Emergency preparedness and response guidelines for Australia’s agricultural industries
Plant Health Australia (PHA) is the peak national coordinating body for plant health in Australia, and has wide government and industry representation. PHA was formed in April 2000 as a non-profit public company to identify and coordinate activities to address current and emerging national plant health issues that impact on Australia’s plant industries.

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Preface

PLANTPLAN provides nationally consistent guidelines covering management and response procedures for Emergency Plant Pests affecting the Australian plant industries.

Authority for the development and maintenance of PLANTPLAN rests with PHA. PLANTPLAN is endorsed by all signatories to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD).

PLANTPLAN will be reviewed annually and updated as a result of activation of the plan or testing in exercises and workshops. Recommendations for amendment from EPPRD Parties may also be forwarded to PHA for consideration. Recommendations for amendments should be forwarded to:

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The latest version of PLANTPLAN and related information is available from the PHA website (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan).

The original development of PLANTPLAN was assisted by funding from the Australian Government through the Department of Agriculture.
# Revision history

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• Alignment with BIMS.  
• Full reformat. |
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Acknowledgements

Many people and organisations representing the members of PHA and staff of PHA have contributed to the development and review of PLANTPLAN.

The main resource documents used in the historic development of the original PLANTPLAN document were the Australian Government Department of Agriculture’s Emergency Management Plan, the PHA and Victorian Government commissioned report Generic Incursion Management Plan for Plant Industries, and the PHA commissioned report, Optimising the Decision Making Process.
Foreword

PHA is a public company, with members including the Australian Government, all state and territory governments, and a range of plant industry organisations. The company was formed to address high priority plant health issues, and to work with all its members to develop an internationally outstanding plant health management system that enhances Australia’s plant health status and the sustainability and profitability of plant industries.

Australia’s agricultural industries are fortunate to experience relative freedom from many pests that adversely affect plant industries worldwide. Maintaining this freedom is vital for the ongoing productivity, sustainability and quality of Australia’s agricultural industries. The introduction of pests can cause serious production losses to plant industries, jeopardise exports of plants and plant products, and have a significant impact on the environment and economy.

Australia’s geographic isolation and lack of shared borders have in the past, provided a degree of natural protection from exotic threats. Australia’s national quarantine system also helps prevent the introduction of pests that can harm agricultural industries and the environment.

However, no quarantine system can guarantee complete protection from the introduction of exotic pests. Rapid increases in overseas tourism, imports and exports, mail and changing transport procedures (e.g. refrigeration and containerisation of produce), as well as the potential for pests to enter via natural routes, mean that relying on quarantine measures is not enough.

A nationally coordinated system of surveillance, inspection and control using pre-border, border and post-border measures is required to prevent the establishment and spread of unwanted pests that may have a deleterious effect on humans, plants, animals or the environment. These activities are the responsibility of the Australian Government, state and territory governments, plant industries and the wider community.
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1. Introduction

Australia is fortunate to be free of many of the world’s most destructive plant pests that are common elsewhere; a benefit that confers significant advantage to Australian agriculture. An Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) could cause serious production losses, jeopardise exports of plant and plant products or have serious implications to the environment, amenity values or regional communities.

To effectively respond to an EPP, a formal and legally binding agreement – the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) – has been agreed between Plant Health Australia (PHA), the Australian Government, all state and territory governments and national plant industry peak body signatories (EPPRD Parties; referred to hereafter as ‘Parties’). The EPPRD covers the management and funding of responses to EPPs, including the potential for Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORCs) for Owners, and formalises the role of Parties in decision making as well as their contribution towards the costs. Under the EPPRD, beneficiaries of the eradication of an EPP pay an appropriate and equitable proportion to the costs of mounting a response, based on an assessment of the relative and public benefits of eradication (refer to section 2.5).

PLANTPLAN is the generic national response plan underpinning the EPPRD primarily concerned with the eradication of EPPs which pose a potential threat to Australia’s agricultural industries.

Where the term ‘Incident’ is used throughout this document, it refers to the occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an uncategorised Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).

1.1 Purpose of PLANTPLAN

PLANTPLAN provides nationally consistent guidelines for managing a response to an Incident at national, state/territory and local levels, describing the national procedures, management structures and information flow systems. Each phase of the response (investigation and alert, operational, stand down and Transition to Management Phase) and key roles and responsibilities of Industry and government Parties during each of these phases are specified.

PLANTPLAN is also consistent with contemporary incident management systems which are widely recognised and used throughout Australia for managing incidents. This includes the application of the Biosecurity Incident Management System (BIMS), endorsed by the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) for use when responding to biosecurity incidents. Further information and copies of the BIMS document are available from the Australian Government Department of Agriculture website (agriculture.gov.au).

1.2 Scope and application

PLANTPLAN must be used by all Parties to the EPPRD (Industry and government) in the management of a response to an Incident. As a schedule to the EPPRD (incorporated by reference), PLANTPLAN is legally binding on all Parties. Specific terms used in PLANTPLAN that are capitalised (excluding names) are a reference to the defined terms under the EPPRD (clause 1.1). Furthermore, where there is any conflict between the terms and conditions contained in the clauses of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN, the clauses of the EPPRD will take precedence (EPPRD schedule 1).

Application of PLANTPLAN is triggered by a detection of an EPP or suspect EPP and all Response Plans must conform to PLANTPLAN unless otherwise agreed by the National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (NMG) (EPPRD clause 6.2).
The steps of a response outlined in PLANTPLAN may occur in a slightly different order depending upon the type and scale of the response. Some steps may also occur concurrently.

It may be possible to merge some of the roles described in PLANTPLAN, depending on the nature and size of the response, the availability and capability of personnel, and the progress of the response.

1.2.1 Clarification of the enactment of the EPPRD at the border
The EPPRD will be used where the Incident occurs post-border. That is, where the detection is not contained within the originally imported goods.

The EPPRD will not be used if:

- An EPP is detected in a consignment of goods at the border or in a consignment of goods that are not under quarantine control (i.e. has passed through the border) and the EPP remains within the imported items.
- An EPP is detected and is contained within a Post-Entry Quarantine (PEQ) facility.

In these situations, the detection is considered to be “at the border” and the Australian Government will manage any required response. Materials held in PEQ facilities are considered to remain “at the border” until the material has been officially released. Furthermore, pests of timber that are detected when contained within the imported goods (e.g. an imported piece of furniture) will be considered as part of an intact consignment and therefore, the EPPRD will not apply.

Where there is a trace-forward from the goods which contained an EPP and where there is a clear risk that an EPP may have spread from the originally imported goods, the EPPRD may be used.

1.2.2 Management of linked and unlinked Incidents
Incidents which occur in multiple locations or jurisdictions that are directly linked to one another will be managed as a single Incident under the EPPRD.

Incidents which occur in multiple locations or jurisdictions that are not known to be directly linked, should be managed as separate Incidents under the EPPRD, consistent with the requirements under clause 5.5 of the EPPRD.

1.3 EPP biosecurity documentation
The EPP biosecurity documentation framework is a hierarchy of documents that enables a uniform response to Incidents. The EPPRD formalises the management, funding and the role of Parties; while PLANTPLAN directly supports the operational implementation of the EPPRD and is a schedule to the EPPRD. The application of PLANTPLAN is in turn supported by a series of documents, which directly or indirectly support the implementation of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.

1.4 Supporting documents under PLANTPLAN
Underpinning PLANTPLAN are supporting documents agreed to by Parties which assist with the implementation of PLANTPLAN. Most of the supporting documents were previously appendices to archived versions of PLANTPLAN. Some elements of the supporting documents are generic in nature, so it may be necessary for government and Industry Parties to develop specific work instructions to add support to these. All supporting documents are available from the PHA website (planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan).

The various types of supporting documents are described below and a register of supporting documents is presented in Appendix 1.
1.4.1 Standard operating procedures
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) provide task specific guidance to response personnel and provide a platform for consistency in the completion of specific tasks within an organisation, between jurisdictions and from one EPP response to another.

1.4.2 Job cards
Job cards provide a written list of responsibilities for a specific role and describe the tasks to be carried out under that role during an EPP response.

1.4.3 Guidelines
Guidelines provide general assistance to response personnel, and more broadly to Parties, in understanding and implementing procedures or policies. For example, the guidelines for urban/peri-urban issues provide points for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and Lead Agency to consider when developing and implementing a Response Plan within that type of environment.

1.4.4 Forms and templates
Forms and templates provide a consistent and agreed format for response personnel to use. This permits a focus on the activity being performed or the information being collected, rather than the manner in which the information is then presented. Forms and templates also ensure that the required minimum information or data is collected in a consistent and harmonised manner.

