scope of these Normal Commitments for PHA includes only those responsibilities associated with a Cost Shared emergency response under the EPPRD, and excludes all other responsibilities and programs PHA conducts as their normal company operations, including the ongoing maintenance and improvement of the EPPRD which is funded under the *EPPRD Management* and *EPP National Training* programs by all PHA members through subscriptions.
- **Parity between normal company operations and response activities**
Costs associated with EPPRD activities undertaken during the implementation of a Response Plan that are also undertaken as part of normal company operations as custodians of the EPPRD, will be funded by subscription funds and not be sought for Cost Sharing. For example, assisting Parties in the development or review of Owner Reimbursement Costs Evidence Frameworks, or managing the categorisation process.
- **Activities during the Incident Definition Phase**
Activities undertaken by PHA following notification of an incursion of a Plant Pest but prior to the endorsement of a Cost Shared Response Plan (the Incident Definition Phase) are considered normal company operations and are funded through the *Incursion Management* program (subscription funds) of PHA's Annual Operating Plan (AOP).
- **Salary and on-costs for existing PHA staff**
Salary and on-costs (such as superannuation) of existing PHA staff members fulfilling PHA responsibilities under the EPPRD/PLANTPLAN following the implementation of a Response Plan are funded through the *Incursion Management* program (subscription funds). For example, staff time for PHA representatives preparing for or participating on the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) or the National Management Group (NMG).
- **Transparency of total PHA costs associated with a specific Response Plan**
Total costs incurred by PHA associated with the implementation of a Response Plan under the EPPRD are tracked and reported to as part of the finalisation of costs incurred by Affected Parties for a Response Plan.
- **Review of PHA's normal commitments**

¹ Clause 9.7.1 specifies that while "PHA is neither a government Party nor an Industry Party, the principles of Cost Sharing will apply to costs incurred by it in respect of a Response Plan which are additional to its ordinary operating costs".

PHA's responsibilities and Normal Commitments are applicable for the current scope of the PHA's responsibilities and strategic direction and will be reviewed by PHA for ongoing appropriateness as required. Changes to the EPPRD, PLANTPLAN or PHA Strategy would trigger such a review.

Normal commitments across key areas of responsibility for PHA

PHA's normal commitments have been consolidated into four key areas of responsibility:

- *Providing support to Affected Parties:* A central part of PHA's role during an incursion as custodian of the EPPRD is to support Affected Parties in implementing the EPPRD/PLANTPLAN and meeting their requirements.
- *Personnel:* Appropriate skilled PHA staff are required (as specified under the EPPRD or PLANTPLAN) or may be asked to participate on committees and working groups formed during a response to an incursion
- *Cost sharing and financial management:* PHA has a number of key roles in the administration and monitoring of financial aspects of a Cost Shared response.
- *Evaluation:* Evaluation activities are an important aspect of any response, enabling Parties to continuously improve the EPPRD/PLANTPLAN and other biosecurity/emergency management related aspects.

Providing support to Affected Parties

- Provide advice on the application of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to Affected Parties and where required, facilitate obtaining legal advice on the interpretation of the EPPRD.
- Provide assistance in the development or review of key response documents, such as the Response Plan, CCEPP and NMG papers, and communication material.
- Facilitate access and distribution of existing training material to Affected Parties.

For the avoidance of doubt

Legal fees incurred by PHA in instances where the matter primarily relates to the response, with limited relevance or benefit to non-Affected EPPRD Parties, may be sought for Cost Sharing. Each instance will be considered by PHA regarding the broader benefit to all EPPRD Parties prior to claiming the costs.

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Qualification of personnel (clause 8.2.1)

Personnel

- Provide representatives on the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and National Management Group (NMG) that have relevant training and are provided and supported for through any EPPRD activity.
- Provide a chair and standing member for a Categorisation Group.
- Provide the chair for Scientific Advisory Panels (SAPs).
- Provide representatives to participate on SAPs or other working groups where appropriate.
- Provide a representative for the Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network (NCN).

For the avoidance of doubt

Incidental costs (such as travel costs) for PHA committee representatives incurred as a direct result of the implementation of a Response Plan may be sought for Cost Sharing.

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Personnel (clause 15), NMG (clause 11.1 and part 1 of schedule 8), Categorisation Group (part 4 of schedule 8), CCEPP (clause 11.2 and part 2 of schedule 8), SAP (PLANTPLAN)

Cost sharing and financial management

- Convene, chair, provide secretariat support and manage the process for categorisation where required to meet the requirements of clause 9.3 of the EPPRD.
- Manage the process to determine Funding Weights in consultation with Affected Industry Parties where required to meet the requirements of clause 2.2.4 of schedule 6 of the EPPRD.
- Coordinate the development and review processes for Owner Reimbursement Cost (ORC) Evidence Frameworks where required.
- Provide assistance to the Lead Agency in implementing the ORC frameworks and reviewing individual ORC assessments.
- Coordinate and collate claims for Cost Sharing during the course of a response, including the determination of total and final costs of a response.
- Provide assistance to Industry Parties regarding the establishment of a positive PHA or EPP Response levy.

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Principles of cost sharing (clause 9 and schedule 6), Funding a response plan (clause 10 and schedule 7), Accounting for a response plan (clause 12), ORCs (part 4 of schedule 6 and schedule 17), Categorisation process (clause 7 and part 2 of schedule 3)

Evaluation

- Coordinate and/or conduct EPPRD debriefs consistent with PLANTPLAN and related guidelines.
- Provide support to Relevant Parties to enable Efficiency Audits to be undertaken, including where requested by the NMG, managing the contract(s) for the Efficiency Advocate(s).

EPPRD/PLANTPLAN references

Efficiency audits (clause 12.3 and schedule 11), Debriefs (PLANTPLAN)

Response Plan development

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	1 June 2018	All	New document developed by Plant Health Australia. Endorsed by Parties May 2018.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Full revision of document. Key sections/areas updated include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document control versioning • Reference to inclusion of assumptions underpinning the aims and objectives, technical feasibility of eradication assessment and trigger points • Clarification and/or addition of information on hosts and additional impacts in the current status of the Incident section • Reference to the impact of the EPP and response strategy actions on industry and the community • New section on host free period/fallow under the response strategy • New section on key performance indicators/program milestones under Response Plan review • Transition to Management – addition to list of activities that may be undertaken, reference to responsible Parties for delivery and social support mechanisms available Endorsed by Parties November 2018.
1.2	8 Dec 2021	Sections 5.1.8, 5.1.12.1, 5.2.6, 5.2.10.1	Addition of the requirement to include the position levels for the Lead Agency response organisational structure in the Response Plan. Details regarding indicative budget cost categories removed and replaced with reference to the <i>Financial Management of a Response Plan</i> guideline. Minor edits to correct cross references and update web links. Endorsed by Parties December 2021.
1.3	13 Dec 2022	All	Full review of document and following key amendments made to reflect relevant variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarification that a Response Plan may be developed for one or more EPPs. • Removal of reference to ORCs only being Cost Shareable once a Response Plan is approved. • Clarification that Transition to Management may exceed a 12 month period if the NMG agrees there are exceptional circumstances.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Clarification on how indexation (using CPI) is applied to the threshold above which a Financial Audit of a Response Plan is required. <p>Minor editorial changes for clarity.</p>
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1. Purpose

This guideline has been developed to assist Parties in developing and revising a Response Plan for a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD).

The intent of this document is to provide guidance on the appropriate structure and format for developing a new Response Plan and revising an existing Response Plan, in accordance with the requirements of the EPPRD (clause 6 and schedule 4), PLANTPLAN and any applicable Emergency Plant Pest strategy (contingency plan).

Once a response strategy has been determined, this information will form the basis for the content of a Response Plan. However, it is not the intent of this document to provide guidance on strategic or operational planning for an eradication response. The [Biosecurity emergency management response planning guide](#) and the [Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans](#) provide guidance on operational planning and response strategy development for EPP responses.

Note that capitalised words and terms (excluding names) that are used within this document are a reference to the defined words/terms within clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.

2. Introduction

A Response Plan, as defined by the EPPRD (clause 1.1), is an integrated plan for undertaking a response to one or more EPPs that is developed in accordance with clause 6 and part 1 of schedule 4 of the EPPRD and subject to Cost Sharing under the EPPRD.

Response Plans are living documents and may be developed and updated at various stages of a response. The level of detail included in the plan will vary according to the nature, extent and stage of the Incident. For instance, a Response plan developed in the early stages when the extent of the Incident is not yet known might be quite a short document that is not yet comprehensively compiled

across all sections of the document. Once further information has been gathered, this Response Plan may be revised to be a whole of life Response Plan that has all sections comprehensively populated.

This guideline will support the development and revision of a Response Plan during each iteration, including revision to incorporate Transition to Management.

2.1 Development and approval

Response Plans are developed by one or more state or territory Chief Plant Health Manager(s) of the Lead Agency(ies) in consultation with Affected Industry Parties, state and territory governments, the Commonwealth government, and Plant Health Australia (PHA), through the membership of the CCEPP. Response Plans are endorsed by the CCEPP and then approved by the NMG, subject to NMG agreement to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD requirements. The Response Plan development and approval process must not impede the initiation of a rapid response by the Lead Agency to the EPP(s). Refer to PLANTPLAN for additional information on the development and approval process for Response Plans.

2.2 Structure and content

Response Plans must be developed in accordance with the principles under clause 6 and must address all matters identified in part 1 of schedule 4 of the EPPRD. The Response Plan must reflect the nature and circumstances of the EPP(s) and Incident and include key strategies and core operational components, including to identify those that will be the subject of Cost Sharing.

The Response Plan must conform to PLANTPLAN and any applicable Emergency Plant Pest strategy (contingency plan) except as agreed by the NMG (clause 6.2). Any proposed significant variations or departures from the current version of PLANTPLAN must be clearly identified in the Response Plan so as to enable consideration of those variations or departures by the NMG as required by clause 6.2.1(a)).

Response Plan templates are available and contain the required elements to fulfil the content requirements. These templates should be utilised when developing a Response Plan for eradication (refer to the [Response Plan for eradication](#) template) or revising an existing Response Plan to incorporate Transition to Management (refer to the [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template). Additional elements that are not captured by the headings contained in the templates may also be appropriate for inclusion in a Response Plan, and the necessary inclusions will be response dependent. In addition, the amount of detail included under each heading and sub-heading will depend on the nature, extent and stage of the response.

2.3 Related resources

The following resources should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines when developing and revising a Response Plan:

- EPPRD
 - Clause 1.1 Definitions
 - Clause 6 Developing a Response Plan

- Part 1 of schedule 4 Development and Management of a Response Plan
- PLANTPLAN available from planthealthaustralia.com.au including:
 - [Response Plan for eradication](#) template
 - [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template
 - [Transition to Management](#) guideline
- The following documents may be used to inform development of the response strategy:
 - *Biosecurity emergency management response planning guide* (available from agriculture.gov.au)
 - *Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans* (available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/biosecurity/risk-mitigation)

3. Document management and control

3.1 Document title

All Response Plans are to be titled according to the following naming convention:

[Common name of pest] ([*Scientific name of pest*]) Response Plan

As a Response Plan is a national document, reference to the state/territory in which the response is being undertaken should not be used within the title.

3.2 Issue date

The Response Plan 'issue date' is the date that the Response Plan is approved by the NMG.

This date may initially be left blank in the draft Response Plan, or pre-populated with the date that the NMG will be convening a meeting to consider the Response Plan for approval.

3.3 Document control

All Response Plans must include version control through numbering/lettering and a revision history table to ensure that changes made to the document are recorded and managed appropriately.

3.3.1 Version numbering and lettering

The use of numbering for NMG approved Response Plan versions and lettering for revised drafts developed by the Lead Agency and amended through CCEPP revision will ensure clear version tracking and enable Response Plan versioning to reflect the extent/magnitude of the change made to NMG endorsed version.

Versioning should be based on the following conventions:

- **Initial drafts considered by the CCEPP** - During the initial stages of Response Plan development by the Lead Agency and review by the CCEPP (prior to approval by the NMG),

the Response Plan version should be identified through alphabetical increments, with the first version labelled 'Version 0.A'. Subsequent revised versions incorporating feedback from the CCEPP should increase alphabetically (e.g. version 0.B, version 0.C, and so on).

- **NMG approved Response Plan** - The first iteration of the Response Plan approved by the NMG should be labelled 'version 1.0'.
- **Revised drafts considered by the CCEPP** - Revised versions of the approved Response Plan updated by the Lead Agency and amended to incorporate CCEPP feedback should increase alphabetically, based on the current approved version number (e.g. version 1.0A, version 1.0B, version 1.0C and so on).
- **NMG approved revised Response Plans** – For each subsequent version approved by the NMG, the version number should increase by increments of 1.0 or 0.1 as determined by the magnitude of the changes made. For example, minor amendments will be issued by applying increments of 0.1 on the previously endorsed version, (e.g. version 1.1, version 1.2). If the subsequent version endorsed by the NMG incorporates more significant amendments (e.g. trigger breach and response strategy change), the Response Plan will be issued by applying increments of 1.0 on the previously endorsed version (e.g. version 2.0, version 3.0, and so on).

3.3.2 Revision history table

The revision history table should appear at the front of the Response Plan, and includes the version number, who proposed the change (e.g. Lead Agency, CCEPP), the date of issue of the version and the details of the specific changes made.

3.3.3 Definitions and acronyms

A definitions and acronyms table should be included at the front of the Response Plan.

4. Response Plans according to stages of a response

Response Plans are living documents, which may be updated as a response progresses through various stages. The expectations of content and level of detail for each of the required elements of the Response Plan will differ depending on the nature, extent and stage of the response. The following section is intended to provide guidance on the minimum content requirements for Response Plan development according to the stage of the Incident.

4.1 Eradication response

4.1.1 Early in the response

Response Plans are intended as a mechanism to support the eradication of one or more EPPs. During the initial stages of a response, Parties may still be gathering information on the extent of the Incident, through delimitation and tracing, and may not yet know with certainty whether the EPP is technically or economically feasible to eradicate. Under these circumstances a short, sharp Response Plan may be developed to undertake eradication and Emergency Containment actions whilst further information is being gathered to inform feasibility of eradication and future actions required. Robust triggers for

Response Plan review should be included in the plan to address the uncertainty regarding the extent of the Incident. Refer to section 5.1.11.2 for additional information.

This phased approach allows for rapid development of a Response Plan that includes a response strategy based on the best information available at the time. The timeframe identified in a phased Response Plan should, as a minimum, allow as much time as necessary to determine feasibility of eradication and does not need to address the whole life of the response. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary to comprehensively complete all sections of the Response Plan. Rather, these sections should be compiled based on the knowledge available at the time and a statement added to indicate that “this section will be revised as further information becomes available”.

The [Response Plan for eradication](#) template should be used for the initial drafting of a Response Plan, and any subsequent revisions.

4.1.2 Under eradication – the duration of the response

The Response Plan may undergo revision during an eradication response. As further information becomes available, or trigger points are breached, the Response Plan may require revision to incorporate changes to the strategy or additional detail in certain areas. Any revisions must be made to the currently approved version of the Response Plan, which is based on the [Response Plan for eradication](#) template and must follow the conventions described under section 3.

4.2 Transition to Management

Following the determination by the NMG (on advice of the CCEPP) that it is no longer feasible to eradicate an EPP(s), and that the response should enter a Transition to Management Phase, the Response Plan will require amendments to incorporate Transition to Management activities.

The approach for Transition to Management will differ significantly to that for eradication of an EPP, and therefore a [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template has been developed and should be used to incorporate Transition to Management activities into the revised Response Plan.

The revised Response Plan should focus on the activities to be undertaken during Transition to Management. It is not necessary to include information on the response approach for eradication of the EPP(s) that was contained in the previous version of the Response Plan. The timeframe of a Response Plan incorporating Transition to Management must not exceed a 12-month period, unless the NMG determines (on advice of the CCEPP) that there are exceptional circumstances. This timeframe for Transition to Management activities will commence when the revised Response Plan is approved by the NMG.

5. Response Plan content

Once the response strategy has been developed, the strategic information should be used to inform the population of the Response Plan.

All sections of the Response Plan template should be included in the Response Plan and completed based on the information available at the time. The level of detail included will be at the discretion of

the Lead Agency and the CCEPP/NMG and may vary depending on the circumstances of the Incident and stage of the response.

As indicated in section 4.1, it is not necessary to fully compile the sections of the Response Plan for which the information is not yet available. Rather, these sections should be completed based on the knowledge available at the time and a statement added to indicate that “this section will be revised as further information becomes available”. For example, a sentence may be sufficient as a minimum in the early stages of a response.

5.1 Eradication response

Parties are encouraged to use the [Response Plan for eradication](#) template to develop a new Response Plan or revise an existing Response Plan for eradication to ensure alignment with the requirements of the EPPRD.

5.1.1 Aim and objectives of the Response Plan

Consideration of the aim and objectives of the response will provide focus for the Response Plan.

An aim is a broad statement of a purpose or anticipated outcome and may reflect why the Response Plan is required. For example, the aim of the Response Plan could be to ensure that an EPP is eradicated from Australia, or to contain and eradicate an EPP whilst information is being gathered to inform feasibility of eradication. The aim should also identify the indicative timeframe of the Response Plan (e.g. “the objective is to contain and eradicate the EPP whilst information is being gathered over an indicative 6-month period to inform feasibility of eradication”) and potentially also for each phase of the response.

Objectives are specific statements which reflect the course of action and/or methodology that will be undertaken to achieve the aim of the Response Plan. If ORCs are likely to be incurred through Response Plan actions, then one of the objectives should be to enable provision of ORCs to eligible Owners impacted by the Response Plan actions. It may also be relevant to include an objective that reflects the desired outcomes related to minimising the impact of the EPP on the community and industry.

