

WE ARE PREPARED FOR AN FMD OUTBREAK AND THIS IS WHY

Kathleen Plowman | CEO

Presentation to the Plant Health Australia members

KEY ISSUES

- Emerging animal disease risks at our doorstep
- AHA engagement with government and industry
- Are we FMD prepared what happens in an FMD outbreak
- Producer and sector preparedness - farm biosecurity is key



EMERGING ANIMAL DISEASE RISKS AT OUR DOORSTEP

In March 2021, there was 42% probability of an exotic disease incursion within five years.

Disease	Initial assessment (March 2021)	Reviewed (April – June 2022)
Foot-and-mouth disease	9%	11% (1.2 fold 个)
Lumpy skin disease	8%	28% (3.5 fold 个)
African swine fever	21%	
African horse sickness	13%	









ENGAGEMENT WITH GOVT/INDUSTRY

EXISTING GOVERNMENT

National Biosecurity Committee (NBC)

Animal Health
Committee
(AHC)

National Biosecurity
Communications and
Engagement Network
(NBCEN)

NEW GOVERNMENT

Ministerial
Exotic Animal Disease
Preparedness Taskforce

DAFF
Emergency Animal Disease
Preparedness Taskforce

Jurisdiction
EAD Taskforces/Working Groups
(QLD, NSW, VIC, NT etc)

NEW INDUSTRY

RMAC/NFF
Industry Taskforce
on LSD and FMD

RMAC/NFF Industry Taskforce working groups

- Communications
- Overseas in country support
- Diagnostics and vaccine development
- Trade and protocols
- Domestic containment strategy



COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGAGEMENT

TACTICS	OVERVIEW	OUTCOMES	
MEDIA	 Getting the right information out there Correcting opinion Technical experts AHA is helping to lead the conversation and not just be part of it 	Radio interviewsTV interviewsNewspaper articlesOnline articles	
SOCIAL MEDIA	 A national producer engagement campaign focused on the themes of: LOOK – what to look out PREPARE – biosecurity planning BE AWARE – what would happen 	Sent to all members, PICs and farming bodies	
WEBINARS	Key role in the industry webinars targeted to livestock producers	Webinars nationally through industry taskforce and to specific industry and interest groups	
E-ALERTS	Animal disease e-alert providing a digest of all the recent updates from govt and industry	Three alerts to date to 1,772 subscribers and growing (60% open rates)	









EADRA, AUSVETPLANS

- Core of our Business
- Reviewed FMD and LSD AUSVETPLAN
 - AUSVETPLANs have been written by technical experts from industry and government and consulted on at high levels of government and industry
 - 2014 and 2015 a series of discussion exercises and field activities, called <u>Exercise Odysseus</u>
 - 2022 and 2023, Australian government agencies will be involved in <u>Exercise Paratus</u>. A series of desktop exercises looking at how agencies escalate, coordinate and use relevant legislation in an emergency animal disease scenario
 - Exercise Paratus will culminate with a major functional exercise in early 2023.

Ongoing AHA training

- BAU EADRA training with NMG, CCEAD representatives (invite only)
- Maintaining with PHA the National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) program
- Training of industry members on specific topics (industry liaison officers, etc)
- Promotion of online EAD Foundation course, and updating key courses to ensure accuracy



FIND OUT MORE

AHA website continues to be updated when new info comes to hand and you can also follow our social channels

SUBSCRIBE TO OUR DISEASE ALERTS



VISIT OUR WEBSITE





What happens in an emergency animal disease (EAD) response?

Dr Therese Wright, Head of Program - EADRA Tuesday 16 August 2022



EAD Management Framework









A series of public manuals

that sets out the agreed national policy and guidelines for agencies and organisations involved in a response to an outbreak.