1.5 Management of PLANTPLAN and supporting documents
Authority for the development and maintenance of PLANTPLAN and supporting documents rests with PHA. To ensure that PLANTPLAN and its supporting documents continue to represent best practice in emergency management, they are updated regularly to incorporate new information or address gaps identified by the outcomes of reviews (e.g. Incident debriefs) and/or testing in exercises or workshops. PHA coordinates the development and review processes for both PLANTPLAN and supporting documents. New supporting documents may also be developed where a need is identified.

1.5.1 Review of PLANTPLAN
PLANTPLAN will be reviewed annually and updated as a result of activation of the plan and/or testing in exercises and workshops. Recommendations for amendment from Parties may also be forwarded to PHA for consideration.

Revision of PLANTPLAN is considered a process pursuant to the EPPRD, so formal amendments to PLANTPLAN are conducted in accordance with clause 16 of the EPPRD. PHA will seek consideration of proposed changes from Parties, generally at an EPPRD Parties’ meeting. Following consultation, and if Parties endorse the amendments, formal notification of the amendments will be sent to all Parties in writing and a copy of the new version of PLANTPLAN will be made available on the PHA website (EPPRD part 1 of schedule 5).

1.5.2 Development and review of supporting documents
Supporting documents are reviewed periodically, generally following a response to an Incident or evaluation through exercises and workshops. Parties may at any point request a review or propose the development of a new supporting document.

The process for review or development of supporting documents is coordinated by PHA. Existing technical working groups (such as the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics (SPHD) for diagnostics) are expected to have a lead role in the development and review of relevant supporting documents. However, if no technical committee exists to develop or review a supporting document PHA will either:

- Coordinate the formation of a small working group with nominees from interested Parties, or
- Use internal expertise (if and where available).
Parties will be asked to endorse new or amended documents either during meetings of the Parties or out-of-session. Unless otherwise clearly specified, endorsement of these documents will be by Consensus, with nil response taken as abstention rather than objection.

1.6 Resource documents

PHA and its government and industry Members produce a number of resources that are designed to assist with Australia’s planning and preparedness for EPPs but are not a formal component of the EPPRD. These resources are produced to assist all relevant stakeholders to actively mitigate the entry of EPPs, minimise any potential impacts, as well as assist the implementation of strategic and operational activities during an EPP response.

Resource documents may provide information about Parties’ responsibilities under the EPPRD. They are identified here to provide a broader understanding of the resources available to manage biosecurity issues along the entire biosecurity continuum. However, the responsibility for developing, managing and amending these documents varies and resides outside of the scope of PLANTPLAN.

1.6.1 Biosecurity plans

Biosecurity Plans (BP) are sector/commodity specific documents that identify and prioritise biosecurity risks and provide a framework for risk mitigation and preparedness activities. These are high level documents used to identify current and future biosecurity challenges for the sector/commodity. Each BP formally identifies and prioritises exotic plant pests that have the potential to negatively impact the sector. A BP also strengthens the partnership between government and industry by providing a guide to the implementation of future biosecurity activities and post response recovery to prevent or minimise the impact of an Incident.

BPs are developed as a collaborative effort between representatives from the peak industry body, government agencies, other relevant stakeholders and PHA. When completed, BPs are endorsed by the Australian and state and territory governments through the Plant Health Committee and by industry through the relevant peak industry body. BPs are developed for PHA industry Members and also upon request, for non-member peak industry bodies. BPs are formally reviewed every 5 years to ensure they are current and can be reviewed annually by a Biosecurity Reference Panel which includes representatives from government, industry, PHA and other stakeholders. Copies of specific BPs may be requested directly from the relevant industry body or PHA.

1.6.2 Farm biosecurity manuals

Farm Biosecurity Manuals are industry or region specific and are designed to raise awareness of exotic plant pests at a producer level to increase the likelihood of early reporting. These documents are also aimed at reducing biosecurity risk by enhancing general pest awareness and recognition, and providing guidance on recommended farm biosecurity practices. They include basic information regarding hygiene practices, movement of people and machinery, factsheets for the high priority pests of the industry and templates for producers to use (such as a visitor register, pest surveillance data sheets and biosecurity checklists). Farm Biosecurity Manuals are developed by PHA in collaboration with the relevant industry. Further information and copies of Farm Biosecurity Manuals are available from the Farm Biosecurity website (farmbiosecurity.com.au).

1.6.3 Pest-specific contingency plans

Contingency plans provide background information on the biology of a specific pest and the control measures currently available to assist with preparedness activities in the event of an Incident, along with guidelines and options for steps to be considered and undertaken when developing a Response Plan. Contingency plans are developed by PHA, government and industry and a number are available from the PHA website (planthealthaustralia.com.au/pidd).
1.6.4 Nationally approved standard operating procedures
Nationally Approved Standard Operating Procedures (NASOPs) have been developed for use by jurisdictions during responses to biosecurity incidents. Further information and copies of current NASOPs are available from the Animal Health Australia (AHA) website (animalhealthaustralia.com.au).

1.6.5 National diagnostic protocols
National Diagnostic Protocols (NDPs) are standard methodologies for the accurate identification of specific pests or groups of pests. These protocols provide transparency when comparing diagnostic results between laboratories and include information on the collection of samples, diagnostic techniques and often include detailed images. NDPs are developed by the SPHD, validated by independent specialists and endorsed by all Australian government Parties for use in the event of an Incident. The NDPs are available from: plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/resources.

When an NDP does not exist or a new/alternative protocol to the current NDP is considered more appropriate for diagnosing the EPP, SPHD can rapidly endorse an Emergency Diagnostic Protocol for use in the EPP response. Information on the submission and endorsement process can be found in the SPHD Reference Standard 3 available from: plantbiosecuritydiagnostics.net.au/work/subcommittee-on-plant-health-diagnostics.
2. National arrangements for responding to an EPP

A number of arrangements are in place and a range of activities undertaken prior to and during an Incident. These activities ensure that Australia is prepared to respond as well as possible to an EPP and can do so effectively to significantly reduce the impact of the EPP.

2.1 Biosecurity legislation

Australia’s biosecurity system operates under both Commonwealth and state/territory legislation administered and managed by the respective agricultural and environmental agencies. The legislation covers a range of activities involving domestic and international movement of people and goods into and around the country, and the export of agricultural commodities. Also contained within the legislation are other relevant functions relating to biosecurity emergency response and reporting.

Regulatory authority for biosecurity controls at Australia’s borders is vested in the Australian Department of Agriculture. Each state and territory has responsibility for post-border biosecurity, including prevention, detection, response and eradication of EPPs within its borders, and administers its own plant protection legislation.

The plant protection legislation in the states and territories provide powers for emergency containment and eradication actions, enabling state and territory agencies to undertake such actions as:

- Declaring pests of concern and making orders for the purpose of eradication.
- Entering properties to survey for pests including EPPs.
- Inspecting and taking samples of plants or plant products.
- Establishing and maintaining quarantine zones.
- Restricting movement of plants, plant products, equipment, vehicles and other potential sources of plant pests.
- Issuing orders for the destruction of infested plant material.

2.2 Biosecurity preparedness and training

Effective preparedness against EPPs requires activities to support early detection and diagnosis, known reporting lines, contingency planning, agreed decision-making processes and coordinated incident management procedures. Each Party to the EPPRD has acknowledged the need for a program of risk reduction measures to reduce the risk of the entry and spread of EPPs and have committed to an on-going process of risk mitigation. These principles are reflected in Parties’ Biosecurity statements, completed in accordance with clause 13 requirements under the EPPRD.

Biosecurity planning provides a mechanism for industry, government and other relevant stakeholders to determine pests of high priority, analyse the risks they pose and put in place procedures to reduce the chance of pests becoming established. BPs (as outlined in section 1.6.1) are an important aspect of biosecurity planning and provide the high level risk mitigation and preparedness policies required by industry.

PLANTPLAN provides a basis for developing national standards for the defined functions and tasks required of individuals responding to EPPs. Competency based and non-accredited training for government officers, plant industry stakeholders, plant health specialists and other relevant staff is available to maintain the necessary levels of skills to perform roles effectively.

PHA works with government and Industry Parties to develop and deliver the National EPP Training Program. The training program is an ongoing and proactive approach providing up to date information, education and training to meet the needs of producers, plant health
specialists, extension service providers, government officers, researchers, agribusinesses, and other stakeholders across Australia’s plant industries.

2.3 National resourcing
The following national arrangements are in place for resourcing biosecurity emergency responses and have been endorsed by the NBC.

2.3.1 National Biosecurity Response Team
The National Biosecurity Response Team (NBRT) is a program that provides a national pool of trained and experienced response personnel that are available for deployment in biosecurity emergency responses to support the Lead Agency. The NBRT is comprised of two cross-sectoral cohorts sourced from the plant, animal, aquatic and environmental sectors. The mentor cohort is deployed to guide less experienced staff from the Lead Agency, and the functional cohort is deployed to fill key biosecurity response roles.