The aim and the objectives may change over the course of the Response Plan as more information becomes available on the Incident and should be adjusted accordingly in each iteration of the Response Plan.

A section on assumptions underpinning the aims and objectives may also be included.

5.1.2 Current status of the Incident

Including an outline of the status of the Incident will enable Parties to quickly identify the stage and status of the response at the time of Response Plan development. The status of the Incident will likely change over the course of the response and details within this section should be adjusted accordingly if the Response Plan is revised. The following headings should be included, noting that additional headings may be required.

- *EPP details*
Include the common and scientific names of the EPP(s). A concise description of the biology and life cycle of the EPP(s) can be included, with more detailed information included as an appendix to the Response Plan, if required.
- *Affected host(s)*
Include the common and scientific name(s) of affected host(s) for which the EPP(s) has been found to affect in this specific Incident.
- *Other known hosts in the affected area*
List any other known hosts of the EPP(s) present in the affected area to inform the risk of spread and the response activities. This includes any alternate or native hosts known to be present in the affected area. The complete list of hosts could be included as an appendix to the Response Plan if extensive.
- *Diagnostic details*
Provide an outline of the diagnostic process used to identify the EPP(s), including whether any approved national or international diagnostic protocols were utilised. Note whether both the initial and independent secondary confirmatory diagnoses have been completed.
- *Description and effect*
Relating specifically to the Incident, briefly provide details of the EPP's effect on the host when infested or infected (i.e. symptoms). Details on the broader known and potential impacts on different hosts or the environment or amenity value could be provided as an appendix if this information is considered required.
- *Extent of Incident*
A concise summary of the immediate extent of the Incident should be provided here. Outline the geographic area currently known to be affected by the EPP(s) and the incidence/density of infection/infestation. Include the current status of the Incident in terms of number, locations and types (e.g. residential, commercial etc) of Infected Premises, Suspect Premises and any other relevant premises classifications.
- *Additional impacts*
Identify any potential flow-on affects that may be incurred by the response, beyond those impacting on the Affected Industry Parties (e.g. impacts on the community, and/or supporting industries).
- Any other relevant information, such as description of the affected industry and its distribution nationally and in the affected state/territory.

5.1.3 Feasibility of eradication

A statement must be included demonstrating that Parties consider it both technically feasible and cost-beneficial to eradicate the EPP(s) from the known affected area, within an identified timeframe. If it is very early in the response and the feasibility of eradication has not yet been considered, this

should be stated here along with the timeline for determining technical and economic feasibility and any specific considerations.

Further details should be included under the following sub-headings:

5.1.3.1 *Technical feasibility of eradication*

The information provided in this section of the Response Plan should be based on the considerations of the CCEPP and should be informed by the *Factors to consider regarding the technical feasibility of EPP eradication* (technical feasibility criteria) provided in Table 1 of PLANTPLAN. It may be appropriate to provide these considerations in table form, noting that not all the criteria listed in PLANTPLAN need to be fulfilled for eradication to be considered technically feasible. The relative importance placed on each criterion will be dependent on the specific Incident.

If the assessment against the technical feasibility criteria changes over the course of the response, this section should be updated accordingly in any revised iteration of the Response Plan, based on the determinations of the CCEPP.

Assumptions underpinning the technical feasibility criteria assessment may also be identified under this section of the Response Plan and linked to specific trigger points (section 5.1.11.2).

5.1.3.2 *Economic feasibility of eradication*

For some EPPs, the economic feasibility of eradication may be relatively easy to compile; while for others, a formal and detailed benefit cost analysis may be required.

This section does not have to be comprehensive in the first instance but should at least include preliminary considerations of the benefits and costs of eradicating the EPP under the Response Plan strategy. The CCEPP may determine that a full benefit cost analysis should be undertaken, which can then be added to the Response Plan in this section of a revised version or as an appendix if required.

5.1.4 *Response activities for Emergency Containment and eradication*

This section should provide a detailed outline of the response strategy and activities that will be undertaken to achieve the aim and objectives of the Response Plan. It must also identify who will undertake each action, and the timelines for each activity.

This section is not a replacement for a situation report and as such does not need to be regularly updated unless the response strategy changes through the duration of the response.

Content of this section may include:

5.1.4.1 *Overall response strategy*

A summary of the overall response strategy must be included. This may include, for example, that eradication will occur through destruction of all host material in a specified area, followed by a specified host free period and proof of freedom activities. A section may also be included here on the impacts of the strategy on the community and industry, how this may influence the response and measures that will be taken to manage the risk.

As the response progresses, the strategy may evolve, and should be updated in this section of the revised Response Plan accordingly.

5.1.4.2 *Zoning, quarantine and movement controls*

This section should outline zoning, quarantine and movement controls on plants, plant products, people, machinery and other items including the timing for implementation and details of the activities, for example:

- Destruction, quarantine and buffer zones.
- Restricted and control areas.
- Movement of host material into, within, and out of quarantine areas.
- Movement of host material outside of quarantine areas.
- Compliance regulations.
- Legislative authorities (complete legislative orders do not need to be detailed; it is sufficient to simply state the names of the Act(s) and order(s) that will be in operation).
- Future quarantine requirements.

5.1.4.3 *Diagnostics and scientific support*

This section should provide a summary of the diagnostic and/or scientific resources required to support the eradication response. This may include details on:

- Whether a National Diagnostic Protocol (NDP) is available, or in the case where a NDP isn't available, best practice diagnostic protocols that could be used nationwide to support the response.
- Resource requirements for laboratory testing, such as how the testing will be carried out, and whether the Lead Agency is able to maintain the level of testing necessary to support a successful response.

5.1.4.4 *Trace forward and traceback*

This section should outline the tracing activities yet to be undertaken. Outcomes of tracing activities to date do not need to be included here as these will be reported to the CCEPP through situation reporting. Depending on the pathways and pest biology, the tracing activities that may be included in the Response Plan could be influenced by:

- Tracking pest movement on produce, equipment, containers or in/on plants/seed/fruit and soil.
- Tracking pest movement along water courses, irrigation lines/channels and run off, and identifying water sources.
- Identifying hitch hiking opportunities for spores or life stages of invertebrates.

5.1.4.5 *Surveillance and monitoring*

This section should provide a summary of the surveillance and monitoring requirements of the response, including:

- The surveillance strategy, including the purpose of the surveillance activities (e.g. delimitation), method (general, targeted, national), frequency, sampling levels and procedures.
- Resource requirements and availability for the surveillance strategy to be undertaken.
- The detailed methodology should not be included in this section but rather provided as an appendix if required.

5.1.4.6 *Decontamination, destruction and disposal*

This section should outline the activities required to achieve effective eradication, including any required control treatments, destruction, decontamination and disposal of affected host material, capital items, and/or personnel. The detail in this section will vary depending on the EPP's biology and the type and extent of the Incident.

The following may potentially be included:

- Eradication control techniques (e.g. chemical treatments)
- Destruction strategy.
- Planning and priorities.
- Method of removal and destruction of infected plants and host plants within the quarantine area.
- Processing of plants, and plant products, including by-products and waste (hygiene protocols).
- Site clean-up and disinfestation (hygiene protocols).
- Any issues with disposal.
- Environmental impacts of host plant removal such as soil erosion and whether cover crops will be planted at affected sites to prevent erosion during any host free period

The ability to perform these activities may not always exist or may be difficult to achieve. Where this would be critical to the success of the Response Plan, this should be noted and included as a trigger point (refer to section 5.1.11.2).

5.1.4.7 *Host free/fallow period*

Details of the host free/fallow period and replanting/restocking requirements must be included in the Response Plan if relevant, including activities that will be undertaken to demonstrate premises remain host free during the required period (e.g. regrowth surveillance specifications and frequency).

Potential environmental and biological impacts of host plant removal and host free periods should also be detailed, and explanation provided for how these impacts will be mitigated. For instance, whether cover crops are to be planted to prevent soil erosion and/or prevent spread of the EPP through soil runoff (if the EPP persists in soil). Any specific requirements for the type/species of cover crop that can be planted should also be detailed in this section.

5.1.4.8 *Owner Reimbursement Costs*

If ORCs are expected to be incurred as a result of implementation of the Response Plan, comprehensive details of the activities to be undertaken that will incur ORCs must be included in the

Response Plan. This includes specific and retrospective identification of response activities already undertaken that have incurred ORCs. Unless the Response Plan specifically identifies these activities, the ORCs will not be Cost Shared.

Examples of response activities are as follows:

- Destruction of host Crops – including whether only infested/infected Crops will be destroyed or all host Crops.
- Destruction of stored product – including whether only infested/infected stored product will be destroyed or all host product.
- The type of properties/premises on which the activities will occur (e.g. production nursery, commercial orchard).
- Emergency Containment activities that may prevent a Crop from moving from a premises and therefore devalue the Crop.
- Any host free/fallow periods that will be imposed.

Information related to the estimated costs of ORCs, appointment of an ORC assessor and associated assessor costs should be included in the financial management section.

5.1.5 Proof of freedom activities

The Response Plan must clearly articulate the activities that will be undertaken to demonstrate that the response strategy has been successful and the EPP(s) has been eradicated. It must also clearly articulate what would constitute evidence of freedom for the response.

Planning how proof of freedom will be achieved should occur at the beginning of a response. It is dependent on the biology of the EPP(s) and the capacity for surveillance and ongoing monitoring to prove absence of the pest over a defined period.

For an early stage Response Plan, this section may not be able to be comprehensively developed until further information has been gathered. An early indication of how proof of freedom will be achieved could be included along with a statement to indicate that this section will be further populated in the next version of the Response Plan.

Elements of proof of freedom may include:

- Trapping
- Placement of sentinel host plants

The information provided should also be consistent with International Plant Protection Convention requirements for proving area freedom. This will help to enable any international restrictions to be lifted once eradication is declared.

As the response progresses the strategy for proving freedom may require further clarification, or additional time requirements. These changes should be made to this section, as appropriate if the Response Plan is revised.

5.1.6 Public relations and communication activities

The Response Plan should articulate the overall communication strategy, as well as details of industry consultation and liaison and community engagement activities.

5.1.7 Social support mechanisms

The Response Plan should include advice on social support schemes and/or mechanisms available through the Lead Agency or nationally, to assist stakeholders that are impacted by the response (e.g. support or financial assistance/advice helplines).

5.1.8 Response Plan management and governance

The response structure and staffing (resource) requirements, including position levels, should be captured in this section of the Response Plan. Greater detail will be captured in the Lead Agency's Incident Action Plan. However, Parties may consider the following matters useful additional information for inclusion under this heading, or as an appendix to the Response Plan:

- Local Control Centre (LCC)
 - LCC site
 - Structure, management and staffing
 - Equipment
 - Operations
 - Planning
 - Logistics
 - Infected premises operations teams
 - Forward command post (if necessary)
 - Industry Liaison
- State Coordination Centre (SCC)
 - SCC site
 - Structure, management and staffing
 - Planning
 - Operations
 - Logistics
 - Communications

5.1.9 Information systems and services

Details of the systems used for recording response details should be noted in the Response Plan, including consistency with any nationally agreed systems. This may include a description of:

- Software to assist the management of EPP information, including systems to record surveillance and diagnostic results data, geographical information systems and database system development.
- Control centre information management
 - Message forms and log sheets
 - Mapping
 - Databases
 - Files
 - Personnel
 - Information boards
 - Staff information briefings
- Information dissemination

5.1.10 Reporting

The Response Plan must articulate the reporting requirements and methods that will be used, including situation reports, expenditure reports and other forms of reporting to the CCEPP and NMG, as well as international notifications.

5.1.10.1 CCEPP and NMG reporting

Situation reports (SITREPS) should be provided during the course of the response to inform the CCEPP and NMG on the progress of the response. Details on the frequency that these reports will be distributed by the Lead Agency should be provided here. If quarterly and/or annual reports will also be provided, this should also be detailed in this section.

The Lead Agency also has an obligation to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure of the Response Plan¹. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section including the frequency with which these reports will be provided. This section should also refer to the *Accounting and reporting expenditure* section for further detail on financial reporting.

5.1.10.2 International notifications

This section should include details of notifications to trading partners as well as to the International Plant Protection Convention.

5.1.11 Response Plan review

5.1.11.1 Key performance indicators/program milestones

A list of key performance indicators or program milestones may be included in this section.

5.1.11.2 Trigger points to review the Response Plan

The Response Plan must clearly identify all relevant trigger points for the review of response activities and these should be informed by discussions of the CCEPP. Triggers should be formatted as a table in

¹ EPPRD clause 12.2 and schedule 10

the Response Plan and may include details on the assumptions underpinning each trigger and explanation for how the triggers will be monitored. Triggers will be dependent on the type of Incident, the individual EPP's biology and the Response Plan aims/objectives and may change over the course of a response.

Potential triggers may include:

- Key performance indicators or agreed milestones not met.
- Financial triggers such as reaching a specific point in the indicative budget or towards the Agreed Limit or Upper Limit on Expenditure.
- EPP related changes, such as:
 - New detections outside of control areas or in another jurisdiction
 - Change in expected EPP behaviour
 - Change in EPP impact
 - New vector discovered.
- Indicators of the effectiveness of the Response Plan activities, for example operational matters such as control methods not successful in achieving eradication.
- Indicators that it may no longer be technically feasible to eradicate.
- Maintenance of quarantine areas no longer possible due to legal/ political/ technical issues.

As the response progresses, the trigger points may be reviewed and amended as required.

5.1.11.3 Efficiency audit

A statement should be included under this heading if an efficiency audit will be conducted during the course of the response.

5.1.12 Financial management of the Response Plan

The following section provides initial guidance on aspects of financial management of the Response Plan.

Note that further detail to guide the development of the indicative budget, including guidance on normal commitments and costs eligible for cost sharing, accounting and reporting expenditure and cost claims processes will be provided in the guidance material currently under development by PHA. The financial management section of this document will be reviewed following the development of this guidance material.

5.1.12.1 Indicative budget

The indicative budget needs to provide the Affected Parties with a clear and transparent indication of the costs of implementing the Response Plan. Sufficient detail must be provided to justify the costs being proposed for cost sharing. This detail should be provided in the form of text and supported by a table reflecting the indicative dollar amounts broken down into specific categories as indicated below.

If the Response Plan budget covers multiple financial years, then the indicative amounts should be split across each financial year.

If there is more than one Lead Agency implementing the Response Plan, it is suggested that an indicative budget is included for each jurisdiction's activities along with an overall total indicative budget for the Response Plan.

If a Response Plan has been revised, the indicative budget should reflect the total cost across all iterations (versions) of the Response Plan, not just the revised version.

The budget must be broken down into line items and must specify both the Lead Agency's normal commitments and cost shared amounts. Guidance on the approach for presenting the indicative budget including details on the minimum level line item breakdown can be found in the [Financial management of a Response Plan](#) guideline.

Sufficient detail should be provided in the budget text that demonstrates the basis upon which the figures have been calculated (e.g. full-time equivalents for personnel and their positions).

The following should be considered in preparing the section on the ORC budget:

- The specific response activities that will incur ORCs must be detailed. This includes specifically describing any response activities that either will take place following approval of the Response Plan or have taken place retrospectively and incurred ORCs (for example during the Incident Definition Phase). If these are not specified, then ORCs may not be cost shareable. Response activities that will incur ORCs are detailed in section 5.1.4.8 and could either be repeated here or that section of the Response Plan referred to.
- Provide an indication of the number and types of premises that are anticipated to incur ORCs.
- Provide details on who the ORC assessor will be, or if one has not been identified, on the process for appointment. Note that the indicative cost of the ORC assessor should not be included within the total ORC budget cost and must be specified under the 'operational costs' category.
- Provide an indication of the administrative burden on the Lead Agency in terms of resource implications for managing the ORCs claims, payments, disputes and other associated processes. Although the resource implications can be described in this section, the indicative administrative costs should be specified under the 'operational costs' category. These must be broken into normal commitments and Cost Shared components as relevant for operational costs.

5.1.12.2 Accounting and reporting expenditure

Response Plan expenditure report

The Lead Agency has an obligation under clause 12.2 of the EPPRD to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP in the form of schedule 10 which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the Response Plan. These should be provided to the NMG in a timely manner. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section

including the frequency with which these reports will be provided (e.g. on every meeting of the CCEPP and NMG or another timeframe).

Accounting and cost claims processes

A statement should be included to indicate that cost claims coordination will be undertaken by PHA in accordance with the requirements of the EPPRD and that all Affected Parties must submit their cost claims quarterly to PHA in accordance with clause 12 of the EPPRD unless otherwise agreed by NMG. If requesting of NMG a different time frame, this should also be specified here.

5.1.12.3 Financial audit

A financial audit is required when the total cost shared amount is equal to or exceeds \$500,000² (clause 12.4 and part 2 of schedule 11). A statement on whether a financial audit is or is not required should be included in this section. If a financial audit is required, it should be acknowledged that a final audit report will be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties). The cost of the financial audit should be included in the 'operational costs' category of the indicative budget.

5.1.13 Appendices

Any additional supporting information that is critical to the Response Plan, but too detailed or extensive to be included within the body of the Response Plan, may be included in an appendix. Examples of information that may be provided in an appendix could include, but are not limited to:

- Maps (e.g. eradication, quarantine and surveillance zones, known areas of infection, or trap locations).
- Ecology and lifecycle of the pest.
- Comprehensive host list.
- Surveillance plans.
- Communication strategies.
- Risk analyses.
- Benefit: cost analysis report.
- Quarantine notices and movement control orders.
- Control options (e.g. chemicals).
- Guidelines (e.g. for trapping).
- Protocols (e.g. for the destruction and disposal of host material).
- Organisational charts.
- References.

Each separate appendix should be numbered and titled (e.g. *Appendix 1: Map of known areas of infection*).

² The amount of \$500,000 will be adjusted as at 1 July each year after 30 June 2011 using the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the four quarters that have been most recently published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at that date.