Overview

Response strategies

Operational manuals

Enterprise manuals

Management manuals

Guidance documents

Resource documents



Parties to the EADRA

































- The Commonwealth and all States and Territories
- Animal Health Australia
- Industry associations or other industry entities





What happens during an EAD outbreak



Report of unusual signs in an animal



Observation:

- Sick or dead animals
- Drop in milk or egg production

Action:

- Call to private or government vet/biosecurity officer
- Call to Hotline 1800 675 888





Disease investigation

- Examines flock/ herd
- Collects samples and arranges prompt submission to laboratory
- Records detailed history
- Notifies DPI/Ag Dept
- Advice to farmer to contain disease
- Interviews farmer/staff to collect tracing information



High suspicion - WAITING FOR TEST RESULTS

- Notification up to CVO
- Government vet or Biosecurity Officer issues Biosecurity Direction or Quarantine notice

CVO:

- Alerts staff
- Briefs:
 - The Executive
 - Australian CVO
 - The Minister
 - Industry
 - State Farming Organisation.

Lead Agency staff:

- Prepares:
 - Response plan
 - Situation Report
 - > Legal orders
 - Communications
- Analyses tracing information
- Activates resources and systems.

Jurisdiction may test samples for EAD while additional samples are on route to CSIRO ACDP.



Laboratory samples submitted to jurisdictional animal health laboratory and the CSIRO Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness


Australian CVO notified by the jurisdictional CVO on strong suspicion of an EAD.

Australian CVO notifies and convenes the Consultative Committee on Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD)

Affected jurisdiction's CVO prepares and submits an EAD Response Plan to the CCEAD

Case definition (incl. laboratory results, if available), current situation, eradicability of the EAD and the EAD Response Plan (incl. response strategy and budget) considered by the CCEAD.

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
If not approved, amendments and/ or clarification requested by the NMG to the CCEAD in an updated EAD Response Plan Agreed EAD Response Plan submitted to the National Management Group (NMG) by the CCEAD for approval (incl. any recommendations for cost-sharing per the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement)

Consideration and approval (if appropriate) of the EAD Response Plan by the NMG

EADRA EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASE

If approved, execution of activities (incl. cost-sharing) by the affected jurisdiction.

Progress on the response provided to the CCEAD via the affected jurisdiction's CVO (may be as an updated EAD Response Plan requiring approvals by the NMG)





AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF AN EAD RESPONSE



To contain and eradicate the EAD as quickly & cost-effectively, while minimising adverse social, economic and environmental impacts

OBJECTIVES


- Contain disease through movement & other biosecurity controls.
- Identify the first case & determine extent of disease spread.
- Eradicate through 'Stamping out' destruction, disposal, decontamination activities.
- Prepare for prompt vaccination program.
- Keep staff & stakeholders safe & well briefed.
- Gather evidence to support proof of freedom.
- Return to normal ASAP.

State/territory CVO

Oversight of the response:



Briefings





Industry personnel

Industry nominated liaison officers and technical advisors



Livestock standstill



Media spokesperson

- Minister
- ACVO
- Affected industries

- Declares biosecurity emergency
- Calls livestock standstill,
- Issues legal order to implement controls/restrictions



INCIDENT CONTROLLER





Seek support

- State coordination centre
- Local control centre
- Forward command posts

e.g. Police, EPA, transport, disposal, community support, engineering






LEAD AGENCY ACTIONS

Responsibilities of the control centres













Response strategy






National STANDSTILL (only for FMD)



contain FMD

No new movements of susceptible animals unless already in transit

After the national livestock standstill



Movement restrictions

Containment and eradication of FMD is the highest priority. Therefore, 'normal business movements' are not allowed.

Live animals pose the greatest risk of disease spread; therefore, their movements from all premises within the RA and CA must be strictly controlled.

The OA should remain as 'clean' as possible. Therefore, movement of animals from the RA to the OA is prohibited, and movement of products is generally prohibited. Movement of animals and products from the CA to the OA will also be restricted.

Movement matrix

То		RA		CA		0.4
From		IP/DCP/SP/ TP	ARP/APFa	SP/TP	POR/APFa	OA
RA	IP, DCP, SP, TP	Proh	nibited	Prohibited		Dualidated
	ARP	Prohibited	Prohibited, except under SpP1			Prohibited
CA	SP, TP	Prohibited		Prohibited		Prohibited
0	POR	Prohibited	Prohibited, except under SpP2	Prohibited	Prohibited, except under SpP3	
OA	OA	Prohibited	Prohibited, except under SpP2	Prohibited	Prohibited, except under SpP3	Allowed under normal jurisdictional requirements