2.3.2 Interstate deployment arrangements for biosecurity responses
The Interstate Deployment Arrangements for Biosecurity Responses provide a nationally agreed framework for coordinating the deployment of personnel between the jurisdictions during biosecurity emergency responses. The arrangements are intended for deployment of personnel employed by agricultural departments (including members of the NBRT) and can be applied whether national Cost Sharing under an approved Response Plan is occurring or not. Further information is available from the Department of Agriculture website (agriculture.gov.au).

2.4 Roles and responsibilities in a response under the EPPRD
There are a number of formal committees under the EPPRD which are responsible for making decisions relating to an Incident. These committees and their roles and responsibilities are detailed below. An overview of the key decision points for the CCEPP and the NMG during the Incident Definition Phase of an EPP response are highlighted in Figure 4.

2.4.1 CCEPP
The CCEPP is a technical committee that makes recommendations to the NMG on suspect and confirmed Incidents and their response arrangements (EPPRD clause 11.2). Representatives from PHA, government and Affected Industry Parties constitute the CCEPP (EPPRD part 3 of schedule 8). Further detailed information for CCEPP members and observers on the operations of the CCEPP is described in the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines and the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests job card.

In discharging its responsibilities, the CCEPP must develop a rational process to assess the grounds for eradication of an EPP. Quality technical advice is essential for sound risk management decision making. At any stage of an EPP response, the CCEPP may determine that eradication cannot be justified and will recommend to the NMG that eradication is not technically feasible or cost beneficial and should either not be attempted or should cease or, if an approved Response Plan has been in place, that a Transition to Management Phase is appropriate. The costs of eradication, overall benefits and technical feasibility of removing the EPP from the Australian landscape are all factors to be considered here.

The CCEPP may identify the need to seek technical advice on specific matters relevant to the EPP response. This will occur by default through the formation of a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) unless there is an existing government or industry mechanism that can adequately address the matter. The CCEPP should also actively consider whether the engagement of international expertise is required to inform aspects of the response. This consideration should occur early in the Incident and must address the management of confidentiality and market access sensitivities.
2.4.2 Scientific Advisory Panel
The CCEPP may appoint a SAP when additional information or advice is required by the CCEPP to assist them in their deliberations. The role of the SAP is to provide expert advice on specific aspects of the Incident as identified in the terms of reference agreed by the CCEPP. This may include those related to pest biology, diagnostic methods, surveillance systems, pest epidemiology and control options that could be incorporated into a Response Plan or may be required to inform decision making. The CCEPP may also engage the advice of a SAP to validate the response strategy and/or when key elements of the strategy are being proposed for revision. More than one SAP may need to be formed depending on the breadth of advice being sought and the associated required expertise of SAP nominees.

Further information is described in the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines and the Scientific Advisory Panel job card.

2.4.3 NMG
The NMG has primary responsibility for decisions with regard to responses to Incidents (EPPRD part 1.2 of schedule 8). Representatives from PHA, government and Affected Industry Parties constitute the NMG (EPPRD part 1.1 of schedule 8). The group will approve or not approve a Response Plan and the consequent application of Cost Sharing and will manage the national policy and resourcing needs of a Response Plan on behalf of the Affected Parties.

Refer to the National Management Group job card for information on the roles and responsibilities of the NMG.

2.5 EPP categorisation
Pest categorisation is the process under the EPPRD (clause 7) for determining the Cost Sharing proportions between government and Industry Parties based on science, public policy and economics, and takes into account the impact of the EPP on the public and private sectors (including impact on human health, environment, amenities and production). EPPs are assigned to one of four categories according to the extent to which eradication would benefit the public or private sector (Table 1). The category of the EPP determines the Cost Sharing ratio between Affected Industry and government Parties if an EPP response occurs.

Where an Incident has been reported to the CCEPP in respect of an uncategorised Plant Pest believed by the NMG to be an EPP and the NMG determines that a Response Plan is to be implemented prior to the categorisation of the Plant Pest (refer to section 4.1.6 for more information), the costs will initially be shared on a 50:50 (Category 3 EPP) basis between Affected governments and Industry Parties until the pest is categorised by a Categorisation Group and agreed to by Relevant Parties. In the case where the NMG determines that there are significant public health issues associated with a previously known but uncategorised Plant Pest, the Plant Pest will be treated as a Category 1 EPP (EPPRD clause 9.3).

Further information on the categorisation process and the role of the Categorisation Group is provided in the Categorisation Group operating guidelines.

Table 1: Categories of EPPs and their Cost Sharing proportions (EPPRD schedule 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Cost Sharing</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high public benefits</td>
<td>100% Government; 0% Industry</td>
<td>These are EPPs which if not eradicated would: • cause major environmental damage to natural ecosystems; and/or • potentially affect human health or cause a major nuisance to humans; and/or • cause significant damage to amenity flora; and • have relatively little impact on commercial crops. This category also covers situations where the EPP has a wide range of hosts including native flora and there is considerable uncertainty as to...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Cost Sharing</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the relative impacts on Crops. In short, it is almost impossible to properly determine which cropping sectors benefit from eradication and to what extent, and in any case the incursion primarily affects native flora and/or amenity plants, and/or is a major nuisance if not a health risk to humans. The eradication of Category 1 EPPs would have very high public benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>High public benefits</td>
<td>80% Government: 20% Industry These are EPPs which if not eradicated would: • cause significant public losses either directly through serious loss of amenity, and/or environmental values and/or effects on households, or indirectly through very severe economic impacts on regions and the national economy, through large trade losses with flow on effects through the economy; and • impose major costs on the affected cropping sectors such that the cropping sectors would benefit significantly from eradication. The eradication of Category 2 EPPs would have high public benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moderate public benefits</td>
<td>50% Government: 50% Industry These are EPPs which if not eradicated primarily harm the affected cropping sectors but there would also be some significant public costs as well (that is, moderate public benefits from eradication). The EPP could adversely affect public amenities, households or the environment, and/or could have significant, though moderate trade implications and/or national and regional economic implications. The eradication of Category 3 EPPs would have moderate public benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mostly if not wholly private benefits</td>
<td>20% Government 80% Industry These are EPPs which if not eradicated would: • have little or no public cost implications and little or no impacts on natural ecosystems. The affected cropping sectors would be adversely affected primarily through additional costs of production, extra control costs or nuisance costs; and • generally there would be no significant trade issues that would affect national and regional economies. The eradication of Category 4 EPPs would have mainly if not wholly private benefits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Managing an EPP response

A response to an Incident is a complex operation requiring rapid mobilisation of resources and coordination of a diverse team of people. Strong management and coordination systems ensure that those involved in emergency management have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, know who the relevant stakeholders are, and who to contact in each organisation. It is essential that each Party (government and Industry) to the EPPRD maintains an up to date list of people who would occupy relevant key positions during a response to an Incident.

3.1. Roles and responsibilities of Parties

3.1.1 Australian Government responsibilities

The Department of Agriculture has responsibility for activities relating to biosecurity in Australia and is the lead Australian Government agency responsible for managing the response to Incidents. Broadly, the Department of Agriculture provides national leadership and coordination for responses to biosecurity incidents. The nature and extent of this role will vary depending on the incident, but may require the Department of Agriculture to undertake its role at an organisational, national or international level.

The main responsibilities of the Department of Agriculture, on behalf of the Australian Government include the following:

- Notify the CCEPP of an Incident via the Chair of the CCEPP (Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer; ACPPO).
- Convene, chair and provide the secretariat support for the CCEPP and the NMG.
- Meet Australia’s international reporting obligations.
- Undertake negotiations with trading partners and address international market access issues.
- Contribute to, and coordinate the dissemination of public information, including the incident response activities of the National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network (NBCEN) (refer to section 3.5.1).
- Provide policy advice on national and international issues.
- Liaise with other Australian Government agencies that are impacted by or who can assist during an emergency.
- Invoke Commonwealth legislation when necessary to assist with EPP eradication operations in states and territories.
- Participate in consultation and decision-making processes including the CCEPP, the NMG, and categorisation.
- Provide appropriately skilled nominees to participate in SAP meetings as required.

In satisfying Australia’s international reporting requirements, the Department of Agriculture will report relevant changes in national pest status to trading partners and through the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). During an EPP response, the Department of Agriculture maintains a high level of interaction with Australia’s overseas posts and trading partners to provide relevant updates to minimise the impact of the EPP and response on market access for affected Australian product(s).

The Department of Agriculture is responsible for tracing plants and plant products that have been exported prior to or since the initial report of the Incident, and those that have entered the country which are suspected of having a role in the Incident. In addition, the Department of Agriculture will negotiate and implement any revisions to export and import certification arrangements required as a result of the Incident.
3.1.2 State and territory government’s responsibilities

State and territory government authorities have constitutional responsibility for operations within their jurisdictional boundaries in response to incidents involving plant, animal or aquatic animal diseases or pests, animal welfare, introduced marine pests, and food residue or other food safety or agricultural threats.