As the response progresses, some appendices may no longer be appropriate for inclusion and should therefore be removed, and/or additional appendices should be added to encompass new information requirements for the Response Plan.

5.2 Transition to Management

The [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template should be used to develop an updated Response Plan that incorporates Transition to Management. The previous iteration of the Response Plan for eradication of the pest (the current approved Response Plan) should be used to help inform the content of relevant sections of this template.

5.2.1 Aim and objectives of the Response Plan

Consideration of the aim and objectives of the response under this section will provide focus for the Response Plan and should justify the need for Transition to Management and clearly reflect the outcome Parties are aiming to achieve.

The aim is a broad statement of a purpose or anticipated outcome that Transition to Management will achieve. The aim should also identify the timeframe of the Response Plan (which in the case of Transition to Management cannot exceed a period of 12 months from the NMG's approval of the Response Plan except if the NMG determines there are exceptional circumstances³).

Objectives are specific statements which broadly describe the activities that will be undertaken to achieve the Transition to Management aim/outcome. Examples of objectives taken from the [Transition to Management](#) guideline include:

- Build capacity and capability in industry and/or the community to manage the pest.
- Develop understanding of the pest's biology and behaviour.
- Develop potential control options.
- Extend knowledge and expertise regarding the pest.
- Maintain domestic and international market access.

5.2.2 Current status of the Incident

This information can be taken from the eradication Response Plan and updated where necessary. A statement should be added under *Decision on feasibility of eradication* to indicate that the NMG agreed, on advice of the CCEPP, that the EPP is no longer considered technically feasible and/or cost beneficial to eradicate. This should include the reasons why and date of decision. The decision by the NMG, on advice of the CCEPP, that a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate could also be referenced in this section.

The following sub-headings should be maintained in the Response Plan for Transition to Management:

- *EPP details*

³ EPPRD clause 5.4

- *Affected host(s)*
- *Other known hosts in the affected area*
- *Diagnostic details*
- *Description and affect*
- *Extent of Incident*
- *Additional impacts*
- *Decision on feasibility of eradication.*

Refer to section 5.1.2 for additional information on the information to include with each sub-heading.

5.2.3 Transition to Management activities

This section should provide a detailed outline of activities that will be undertaken to deliver on the aim and objectives of the revised Response Plan. This section must also identify who will undertake each action/activity and a timeline for each activity (e.g. the number of days, weeks or months to complete each activity).

Subheadings under this section will be dependent on the specific Incident and required activities to achieve the Transition to Management aims and objectives. Examples for sub-headings for Transition to Management activities may include:

- *Development of regulations and associated legislation*
- *Research activities/projects*
- *Communication, engagement and training*
- *Registration of chemicals*
- *Industry contingency and/or enterprise management plans*
- *Development of a national management plan*
- *Development or review of existing codes of practice, on-farm biosecurity plans, market access protocols or Industry enterprise management plans*
- *Consolidation and publishing of outcomes and results arising from the response*
- *Details of formal handover arrangements to share information and knowledge from the response.*

Each Transition to Management activity identified should also clearly articulate the Party(s) responsible for undertaking that action.

5.2.4 Public relations and communication activities

The Response Plan should articulate the overall communication strategy for the period of Transition to Management, as well as details of industry liaison/consultation and community engagement activities.

5.2.5 Social support mechanisms

The Response Plan should include advice on social support schemes and/or mechanisms available through the Lead Agency or nationally, to assist impacted stakeholders (e.g. support or financial assistance/advice helplines).

5.2.6 Response Plan management and governance

The Transition to Management staffing structure and personnel (resource) requirements, including position levels, should be included under this section of the Response Plan.

5.2.7 Information systems and services

Details of the systems used for recording response details should be noted in the Response Plan, including consistency with any nationally agreed systems. Refer to section 5.1.9 for further detail on what to include in this section.

5.2.8 Reporting

5.2.8.1 CCEPP and NMG reporting

Situation reports should continue to be provided during implementation of Transition to Management. Details of the frequency that situation reports will be developed and provided to the CCEPP/NMG by the Lead Agency should be noted under this heading. If quarterly and/or annual reports will also be provided, this should also be detailed in this section.

The Lead Agency also has an obligation to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure of the Response Plan. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section including the frequency with which these reports will be provided. This section should also refer to the *Accounting and reporting expenditure* section for further detail on financial reporting.

5.2.8.2 International notifications

This section should include details of notifications to trading partners and to the International Plant Protection Convention. This section is likely to require updating from the Response Plan for eradication as the status will change from the EPP being under eradication to, for example, being present in some areas.

5.2.9 Trigger points for Response Plan review

The Response Plan must clearly identify any relevant trigger points for the review of response activities and these should be informed by discussions of the CCEPP. Triggers should be formatted as a table in the Response Plan and include details on how these will be monitored. Triggers will be dependent on the Transition to Management aims/objectives and specific activities being undertaken.

Potential triggers may include:

- Key performance indicators or agreed milestones not being met.
- Financial triggers such as the point when expenditure is projected to exceed the indicative budget or approaches the Agreed Limit or Upper Limit on Expenditure.

- Emergence of new knowledge (including science or technical advice) that impacts the Transition to Management aims/objectives.
- Any other events that may result in activities identified in the Response Plan no longer being considered appropriate or capable of achieving the agreed outcome.

5.2.10 Financial management of the Response Plan

The following section provides initial guidance on aspects of financial management of the Response Plan.

Note that further detail to guide the development of the indicative budget, including guidance on normal commitments and costs eligible for cost sharing, accounting and reporting expenditure and cost claims processes will be provided in the guidance material being developed by PHA. The financial management section of this document will be reviewed following the development of this guidance material.

The content of the following sub-sections will differ to the eradication stage of the response and will depend on the activities that are required for Transition to Management.

5.2.10.1 Indicative budget

The indicative budget needs to provide the Affected Parties with a clear and transparent indication of the costs of implementing the Response Plan. Sufficient detail must be provided to justify the costs being proposed for cost sharing. This detail should be provided in the form of text and supported by a table reflecting the indicative dollar amounts broken down into clearly defined and transparent categories.

The budget categories included in the Response Plan for eradication will not all be appropriate for inclusion in Transition to Management and additional and/or different categories will be required to transparently reflect the costs of Response Plan activities. For this reason, it is appropriate to provide a specific indicative budget for Transition to Management that is separate to the overall total budget across all iterations of the Response Plan. However, a total budget across all iterations (versions) of the Response Plan to date must also be provided to reflect the total cost of the response (cost shared and normal commitments).

The Transition to Management budget must be broken down into line items and must specify both the normal commitments and cost shared amounts. Guidance on the approach for presenting the indicative budget including minimum requirements for line item breakdown can be found in the [Financial management of a Response Plan](#) guideline.

Sufficient detail should be provided in the text that demonstrates the basis upon which the figures have been calculated (e.g. full-time equivalents for personnel and their positions).

Note: If any costs associated with administering ORCS are still being incurred during Transition to Management (i.e. as ORC assessments for ORCs incurred during the Emergency Response Phase have not yet been completed), then the specific activities and costs must be specified in the indicative budget (for example, assessor costs and Lead Agency administration).

5.2.10.2 Accounting and reporting expenditure

Response Plan expenditure report

The Lead Agency has an obligation under clause 12.2 of the EPPRD to provide a written report at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP in the form of schedule 10 which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the Response Plan. These should be provided to the NMG in a timely manner. General acknowledgement of this reporting requirement should be noted in this section including the frequency with which these reports will be provided (e.g. on every meeting of the CCEPP and NMG or another timeframe).

Accounting and cost claims processes

A statement should be included to indicate that cost claims coordination will be undertaken by PHA in accordance with the requirements of the EPPRD and that all Affected Parties must submit their cost claims quarterly to PHA in accordance with clause 12 of the EPPRD unless otherwise agreed by NMG. If requesting of NMG a different time frame, this should also be specified here.

5.2.10.3 Financial audit

As indicated in section 5.1.12.3, a statement must be included to indicate whether a financial audit is or is not required. If a financial audit is required, it should be acknowledged that a final audit report will be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties). The cost of the financial audit should be included in the operational section of the indicative budget.

5.2.11 Appendices

Any additional supporting information that is critical to the Response Plan, but too detailed or extensive to be included within the body of the Response Plan, may be included in an appendix.

When incorporating Transition to Management into the Response Plan, some appendices from earlier iterations of the document may no longer be appropriate for inclusion and should therefore be removed or updated.

Each separate appendix should be numbered and titled (e.g. *Appendix 1: Map of known areas of infestation*).

Transition to Management

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	27 May 2016	All	<p>New document developed in conjunction with the Issue Resolution Group on Transition to Management.</p> <p>Endorsed by Parties May 2015 subject to the relevant formal variations to the EPPRD being signed off by all Parties.</p> <p>Variations to the EPPRD approved by all Parties and incorporated into new version of the EPPRD 27 May 2016.</p>
2.0	30 Nov 2018	All	<p>Full revision of document. Changes made to provide clarity in the following key areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key decision points, timing and sequence of events associated with Transition to Management including the addition of Figure 1. • Processes and activities undertaken during intervening periods of the key decision points. • Distinction between the Transition to Management Phase and Transition to Management activities under the revised Response Plan. • Further explanation of completion of Transition to Management and the Transition to Management Phase, as well as activities that follow, including addition of new sections/headings (sections 10, 12 and 13). • Minor changes to provide clarity and consistency in terminology throughout. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2018.</p>
2.1	8 December 2021	Sections 1, 9 and 13	<p>Full revision of document. Changes made include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Addition of the approach to convene a Transition to Management reference group (section 9). • Minor editorial changes for clarity and consistency within PLANTPLAN. <p>Endorsed by Parties November 2021.</p>
2.2	13 December 2021	All	<p>Full review of document and the following key amendments made to incorporate variations to the EPPRD adopted October 2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explanation that Transition to Management may exceed a 12 month period if the NMG agrees there are exceptional circumstances. • Clarification that Transition to Management may follow an unsuccessful Proof of Freedom Phase (in addition to an unsuccessful Emergency Response Phase).

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance on the application of the provisions of the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) related to Transition to Management (T2M). These guidelines are provided to Parties for use in determining whether a T2M phase is appropriate, subsequent to a decision that eradication of an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under an agreed Response Plan is no longer feasible. These guidelines provide information on the aim and intent of T2M, key decision points, timing and potential scope and activities that may form part of a Response Plan for T2M.

The relevant sections of the EPPRD that should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines are:

- Clause 1.1 Definitions¹
- Clause 5 Phases of an Emergency Plant Pest Response
- Schedule 4 Development and Management of a Response Plan

The relevant sections of PLANTPLAN that should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines are:

- Part 1, Chapter 3 Phases of an EPP Response

The relevant PLANTPLAN documents that should be referred to in conjunction with these guidelines are:

- [Response Plan development](#) guideline
- [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template

The latest version of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN can be downloaded from the PHA website at planthealthaustralia.com.au.

2. Background

Prior to the inclusion of a T2M phase in the EPPRD, once a decision was made that an EPP was not eradicable the processes of the EPPRD ceased and there was no clear path for decision making and cost sharing of any further programs that may be in the national interest. Parties identified this gap between the mechanism for emergency response (the EPPRD) and the mechanisms for pest management outside emergency response as an issue.

Parties agreed to formalise arrangements to fill this gap by including the option for T2M within the EPPRD, ensuring that the governance and Cost Sharing arrangements currently in place under the EPPRD would apply to T2M, including:

- governance and decision making through the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and the National Management Group (NMG),
- Cost Sharing by established formulae between Affected Parties,
- mechanisms for Industry Parties to meet their Cost Sharing obligations,
- current funding limits (Agreed Limits), and
- management processes for Response Plans.

¹ Capitalised words and terms (excluding names) are a reference to the defined words/terms within the EPPRD

Parties agreed that the T2M phase in the EPPRD would only apply in a situation where an eradication program fails; that is where a Response Plan has been agreed and implemented and subsequently the NMG has determined that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP. While governments and industries are free to participate in other types of T2M programs, the only time the EPPRD may be used for a T2M program is when a Response Plan is in place and the attempted eradication is deemed no longer feasible.

In developing the T2M arrangements to apply under the EPPRD, regard was had to the National Transition Program Policy Framework (national framework) including containment to allow future management options to be determined and for activities for industry and/or the community to manage the EPP. However, a T2M phase under the EPPRD may not always lead to containment of an EPP but rather the ability to manage that EPP within production systems.

3. Scope

The scope of these guidelines covers an EPP that is subject to a Response Plan and has reached a point where the NMG has determined that it is no longer technically feasible or cost beneficial to eradicate. How the NMG determines a Response Plan should no longer continue is subject to review triggers that are part of the Response Plan and will not be dealt with in this document.

These guidelines take into account existing principles and decision thresholds developed for the national framework.

These guidelines do not apply to:

- containment programs undertaken to preserve the opportunity to eradicate an EPP, or
- programs that may (from time to time) be developed for pests other than those subject to a Response Plan.

4. Definition and aim of T2M

T2M is defined as *"the undertaking of activities to transition the management of an EPP from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP under a Response Plan to management of the EPP outside the EPPRD"*. The T2M provisions of the EPPRD enable a short term (up to 12 months) nationally Cost Shared program during which national management of an EPP is formalised. The NMG may agree to extend the time in which T2M is considered achievable to a defined and reasonable timeframe exceeding 12 months, but only if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances. Activities that make up T2M will be included in the Response Plan which will be updated for NMG endorsement if CCEPP recommends to NMG that a T2M phase is appropriate.

The aim of T2M should be to address identified gaps in knowledge and information required to enable an orderly stand down from a state of eradication to ongoing management of the particular EPP outside of the EPPRD. This will assist industry, government and the community to be best prepared for 'living with' or 'managing' the EPP.

5. Timing and summary of key decision points

As noted above, a T2M program (activities under the Response Plan) may not exceed 12 months, unless the NMG agrees to extend the timeframe if it determines there are exceptional circumstances. However,

the program of activities does not officially commence until the NMG has endorsed the updated Response Plan – therefore time expended on discussions and development of the updated Response Plan is not included in the period of T2M (timeframe to implement activities under the revised Response Plan).

An overview of the timing, key decision points and activities associated with T2M are provided in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Key decision points, timing and activities associated with T2M

[#] Note: During this period a financial audit may need to be completed and the final audit report provided to Affected Parties within 60 days after the NMG agrees T2M is completed (refer to point 4 below).

^{##} Note: The NMG may agree to extend the time in which T2M is considered achievable to a defined and reasonable timeframe exceeding 12 months, but only if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances.

1. The T2M Phase commences when the NMG agrees (on advice of the CCEPP) that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP and that the response should enter a T2M Phase. During the period that follows the NMG decision to enter a T2M Phase, the Response Plan is revised to incorporate T2M activities.

2. The NMG approves the revised Response Plan and T2M formally commences. The delivery/implementation timeframe of the Response Plan (and Cost Sharing of eligible costs) may not exceed a period of 12 consecutive months, unless the NMG agrees to extend the timeframe if it determines there are exceptional circumstances.

3. T2M activities under the Response Plan are completed within the agreed timeframe for T2M. The Lead Agency will then prepare a report on the activities completed under the Response Plan for consideration by the CCEPP and NMG.

4. The T2M Phase ends when the NMG agrees (on advice of the CCEPP) that T2M has been completed; or alternatively that the T2M Phase should end, in which case the Response Plan will come to an end. The date on which agreement by the NMG is achieved identifies the Response Plan Completion Date.

Following finalisation of the Response Plan by the NMG:

- All Affected Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the operational phase and T2M. This includes determining the total shared costs of implementing the Response Plan as well as the wider (non-shared) costs incurred by them in responding to the Incident. Affected Parties must provide all required information to Plant Health Australia (PHA) within 6 months of the Response Plan Completion Date (refer to section 12.1).
- Depending on the total Cost Shared amount of the Response Plan, a financial audit may need to be arranged by the Lead Agency. The final audit report must be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date, or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties (refer to section 12.2).

5. Once Cost Sharing has been completed and wider costs reported by Affected Parties, PHA will consolidate the information and advise all EPPRD Parties of the total and wider costs incurred in responding to the Incident.

6. Decision making and commencement of the T2M Phase

If the activities detailed in the Response Plan fail to eradicate an EPP, then CCEPP have the option to recommend to the NMG that the response enters a T2M Phase. To determine whether the EPP becomes the subject of a T2M Phase the following criteria must be met.

1. *The pest must be an EPP currently subject to a Response Plan.*
Only an EPP currently subject to a Response Plan will be considered a candidate for a T2M Phase under the EPPRD.
2. *Eradication is no longer considered to be technically feasible or cost-beneficial.*
If a Response Plan is reviewed and CCEPP recommends that the EPP is no longer technically feasible to eradicate then that EPP may be considered for a T2M program. This will always be on a case by case basis as not all situations or EPPs will be appropriate for a T2M program.
3. *CCEPP considers that a T2M program is appropriate.* As part of this, they will confirm that the current management measures and activities will be insufficient to manage the pest or disease and that this gap can be adequately addressed through a T2M program under the EPPRD.

Once a pest is considered an EPP and has triggered development of a Response Plan, it has already met criteria determining its national significance. This need not be revisited. In addition, the cost-benefit analysis undertaken to support the original response can be used, or updated, to provide an economic case for T2M.

Once the CCEPP has reached agreement on the need for a T2M Phase, it will make a recommendation to the NMG that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP and that the response should enter a T2M Phase. If the NMG agrees to this recommendation, the T2M Phase will commence. The NMG can only make this determination if it considers T2M is achievable within a defined and reasonable timeframe not exceeding 12 months; or exceeding 12 months if the NMG (on the advice of the CCEPP) determines that there are exceptional circumstances.

As there may not be sufficient time to prepare a revised Response Plan prior to informing the NMG that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible and that T2M is considered appropriate, the CCEPP will present

to the NMG the potential scope and objectives of the T2M as well as proposed T2M activities that will be included in the amended Response Plan.