During an EPP response, the relevant biosecurity agency within each jurisdiction will manage their responsibilities in accordance with relevant biosecurity and emergency management arrangements. In the jurisdiction where the Incident has occurred, this may include the establishment of a State Coordination Centre (SCC) to coordinate activities across the state/territory, and a Local Control Centre (LCC) and potentially Forward Command Posts to manage operational aspects of the response (refer to section 3.2.2).

The Lead Agency is the government agency of the state or territory which is responsible for leading the conduct of a Response Plan due to the occurrence of an Incident within their state/territory. In a multi-jurisdiction Incident, there will be more than one Lead Agency and major decisions such as when to declare the emergency and when to change phases of the response will be made jointly through the NMG.

The main responsibilities of the Lead Agency and where relevant, all other jurisdictions are:

- Take reasonable steps to ensure persons within their jurisdiction (including public and private plant health personnel and public and private laboratories) report suspect EPPs to the relevant state/territory department.
- Provide notification of an Incident to the Chair of the CCEPP (ACPPO) via the Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) in accordance with the EPPRD.
- Engage with Affected Industry Parties immediately following the detection and invite their participation in the response centres.
- Work to confirm diagnostics for the EPP.
- Notify and advise affected property owner(s).
- Determine the extent of the Incident through delimiting surveillance and trace forward and back activities.
- Adopt precautionary quarantine measures.
- Identify and implement control strategies.
- Develop and implement an approved Response Plan, including to engage and collaborate with Affected Industry Parties early in the process of Response Plan development.
- Participate in consultation and decision-making processes including the CCEPP, the NMG and categorisation.
- Provision of information to support the Australian Government to effectively represent Australia’s interests internationally.
- Engage with local communities, councils and other local stakeholders.
- Participate in the NBCEN to ensure public information is nationally consistent.
- Provide appropriately skilled nominees to participate in SAP meetings as required.
- Implement the ORC provisions (if relevant).

The CPHM of the Lead Agency(s) will have primary carriage of a response to an Incident, and will activate PLANTPLAN and make follow-up decisions on pest control measures in consultation with the CCEPP and report to the CCEPP, as required, on the situation and expenditure of a response. In a multi-jurisdiction Incident (directly linked detections in multiple jurisdictions), the Lead Agencies will work collectively to lead the response to the Incident and should engage with each other as early as possible to ensure consistency in
operational matters and coordination of relevant aspects including development of the Response Plan and budget and in reporting to the CCEPP. Refer to the Chief Plant Health Manager job card for additional information.

3.1.3 Industry responsibilities
During a response to an Incident the Affected Industry Parties will have roles at a number of different levels, specifically:

- Industry Party Delegates: Industry Liaison Coordinator (ILC) / Officer (ILO) in the SCC/LCC respectively.
- Industry Party Representatives: national representative(s) on the CCEPP and the NMG.

Close cooperation is required between relevant government and Industry Parties, and other stakeholders for effective management of an Incident and to provide consistent and timely public information.

The main responsibilities of the Affected Industry Parties are:

- Undertake reasonable steps to ensure industry members and other relevant stakeholders report suspect EPPs to the relevant state/territory department.
- Provide advice on the affected industry (such as size, distribution, sources of supply, marketing practices, industry organisation and other factors which may affect the eradication program) and the Response Plan.
- Identify appropriate resources (ILC and ILO personnel) to participate in response centres as required.
- Contribute to the development of a Response Plan in collaboration with the Lead Agency and through the CCEPP, and implement relevant aspects of the approved Response Plan.
- Participate in consultation and decision-making processes including the CCEPP, the NMG and categorisation.
- Participate in the NBCEN to ensure nationally consistent information, implement the agreed communication strategy and help ensure that nationally agreed information is distributed to their industry.
- Provide appropriately skilled nominees to participate in SAP meetings as required.

**Industry Liaison functions**
The Industry Liaison functions are vital to the EPP response and include delegates at state/territory and national levels (ILC in the SCC) as well as at the local level (ILO in the LCC and potentially the Forward Command Post).

Delegates for the ILC and ILO functions will be identified by the Affected Industry Party and invited by the Lead Agency (through the CPHM) to participate in the response centres. The CPHM will engage the Affected Industry Party(s) immediately following the detection to enable delegates to be promptly identified and to arrange their attendance in the response centres as soon as practically possible. The ILC and ILO will receive an induction by the Lead Agency prior to entering the response centres. The Affected Industry Party(s) and Lead Agency may discuss whether the responsibilities of the function can be fulfilled remotely. If this approach is determined to be appropriate, a mechanism for regular communication and engagement with the response centres will promptly be established.

The scale and nature of the response will determine whether delegates are appointed to both the ILC and ILO functions. Where both the ILC and ILO functions are appointed they must work closely with each other as well as representatives from the Affected Industry Party. ILC and ILO delegates must have (or obtain) the authority to present the Affected Industry Party view on relevant decisions being made in the response centre, for instance, in relation to
response strategy and implementation actions. It will therefore be important for clear lines of communication to be established between the Industry Liaison functions and the relevant Affected Industry Party to enable two-way information flow. The Industry Liaison functions also liaise with interstate counterparts where an EPP response crosses state/territory borders.

For all scaled responses the Industry Liaison functions will engage across the response centre functional areas (refer to Figure 1) to provide input and receive relevant information. This will occur through direct communication and engagement with the Incident Manager and mechanisms established to facilitate:

- Regular communication with the Incident Management Team (IMT) (whether through attendance at IMT meetings or an alternative meeting mechanism); and
- Situational updates being provided (e.g. through attendance at daily response centre briefings).

In a large scale response, the Lead Agency may appoint dedicated staff to the Liaison function (refer Figure 1). This function is a member of the IMT and is responsible for facilitating access of the Industry Liaison functions and other support agencies to IMT members and promoting engagement with the response centre functional areas. In the majority of EPP responses this function will be undertaken by the Incident Manager or Deputy Incident Manager.

The key responsibilities of the Industry Liaison functions include:

- Seek and provide information/knowledge on the industry to inform decisions on response strategy and actions (e.g. size, distribution, production systems, business practices, supply chain, options for EPP control, the practicality and effect of EPP control policies and programs on industry).
- Consult with industry stakeholders to inform and gather feedback on the progress of the response, impact of response strategies, operations/actions and identify emerging issues.
- Participate in the development and implementation of the Response Plan.
- Assist in the identification of operational resources.
- Assist with and guide communication and engagement activities that will keep industry informed of developments in the response situation and operations/actions.
- Seek and encourage industry support and cooperation with relevant aspects of the response strategy and operations/actions through engagement with and dissemination of information to their members.

The ILO and ILC delegates must have the skills and knowledge required to effectively perform the function or the ability to quickly attain them. Details on the skills and knowledge required and further information on the roles/responsibilities are provided in the Industry Liaison functions job card.

### 3.1.4 Plant Health Australia

PHA is the custodian of the EPPRD and the national coordinator of the government-industry partnership for plant biosecurity in Australia. During a response to an Incident PHA assists Parties’ compliance with the provisions of the EPPRD and provides advice to Parties on actions in relation to the EPPRD.

PHA attends all meetings of the CCEPP and the NMG as a non-voting standing member to provide advice in respect of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN. PHA also chairs any meetings of a SAP and a Categorisation Group.
PHA has a number of key roles in the administration and monitoring of financial aspects of a Cost Shared response and following the finalisation of an Incident, PHA has a key role in conducting and/or coordinating the Incident debrief.

For further information on the roles and responsibilities of PHA during a response to an Incident, refer to the Normal Commitments guidelines.

### 3.2 Structure and management of an EPP response

During an EPP response, the Australian Government and Affected states/territories will manage their responsibilities in accordance with relevant biosecurity legislation and emergency management arrangements. PLANTPLAN is aligned with the BIMS (refer to section 1.1) which sets out the incident management system used for managing the national response to biosecurity incidents.

Areas of alignment include the organisational structure and the management principles:

- **Management system flexibility**: establishing coordination, control and command centres at the national (refer to section 3.2.1), state/territory and local level (refer to section 3.2.2) according to the needs of the response as structure and staffing may vary considerably between emergency responses and during the course of a single response.

- **Management by objectives**: a process of consultative management where the Incident Management Team determines the objectives and then communicates these to those involved.

- **Span of control**: acknowledges the number of people or groups which can be effectively supervised by each person involved in the response.

- **Functional approach**: specific functions are identified and used to manage the response. PLANTPLAN aligns these functions with BIMS (Figure 1).