7. Objectives and activities under T2M

The objectives and activities undertaken during T2M will depend on the biology of the pest and the circumstances relating to the stage of the response and will be considered on a case by case basis. The Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties should engage and collaborate early to identify the scope and objectives and set the expectations for T2M. The T2M activities then need to be developed to meet these objectives.

The objectives of T2M may include:

- build capacity and capability in industry and/or the community to manage the pest
- develop understanding of the pest's biology and behaviour
- develop potential control options
- extend knowledge and expertise regarding the pest
- maintain domestic and international market access.

Activities which may be undertaken during T2M include:

- research
- registration of chemicals
- introduction of improved or resistant varieties of host plants
- development of regulations and associated legislation
- development of trading protocols
- development or review of existing codes of practice, on-farm biosecurity plans or guidelines
- communication, engagement and training
- consolidation and publishing outcomes and results arising from the response.

To support the objectives of T2M, it may also be necessary to cost share:

- administrative support (above normal commitments) and/or a national coordinator to manage the program
- actions to finalise the Response if the Response Plan is terminated early.

8. The Response Plan - T2M

Once a decision is made to enter a T2M Phase, the Lead Agency will work with Affected Industry Parties to update the Response Plan with the operational details of T2M. It is important that the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties collaborate early in the development of the revised Response Plan.

The updated Response Plan must:

1. contain an update of all relevant sections of the Response Plan including:

- a. aims and objectives
 - b. proposed activities
 - c. indicative budget
 - d. public relations
 - e. triggers for review
2. contain justification for undertaking T2M,
3. describe all activities both Cost Shared and those to be funded through normal commitments,
4. contain consideration of whether new detections of the Plant Pest could be considered to meet the definition of an EPP for a Plant Pest already found in Australia (clause 1.1 of the EPPRD) once the T2M phase is complete,
5. be achievable, that is each Party must have the capability to implement the agreed program, for example jurisdictions must have the ability to put any required legislation in place,
6. have an indicative date for completion of T2M activities no later than 12 months from the approval of the revised Response Plan by the NMG (or other defined timeframe as agreed by the NMG), and
7. be consistent with Australia's international obligations.

The Response Plan must not include cost sharing for any ongoing activities (such as containment) after T2M is complete. All activities under the Response Plan must be able to be completed within the defined timeframe (no longer than a period of 12 consecutive months unless the NMG agrees to an extended timeframe due to exceptional circumstances). For some EPPs, a 3 or 6 month T2M may be sufficient. During development of the updated Response Plan it should be kept in mind that T2M is transitioning management of the EPP away from eradication to management systems outside the EPPRD.

Refer to the [Response Plan development](#) guideline and the [Response Plan for Transition to Management](#) template for further information on revision of the Response Plan.

9. Response Plan implementation

Once the CCEPP endorses the revised Response Plan, it is provided to the NMG for consideration. When the NMG endorses the revised Response Plan, the T2M program of activity (and start of the defined T2M timeframe) formally commences. It is then the responsibility of the Lead Agency to lead the implementation of the plan under direction from the CCEPP, in the same manner as for the operational phase and in accordance with PLANTPLAN section 3.4.3.

A dedicated T2M reference group will be formed to support the CCEPP in its role to monitor Response Plan progress by providing operational oversight of the activities implemented under the Response Plan. Convening of the group will also provide a mechanism to support close engagement/partnership between the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Party(s) during the period of T2M. Membership could include nominees from the Lead Agency, Affected Industry Parties and PHA. If issues arise during the course of Response Plan implementation these would be reported back to the CCEPP/NMG to consider as required.

9.1 Coordination of Cost Sharing

As T2M will be part of an existing Response Plan, there are no changes to the Cost Sharing provisions. Cost Sharing arrangements will occur in the same manner as for the operational phase, in accordance with PLANTPLAN section 3.2.2.

10. Completion of T2M activities

Once the T2M activities under the Response Plan are completed (within the agreed timeframe for T2M), the Lead Agency will prepare a report to the CCEPP and NMG detailing the activities that have been completed in accordance with the Response Plan.

The CCEPP will consider the report and outcomes of T2M and provide a recommendation to the NMG on successful completion of T2M.

11. Completion of the T2M Phase

The T2M Phase is complete when:

- the NMG agrees (on advice of the CCEPP) that T2M has been completed (as all activities from the Response Plan are completed), or
- a trigger for review has been reached and subsequent to the review, the NMG formally declares that the T2M Phase will no longer continue in which case the Response Plan will come to an end.

The date on which agreement by the NMG is achieved identifies the Response Plan Completion Date.

12. Completion of Cost Sharing and reporting total and wider costs

Following completion of the T2M Phase, there are several activities that are required to stand down the response.

12.1 Completion of Cost Sharing and reporting of total and wider costs

Following the completion of the Response Plan, all Affected Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the operational phase and T2M. As part of this process (and as described in section 3.3.3 of PLANTPLAN) all Affected Parties must, within 6 months of the Response Plan Completion Date, provide information to PHA to enable it to determine the total cost of implementation of the Response Plan and the wider costs incurred by them in responding to the Incident. Once this process is complete, PHA will report to all EPPRD Parties on the total and wider costs incurred in responding to the Incident.

12.2 Financial audit

At the completion of the Response Plan, if the total Cost Shared amount is expected to be equal to or exceed \$500,000 indexed annually (refer to part 2 of Schedule 11 of the EPPRD), an external financial audit of the Response Plan ledger account must be arranged by the Lead Agency. The final audit report must be provided to the Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date agreed by the Affected Parties).

13. T2M debrief

An Incident debrief should have been held prior to the commencement of the T2M Phase to capture any relevant information from the attempted eradication response. An additional debrief may occur either during, or at the finalisation of the T2M Phase. This will capture information from the T2M Phase only and may be used to inform any future use of T2M. It may be more valuable to hold the T2M debrief prior to the completion of T2M activities, to capture observations from participants before dispersing after the completion of the Response Plan.

Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 3 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Original document separated into two SOPs. Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	Guideline developed from <i>Collection and transport of Emergency Plant Pests</i> SOP (V1 Dec 2013) by the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostic Standards (SPHDS). Original SOP separated into two guideline documents. Approved by SPHDS October 2014. Endorsed by Parties November 2014.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of these guidelines is to assist diagnosticians and field officers to safely transport suspect Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) material to the diagnostic laboratory.

2. Critical issues

Transport of infested/diseased material to the diagnostic laboratory presents a potential risk of escape of exotic pests to the environment and deterioration of the sample. Critical issues include:

- The sample is appropriately contained, packaged and labelled (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines).
- The sample is transported in a way that will minimise the risk of escape of the pest during transit.
- The sample needs to arrive at the destination in the best possible condition to enable effective diagnosis.
- The transport meets any legislative requirements.

- Chain of evidence is followed at all times (refer to *Chain of evidence* standard operating procedure; SOP).
- Hygiene and disinfection protocols are followed (refer to *Disinfection and decontamination* guidelines).

3. Transport criteria

If necessary, consult with the receiving laboratory to ensure the most appropriate transport method is used for the sample.

3.1 General

- The Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) will select the preferred laboratory for sample diagnosis.
- The quarantine officer or CPHM will confirm with the manager of the diagnostic laboratory that they are prepared to accept the sample(s), and if required organise any permits to comply with jurisdictional biosecurity legislation.
- For submission to an overseas laboratory, the Lead Agency CPHM:
 - will notify the Department of Agriculture of the intended movement of a suspect EPP and obtain movement permits for transfer to the port and for export to the receiving country;
 - will confirm international courier arrangements and any special quarantine requirements of the importing country.

3.2 Notification

- Notify the receiving laboratory when intending to submit a sample of an EPP and advise whether it will be preserved or a live/viable sample.
- This should be done prior to packaging to ensure there are no additional precautions that should be taken and that staff will be available to take receipt of the consignment on its arrival.
- The diagnostician should be informed of any additional precautions that may be required on arrival, e.g. open the consignment in appropriate containment facilities.
- If samples are being sent interstate or by an overnight commercial courier or Australia Post (only Express Parcel Service is acceptable because this is traceable), advise the receiving laboratory of the tracking number.
- Request the receiving laboratory to confirm sample receipt.

3.3 Packaging

Quarantinable material being sent for analysis must be triple packaged using the appropriate packaging (refer to *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines).

- The receiving lab should be contacted to determine whether the sample should be sent in an insulated container with a coolant such as dry ice with appropriate International Air Transport Association (IATA 650) labelling.
- Any identifying document information required for biosecurity clearance should be placed between the outer two packaging layers or taped to the outer package.
- Sample submission information should be placed between the outer two packaging layers.
- The internal packaging should be securely sealed with 'Hold Quarantine' tape or tamper-proof evidence tape where required.

- Clearly label all samples and store securely (refer to *Chain of evidence* SOP).

The outer package should be labelled with:

- "Urgent – Diagnostic sample. Keep cool"
- the recipient's name, address and telephone number
- the sender's name, address and telephone number
- an emergency contact name, address and telephone number
- other labelling as required by legislation.

A label should also be included inside the outer packaging in case the outer label is destroyed.

3.4 Transport

- It is essential that the time between sampling and dispatch of the sample for identification be kept to a minimum.
- Do not send samples on a Friday unless first consulting with the receiving laboratory.
- Requirements for preserving samples for identification differ according to taxa, and those collection and preservation protocols appropriate to taxa need to be followed.
- Requirements for live samples differ from those for dead preserved samples.
- Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) requirements should be followed for safe transport of samples. These requirements may be accessed via the CASA website: www.casa.gov.au. There may be requirements that a suitably authorised person be responsible for preparing and sending material via air.

3.5 Resource equipment

Possible equipment required will depend on the sample and whether IATA or CASA packaging rules are to be followed:

- insulated, sealable container with freezer blocks for keeping samples cool
- pre-ordered tamper-proof plastic bags or zip lock plastic bags of suitable sizes for samples
- sealable (e.g. screw top with rubber seals) sample containers or vials of varying sizes (e.g. Bio-bottles)
- quarantine tape, tamper-proof tape or similar
- overnight express post packs or equivalent, corrugated cardboard packing boxes
- sample tracking spreadsheet or evidence register (refer to *Chain of evidence* standard operating procedure)
- list of contacts for the laboratory/courier/CPHM for the state.

Urban and peri-urban biosecurity guidelines

These guidelines were initially developed by Res Eng (Australia) Limited in 2006 as a project commissioned by the Department of Agriculture. These guidelines were designed to encourage the enhancement pest response in urban and peri-urban areas and were included as an Appendix in previous versions of PLANTPLAN.

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 19 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). SPCHQ/LPCC changed to SCC/LCC, and Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. "Communications" changed to "Public Information"

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the Control Function throughout the phases of a response

Control in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- An initial examination of the Control function is required to ensure that workload and skill-set are appropriate for an urban or peri-urban response. Although it may be difficult, it is imperative that the functions within PLANTPLAN are properly assigned. Initially it is likely that an individual will be undertaking each function, and it is important to recognize that escalation will require delegation and transition to formal arrangements during establishment. In this case, the Rapid Response Team (RRT) is a valuable resource and should be considered for any urban or peri-urban response.
- The Investigation Phase for urban and peri-urban response will be initially characterised by potentially large rates of change, rapid escalation, and bulk enquiry from the community and industry.
- This Phase will be influenced by political activities, media, and community. Community interest groups may become a focal point and must be properly considered.
- PLANTPLAN requires that a SCC Director be appointed at the beginning of the Investigation Phase. In appointing the Director for an urban or peri-urban response, the candidate's knowledge of the community and local issues should be considered.
- Depending upon pest, scale, and rate of escalation, the Director may be changed at different times within the response. This concept should be understood at the outset to ensure that change of Controller is not seen as lack of confidence in the leadership team, but rather a strategy to recognize that skill needs change. For example, the individual responsible for establishment of the campaign (Investigation) may be different from the individual responsible for the Operations Phase.
- Strategy for disease investigation must be developed with particular reference to urban and peri-urban access issues, number and types of properties to be visited, information needs, privacy

considerations, as well as consideration of issues of impact on land value and discovery of illegal activities during surveillance.

- Movement controls must consider long-term impact on other commercial activities not directly associated with the campaign or the primary industry activity directly associated with the response.
- PLANTPLAN requires stakeholders to be briefed at various stages. During the Alert Phase, the Control function has a specific leadership role. In an urban or peri-urban campaign this includes engagement of property owners as well as occupiers. A specific strategy must be established. This may include using specific cultural based media, real-estate agents, local government, religious conduits, or other appropriate mechanisms.
- During this time, media enquiries may outpace technical knowledge and a "Holding Statement" may be required to ensure that expectations for media information are met.
- It is appropriate that the Controller places SCC staff, and at least 2 LCC controllers, on standby during any Alert Phase within an urban or peri-urban area.
- A range of technical advisories and briefings must occur. For urban and peri-urban response, this must include Local Government Areas (LGA's) and local representatives, as well as the specific identification of local/active community groups and potentially impacted industries and businesses. In this case, businesses may simply represent a vector for the pest, rather than be directly impacted. Examples may include excavation contractors, earth-moving equipment transport, nursery, and allied industry in the case of a soil resident pest.
- The Control function must establish and then liaise with the Planning Manager, Logistics Manager, Communications Manager and Industry Liaison Manager to assess personnel and resources required should the response be elevated to the Operational Phase. This should then be handed to the Logistics Manager.

Control in the Operational Phase:

- In the case that planning has been comprehensive and anticipated most risks, the Controller's role in the Operational Phase is one of oversight and approval. Initially this requires the direction to enter the Operational Phase of PLANTPLAN.
- In terms of oversight, a process must be established to provide ongoing consultative and reporting arrangements between SCC and the LCC(s). In the case of urban and peri-urban response, it is likely that multiple LCC(s) will be established, increasing this management activity.
- As urban and peri-urban areas are likely to involve a large number of locally elected representatives, it is imperative that the control function provides advice to the relevant stakeholders, including mayors, ministers, departmental and industry executives.
- The Control function must also initiate emergency response by liaising with other states/territories as necessary, including the provision of briefings associated with the Operational Phase.
- Leadership must be maintained by way of active encouragement of communications strategies including media releases, technical information, press conferences, and potentially novel approaches to encourage the interest of urban and peri-urban dwellers. In some cases joint media releases may need to be issued or "local identities" employed.

Control in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Significant complications may arise with respect to the Stand-Down Phase. In particular, decommissioning of significant resources and definitional issues associated with eradication requires strict control.

- It may be useful to acknowledge the possibility of re-infestation and non-detection to prepare urban or peri-urban communities of future incursions or limit any misunderstandings in relation to the declaration of “area freedom”.
- Prior experience with urban and peri-urban programmes has highlighted the potential for vandalism and tampering of traps and or surveillance equipment. Asset protection strategies may need to be considered.
- Useful tools include debriefing of all participants as well as appropriate transfer or integration of on-going activities to responsible agencies. This is particularly the case in relation to on-going health monitoring requirements in the case that such monitoring was a requirement of the application of chemical controls.
- In relation to the increased potential for litigation, it is also imperative that all records relating to the EPP response are held securely so they are available for future retrieval in accordance with the relevant archival regulations and any statutes of limitations.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the Planning Function throughout the phases of a response

Planning in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- Taking into consideration the potential for extended durations and large resource numbers in an urban and peri-urban response, locations and timing of planning meetings must be properly addressed.
- Situation and resource briefings will be complicated by the possibility of a range of latent planning risks. In particular, these relate to increased movement control activities, interference with normal day-to-day business practices of remotely or non-affected individuals or enterprises, as well as increased opportunities for conflict at many levels.
- It may be difficult to properly establish resource estimates, particularly during the initial period of the Investigation Phase. For urban and peri-urban response it is appropriate to seek information of resource availability from appropriate agencies at the earliest time.
- Definition of the operational period will bring a range of complications associated with resource acquisition and deployment. Issues such as travel times, seasonal considerations, infrastructure interdependencies may need to be considered when establishing operational periods. In extended responses, the Planning function must consider the back-filling of positions and the strain placed on those agencies from where resources have been obtained.
- Collection and submission of samples must consider potential volume of volunteered samples or samples not directly collected by diagnostic teams. Use of “enthusiasts” such as topic specific associations or clubs may be considered.
- Incident definition must consider boundary conditions such as Local Government Areas (LGAs), State/Territory borders, and/or catchments for example. In particular, delineation, quarantine or potential movement controls should use land-marks or boundaries able to be recognised by community members.
- Allocation of resources must assume multiple visits to each property (as urban and peri-urban dwellers are generally not on the property during working hours) and property numbers. An initial indication may be 10 persons per 1000 residents.
- Information and management systems dealing with community contact information must be activated immediately to support establishment and assume significant data (both spatial and textual) volumes.