![Diagram of incident management functions](adopted from BIMS)

Figure 1: Incident management functions (adopted from BIMS)

Importantly it is also recognised that biosecurity incidents can vary in scale, complexity, degree of delegations required, duration and the number of individuals, groups, agencies and resources involved. Therefore, the classification or level of the biosecurity incident is identified and communicated to ensure effective coordination, resources and support during a response. These levels are described within BIMS.

The way in which the incident management system is implemented during a response to an Incident and their relevant responsibilities at the national, state/territory and local levels are described below.

#### 3.2.1 National incident management

The centre from which the Department of Agriculture manages its responsibilities is known as the National Coordination Centre (NCC). The NCC’s role is dependent on the scale of the
response though if required it provides national leadership and coordination in managing an emergency such as an EPP response.

### 3.2.2 State/Territory incident management

There are three different types of centres which may be established during a response to an Incident to manage the response at the state/territory, local and field levels. The structure and staff of these centres will vary according to:

- Nature of the Plant Pest incursion.
- Location of the incursion.
- Size of the incursion.
- Stage of progress of the response.

All personnel and contractors appointed to positions within the EPP response must be trained in the specifics of the role they will be performing and must go through a response specific induction process. Training is provided by a number of organisations including PHA and jurisdictions. Supporting documentation to PLANTPLAN including SOPs, job cards and jurisdictional specific materials should be used during training and induction as appropriate.

### SCC

The SCC will have primary responsibility for the coordination of activities across the state/territory and generally should not become involved in the management of on ground activities. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to combine state/territory and local operations in one centre. Refer to the Functions of the SCC section and State Coordination Centre Director job cards for additional information.

### LCC

The LCC will have primary responsibility for planning, conducting and supporting all operational activities within its jurisdictional borders. Depending on the complexity or extent of the response it may be necessary to establish more than one LCC. The LCC Incident Management Team will identify what needs to be achieved by the LCC, how this will be achieved and allocate responsibilities. These arrangements will normally be documented in an incident action plan which is approved by the Incident Manager at the local level and disseminated to those with responsibility for implementing activities. Refer to Functions of the LCC section and Local Control Centre Controller job cards for additional information.

### Forward Command Posts

Forward Command Posts may be established under the control of the LCC in order to manage specific field level activities.

### 3.3 Laboratories dealing with EPPs

During an EPP response it is essential that each laboratory involved in processing response related samples has documented standard procedures that ensure biological security during normal operation. Manuals containing these procedures should be readily available to all laboratory staff at all times.

#### 3.3.1 Laboratory standards

Laboratories handling suspected EPP samples will be either Class 5.2 (Biosecurity Containment [BC] Level 2) or Class 5.3 (BC Level 3) Approved Arrangements, as appropriate to the pest in question. The Australian Government approves a BC2 or BC3 facility based on national Approved Arrangements criteria and Australian/New Zealand Standards.

BC Level 2 (Class 5.2) laboratories are used for work on biological materials including microorganisms, animals and plants (and their products) that pose a risk of causing disease in animals, plants and humans, but are unlikely to be a serious hazard to facility workers, the community, livestock or the environment. The facility must include all laboratory design and construction requirements to meet BC2 status as specified in Australian/New Zealand Standards.
BC Level 3 (Class 5.3) laboratories are used for work on biological materials including micro-
organisms, animals and plants (and their products) that pose a higher risk of causing serious
disease in animals, plants or humans. These materials present a serious hazard to laboratory
workers and may present a risk if spread to the community or the environment. The facility
must include all laboratory design and construction requirements to meet BC3 status as
specified in Australian/New Zealand Standards AS/NZS 2243.3:2006 (Safety in laboratory –
chemical aspects) and AS/NSZ 2982.1:2010 (Laboratory design and construction).

3.3.2 Control of access to and movements within the laboratory
The number of people allowed access to the laboratory should be tightly controlled. A log of
every person entering an area and records of training given during an EPP response should
be kept (both as legal defence and as a matter of good practice).

Depending on biology of the EPP there should be an exclusion period for people who have
visited an infected area before being allowed to access the laboratory. Similarly, there
should be an exclusion period for people exiting the laboratory before they are allowed
access to a production area.

3.3.3 Recording of data from diagnostic tests
The following (minimum) key points must be addressed:

- Results must record the unique sample identification number.
- Data (inclusive of such items as photographic records of gels, host symptoms from
  pathology tests, records from automatic analysis and sequence information) should
  be entered in an approved data recording system.
- All relevant data should be linked to the sample and to personnel who entered the
  data.
- Results should be entered into the data recording system by approved staff, checked
  for errors and verified by the diagnostic specialist.

3.3.4 Communication for laboratories during an EPP response
During an EPP response, the lines of communication outlined in Figure 2 will be used by
laboratories and control centres. Results from initial and confirmatory diagnostic tests may
only be disclosed to the CPHM.

3.4 Information management systems
Information management systems and procedures for managing information relevant to an
EPP response must be simple and easily understood by response staff who may not have
experience in using such systems as part of their normal duties.

During an EPP response, it is critical that information relevant to the response is recorded,
filed appropriately and is retrievable when required. During and following a response there
may be a requirement to provide information to government enquiries or audits. An
efficiency or financial audit, for example, may be required under the EPPRD. The financial
audit must comply with Australian Auditing Standards (EPPRD part 2 of schedule 11) so all
information should be of an auditable nature.

The information management system selected for use by agencies must allow for the
collection of:

- Owner and location.
- Case number.
- Area status.
- Frequency of visits.
- Statistics for surveillance and tracing activities.
- Staff movement details.
- Reports or information provided by the public or industry.
- Records of expenditure.
- ORC valuations.
- Market access status of the Affected premises.

Information Management Systems may also allow for:
- Tracking of samples and diagnostic progress.
- Generation of progress reports on destruction and decontamination.
- Computerised tracing models.
- Generation of forms for scheduled property visits.

![Diagram key](image)

Figure 2: Lines of communication for diagnostic laboratories during an emergency response.

### 3.5 Communication and public information

Public information is time-critical information that audiences need so that they can respond appropriately during and after an Incident. Information is disseminated to, and received from, affected industries, the public/communities, the media, stakeholders and within an agency/organisation.

During an EPP response, both government and industry have a responsibility to communicate the Incident and response quickly and effectively. As there may often be a broad range of stakeholders with different communication needs, a variety of communication mechanisms may be required. All information pertaining to the Incident must be treated as confidential and communicated only on a 'need to know' basis. If information needs to be communicated, it must be restricted to key messages contained within agreed national talking points. To facilitate rapid communication, it is therefore important that national
talking points are developed, agreed to and distributed as soon as possible following the detection of an EPP (refer to section 4.1.5). To support the Response Plan, a communications strategy should be developed that considers the impacts on a broad range of audiences including ministers, industry executive officers, local and national industry groups, growers, media and the wider community. The nature and extent of the communication strategy will depend on the Incident.

Appropriate information helps the community and affected stakeholders prevent the spread of EPPs and aids containment and eradication efforts. Public information also plays an important role in informing media and the public about invoked laws, such as movement restrictions and controlled quarantine areas. Keeping the public informed improves the perceived effectiveness of a response and can assist with recovery. Where an EPP is present in, or spreads to more than one jurisdiction, the Department of Agriculture will take responsibility for the national coordination of public information.

Specific considerations in relation to communication and public information during each phase of an EPP response are covered in sections 4.1.5, 4.2.3 and 4.3.2.

### 3.5.1 National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network

The NBCEN is an intergovernmental network which assists in EPP responses by enhancing risk mitigation and response activities through ensuring nationally consistent and timely communication and engagement activities. The NBCEN is tasked with producing and disseminating nationally consistent public information in response to biosecurity incidents.

Standing members of the NBCEN comprise of communication managers from agricultural health organisations (including PHA) and Australian, state and territory government agencies responsible for biosecurity. During a response to an Incident, the NBCEN chair will invite communication managers (or an alternative contact) from Affected Industry Parties to participate in the NBCEN.

In order to guide effective communication during an EPP response, the NBCEN has developed a *Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual* (BIPIM) which aligns to the public information function within BIMS. This manual guides the activities of public information personnel appointed to LCC, SCC and NCC and includes job cards/role descriptions and templates specific to the public information functions carried out in control and coordination centres. A copy is available from [animalhealthaustralia.com.au/our-publications/ausvetplan-manuals-and-documents](http://animalhealthaustralia.com.au/our-publications/ausvetplan-manuals-and-documents).

In addition to the BIPIM, the NBCEN uses the *National Biosecurity Engagement and Communication Framework*, which has been endorsed by the NBC. The nationally agreed framework helps government agencies and industry to engage their stakeholders in various levels of biosecurity activities.

The NBCEN publishes current information on national eradication programs on the Outbreak website ([outbreak.gov.au](http://outbreak.gov.au)). The website also provides information to assist people in preventing, preparing for, and responding to an EPP.
4. Phases of an EPP response

Responding to an Incident is broken down into three phases in PLANTPLAN:

- Investigation and alert phase
- Operational phase
- Stand down phase.

A Transition to Management Phase may be initiated under certain circumstances (refer to section 4.2.4).

The PLANTPLAN phases are operational in nature and describe the actions which must be taken to successfully respond to an Incident. In contrast, the phases outlined in the EPPRD (clause 5) are legal terms relating to the actions taken to meet the legal requirements of the EPPRD and the Cost Sharing of an EPP response. The relationship between the PLANTPLAN and EPPRD Phases is illustrated at Figure 3.

The following should be noted:

- While the phases of PLANTPLAN are depicted as separate events, they should all be viewed as part of a continuous process.
- Due to the potential urgency and evolving timeline of an Incident and response, the operational phase can be commenced prior to all activities in the investigation and alert phase being completed.
- The actions described in these phases are not a definitive list and the course of an EPP response may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

4.1 Investigation and alert phase

The aim of this phase is to complete a detailed scoping of the Incident to determine the extent of the emergency and the appropriate course of action. The phase is activated when the Australian Government or relevant state/territory government (Lead Agency) is notified of the report of a suspect EPP and the detection is investigated. Key issues to be addressed include:

- Whether the Incident relates to an EPP or not.
- Whether the EPP can be effectively contained and eradicated.
- The potential for the EPP to spread rapidly.
- The potential to lead to significant industry or wider economic and trade losses.
• The potential environmental consequences.

Activities carried out during this phase are considered normal commitments for all Parties and are not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD unless specifically agreed to by the NMG (EPPRD clause 9.1.1(b)). Refer to the Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed guidelines for further information on agreed normal commitments.

Broadly, during the investigation and alert phase:

• The Lead Agency will provide Formal Notification to the Chair of the CCEPP (ACPPO) as required under the EPPRD.
• A CCEPP will be convened via email, teleconference or face-to-face.
• A NMG may be established.
• Confirmation of the diagnosis will occur by a second independent laboratory.
• Key response staff will be placed on standby to respond if necessary. This includes the identification by industry of delegates to participate in response centre functions (ILC, ILO).
• Precautionary measures will be adopted.
• Emergency Containment measures may be put in place.
• The extent of the Incident will be determined and control measures identified.
• The appropriate course of action will be determined and preparation of a Response Plan may occur (if required).

The activities undertaken during the investigation and alert phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.

4.1.1 Notification of an Incident

The initial report of a Plant Pest will most likely be received by a local departmental officer or diagnostic laboratory who must report it to the relevant CPHM within 24 hours. Reports may also be received directly from the public via the Exotic Plant Pest Hotline (1800 084 881) which must then be investigated. The CPHM will coordinate the collection of all relevant information and investigation of the initial report.

Where there are grounds for suspicion of an EPP, the CPHM will:

• Coordinate collection of initial details and any urgent trace backs or trace forwards.
• Take immediate steps and adopt precautionary measures to limit spread of the suspect EPP by putting into place appropriate interim quarantine measures on affected properties. Quarantine measures may include:
  o Restrictions on the movement of vehicles, equipment and plant material/products on and off the affected property.
  o Interim control or containment measures.
  o Establishment of buffer zones around affected properties.
• Ensure sufficient preliminary information regarding the Incident is collected and documented, and samples collected are forwarded to an appropriate laboratory for diagnosis.

Plant health officer(s) would generally be tasked with undertaking a number of these activities. Refer to the Plant health officer job card for additional information.
**Formal Notification to the CCEPP**

Under the EPPRD (clause 4.1.1), the CPHM must notify the Chair of the CCEPP (ACPPO) within 24 hours of becoming aware of an Incident. Failure to notify within this timeframe may lead to a situation where the jurisdiction receives no payment for their actions in relation to the detection (EPPRD clause 4.2). Notification from the CPHM may initially be provided verbally however, any verbal advice must be confirmed in writing using the form agreed by Parties (EPPRD clause 1.1 – definition of ‘Formal Notification to the CCEPP’), the **Preliminary Information Data Sheet** (PIDS) form.

The CPHM in the Lead Agency will advise relevant senior Industry Party Representatives immediately following the EPP detection, facilitating early and ongoing engagement and collaboration.

**Preparation of the Preliminary Information Data Sheet**

The PIDS is a document which details information relevant to the Incident and is completed by the Lead Agency. It must be provided as part of the overall notification process. However, convening a CCEPP meeting can occur prior to the PIDS being submitted to address factors including urgent information or action requirements relating to the Incident.

The PIDS should include all currently available information to help inform the CCEPP’s considerations as well as the identification of potential Affected Industry Parties.

**Notifying CCEPP representatives**

The ACPPO must immediately notify the CCEPP representatives of the Incident following receipt of the formal notification. This will generally be done by email distributed by the CCEPP Secretariat. PHA will provide advice to the CCEPP Secretariat regarding the potential Affected Industry Parties that will form part of the CCEPP. This advice is based on the host list of the Plant Pest in question as provided to PHA, as well as the Crops represented by the Industry Parties under the EPPRD (part 3 of schedule 7).

**Convening the CCEPP**

The ACPPO will arrange a meeting of the CCEPP as soon as practical after receipt of the formal notification. Prior to the meeting, the CPHM of the Lead Agency will provide a CCEPP situation report to the ACPPO for distribution to the CCEPP. A template for this is under development (**Situation report template**).

It is not expected that all information will be available for this first meeting, however all available information must be presented. The CCEPP may provide:

- Assistance to the Lead Agency with advice on aspects of diagnostics, delimiting surveillance, extent of industry, potential scale of industry impacts, and quarantine.
- Consideration of whether engagement of additional expertise (SAP, international experts or other means) is required to inform the response.
- Assurance to other Parties that necessary actions are occurring while diagnostics and other information are finalised and collated.
- Advice to all Parties on international and interstate trade implications.
- Advice to industry on actions and information that can be discussed with their members.
- Communication advice as necessary for the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to enable prompt and consistent messages to be given to industry, the media and other relevant stakeholders.

Regular situation reports should be provided by the Lead Agency during the course of the EPP response to inform the CCEPP and the NMG. Sufficient detail should be provided to support situational awareness, including to enable the CCEPP and NMG to be informed of key changes to the situation and the progress being made with response activities.
Information that should be presented and issues that should be covered at the meeting is outlined in the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines. Specific considerations such as urban and peri urban biosecurity issues, and disinfection and decontamination are available in the Urban and peri urban biosecurity guidelines and Disinfection and decontamination guidelines respectively.

4.1.2 Diagnostics

Required laboratory standards for diagnostics are outlined in section 3.3.1. Results from initial and confirmatory diagnostic tests may only be disclosed to the CPHM in the first instance.

Refer to the Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines for further information on diagnostics.

Initial diagnostics

Following the report of a suspect EPP, the CPHM or Incident Manager will arrange for a diagnostic or sampling team to be dispatched to the Suspect Premises (SP). The diagnostic or sampling team must ensure the endorsed sampling protocol is adhered to and that information associated with the Incident is appropriately recorded. Refer to the Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines and the Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines for directions.

Chain of evidence requirements for collection of samples must be met. An unbroken chain of evidence must be maintained for results to be admissible in court. This requires that appropriate security measures and documentation procedures are followed at all times. Refer to the Chain of evidence SOP for directions.

Confirmatory diagnosis

The initial diagnosis of a suspect EPP must be confirmed by a second independent laboratory to mitigate opportunities for legal action and prevent a full scale response to a false positive. Confirmatory diagnosis must be completed prior to the NMG approval of a Response Plan and is only required to occur once during the course of an Incident.

The CCEPP may assist in determining the most appropriate laboratory to be used in confirming a diagnosis. International laboratories may be utilised for confirmatory diagnoses as positive controls may not be available in Australia for many EPPs. Samples must be sent as per the Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines and the Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests guidelines.

The CPHM of the Lead Agency will notify the ACPPO immediately once the identification of the suspect EPP is confirmed. Once confirmatory diagnosis is completed the detection will no longer relate to that of a ‘suspect EPP’.

The CCEPP will meet to review the situation following confirmation of the diagnosis. The CPHM of the Lead Agency must provide an updated written situation report to the CCEPP secretariat for distribution to the CCEPP prior to the meeting. After consultation with the CCEPP, the ACPPO will formally declare the detection at a national level concurrently with the Lead Agency.

Information required for the CCEPP meeting and issues that should be covered are outlined in the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines.