- A review of legislative, regulatory and contractual obligations must occur. In particular, this must include access and treatment rights (this is particularly important in relation to multiple consolidated dwellings) as well as liability issues.
- A review of local or significant social or cultural events should also be undertaken to examine coincident issues.
- Planning should consider that political and social reaction may overtake epidemiological modelling in terms of timing, forcing decisions to be made using less than perfect information. In particular, Planning must be prepared to provide summary diagnostics and what additional tests are required, summary of survey information and quarantine action, potential movement controls on a large scale, and using boundaries based on parameters other than pest biology.
- That being said, details of the biology of the pest including its host range, economic impact and opportunities for eradication or containment (included in the Incursion Incident Report) must also be developed, including whether the pest has been identified in IBPs or Categorised as part of the EPPRD.
- Examination of affected industries must be extended to industries other than those directly associated with the pest.
- Examination of information and effectiveness of controls, and availability of pesticides/chemicals/other control methods in Australia and overseas, should be undertaken with a focus on community reaction in urban and peri-urban areas. This extends to “regional” quarantine measures and movement control issues.
- It will be imperative to develop a rationale for the size of the quarantine zones surrounding affected sites and what movement controls should be applied to intra- and interstate trade, including interstate trade restrictions. Such restrictions must consider the right to free trade between states, particularly from those industries that may not at first directly appreciate their connection with the campaign or the impact of the pest.
- The human population density associated with an urban or peri-urban biosecurity emergency will magnify any issues associated with the existing emergency management protocols and any issues associated with administrative or managerial processes.
- A declared emergency does not automatically remove the obligations of existing legislative instruments and regulation, requiring emergency management staff to meet all occupational health and safety requirements, for example.
- There is an increased need to formally engage and liaise with emergency services to ensure access to required resources and up-to-date urban or peri-urban survey and response information (such as occupier information).
- Examination of applicable science and the development of a needs profile for laboratory resources will be essential. In particular, specialists who have gained urban and peri-urban operational experience should be sought.
- In addition to privately owned and occupied land, Planning must also develop an approach for Government landholders to ensure that timely access to public lands is possible during the Operational Phase. Pre-prepared protocols should also be developed for sensitive facilities (such as military installations and consulates etc) to ensure timely access, or assessments by their own teams.
- As general rule, compensation schemes should be avoided in urban and peri-urban situations, as it is considered that the management effort, the maintenance of equity, and the temptation for abuse of compensation, far outweighs any advantage or incentive such a scheme may create.
- Specific multi-jurisdictional planning and associated protocols for the urban and peri-urban centres of Tweed Heads/Coolangatta, Albury/Wodonga, and Canberra/Queanbeyan should be established prior to an outbreak in these centres.

- An exit strategy must be planned as a component of the Alert Phase. Such a strategy must consider the process of “Area Freedom” declaration and the possibility of coincident or recurrent infestation, independent of the eradication campaign. This is imperative with respect to the development of expectations within the urban and peri-urban communities.
- At the commencement of the Alert Phase, it should be anticipated that a range of reports will need to be kept up-to-date. The information demand will be great, and this particularly relates to situation reports (SITREPS).
- Proclamation of quarantine areas will require detailed planning of movement and security controls. Planning must consider these controls in the context of a large population base needing to undertake day-to-day activities.

Planning in the Operations Phase:

- As discussed previously, an urban or peri-urban response will magnify resource requirements. In particular, Planning must consider issues such as the availability of approved valuers, resources with appropriate approvals or appropriate licences for the application of chemicals or administration of drugs etc. In this regards, Planning’s role during Operations will be pest or host specific.
- Planning must also be aware that destruction techniques may come under significant scrutiny and be different for the operational response in urban and peri-urban area.
- Links with the Local Government(s) must also be properly considered by Planning to ensure appropriate local regulations are met (for example, use of local waste transfer stations, working times within in urban and peri-urban areas, and traffic management issues associated with works and movement controls. This also extends to issues such as the compatibility of plant and equipment for local areas.

Planning in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Depending on the scale of the response, Planning will be required to maintain situation reports during the Stand-Down Phase as well as provide decommissioning and de-escalation plans. Within the context of urban and peri-urban response, these will be pest or host specific.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the Operations Function throughout the phases of a response

Operations in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- Peri-urban areas dominated by “hobby farms” or similar present a major challenge as property owners or occupiers may not be connected with the established primary industry extension frameworks or may sell produce through less defined processes than established market environments. In addition, sales may not be recorded.
- Collection of initial details and any urgent tracing (backwards or forwards) may be frustrated by either lack of records or simply the number of small producers that may need to be visited.
- Pests that require “real-time” observation (such as European Wasps) present an even greater operational challenge during the Investigation Phase in an urban area. Immediate access rights to land or ability to access lands may be severely restricted, effectively limiting traceability.
- Although immediate steps to limit spread of the pest may be taken by imposing quarantine to stop the movement of material, people, machinery and equipment into, and out of, the suspect property or area, a large and dense population will present difficulties. In particular, communities

from some ethnic backgrounds may attach specific stigmas to being involved in such activities and their cooperation may be very limited.

- When there is a significant probability that an EPP incursion has occurred, the CPHM or SCC Director will arrange for a diagnostic team to be dispatched to the Suspect Premises (SP). The diagnostic team must consist of at least two officers for legal and Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) reasons. The collection of samples must also be handled with sensitivity, as cultural and other prejudices may create issues for the occupiers or owners (for example in the case where an occupier is looking for an excuse to break a lease). Such samples should be managed and forwarded to an appropriate laboratory that meets the required standards to handle quarantine samples and within a process that maintains the forensic chain of evidence. In the case where a technical expert accompanies the team to ensure the sampling protocol, and that all details associated with the incident are recorded, it is imperative that appropriate identification be provided and that the personnel have been trained in relation to dealing with the public. Initial advice from Operational managers from past events indicates that the least said by the diagnostic team(s) the better.
- Tracing (backwards and forwards) may prove a difficult exercise in urban and peri-urban areas. In particular, registers of animals and plant activities are minimal, although enthusiast associations and clubs may be able to assist.
- Trace forward and trace back must also acknowledge the high degree of movement within an urban or peri-urban community. Rent and lease rotations are frequent (rental churn rate), and real-estate agents or removalist companies may be an effective information gathering and dissemination source relating to tracing.
- Pest or disease specific processes may be best understood by liaising with affected local people. Although industry bodies represent a range of members, effective tracing relies upon detailed knowledge of movements, normally beyond the scope of industry representative bodies.
- All information must be treated as confidential, and the initial diagnostic team must be aware of the need for confidentiality.
- The timeframe for a biosecurity emergency may extend into years. Generally, emergencies may be understood by the staff and community to be short events. As a result, the focus of staff and the community may reduce overtime, and any eradication campaign must acknowledge the need to maintain urgency in response – particularly during the Alert Phase.
- Urgency may be best maintained through effective leadership, and overt senior management commitment. The establishment of defined milestones, or sub-objectives may be advantageous during the Alert Phase.

Operations in the Operations Phase:

- Ensure an incident action plan is developed for field operations (both short term and longer term) considering the complexity of the urban or peri-urban environment involved. These complexities range from occupier or owner availability, security systems, savage dogs, access rights, conflict with land-holders, dealing with diverse societies, and many aspects of logistical planning.
- Although action plans may be best based on moving through areas in “fronts”, such an approach in an urban or peri-urban environment will require a process of addressing the premises which could not be accessed or where access was denied.
- Eradication is the objective of an eradication campaign. Although the role of research and science will be significant, an eradication program must focus on the primary objective. Research and science provides the tools to aid eradication, and is not an objective in its own right.
- As the eradication campaign may continue for years, it is imperative that the campaign resists pressures to conduct itself as an on-going programme of events. Although a programme

approach may fit well with existing lead agency protocols and budget cycles, the structure and span of control elements of an emergency response are deliberately based along functional lines to ensure objectives are set and achieved. An eradication campaign has a distinct end point. The operational need is to keep a focus on the eradication of the pest.

- Local knowledge and expertise must be sourced for operational tasks and supported by robust administrative and management systems. Biosecurity emergencies have a tendency to escalate, particularly during the Investigation Phase, as a result of the discovery of further infestations, beyond that which are already known. This process of escalation is accompanied by an increase in human and other resources. This increase in resources requires robust administrative and management systems. Any flaws in such systems will create significant rework and divert operational resources from the eradication objective.
- Resources will be required on a temporary basis for specific functions and to meet specific objectives. These resources are best acquired in a manner that allows effective disposal at the required time. That being said, operational focus will be difficult to maintain towards the end of the campaign, when the discovery of infestations is rare or non-existent and team members begin seeking other employment. Indeed training of new staff may prove difficult, as it may not be possible to provide field examples of the pest or disease towards the end of the campaign.
- Operational security is paramount, including security of examples of the pest or disease. Security of samples is required to avoid deliberate and fraudulent/criminal reinfection.
- Unlike rural biosecurity emergencies, urban and peri-urban survey and eradication may need to be conducted over more than 100,000 properties, with a range of owners and usage. Information must be current, requiring significant resources and technology to maintain data accuracy. There is a need to align processes with existing information sources used by other emergency services, to reduce the need for customised data collection and entry process.
- Movement control and permits work when those required to use them understand the reason for their use and understand how to use the administrative process that has been established.
- Surveillance of urban and peri-urban environments may also uncover illegal plantings or activities. The eradication campaign must have a very clear policy on the appropriate actions to take with respect to such discoveries.
- Laboratory resources may become overwhelmed if large numbers of samples continually require identification or confirmation. A range of contingency and support plans should be developed for laboratory support.
- Spatial information will be critical to support operational decision-making. Map production, quality and accuracy will impact the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. If in-house systems must be developed, these should complement and be compatible with the lead agencies existing systems.
- Urban and peri-urban response requires cooperation between agencies for surveillance, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Resources, data in particular, owned by Government must be made readily available to contribute to any eradication campaign. This need is more pronounced where complex internal transfer pricing and funding arrangements are established. The community expectation is that resources owned by the Crown (in whatever administrative or custodial framework), be available as and when required during emergency response.
- The use and impact of volunteers may also be considered. Like other resources, volunteers range in skill, levels of training, knowledge, as well as motivation. They may be engaged to undertake a range of roles, including information dissemination at local shopping centres, or surveillance of parks or other public lands. In an operational context, it is important to understand the motivation of volunteers to ensure that their input is recognised and their energies used in appropriate ways. Disgruntled volunteers can present both operational and communications issues.

- In the area of logistics, these guidelines do highlight that in-kind support may be limited or non-existent in urban and peri-urban campaigns, and as a result there is a need to assume that the campaign will need to be self-sufficient. However, it may be the case that the campaign does receive donations. These donations may include time (such as volunteers), or resources such as use of car parking, or supplies, or free advertising. From an operational context, these donations may prove of considerable value and their use must be recognised and handled with appropriate sensitivities associated with the motivations of those providing the donations. Once again, disgruntled givers can present both operational and communications issues.

Operations in the Stand-Down Phase:

- On-going surveillance will be required. This will be particularly difficult with respect to the declaration of area freedoms and the lifting of movement controls. This aspect of campaign will be heavily dependent upon operational considerations being taken into account during the Investigations Phase and the development of the exit strategy.
- In terms of on-going surveillance, and in the context of operations, it is important to recognise the potential for vandalism and the potential need for security in urban and peri-urban areas.
- Stand-Down of volunteers and dealing with the disposal of donations will also require specific operational considerations.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the logistics Function throughout the phases of a response

Logistics in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- As an urban or peri-urban eradication campaign escalates, the need to appropriate SCC facilities may become great. Large office space, or facilities for parking many vehicles etc., may not be easily acquired in an urban area (this is particularly the case with respect to marshalling of a large number of vehicles).
- Jurisdictions may consider pre-determination of a Pest Control Headquarters in major urban centres, before an outbreak occurs. This process may be mapped to the jurisdiction's emergency management framework, and the activities of other emergency services.
- Administration and management requires particular attention for an eradication campaign. Poor administration will hinder any campaign, and lead to the inefficient and ineffective use of resources. The administrative structure of the campaign should be an initial priority upon activation of the Pest Control Head Quarters.
- Administrative processes for financial delegations and payments should be prearranged, critical resources should be pre-identified, and personnel issues dealt with using professional Human Resources expertise. The role of the administrative function must also include insurance reviews as well as the establishment of file and archive systems complimentary with the lead agencies existing systems.
- Logistics should become aware of "out of jurisdiction" resources. This particularly includes personnel and laboratory resources. A formal and active biosecurity peer-networking programme would support such a need.
- A significant role for Logistics during the Alert is to also coordinate the identification of likely LCC sites. This is particularly difficult for urban and peri-urban response due to the potentially large number of vehicles and personnel. In some case, a large influx of personnel can impact the

economics of an urban community during the Stand Down Phase. Such issues should be anticipated.

- Occupational health and safety (OH&S) requirements cannot be underestimated. Specific training will be required for all team members and must be appropriate for the duties undertaken (including personal protection and dealing with issues that may be faced when interacting with the community including public relations and assault).

Logistics in the Operations Phase:

- Provide treatment resources applicable to urban and peri-urban areas. In particular, these may be novel or at least different than those generally used in rural environments.
- Unlike rural responses, where land holders may be willing to provide basic resources or plant or equipment, it must be assumed that there will be little or no “in-kind” support from urban and peri-urban communities. That is, the campaign should be fully self-supporting.
- Although it is often assumed that communications networks in urban areas may be better than rural areas, response campaigns do create communication issues, particularly if large numbers of GSM mobile telephones are used simultaneously, or large amounts of data consume available band-width. Logistics must be fully aware of communications short-falls.
- Due to the complexity of urban and peri-urban response, and the potential for novel approaches to eradication, Logistics should be aware that Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements, and associated training, may differ from a purely rural response.
- Logistics should be aware that the male / female mix of the response workforce may guide logistical issues including such issues as PPE, washing and decontamination facilities and the like.
- Due to the complexity of urban and peri-urban response, particular attention must be paid to ensure employment conditions are satisfied. This includes the need to provide a safe and secure environment, as well as acknowledging the variety of premises that staff may visit and any particular requirements that may result. For example, this may include security checks for correctional centres, or gender restrictions to certain facilities such as women’s refuges.
- Appropriate records and processes must exist in relation to work place incidents. It must be remembered that the declaration of an emergency does not remove the OH&S obligations of an employer, including such activities as site risk assessments and first aid training and appropriate supervision.
- Human resources management and robust supporting systems must be used. Team members should be appropriately scrutinised before engagement (via whatever process), including appropriate reference and police checks. In the case where legislation requires, this should also include “working with minors” requirements.
- It is imperative for a rapid response in the Operational Phase that links are established with existing systems and structures, and that reinventing systems is kept to a minimum. These links can be maintained by effective peer group networking, scenario training and the use of campaign establishment teams, who carry with them experience and knowledge of biosecurity emergency response functions, and who can aid and coach local staff during the establishment period.
- The role of technical and administrative audit and quality assurance is essential. Particularly peer group audit of technical and scientific activities, which provides opportunities for improved eradication campaigns.

Logistics in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Logistics must anticipate the need to terminate personnel, dispose of assets and resources, and reinstate or transfer resources to their point of origin. In urban or peri-urban environments this

may create unusual behaviour during Stand-Down, which should be anticipated. Unusual behaviour may include deliberate re-infestations in an effort to remain employed, or misappropriation of campaign resources for example.

- Stand-Down of volunteers and dealing with the disposal of donations will also require specific logistical considerations to ensure that expectations of the “givers” are met, and to limit any potential for back-lash through inappropriate Stand-Down or disposal.

Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the public information Function throughout the phases of a response

Public information in the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- In accordance with PLANTPLAN, the CPHM assumes sole responsibility as spokesperson during the Investigation Phase.
- In urban and peri-urban environments, it would also be wise to assume that other information conduits may be created which would need to be addressed as a component of the Communications function. In this case, the CPHM may be playing both a pro-active and reactive role, requiring specific engagement strategies and a degree of flexibility. This must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
- PLANTPLAN highlights that if symptoms or the diagnosis indicate the presence of an EPP the CPHM will advise the property owner or manager [occupier]:
- That diagnostic tests have identified a possible EPP that may require quarantine controls;
- That all staff working on the incident have been instructed to maintain strict confidentiality regarding the event;
- Of the need for cooperation in applying voluntary movement control on plants, plant products, personnel. If cooperation is not offered the CPHM should explain that a quarantine order can be placed on the property which imposes mandatory control on the movement of people, plants and equipment;
- Of what will happen in respect of national recommendations on eradication and containment;
- Of any financial arrangements;
- That counselling services can be made available to assist with social, economic or other issues; and
- That they will be advised of the outcome of final diagnostic tests.
- At this point, the Controller must anticipate communications initiatives that deal with the owner or manager [occupier] approaching the media, their legal advisors, or local political representatives in the case that they feel aggrieved, threatened, or disadvantaged. A crisis communications strategy may be an advantage in this regard.
- Appointment of appropriate media spokesperson(s) considering the demographics of the urban and peri-urban areas. This could include language or cultural based decision criteria.
- A range of specific urban or peri-urban focused briefings should be conducted. These include briefings to directly impacted industry, police, emergency services and local governments as well as those listed in the Investigation Phase, to inform them that PLANTPLAN has entered the Alert Phase. It is possible that many of the attendees at such briefings may never have heard of PLANTPLAN and its objectives.
- Specific media kits should be developed at this stage, recognizing the variety of media outlets and information conduits available within urban and peri-urban areas. In this instance, it may be valid

to assume that initial contacts from the community will be via the local government authorities, requiring sophisticated liaison between the campaign and local government. The establishment of a dedicated local government communication or liaison function should be considered.

Public information in the Operations Phase:

- There is a need to identify alternative information conduits as established, or “normal” industry based approaches such as agricultural extension officers, these may not exist or be limited within urban and peri-urban areas.
- Eradication campaigns in urban and peri-urban situations rely upon community support. Campaigns must be in constant contact with the community, as well as the affected industry(s), and all levels of Government.
- Briefings must recognise the diversity of the audience and their potential “separation” or different perspectives or belief systems on issues of pest response, such as the use of agricultural chemical in urban areas.
- Activities must include listening to concerns, providing information, and acting upon the information needs as they arise. These activities must recognise the diversity of cultural and educational backgrounds. It is also important to understand that a community is not homogenous, and that a mixture of broad spectrum and individual specific communication activities may be required.
- There will be a need to prepare a range of communications materials, including technical information, interpretive materials, materials in different languages or for the vision or hearing impaired, press conference materials, electronic media etc. In addition, joint state/territory and Australian Government media releases, or industry, or local government, communications materials may be needed.
- Urban and peri-urban communities may also present a broader range of interests and experiences. This will likely include individuals with specific technical and legal training, those with high computer literacy skills, others with political and social connections. These individuals provide both an extensive resource if properly engaged, but also a source of conflict for the eradication campaign.
- Importantly, urban and peri-urban areas combine a range of land uses, population density, demographic (in terms of the elderly, infant and cultural diversity), and complications of day-to-day living. These characteristics present an environment where mass media alone will not suffice.
- Added to these complications will also be a range of existing social and community issues, which may take resources and energy away from an eradication program. It is also considered that whereas a rural community may be more understanding of the need for pest or disease eradication, urban and peri-urban dwellers may not be as understanding and require specific education relating to the impacts of the pest or disease, particularly as it relates to them as individuals.
- Local political representatives have specific community links and also offer a range of existing resources, such as meeting rooms, which may be used to the advantage of an eradication campaign.
- Whatever communications and engagement strategies are employed, on-going evaluation of the effectiveness of the strategies is required, to enable fine-tuning of messages and feed-back to the stakeholders.
- If volunteers have been utilised, then it is imperative that specific communications strategies be developed to recognise the contributions of the volunteers.

Public information in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Communications during the Stand-Down Phase will largely depend on the exit strategy. In particular, Communications must acknowledge issues that may arise from the differences between control, eradication and elimination. Understanding the stakeholders expectations in terms of the performance criteria will be paramount with respect to a successful closure of the campaign.

**Urban / Peri-urban Issues to consider within the industry liaison
Function throughout the phases of a response****Industry Liaison in the Investigation Phase:**

- In the context of urban and peri-urban response, Industry Liaison during the Alert Phase includes educational and engagement activities associated with movement controls and other control techniques, which may be deployed during the Operational Phase.
- Industry participants may have access to a variety of resources and cooperative engagement may create a range of opportunities with respect to novel or innovative approaches to control.

Industry Liaison in the Operations Phase:

- An informed and active industry may be able to assist in addressing community concerns and provide motivation for individual sacrifices. If the community is made aware of the potential personal and industry impacts, a higher degree of acceptance and cooperation may be created for the Operational Phase.
- Taking into consideration the potential range of industry types, industry may also be able to make contributions other than financial support, but expertise, product or other resources. These are issues that may be addressed through effective and comprehensive Industry Liaison.

Industry Liaison in the Stand-Down Phase:

- Effective Industry Liaison during the Stand-Down Phase will be critical to minimising potential negative feedback. This is particularly the case where the industry mix may be significantly varied.
- An effective exit strategy will be enhanced by engagement of industry and management of their expectations, particularly in relation to lifting of movement controls.
- Disadvantages to other industries may occur as a result of Stand-Down. That is, if it has been an extended campaign in a regional urban area, then local businesses such as accommodation suppliers may have come to rely on the income generated by the response activities.

PART 4 Procedures

Procedures provide an established set of actions for completion of a specific activity by response personnel and a platform for national consistency between jurisdictions and from one EPP response to another. The following procedures are included in PLANTPLAN¹:

- Chain of evidence
- Planning eradication at affected properties

¹ Procedures are available individually from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

Chain of evidence

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted into SOP from Appendix 5 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. "Purpose" added

1. Purpose

The purpose of this procedure is to provide diagnosticians and field officers with information on maintaining appropriate 'chain of evidence' during an EPP Incident. In the event that a grower or other person takes legal action against the Lead Agency a demonstrable chain of custody and record of evidence from the time of sampling until trial is essential for evidence to stand up in court.

2. Application/Scope

The samples taken from the Infected Premises (IP) and Contact Premises (CP) are likely to be one of the most important forms of evidence for the Lead Agencies and the courts. Protocols are therefore required to maintain confidence in the integrity of the samples and their value as evidence. The Lead Agencies must be able to ensure:

- The collection of the samples is authorised by law;
- The samples collected come from the Infected Premises or Contact Premises;
- The persons collecting the samples have appropriate training and experience; and
- The samples are properly identified, recorded, stored and handled between the time of collection and trial.

In order to maintain continuity of evidence, diagnostic and survey teams and diagnostic laboratory staff should follow these protocols when collecting and handling EPP samples. Chain of Evidence protocols do not have to be followed for samples from general surveys.

The collection of the samples is authorised by law;

If a sample is to be used as evidence, the Lead Agencies must ensure that the persons collecting the sample are authorised to do so by law. If the collection of the sample is not authorised, a court may refuse to accept the sample as evidence or, if accepted, accord it little or no weight.

The samples collected come from the Infected Premises or Contact Premises

The person or persons collecting the sample must be able to establish that the samples were collected from the Infected Premises or Contact Premises.

To help establish that the samples were collected from the Infected Premises or Contact Premises and how the samples were collected, the person or persons collecting the samples should make a written record of collection at the time the sample is collected. It would be appropriate for those persons to mark the point or points of collection on a map of the Infected Premises or Contact Premises and to photograph the scene.

The persons collecting the samples have appropriate training and experience

The training and experience of the persons collecting samples is vital. The chain of evidence is only as good as the people who operate it and there are risks throughout the collection process of things going wrong: people misidentifying a sample or compromising its integrity, or making an error in its analysis or misinterpreting results.

Lead Agencies must ensure that everyone involved in the collection process is trained and competent to collect, store and handle samples. In addition persons packing samples will have to be trained by IATA if samples are to be sent samples by air.

The samples are properly identified, recorded, stored and handled between the time of collection and trial.

Chain of evidence protocols should be followed for all samples taken from Infected Premises or Contact Premises. Appropriate handling, documentation procedures and security measures are required when collecting and handling samples to preserve the integrity of the evidence. It is considered best practice if all samples submitted have uniquely numbered seals affixed to them for continuity and security.

The written record should be sufficiently detailed to:

- Permit the Lead Agency to call witnesses who could explain how the sample was collected, identified, stored and handled between the time of collection and trial; and
- Permit another expert to be able to identify what has been done to a particular sample and to independently assess the Lead Agency's findings.

The diagnostic or sampling team will complete a Sample Submission Form at the time of sampling. This will form the Evidence Register. Sample Submission Forms will be supplied by the laboratory to which the samples are being sent.

Of the original sample, the specialist will use a sub-sample for diagnostics and store the remainder of the sample as a reference sample. The reference sample will follow chain of evidence protocols. The sub-sample used for diagnostics will be tracked by normal laboratory procedures.

All material held by the agency which is relevant to the incursion should be treated as evidence until no longer required for the investigation and/or prosecution.

In the event that a grower or other person takes legal action against the Lead Agency a demonstrable chain of custody and record of evidence from the time of sampling until trial is essential for evidence to stand up in court.

3. Resource equipment

(to be completed)

4. Warnings

(to be completed)

5. Description of activities

5.1 Marking the exhibit

The diagnostic team (or other person collecting samples) will allocate each sample container with a unique identifier so that each sample can be easily tracked within the laboratory system. Each tamperproof seal will carry a unique number which can be the basis of it passing through the laboratory. The method of marking the sample will rest with the person in charge of the diagnostic team; however this should be consistent across the emergency response. Marking should be difficult to remove and appropriate to the surface. A label should be included within the audit bag/container in case outer label is accidentally destroyed.

The identifier shall be retained throughout the life of the item in the laboratory and shall not be reused at any subsequent time.

5.2 Exhibit labels

Sample ID and tracking of samples within the laboratory is a vital issue. Sample tracking must occur through the Evidence Register but also may occur on the sample label (as below). The amount of detail in the example label below may only be necessary for the first sub-sample.

Sample Continuity Label			
Sample ID No.			
Bag No:	<i>All samples obtained are grouped together and placed in bags or containers. These are then sequentially numbered</i>		
Handed to:	1	ON:	/ / am/pm
	2	ON:	/ / am/pm
	3 etc		

5.3 Sealing of items

All evidence must be stored in appropriate tamperproof audit bags/containers that are properly sealed with a tamperproof seal. Sealing an exhibit within an audit bag/container may reduce the opportunity for allegations of impropriety being made against investigators and enhances credibility. Occasional exceptions (eg. for very large or wet items) may be made, and this shall be recorded in the case file. A container is properly sealed only if its contents cannot readily escape or become contaminated and only if entering the container results in obvious damage to the container or seal.

Containers must be closed or items covered, during storage, to prevent accidental loss or contamination. When a long break is expected in the examination of an item, the item must be sealed with a tamperproof seal to prevent contamination.

Containers are designed to prevent illegal entry, not prevent entry per se.

Containers shall be resealed using a tamperproof seal after the examination is complete.

Evidence labels or evidence tape used to seal containers must be initialled or signed to record the person sealing the item, and must be dated with the date the item was sealed.

In circumstances where an audit bag/container is to be re-opened, the investigator responsible for sealing should consent and be present when the bag is re-opened. If this is not feasible, an independent person should be present to verify the contents of the audit bag at the time that the bag is re-opened. A written

record should be made in relation to the opening of an audit bag/container and placed in the Evidence Register. The record should include:

- Time, date and place that the bag/container was opened.
- Name of the person opening the bag/container.
- Name of the independent witness.
- Reason the bag/container was opened.
- Full description of the contents of the bag/container.
- Verification that the contents of the bag/container are those recorded on the property seizure record.
- What occurred to the contents of the bag/container.

5.4 Evidence Register

Once the investigating officer/specialist takes possession of the sample, the following procedures must occur immediately:

- a) The sample must be recorded in the Evidence Register and allocated a sample number. The information in the Evidence Register should include the full details as recorded specimen advice.
- b) Any subsequent movements of the sample must be recorded in the Evidence Register. This must include the date, the name and signature of the person taking the evidence, the reason and the destination.
- c) A designated person must maintain the Evidence Register. The nominated person should monitor and maintain the Evidence Register and the storage area. This person needs to have appropriate authority

The Evidence Register shall provide a comprehensive record of each evidence transfer over which the laboratory has control.

For transfer of items out of the laboratory

Samples shall be recorded on an appropriate specimen advice sheet, along with a copy of the original specimen advice, the name of the delivering person, the name (printed) and the signature of the accepting person, and the date and time of transfer.

Sample transfer will be recorded.

For transfers of evidence items in and out of the section

The unique identifier of the evidence item, the name of the delivering person, the name of the accepting person, and the date and time of the transfer shall be recorded on the item examination sheet and in the Evidence Register

5.5 Receipt of sample

Upon receipt of sample into the laboratory, the receiving scientist must ensure that:

- a) Sample packaging must be retained until AQIS and/or the Lead Agency approves its disposal. Note: Responsibility will depend upon the quarantine status of the sample.
- b) A complete description of testing requirements from the Lead Agency CPHM is documented and understood. This shall be evidenced by completion of a Sample Submission form.
- c) Any abnormalities or incorrect sample collection or preservation practices are noted in writing.

Where there is any doubt as to the suitability of a sample for test or examination, or when an item does not conform to the description provided, or the test/examination is not specified in sufficient detail, the Lead Agency shall be consulted for further instructions before proceeding. A written record must be made of any further instructions received from the client, at any point in the diagnostic process.

NOTE: Where it is clear that the sampling procedures were so inadequate that this could fundamentally compromise the results, then the receiving officer may reject the samples, using his or her professional judgement. Where samples were obviously collected or stored incorrectly, this should be clearly stated on the final report to the client.

- d) Samples submitted are to be examined for the pest in question
- e) All items are sealed in accordance with "Sealing of Items" procedure.

If not already adequately sealed, the samples must be sealed by the submitting officer or the receiving scientist at the time the evidence items are accepted.

- f) The section has the capability to perform the work requested.

Any requests for diagnostic service which are not provided by the section shall be rejected, or accepted only if there is a danger that the evidence samples may deteriorate, and on the clear understanding that the section will limit its role to the referral of the samples to another service provider, on the Lead Agency's behalf.

- g) The Receipt of Sample procedure is followed.

5.6 Storage of samples and documents

Samples and documents must be securely stored in a physically safe area with appropriate restrictions on access.

5.7 Movement of samples and documents

Samples and documents must be accessible only by designated or authorised officers. It is advisable that samples or documents be removed only for specified purposes, such as:

- registration
- initial examination and assessment
- identification processes
- imaging
- photocopying
- hearing or trial
- answer subpoena
- where it is impractical to examine sample or document in the confines of the storage area
- disposal.

The removal of the sample must be noted in the Evidence Register in accordance with this procedure.

5.8 Protection of Items

All samples must be protected from loss, cross transfer, contamination and/or deleterious change.

Samples shall be stored under controlled environmental conditions when not in the process of being examined. Appropriate conditions include:

- A cold room with restricted access; or

- Other suitable condition to preserve plant tissue and pest

Non-destructive tests should be utilised wherever practicable.

When destructive tests are used, up to ¼ of the substance may be used in pre-DNA testing. After the completion of all testing at least ¼ of any substance should remain. This is to allow possible re-testing by an independent laboratory.

This may not be useful in all situations, for example citrus canker, and may need alternative options.

Samples shall be collected from evidence items so as to maintain evidence integrity.

Instruments shall be sterilised before and after each sample is removed, or separate disposable instruments shall be used to take each sample. Appropriate outer garments, including disposable gloves, shall be used.

5.9 Evidence Retention and Disposal

After the completion of testing, all evidence must be returned to the Lead Agency CPHM, except where listed for retention below.

Retention of sub samples, records, photographs, DNA extracts and samples

Samples and other items shall be retained indefinitely in the following circumstances:

- To be made available for further diagnosis.
- Where the evidential material is likely to be of significant value in the future (eg. where court proceedings have not yet taken place).
- As reference material to the diagnosis that was made.
- To assist with future incursions of the pest.

The retained material shall be sealed and stored in accordance with this procedure.

Destruction of Samples

Samples shall be destroyed only on written authority from the Lead Agency CPHM. Waste disposal will be by AQIS approved method or CPHM approved equivalent. Note: Responsibility will depend upon quarantine status of the sample (managed under Australian Government or state/territory government legislation).

Prior to issuing any such instruction, the Lead Agency CPHM must ensure that:

- Any decision he/she makes is not in conflict with any Court Order.
- All potential claimants have been afforded an opportunity to lodge a claim for the items/goods/documents.

When authority to destroy is received, the specialist shall:

- Remove, or make illegible, any feature that might allow the identification of any person involved in the case.
- Dispose of the item appropriately (autoclaving or incineration etc).
- Record the name and signature of the person destroying the items, the method and date of destruction and a reference to the authority received in the Evidence Register.

6. References

(to be completed)

7. Appendices

Nil

Planning eradication at affected properties

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	Reformatted from Appendix 14 of PLANTPLAN (V1 Nov 2011). Internal references to Appendices in PLANTPLAN removed. SPCHQ/LPCC changed to SCC/LCC. OCPPO changed to CPPO

1. Purpose

(to be completed)

2. Application/Scope

(to be completed)

3. Resource equipment

(to be completed)

4. Warnings

(to be completed)

5. Description of activities

5.1 Planning and approvals

The Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) will prepare an urgent paper for consideration by Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) on a proposed program for removal and destruction of affected plants incorporating:

- Communication protocols with growers/property owners/managers.
- Site access and movement controls.
- Justification for removal of adjacent buffer plants (where legislation allows).
- Methods of removal, destruction and disposal (on or off site).
- Resource and training requirements of Infested Premises Operations Teams (IPOTs) – including contractors.
- Special arrangements for apiarists (if applicable).

The CPPO and Plant Health Australia (PHA) will prepare a paper on owner reimbursement costs and associated budget.

5.2 Confirmation from CCEPP

The CCEPP will meet out of session to resolve and approve protocols for removal of affected plants. PHA will confirm arrangements for owner reimbursement costs under the EPPRD

5.3 Resourcing and training of IPOTs

The Planning and Operations Managers will appoint leader and members of each IPOT including contractors employed for removal and disposal of plants.

The Planning and Operations Managers will brief IPOTs on:

- Operation of mobile communication equipment.
- Process for consulting with growers/property managers to discuss the removal and disposal process and confirm locations of plants to be removed.
- Disinfestation protocols for entry and exit including dedicated on site clothing.
- Method of removing above and below ground parts of plants.
- Methods for either on site destruction or off site transportation and burial.
- Methods for fumigation of soil after removal.
- Requirement for photographic and written recording of action at site and reporting and sign off by grower/property manager.

Additional planning issues for the Planning Manager may include:

- Establishing date and time for removal.
- Identifying different requirements for households, commercial producers, parks and reserves.
- Labelling plants for removal (including buffers).
- Harvesting and marketing of any produce from affected plants (if applicable).
- Special arrangements for on site service providers such as apiarists.
- Securing enclosed trucks for any off site transportation of affected plants.
- Special arrangements for burial at approved sites which ensures effective barrier of soil over affected plant material.
- Methods for high pressure washing and steam cleaning and chemical decontamination of machinery before leaving site.
- WH&S issues, standards, training, equipment, and records.

5.4 Operational planning for removal and destruction of plants from infected properties

5.4.1 Planning plant removal and other special arrangements

The Operations Manager and SCC Director will meet with contractors to confirm:

- Date and time for removal.
- Preferred methods for killing plants prior to removal.
- Availability of equipment.
- Site entry and exit protocols including sterilisation/hygiene practices.

- Methods for removal and destruction.
- Confidentiality and security arrangements.
- Costs of work and methods of payment.

They will also need to consider special arrangements such as for on site pollination services provided by apiarists, for domestic premises, parks or reserves.

5.4.2 Planning transportation off site

The Operations Manager and SCC Director will meet with the contractor to confirm:

- Date and time for removal.
- Availability of equipment with secure enclosures.
- Site entry and exit protocols including sterilisation/hygiene practices.
- Methods for loading and selected route to burial site.
- Protocols at burial site including entry and exit arrangements (sterilisation/hygiene).
- Confidentiality and security arrangements.
- Costs of work and methods of payment.