4.1.3 Determining the extent of the Incident

The CPHM or Incident Manager will coordinate delimiting surveys of the area to determine the extent of the distribution of the EPP and inform the extent of necessary quarantine zones (refer to section 4.1.4). These activities provide important information on the potential movement of the EPP and inform the CCEPP’s discussions regarding feasibility and economic benefit of eradication and assist development of a Response Plan if required.
Minimum standards for surveillance will be specified by the CCEPP in order to determine the extent of the incursion with a reasonable degree of confidence. Further guidance on delimiting surveys is outlined in the Delimiting surveys guidelines.

The CPHM will coordinate survey teams to conduct trace backs to determine where the EPP may have originated from and trace forwards to identify where the EPP may have spread. Survey teams must consult with property owners or managers in order to identify:

- Movement of plant materials and products that may assist in the spread of the EPP.
- Equipment which is shared between properties.
- Personnel or contractors that may have moved from affected to unaffected properties.
- Linkages from and between affected properties.

Decontamination and disinfection practises are critical to restrict movement of the suspect EPP. Refer to the Disinfection and decontamination guidelines for further information.

4.1.4 Emergency Containment measures
In the event of an Incident it is important to implement precautionary quarantine measures as soon as possible. Control procedures, including the establishment of quarantine zones, may be implemented to contain the EPP while the feasibility of eradication is investigated.

**Establishing quarantine zones**
Outcomes from delimiting surveillance will inform the establishment of quarantine zones and identify the Restricted Area(s) (RA), Control Area (CA) and the Pest Free Area. The size of quarantine zones will be determined by a number of factors, including the:

- Location of the incursion.
- Climatic conditions.
- Biology of the EPP.
- Proximity of an Infected Premises (IP) to other IPs.

**Restricted Area** – Data collected from surveys and tracing will be used to identify the first quarantine zone known as the RA, which comprises all properties where the EPP has been confirmed (IP), properties which have come into direct or indirect contact with an IP or infected plants (Contact Premises or CP) and properties which may have been exposed to the EPP (SP). Trace back and trace forward information will be considered in defining the RA.

**Control Area** – A buffer zone or CA is established around an RA to control the movement of susceptible hosts and other regulated materials until the extent of the incursion is determined. There may be multiple RAs within one CA.

When the extent of the Incident has been confidently defined, the RA and CA boundaries and movement controls may need to be modified, and where possible reduced in size commensurate with appropriate controls.

**Establishing movement restrictions**
The CCEPP may consult with the Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access (SDQMA) regarding the development and modification of movement controls out of the CA to ensure that the least restrictive conditions required to achieve successful Emergency Containment are applied. Interstate movement restrictions of risk items, such as host plants, plant products and machinery, should be risk-based, applied consistent with those restrictions applied to the CA and ideally be nationally consistent.

Where interstate movement restrictions are enacted by a jurisdiction(s) a notification must be provided to the CCEPP Secretariat as soon as practicable for circulation to all Affected Parties.
Control strategies
The Lead Agency will coordinate an investigation to identify chemical controls or other control procedures which may be available for use during an EPP response. This may involve gaining permits for emergency use of unregistered products or for off-label use of registered products from the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority.

The Lead Agency will also coordinate investigation of non-chemical control and monitoring strategies. Refer to Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans (available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/biosecurity/risk-mitigation) for further considerations on control strategies.

4.1.5 Communication and public information
Broad considerations regarding effective communication and the management of public information at all levels during an EPP response are outlined in section 3.5. All communication material must be developed according to the confidentiality requirements of the EPPRD (clause 29). If information related to the Incident is to be communicated to the public, it must be based on the agreed national talking points. Specific communication issues relating to the investigation and alert phase are described below.

Advice to property owners
In the early stages of the investigation and alert phase, the CPHM, Incident Manager or other authorised personnel will provide necessary information regarding the situation to property owners or managers. This information should include advice:

- That diagnostic tests have identified a possible EPP that may require quarantine controls.
- That all staff working on the Incident have been instructed to maintain strict confidentiality.
- About the need for cooperation in applying voluntary movement control on plants, plant products, equipment, and personnel. If cooperation is not offered it should be explained that a quarantine order can be placed on the property.
- What will happen in respect of national recommendations on containment and eradication.
- About availability of counselling services to assist with social, economic or other issues.
- That they will be advised of the outcome of final diagnostic tests.
- On where they can seek support and further information about the outbreak.

When appropriate, affected property owners should be provided with a comprehensive explanation of the intended response actions. Property owners may also be advised of the potential for ORCs to be paid as part of a Response Plan, noting that such payments are not guaranteed and are dependent on a number of factors including the NMG agreeing to invoke national Cost Sharing arrangements under the EPPRD and approving a Response Plan.

Communication strategy
When an EPP is present in one jurisdiction, the Lead Agency in collaboration with the Affected Industry Parties will draft a communication strategy to guide public information activities. Where there are multiple jurisdictions affected and where the response warrants it, the Department of Agriculture will coordinate a national communication strategy and provide it to the CCEPP for endorsement. CCEPP members must, where applicable, liaise with their NBCEN member to provide relevant technical input into the communication strategy (refer to section 3.5).

The communication strategy should consider all relevant phases of the response and support the objectives of the response as agreed to by the CCEPP and the NMG.
Guides and templates for talking points, media releases and communication strategies are in the BIPIM (refer to section 3.5.1). A National talking points template that is specific to the plant industry sector is also available as a supporting document to PLANTPLAN as well as the associated National talking points guidelines.

**National talking points and media releases**

National talking points are drafted to ensure messages are nationally agreed and consistent, are pitched correctly to the affected audiences and can be used by media spokespeople and for all other forms of public communication. Approved national talking points can be used both proactively and reactively by each Affected Party and will form the basis of the information used when developing media releases, website content, as well as in other public information materials and industry/community engagement activities. National talking points should be sufficiently detailed to meet the communication needs of Affected Parties. This includes ensuring sufficient information is included to support on the ground engagement with the local industry and other key stakeholders.

Media releases should be shared with Affected Parties prior to release and should be coordinated as much as possible to enable consistent public messaging. The development and approval of national talking points must be managed quickly to meet tight media deadlines and enable key awareness messages to be communicated as early as possible to industry/growers and the broader community. Communications with the media will be restricted to the delegated media contacts within Affected Parties.

The Department of Agriculture (through the NBCEN Chair/Secretariat) and the Lead Agency will jointly coordinate the development of draft national talking points. Where talking points are not drafted by the NBCEN, Affected Industry Parties may develop their own draft national talking points for comment by NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties and approval by the ACPPO. Talking points will typically be drafted either prior to or immediately following CCEPP meetings; however, Parties may initiate their development anytime following the notification of an Incident.

All Parties have a role in providing input into the development and review of talking points. Key points to be covered in the talking points should be raised by CCEPP members, either prior to, or at the CCEPP meeting to ensure specific information is included to support effective communication with stakeholders. Where relevant, draft talking points must be distributed by the NBCEN Secretariat for immediate comment by NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties. NBCEN members are expected to consult with their respective CCEPP member to coordinate feedback from their Party. All draft national talking points will be approved by the ACPPO, with the final approved version distributed by the NBCEN Secretariat to NBCEN members and Affected Industry Parties, and by the CCEPP Secretariat to CCEPP members, with an aim to distribution and use on the same day as the meeting.

Further information on the process for development and approval of national talking points is included in the National talking points guidelines and a National talking points template is also available.

**International trade impact and notifications**

The Department of Agriculture will consider potential international trade implications, notify relevant trading partners and commence any necessary negotiations for the continuation of trade. CCEPP members should be informed of the implications of the Incident for export trade in the affected crop(s). The Department of Agriculture is also responsible for IPPC notifications where necessary. The CCEPP will consider draft notifications to the IPPC during the course of the Incident.

**4.1.6 Decision on eradication or alternative action**

There are a number of key recommendations that the CCEPP must make to the NMG in order to initiate a decision to eradicate an EPP under the EPPRD processes (refer to Figure 4). Firstly, the CCEPP must make a recommendation on whether the Incident relates to an EPP. Secondly, if the CCEPP agrees that the Incident relates to an EPP (as it relates to an EPP
listed on schedule 13 of the EPPRD, or relates to an uncategorised Plant Pest that is reasonably believed to be an EPP), the CCEPP must make a recommendation on the feasibility of eradicating the EPP. For the CCEPP to recommend to the NMG that eradication is feasible (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(a)(i)), the CCEPP must be satisfied that it is both:

(a) technically feasible to eradicate the EPP; and
(b) cost beneficial to eradicate the EPP.

The CCEPP does not need to consider the cost-benefit of eradication if the recommendation to the NMG is that the EPP is not technically feasible to eradicate.

The CCEPP is also able to provide advice to the NMG on alternative actions if it considers the EPP is not technically feasible to eradicate.