They will also need to consider special arrangements such as for on site pollination services provided by apiarists, for domestic premises, parks or reserves

5.4.3 Planning burial either on or off site

The Operations Manager and IPOT Leader will meet with the contractor to confirm:

- Date and time for removal.
- The excavation of pit of prescribed dimensions.
- The availability of equipment.
- Requirements for covering the affected material.
- Sterilisation/hygiene protocols and entry exit arrangements for trucks transporting affected plants.
- Arrangements for quarantine of burial site.
- Confidentiality and security arrangements.
- Costs of work and methods of payment.

They will also need to consider special arrangements – for domestic premises, parks or and reserves.

5.5 Implementing removal of affected plants

5.5.1 First site visit - confirm process

The Operations Manager, SCC Director and property owner/manager will confirm:

- The area(s) within which plants are to be removed (including the buffer zone).
- An appropriate method for labelling the plants for removal.
- The method of marketing any produce for fresh markets or for processing (if applicable).
- A written agreement describing the process which is signed by stakeholders.

- Arrangements for controlled site access and media liaison (noting that any media access will need approval from the Communications Manager and that media personnel will need to abide by any relevant quarantine measures and hygiene requirements).

5.5.2 Second site visit - removal operation

The Operations Manager and SCC Director will supervise:

- Control of access to site using additional back up security if required.
- Plant removal program at infected property in accordance with previously agreed protocols (refer to pages on planning eradication).
- The burning/burial on site of affected plant material or the security of transportation of affected plant material off site and its subsequent burial.
- Any variations to operational plans.
- The official recording of operations including photographic records.
- The post operation clean up of the affected site and sign off by the property owner/manager.

5.5.3 Media liaison

The Communications Manager should be available on site to respond to clarification of operational issues from the media and should liaise with the SPCHQ Director regarding any substantial media issues.

5.6 Program to confirm eradication at infected premises

5.6.1 Planning program

The Planning and Operations Managers together with the specialist will develop a program based on the specific biology of the pest/pathogen which will incorporate:

- Compliance with specified movement controls for plants, personnel and equipment.
- Sentinel plant program to detect EPP incorporating a biometrically based deployment, monitoring and sampling strategy (refer to page on sentinels and lures), noting that special arrangements will be required for soil borne pathogens.
- Arrangements for marketing of non-host plants and products.
- The specified duration of the program and recording systems.
- A paper to the CCEPP and Subcommittee for Domestic Quarantine and Market Access seeking approval for the program.

5.6.2 Implementation

The Operations and Planning Managers will meet with the property owner/manager of the IP to explain the rationale for the program (pending necessary approvals) including:

- The significance of the program in establishing pest free status for the area.
- What can be grown and under what restrictions.
- The duration of the confirmation program (monitoring and sentinel testing).
- The sentinel program – monitoring and testing.
- The requirement for ongoing compliance with movement restrictions.
- The maintenance of records and their associated audit by CPHM.
- Written agreement by the owner/manager on the reporting of any variations to the program.

6. References

(to be completed)

7. Appendices

Nil

PART 5 Forms and templates

Forms and templates provide a consistent and agreed format for response personnel to use for a specific task and ensure that the required minimum information or data is collected in a consistent and harmonised manner. The following forms and templates are included in PLANTPLAN individually as word documents:

- National talking points
- Preliminary Information Data Sheet
- Response Plan for eradication
- Response Plan for Transition to Management
- Situation report template
- Technical feasibility of eradication criteria

Disclaimer and warranty

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National talking points template

The information provided in this template should be used as a guide only, and is based on standard content commonly presented in national talking points for Incidents under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) as well as the generic template available in the Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual. The specific headings, content and level of detail required in national talking points will depend on the nature, extent and stage of the Incident as well as the specific messages that Affected Parties need to communicate. This template should be read in conjunction with the *National talking points* guidelines¹ which provide information on the purpose, use and process for development of national talking points during a response to an Incident under the EPPRD.

Document revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	30 Nov 2017	All	New document developed by Plant Health Australia in collaboration with Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network Chair/Secretariat. Endorsed by Parties November 2017.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Minor update to reference inclusion of relevant situational information, response strategy details and information on counselling and support services available. Endorsed by Parties November 2018.

Pest name – location (state/territory)

National Talking Points – date (of draft/approval) DRAFT/APPROVED

Current Situation

This section should include up to date details about the Incident. It may be brief or contain as much detail as required to meet the communication needs of Affected Parties. This section will cover information such as:

- The identity of the pest that has been found (scientific and common name), if suspect or confirmed identity through diagnosis. The common name must be used throughout the talking points.
- Date of detection(s) (i.e. month)
- Broad location of the detection(s) (i.e. suburb or region)
- The specific commodity/commodities it has been found on
- The number of Infected Premises

¹ Available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan

- Other specific situational details as considered appropriate and necessary to support stakeholder engagement and other communication needs
- Immediate response activities that are underway (e.g. whether quarantine actions are in place, that surveillance is being undertaken) and/or have been completed. If required, a summary of data may be included to reflect more detail on the activities (e.g. data on the number of samples collected, traces completed, surveillance events conducted, plants destroyed etc).
- The significance and impact of the pest (what other plants/commodities it could affect)
- Whether there is or is not any potential impact on human health
- That the detection is being considered by national committees (Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and National Management Group (NMG))
- Whether there is a nationally agreed Response Plan in place or being developed
- The response strategy being implemented under the agreed Response Plan
- What activities are being undertaken or planned (long term) in implementing the Response Plan
- Where more information can be found

Background

- Information that provides context about why the pest is significant. This could include impacts observed internationally, to crops, the economy or wider.
- Any decisions previously made by the CCEPP or NMG about this pest. e.g. decision that the pest is feasible to eradicate, and/or Response Plan approved
- Where to go for further information (outbreak.gov.au/)

Biosecurity and reporting

Advice to growers

- Any specific advice to growers about:
 - what they should look out for
 - whether they need to do something differently
 - Advice on how to minimise the spread of the pest
 - who they should contact if they want advice on how to treat for the pest, or if they have any questions
 - where they can get additional information.
- Messages highlighting the importance of on-farm biosecurity; e.g. *Good on-farm biosecurity practices minimise the risk of pests entering and exiting your property, as well as spreading within your crops. Information about how to put biosecurity measure in place on your farm is available at farmbiosecurity.com.au.*
- If there is a specific need for the public to look for and report the pest, this section will include messages targeted for the public in relation to what they should look out for, and where as well as any other information that is relevant to finding the pest.

- Include the following statements where relevant:
 - *All commercial growers and home gardeners, need to be vigilant for new plant pests or disease symptoms. Reporting suspect symptoms can prevent serious and long-term damage to Australia's food production industries.*
 - This statement should be tailored to the appropriate audience such as groups like bush walkers.
 - *If you think you have seen the 'pest name' or that it may be present on your plants, you need to report this to the Exotic Plant Pest Hotline on 1800 084 881 or to the 'insert details of the relevant state or territory government'.*
 - *Everyone has a role in Australia's biosecurity. It is important that importers and others who work around imported goods be vigilant for exotic pests and pest activity. Some pests may not be visible to the human eye and it may take certain environmental conditions for some pests to emerge from imported goods.*
 - This statement is specific for pests that may have arrived in imported cargo.

Counselling and support services

- Information on the availability of counselling and support services provided by the relevant jurisdiction and available nationally (if relevant), and where to go to find information on these services.

About 'pest name'

- Description of the pest, both immature and adult forms, and/or what the symptoms look like. Do not use scientific terminology, but rather describe in lay terms for example small white insects, approximately 0.5 mm in diameter, appearing on the underside of leaves.
- Host list for the pest
- Description of how the plants are impacted including where on the plant symptoms may first be observed and how the symptoms progress.
- How the pest can be spread
- Global distribution of the pest
- Clarification of the name or any synonyms if appropriate
- Where to access further information about the pest and images

Trade

International trade

This section should be included if the presence of the plant pest or response activities have an impact on domestic or international trade.

- The information in this section could be as simple as 'There are no trade impacts as a result of the detection of this pest.'

- If there are international trade implications, include the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources website (agriculture.gov.au).
- Any media enquiries related to overseas trade issues are handled by the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources, and should be directed to media@agriculture.gov.au or (02) 6272 3232.

Domestic trade

This section should be included if movement restrictions have been put in place for one or more jurisdictions.

- If there are different restrictions for each jurisdiction, these should be outlined and directed to the Australian interstate quarantine website (interstate.quarantine.org.au) for further information.
- Include the information for industry/growers and if there are any restrictions that may impact or be relevant to the general public.

Response arrangements

Standard wording has been developed to explain the EPPRD, the CCEPP and the NMG, and their role in the national biosecurity emergency management.

- *The Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests provides technical and scientific advice in response to exotic plant pest and disease outbreaks. The committee is chaired by Australia's Chief Plant Protection Officer and comprises the Chief Plant Health Managers and specialists from government, Plant Health Australia, and representatives from affected industries. In this incident, this includes (insert Affected Industry Party names).*
- *The National Management Group consists of Chief Executive Officers from government agencies responsible for agriculture, and representatives from affected industry organisations. It is chaired by the Secretary of the Australian Government Department of Agriculture and Water Resources. Plant Health Australia is a non-voting member.*
- *The National Management Group makes decisions on whether or not to support national eradication programs for pest or disease outbreaks under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed. The National Management Group considers recommendations provided by the Consultative Committee before making decisions on whether or not a pest or disease is technically feasible to eradicate.*
- *The Consultative Committee and National Management Group operate in accordance with the deed. The deed is a formal legally binding agreement between Plant Health Australia, the Australian, state and territory governments, and national plant industry bodies that represent specific cropping sectors. It covers the management and funding of nationally agreed responses to Emergency Plant Pests.*

If asked

- This section includes information that the CCEPP do not want to promote but agree to release if members are asked specifically.
- The information listed under 'Response arrangements' is sometimes listed in this section.

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION DATA SHEET (PIDS)

SCIENTIFIC NAME

PIDS REFERENCE NUMBER: **CCEPP SECRETARIAT TO ADD**

1. PIDS Details

Pest details		
Scientific name	"Scientific name"	
	Synonyms:	
Common name(s)	"common name"	
Pest grouping	Choose an item	Other:
Reporting details		
PIDS type	Choose an item	
Jurisdiction	Choose an item	
Date of PIDS submission	Click here to enter a date	
Contact Details	Name: Department: Phone number: Email:	
EPP Category (Schedule 13, EPPRD)	Choose an item. CCEPP Secretariat to complete	
High Priority Pest in Biosecurity Plan(s):	Choose an item. CCEPP Secretariat to complete If yes, list relevant industry(s):	
CCEPP has considered this pest previously:	Choose an item. CCEPP Secretariat to complete If yes, provide details:	

2. Incident details

Detection summary		
Summary	" Brief outline of detection and current situation "	
Date of detection in the field/sample collected	Click here to enter a date	
Date initial diagnosis	Click here to enter a date	
Date of notification to ACPPO	Click here to enter a date	
Pest reported by?	Choose an item	Other:
Pest detected through	Choose an item	Other:
Photographs	Choose an item	
Pest detection		
Pest detected on/in/associated with?	"where was pest found eg on bee, in the environment, on plant, on fungi"	
Describe	"for pest not found associated with a plant host provide information." Include information on the species or object it was detection on, impacts observed and other relevant information specific to what the pest was detection on or associated with.	
Plant host details and impact observed – for pests detected on a plant host		
Host name	" scientific name, common name, variety"	
Host age	"if applicable add details of the age of the host"	
Host development stage	"if applicable add the development stage e.g seedling, mature"	
Damage symptoms and severity	"detail what symptoms have been observed on the host and the severity"	
Incidence of infection/infestation	DisplayText cannot span more than one line!	
Detection site details		
Land use at detection site	Choose an item	Other:
Land ownership	Choose an item	Other:

Location of detection site	"Suburb, nearest town, district"	
Map coordinates	"map name, scale and coordinates; latitude and longitude using WGS84 "	
Location of the pest on site	"additional information to assist in locating the pest or and/or map"	
Recent activities at the site	"e.g. Pruning, harvesting, grafting, moving etc"	
Diagnostics		
Laboratory name	"name of laboratory undertaking the diagnosis"	Accredited for test? Choose an item.
Diagnostic Protocol	DisplayText cannot span more than one line!	Endorsed NDP? Choose an item.
Confirmatory laboratory name	"provide details of laboratory undertaking confirmatory diagnosis"	
Specimen lodged with:	"name of herbarium/collection"	
Collection accession number(s)	"insert accession number"	
Upload to the Australian Plant Pest Database (APPD)?	Choose an item	
Proposed activities to manage the Incident		
Proposed course of action	"What action is being proposed to manage/contain the pest"	
Potential spread	" how far the pest has or may have spread from the detection site"	
Trace back/trace forward	"Been or being undertaken? Outcomes? Recent introductions of host material"	
Surveillance	"Provide details of any surveillance activities planned or being undertaken"	
Additional information required?	"Identify information required to inform what action will be taken?"	

3. Additional Pest Information

Pest Biology	
Known or suspected hosts	"Provide details of known and suspected hosts, include references"
Potential economic impact	"list possible economic impacts if pest established"
Potential environmental impact	"are there potential environmental impacts from the pest"
Vector(s)	"is the pest a vector or associated with a vector(s)?" DisplayText cannot span more than one line!
Scientific references	"List all scientific references referred to in obtaining information"
Additional information	
Known distribution	
Occurrence in Australia	"Where pest is currently known to occur within Australia. Include references"
Occurrence overseas	"Where is the plant pest known to occur overseas"

Submit to the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer via the **CCEPP Secretariat** by email to CCEPP@agriculture.gov.au

Response Plan for eradication

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	1 June 2018	All	New template developed to align with the <i>Response Plan development</i> guidelines (version 1.0). Parties endorsed the new template in May 2018 and noted that the original <i>Response Plan</i> template (version 1.0, December 2013) will be archived.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Template revised to align with the draft <i>Response Plan development</i> guidelines (version 1.1). The following sections were added: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1- Aim • 1.2 - Objectives • 2.3 – Other known hosts in the affected area • 2.6 – Additional impacts • 4.7 – Host free/fallow period • 11.1 – Key performance indicators/program milestones Endorsed by Parties November 2018.

This template should be used in conjunction with the *Response Plan development* guidelines which has been developed to assist Parties in developing and revising a Response Plan for a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD). The guideline includes specific instructions on the appropriate structure and content of a Response Plan developed at various stages of a response. The following headings are consistent with the guideline document.

1. Aim and objectives of the Response Plan

- 1.1 Aim
- 1.2 Objectives

2. Current status of the Incident

- 2.1 EPP details
- 2.2 Affected host(s)
- 2.3 Other known hosts in the affected area
- 2.3 Diagnostic details
- 2.4 Description and affect
- 2.5 Extent of Incident
- 2.6 Additional impacts

3. Feasibility of eradication

- 3.1 Technical feasibility of eradication
- 3.2 Economic feasibility of eradication

4. Response activities for Emergency Containment and eradication

- 4.1 Overall response strategy
- 4.2 Zoning, quarantine and movement controls
- 4.3 Diagnostics and scientific support
- 4.4 Trace forward and traceback
- 4.5 Surveillance and monitoring
- 4.6 Decontamination, destruction and disposal
- 4.7 Host free/fallow period
- 4.8 Owner Reimbursement Costs

5. Proof of freedom activities

6. Public relations and communications activities

7. Social support mechanisms

8. Response Plan management and governance

9. Information systems and services

10. Reporting

- 10.1 CCEPP and NMG reporting
- 10.2 International notifications

11. Response Plan review

- 11.1 Key performance indicators/program milestones
- 11.2 Trigger points to review the Response Plan
- 11.3 Efficiency audit

12. Financial management of Response Plan

- 12.1 Indicative budget
 - 12.1.2 Salary and wages

12.1.3 Operational costs

12.1.4 Capital items

12.1.5 Owner Reimbursement Costs

12.2 Accounting and reporting expenditure

12.2.1 Response Plan expenditure report

12.2.2 Accounting and cost claims processes

12.3 Financial audit

13. Appendices

Response Plan for Transition to Management

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	1 June 2018	All	New template developed to align with the <i>Response Plan development</i> guideline (version 1.0). Parties endorsed the new template in May 2018 and noted that the original <i>Response Plan</i> template (version 1.0, December 2013) will be archived.
1.1	30 Nov 2018	All	Template revised to align with the draft <i>Response Plan development</i> guidelines (version 1.1). The following sections were added: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.1- Aim • 1.2 - Objectives • 2.3 – Other known hosts in the affected area • 2.7 – Additional impacts • 5 – Social support mechanisms Endorsed by Parties November 2018.

This template should be used in conjunction with the *Response Plan development* guideline which has been developed to assist Parties in developing and revising a Response Plan for a response to an Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD). The guideline includes specific instructions on the appropriate structure and content of a Response Plan that is being revised to incorporate Transition to Management activities. The following headings are consistent with the guideline document.

1. Aim and objectives of the Response Plan

- 1.1 Aim
- 1.2 Objectives

2. Current status of the Incident

- 2.1 EPP details
- 2.2 Affected host(s)
- 2.3 Other known hosts in the affected area
- 2.4 Diagnostic details
- 2.5 Description and affect
- 2.6 Extent of Incident
- 2.7 Additional impacts
- 2.8 Decision on feasibility of eradication

- 3. Transition to Management activities**
- 4. Public relations and communication activities**
- 5. Social support mechanisms**
- 6. Response Plan management and governance**
- 7. Information systems and services**
- 8. Reporting**
 - 8.1 CCEPP and NMG reporting
 - 8.2 International notifications
- 9. Trigger points for Response Plan review**
- 10. Financial management of Response Plan**
 - 10.1 Indicative budget
 - 10.1.1 Salary and wages
 - 10.1.2 Operational costs
 - 10.2 Accounting and reporting expenditure
 - 10.2.1 Response Plan expenditure report
 - 10.2.2 Accounting and cost claims processes
 - 10.2.3 Financial audit
- 11. Appendices**

Situation report template

This template provides a standardised situation report structure with the minimum content requirements to support situational awareness during an Incident under the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed. The specific content and level of detail required in situation reports will depend on the nature, stage and extent of the Incident as well as the situational awareness needs of the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests and National Management Group.

Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment details	
		Section(s)	Details
0.1		All	Drafted by the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources. Draft noted by Parties November 2018.
1.0	8 June 2023		Endorsed by Parties June 2023.

1. Purpose

The purpose of a situation report (sitrep) is to provide an update on the current Incident status and detail the response activities undertaken since the previous sitrep to support situational awareness. If an approved Response Plan is in place, the sitrep should provide sufficient information to identify the progress made against the response strategy. The sitrep is not intended to provide a detailed chronology of events for the Incident.

2. Notes for completing a situation report

- Red text is to be used to highlight new information in subsequent sitreps
- Sitreps should be brief and not a narrative (read in 3-5 mins)
- Information should be factual and largely without interpretation and conjecture
- Information should cover the period since the last sitrep
- If a section of the template is not relevant for the Incident or there is nothing to report against it for this period, indicate this by stating "not applicable" or "no actions to report"
- Refer to personnel by their role – do not use their name
- Refer to locations by Infected Premises (IP) number or anonymised reference rather than using specific address details
- It is acceptable for a sitrep to be issued that states "no change since last sitrep (see last sitrep issued on [insert date/time] for information)"

SITUATION REPORT
EMERGENCY PLANT PEST SCIENTIFIC NAME
(common name)
Situation Report No: X
Reporting period covered: dd Month Year to dd Month Year

1. Current situation overview

Provide a summary of the current situation, including to detail key new developments since the last sitrep and subsequent changes to the current status in **red text**. After the initial sitrep, remove any information that is no longer relevant to the current situation. Examples of information include:

- Premises status update:
 - Number of new Infected Premises (IP) and the new total number of IPs
 - Details regarding new IPs:
 - location and whether within existing Restricted Areas or Control Areas
 - the species of host detected on
 - the scale of infection/infestation (i.e. symptoms, number of host species infected, number of traps with positives)
 - how the new IP was identified (e.g. through tracing and surveillance or public report)
 - Update on any new Suspect Premises (SPs) and timing for their status to be confirmed/resolved
- Key highlights related to the following, including total numbers/statistics to reflect current status where relevant:
 - Surveillance and monitoring – e.g. delimiting surveillance in area [x] now completed; 30% premises in areas [x] have been surveyed
 - Diagnostics – e.g. number of new samples received, total number of samples pending diagnosis, number confirmed as negative, number confirmed as positive
 - Tracing – e.g. tracing related to IP[x] ongoing, completed trace forward activities related to....., [x] number of traces still to be followed up
 - Treatment and/or destruction – e.g. destruction of all host plants in 75% of premises in Restricted Area now complete
 - Zoning, quarantine and movement restrictions – e.g. new Restricted Area gazetted dd Month Year
 - Public information and engagement – e.g. new hotline number and email for public reporting now established.

- Status of activities related to Owner Reimbursement Costs – e.g. number of new claims received, assessor appointed and on-site undertaking assessments
- Maps and graphs may be attached as appendices to the sitrep to illustrate key points or provide a visual representation of the current situation. Maps should be of appropriate scale and resolution such that locations and legends are legible.
- Cost Shared expenditure (committed and actual) against approved Response Plan budget. A detailed expenditure report in the format required under schedule 10 of the EPPRD should be provided as an appendix in relevant reporting periods (at each relevant meeting of the CCEPP).

2. Current Incident objectives

Include a brief statement or list of objectives for the Incident, relevant to the stage of the response and timing of the sitrep. This may be in the form of the immediate priorities for the response. For example:

- Complete delimiting surveillance within [x km] of new IP
- Complete destruction of all hosts within the Restricted Area
- Investigate all public or industry generated reports of suspected IPs

3. Predicted situation over the next operational period

State what the predicted situation is likely to be across the next reporting period. For example:

- Delimiting surveillance in [xx] expected to be completed
- Outstanding tracing investigations from [xx] expected to be completed

4. Issues

Report any significant detections and/or breaches of triggers under this section.

Identify new and emerging issues that require resolution and propose ways in which they may be resolved. It may be appropriate to differentiate between immediate and medium term issues.

Examples include:

- Areas where assistance is required – e.g. logistics and resourcing/support requirements, industry liaison.
- Present brief description of issue/s that are known/reasonably expected to arise before the next sitrep is issued e.g. a shortage of a given resource, significant WHS issues
- Identify any likely logistical and support required to resolve the identified issues. This will enable providers to prepare for requests, thus reducing response time. Formal requests for support should be made separately and not included in the situation report

5. Actions undertaken since last sitrep

Include a brief description of the actions completed for the period covered by the sitrep.

Include industry involvement in activities (who, what and where) where relevant.

If appropriate/required the format below should be used, alternatively some or all points could be combined.

5.1 Planning

Examples:

- Gazettal of new Restricted Area and Control Area
- Finalised Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Decontamination, Destruction and Disposal
- Finalised letters for....
- Forward planning for Industry Liaison Officer resourcing

5.2 Operations

Include a brief update on activities undertaken across the following areas where relevant

- Surveillance and monitoring – e.g. number of premises surveillance completed on; organised surveillance for xx number of hotline calls received
- Diagnostics - e.g. number of diagnostic samples processed
- Tracing – e.g. number of trace forwards and back followed up
- Treatment and/or destruction – e.g. number of premises that destruction activities were completed on
- Zoning, movement restrictions and compliance – e.g. number of premises that compliance inspections were completed for; permits issued to....

5.3 Logistics

Examples:

- Number of new staff inducted in planning, operations...
- Recruitment for long term positions commence
- Industry liaison coordinator/officer engagement

5.4 Public information and engagement

Report on activities undertaken or media interest. Examples:

- A summary of proactive media activities, for example, media releases, articles, interviews, social media, public or industry/grower meetings
- Key communication messages
- The number of suspect reports from the public
- Progress on development of communication and engagement strategy
- Industry involvement in activities
- Input from Industry liaison officer and Industry liaison coordinator

5.5 Finance

Example:

- Invoices being finalised, including reimbursement of interstate deployment expenses

5.6 Safety

Examples:

- New incident (WHS) reports and audit information
- [Xx] reportable incidents have occurred with no time lost

5.7 Owner Reimbursement Costs

Report on activities undertaken. Examples:

- Information package completed
- Identified [xx] number of growers that are potentially eligible to submit claims
- Received [xx] new claims
- Assessments completed for xx number of claimants
- Industry involvement in activities

6. Future actions to be undertaken

Insert a brief description of scheduled, planned, and/or proposed actions for the operational period covered by the sitrep. Include future intentions and resources required i.e. what additional operational requirements are anticipated by the next sitrep reporting period.

If appropriate/required the format below should be used, alternatively all points could be combined.

6.1 Planning

Examples:

- Continue to work on the area freedom concepts
- Complete letters to additional Restricted Area premises
- Finalise longer-term surveillance plan
- Continue to create or update Standard Operating Procedures identified by both planning and operations
- Restricted Movement and Compliance Plan.
- Forward planning for industry liaison officer resourcing.

6.2 Operations

Include a brief description of planned activities across the following areas where relevant:

- Surveillance and monitoring – e.g. number of premises surveillance planned for
- Diagnostics - e.g. number of diagnostic samples expected to be processed
- Tracing – e.g. number of trace forwards and back to be followed up
- Treatment and/or destruction – e.g. number of premises that destruction activities are planned to be completed on
- Zoning, movement restrictions and compliance – e.g. number of premises that compliance inspections are planned for
- Industry activities planned

6.3 Logistics

Examples:

- Number of new staff to be inducted week commencing in planning, operations...
- Industry liaison coordinator/officer engagement

6.4 Public information and engagement

Examples:

- Key messages to be communicated
- Opportunities identified for further public and industry communication/interaction (e.g. local industry meetings, shows)
- Development of material for indigenous communities
- Planned future media
- Input from Industry liaison officer and Industry liaison coordinator

6.5 Finance

Example:

- Expenditure reporting

6.6 Safety

Examples:

- New policies/procedure under development
- Risks continued to be identified and managed

6.7 Owner Reimbursement Costs

Examples:

- [Xx] number of assessments expected to be completed and reviewed
- [Xx] number of valuations to be provided to claimants
- Timing for payments expected to be made...

7. Premises status summary

Table x: Current status all premises

	Infected Premises (IP)	Suspect Premises (SP)	At Risk Premises (ARP)	Dangerous Contact Premises (DCP)	Trace Premises (TP)	Unknown Status Premises (USP)	Assessed Negative Premises (ANP)	Zero Host Premises (ZHP)	Resolved Premises (RP)	Total
Restricted Area										
Control Area										
Remainder of jurisdiction										
Total										

Note: If Trace Premises extend into other jurisdictions this will need to be noted or an additional row added.

8. Destruction and/or treatment summary

The following tables are examples only. Additional or different tables may be required, for example, to demonstrate the status of insect trapping or other response activities.

8.1 Destruction summary

Table x: Destruction status of Infected Premises

IP number	Restricted Area	Number of host plants	Number of host plants destroyed	% destruction completed
IP X				
IP X				
IP X				
Total				

Table x: Host surveillance and destruction status in Restricted Areas

Restricted Area	Number of premises in RA	Number of premises host survey complete	% premises host survey complete	Number of premises in RA with hosts	Number of premises cleared of hosts	% destruction in RA completed [#]
Total						

[#] Note: this column cannot be compiled until number of premises in RA with hosts is known

8.2 Treatment summary

<i>Table x: Treatment status of Infected Premises</i>				
IP number and location	Area	Number of host plants	Number of host plants treated	Complete %
IP X				
IP X				
IP X				
Total				

9. Tracing summary

Examples:

- Insert a brief summary of tracing activities (including trace forward and trace back). If information is too complex for the sitrep it could be provided as an attachment
- Inclusion of a large-scale map of trace forwards and tracebacks may be more useful.

10. Surveillance summary

The following tables are examples only. Additional or different tables may be required depending on the specific activities.

<i>Table x: Surveillance status</i>						
	Restricted Areas		Control Areas		Remainder of jurisdiction	
	Surveyed this period	Total number	Surveyed this period	Total number	Surveyed this period	Total number
Surveillance						
Trace (forward/back)						
Other						
Total						

'Other' may refer to non-planned surveillance activities, such as hotline enquiries, staff observations, public reports, industry self-reporting.

11. Sample and diagnostic summary

Table x: Diagnostics results						
	Specimens submitted	Asymptomatic /not tested	Suspect specimens	Confirmed positive	Confirmed negative	In progress
Previously submitted						
Newly submitted this period						
Total						

12. Report details

Table X: Situation Report Details	
Issued at:	Time, dd Month Year
Reporting Period:	From dd Month year To dd Month year
Distribution:	
The next sitrep to be issued at:	
Issued by:	
Name	
Title	
Approved by:	
Name	
Title	
Signature	
Date/Time	

Maps

A map and/or other graphic can be included in a sitrep to demonstrate information visually, for example, locations of IPs, SPs, Restricted Areas and Control Areas. Multiple maps may be required at different resolutions.

Ensure a key is included and date/time of the graphic is displayed. There should also be a reference between the graphic and the sitrep.

Appendix 2

Expenditure report

The expenditure report must show the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure on the approved Response Plan in the format required under schedule 10 of the EPPRD.

Appendix 3

Acronyms and Definitions

Case Status	Definition
Assessed Negative Premises (AN)	A premises (or locality) that has previously been identified as a DCP, SP, ARP or TP that has been cleared of suspicion at the time of designation and is subject to restrictions appropriate to the area in which they are located.
At Risk Premises (ARP)	A premises (or locality) confirmed to be at risk due to presence of susceptible host plant, plant pest suspected based on visual inspection and sampling visit required OR A premises (or locality) confirmed to be at risk of the Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) due to presence of susceptible host plant, access issues to be resolved prior to surveillance visit.
Control Area (CA)	An area around the Restricted Area where movement is controlled but not restricted. The area is intended to reduce likelihood of the EPP spreading beyond the Restricted Area.
Dangerous Contact Premises (DCP)	A premises (or locality) containing susceptible host plants which are known to have been in direct or indirect contact with an Infected Premises.
Infected Premises (IP)	A premises (or locality) at which an EPP is confirmed to exist
Pest Free Area (PFA)	An area which a specific EPP is known not to occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained.
Restricted Area (RA)	A relatively small area (compared to a Control Area) around an IP that is subject to intense surveillance and movement controls. Note: Movement out of the area will, in general, be prohibited, while movement into the area would only be by permit. Multiple Restricted Areas may exist within one Control Area.
Resolved Premises (RP)	IP that has had all the host material removed and destroyed. The premises are subject to the procedures and restrictions to the area in which they are located.
Suspect Premises (SP)	A premises (or locality) containing plants which may have been exposed to an EPP and which will be subject to quarantine and intense surveillance.
Trace Premises (TP)	A premises associated with an IP and requiring investigation. Trace maybe through the movement of plant material, people, machinery

	or tools. TP include trace-forward and trace backwards premises linked to an IP. A TP classification will remain until surveillance or other activity has occurred to allow determination of another status.
Unknown Status Premises (USP)	Premises that have not been surveyed and it is unknown if the premises are infected or contain host material.
Zero Host Premises (ZHP)	Premises that have been surveyed and have been confirmed to contain no susceptible host material.

Table 1: Factors to consider regarding the technical feasibility of EPP eradication¹

Technical feasibility of eradication criteria	Factors to be considered <i>Note: not all factors listed may be relevant to the EPP or Incident and/or there may be additional factors to consider</i>	Supports or is an impediment to successful eradication or is unknown
1. Aspects of the species biology that influence the ability to eradicate the EPP		
1.1. Ability of the EPP to establish and spread	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range of climate/environmental conditions EPP can survive/reproduce in • Extent of natural (e.g. wind, rain, invertebrate vectors) and human assisted (e.g. people, equipment, machinery) pathways of spread • Broad versus narrow host range (including alternate/weed hosts) • Reproduction rate, infectivity/virulence • Lifecycle/ability to rapidly reproduce/generate offspring, ability to infect at low inoculum load 	e.g. supports successful eradication
1.2. Ability of the EPP to persist in the environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Persistence in soil, water, plant debris, vectors • Dormant stage, latency period and/or asymptomatic infections 	
2. The current circumstances of the Incident that influence the ability to eradicate the EPP		
2.1. Suitability of current circumstances to establishment and spread	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current EPP prevalence/inoculum load • Likely time from introduction to initial detection • Current extent of EPP distribution • Suitability of climate/environmental conditions in the affected area to establishment and spread • EPP likely to be present and persisting in soil, water, plant debris • Extent of host distribution (how wide and densely distributed) in the affected area (including alternate/weed hosts) • Presence and distribution of natural vectors in the affected area 	
2.2. Ability of quarantine and other measures to contain the EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infected Premises quarantined • Pathways and risk mitigation measures known or can be determined 	

¹ The [Technical feasibility of eradication criteria](#) are also available within Part 1 of PLANTPLAN.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quarantine areas can be determined and implemented 	
3. The ability to accurately diagnose the EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reliability of diagnostic method/protocol Sensitivity of diagnostic method/protocol (can detect EPP at low levels) Resolution of taxonomy Availability of diagnostic equipment/expertise 	
4. The ability to find all sites in which the EPP may be present	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detectability of the EPP (e.g. symptoms can be visualised or a variant form of an established pest can be easily differentiated) Reliability of surveillance methodology Sensitivity of surveillance methodology (e.g. detect at low expression/prevalence) Extent of host range (wide versus narrow host range) Extent of host distribution (density/abundance and how widely distributed) Ability to find and identify hosts Affected areas accessible Ability to successfully conduct trace-back and trace-forward investigations Pathways of movement/spread can be identified Ability to model natural spread pathways (e.g. wind, water, vector distribution) 	
5. The presence of an effective control method that will remove or destroy all EPPs present		
5.1. An effective control method is available/accessible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Method effective at destroying/removing EPP Chemicals, traps etc available and accessible Control method has been used elsewhere to successfully eradicate Availability of resistant crop varieties Ability of EPP to rapidly develop resistance to chemicals/control Effectiveness of control method at low prevalence levels 	
5.2. Control method can be implemented to remove the EPP at a faster rate than it can propagate/spread	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent of infestation Extent of distribution and accessibility of hosts (including alternate/weed hosts) Reproduction rate/virulence/infectivity Persistence of EPP in plant debris, soil and water Control effective during dormancy 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limitations to timely manual removal of affected hosts 	
5.3. Whether there are control methods commonly employed for endemic pests and diseases, that may limit the establishment, spread and/or impact of the EPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chemicals or cultural controls commonly in use in the affected area are likely to be effective at suppressing or controlling the EPP • Extent to which establishment, spread and/or impact of the EPP may be limited through common use of control methods for endemic pests and diseases 	
6. The likelihood of repeated introductions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to identify pathway of entry into Australia or out of a defined area of containment within Australia • Whether likely pathway is regulated or non-regulated (e.g. entry through natural means) • Effectiveness of controls in place to mitigate re-entry 	
7. The recommended response strategy is acceptable to stakeholders and the general public	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Direct impacts on industry • Flow on effects to allied /downstream industries • Impacts on health, community and lifestyle (e.g. cultural and social impacts, amenity and landscape impacts) and public acceptability of control methods • Environmental, non-target impacts • Stakeholder consultation and support 	
8. Any legislative impediments to undertaking an emergency response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impediments to use of control methods e.g. environmental impacts • Ability to effectively apply legislation • Ability to access properties/land 	
9. The resources e.g. chemicals, personnel etc. required to undertake an emergency response are accessible or available	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chemicals/traps etc. available • Permits can be obtained • Expertise available • Work health and safety impediments • Logistical impediments (e.g. sufficient personnel available/accessible) 	



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