In making an initial recommendation on eradication or alternative action, some assumptions may need to be made by the CCEPP, including whether:

- Biology, dispersal and host range information is correct.
- Effective control treatments have been identified and are available.
- The cost/benefit considerations are accepted as an appropriate economic risk assessment summary.
- Survey data represents a realistic and up-to-date summary of the distribution of the incursion for risk management decisions.

The CCEPP will meet to review the situation, following confirmation and declaration of the Incident and as necessary throughout the Incident, to determine and make recommendations to the NMG regarding the feasibility of eradicating the EPP.

**Decision on EPP status**

The CCEPP must make a recommendation to the NMG whether the Incident relates to an EPP (refer to Figure 4); that is, the Incident relates to the occurrence of either:

- a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP that is listed in schedule 13 of the EPPRD, or
- an uncategorised Plant Pest that is reasonably believed to meet the definition of an EPP (EPPRD clause 1.1).

In forming a recommendation on whether an uncategorised Plant Pest is reasonably believed to be an EPP, the CCEPP must consider available information against the EPP criteria listed in clause 1.1. The *Emergency Plant Pest subclause (d)* guidelines provide detailed information to assist the CCEPP in determining whether an established Plant Pest meets the definition of an EPP under the criteria listed in subclause (d).

If the NMG agrees that the Incident relates to an uncategorised Plant Pest that is reasonably believed to be an EPP, the NMG does not need to wait until the Plant Pest has been categorised before it makes a determination that a Cost Shared Response Plan should be implemented (EPPRD clause 9.3.1).

Following the initial implementation of the Response Plan a concerned Party, such as the Lead Agency, may submit a formal request for a Categorisation Group to categorise the Plant Pest (EPPRD clause 9.3.1). As part of the categorisation process the NMG’s determination on the Plant Pest’s EPP status under clause 1.1 of the EPPRD will be corroborated by the Categorisation Group.
What is an Incident?
Incident means the occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an unclassified Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).

CCEPP would generally report these recommendations via the biannual NMG report. However, if needed, an OOS recommendation could and should be used.

Technical advisors are permitted to be present in the CCEPP if needed to assist considerations regarding this decision point.

CCEPP may appoint a SAP to provide expert advice.

Further consultation with CCEPP or alternative action

Does the Incident relate to an ecologically restricted Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP?

NO

Does the Incident relate to an unclassified Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP?

NO

CCEPP considers feasibility and cost/benefit of eradication

YES

CCEPP considers formal notification of the Incident

YES

NMG considers recommendations of the CCEPP

YES

NMG accepts recommendation from CCEPP that the Incident does not relate to an EPP?

(NO clause 5.1.2(b)(ii))

YES

Determines eradication of the EPP not feasible clause 5.1.2(b)(ii)

NMG accepts recommendation(s) from CCEPP?

YES

Determines eradication of the EPP is feasible clause 5.1.2(a)(i)

Response Plan agreed and implemented for...

Uncategorised Plant Pest believed to be an EPP

Schedule 13 EPP

Cost sharing response activities under the EPPRD based on known category

Cost Shared response activities under the EPPRD based on default category until further determination by a Categorisation Group (clause 9.3.1 and 9.3.2)

Further consultation with CCEPP or alternative action

NO

Non Cost Shared response. Outside scope of EPPRD. Incident termination process

Figure 4: Flow diagram highlighting key decision points for the CCEPP and the NMG during the investigation and alert phase of a response to an Incident.
**Technical feasibility**

The CCEPP should reach a considered decision if it is technically feasible to eradicate the EPP given the information available at the time. Where it is apparent that there are critical gaps in available information such that the CCEPP cannot determine whether it is technically feasible to eradicate the EPP, the CCEPP may need to promptly seek further information. The CCEPP should endeavour to provide advice to the NMG as soon as possible to not delay the consideration of a phased Response Plan.

Table 2 lists the criteria and underpinning factors that should be considered when determining technical feasibility of eradication. The CCEPP should consider all of the criteria, however not all the criteria (or factors within) need to be fulfilled for eradication to be considered feasible. The relative importance placed on each criterion will be dependent on the Incident in question and it will be for the CCEPP members to determine when considering the technical feasibility of each eradication. Assessment of the criteria will also inform development of a feasible response strategy.

An overall measure can be indicated (in column 3 of Table 2) on whether each criterion supports or is an impediment to successful eradication of the EPP or whether this is currently unknown and further information needs to be gathered.

A technical feasibility of eradication decision making support tool is also available and can be utilised for a more detailed and rigorous analysis of technical feasibility of eradication.

**Cost-benefit analysis**

In addition to an EPP being technically feasible to eradicate, it also needs to be cost beneficial to undertake the eradication. The CCEPP will consider the cost-benefit of the proposed eradication option to assist decisions on response activities.

If necessary the CCEPP and/or the NMG can request, at any stage during an Incident, that a formal cost-benefit analysis be completed by a recognised provider of economic analysis services, such as the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES), to provide assistance with a determination of whether it is cost-beneficial to eradicate. The NMG must approve the cost of the economic analysis if it is substantial.

**CCEPP recommendations to the NMG**

Following analysis of both technical feasibility and cost-benefit, the CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG regarding eradication. The CCEPP may make the recommendation to attempt eradication and implement a Response Plan; continue with current quarantine controls pending further information being obtained; or take no further action under the EPPRD (refer to section 4.1.7).

The recommendation to the NMG needs to include sufficient detail and justification for the outcome of the technical and economic feasibility analysis to assist the NMG in decision making. The recommendation will take into account, among other things, reliability of diagnostic tests, impact on productivity and domestic/international trade and many of the other factors listed in Table 2.

If the recommendation to the NMG is to attempt eradication and implement a Response Plan, the recommendation must demonstrate that the EPP has been confirmed and that eradication is both technically feasible and cost-beneficial.
Table 2: Factors to consider regarding the technical feasibility of EPP eradication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical feasibility of eradication criteria</th>
<th>Factors to be considered</th>
<th>Supports or is an impediment to successful eradication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note: not all factors listed may be relevant to the EPP or Incident and/or there may be additional factors to consider</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Aspects of the species biology that influence the ability to eradicate the EPP

1.1. Ability of the EPP to establish and spread
- Range of climate/environmental conditions EPP can survive/reproduce in
- Extent of natural (e.g. wind, rain, invertebrate vectors) and human assisted (e.g. people, equipment, machinery) pathways of spread
- Broad versus narrow host range (including alternate/weed hosts)
- Reproduction rate, infectivity/virulence
- Lifecycle/ability to rapidly reproduce/generate offspring, ability to infect at low inoculum load

1.2. Ability of the EPP to persist in the environment
- Persistence in soil, water, plant debris, vectors
- Dormant stage, latency period and/or asymptomatic infections

2. The current circumstances of the Incident that influence the ability to eradicate the EPP

2.1. Suitability of current circumstances to establishment and spread
- Current EPP prevalence/inoculum load
- Likely time from introduction to initial detection
- Current extent of EPP distribution
- Suitability of climate/environmental conditions in the affected area to establishment and spread
- EPP likely to be present and persisting in soil, water, plant debris
- Extent of host distribution (how wide and densely distributed) in the affected area (including alternate/weed hosts)
- Presence and distribution of natural vectors in the affected area

2.2. Ability of quarantine and other measures to contain the EPP
- Infected Premises quarantined
- Pathways and risk mitigation measures known or can be determined
- Quarantine areas can be determined and implemented

3. The ability to accurately diagnose the EPP
- Reliability of diagnostic method/protocol
- Sensitivity of diagnostic method/protocol (can detect EPP at low levels)
- Resolution of taxonomy
- Availability of diagnostic equipment/expertise
### PHASES OF AN EPP RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. The ability to find all sites in which the EPP may be present</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Detectability of the EPP (e.g. symptoms can be visualised)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reliability of surveillance methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sensitivity of surveillance methodology (e.g. detect at low expression/prevalence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extent of host range (wide versus narrow host range)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extent of host distribution (density/abundance and how widely distributed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to find and identify hosts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Affected areas accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to successfully conduct trace-back and trace-forward investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pathways of movement/spread can be identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to model natural spread pathways (e.g. wind, water, vector distribution)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. The presence of an effective control method that will remove or destroy all EPPs present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1. An effective control method is available/accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Method effective at destroying/removing EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chemicals, traps etc available and accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Control method has been used elsewhere to successfully eradicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Availability of resistant crop varieties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability of EPP to rapidly develop resistance to chemicals/control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effectiveness of control method at low prevalence levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.2. Control method can be implemented to remove the EPP at a faster rate than it can propagate/spread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Extent of infestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extent of distribution and accessibility of hosts (including alternate/weed hosts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reproduction rate/virulence/infectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Persistence of EPP in plant debris, soil and water</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Control effective during dormancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Limitations to timely manual removal of affected hosts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.3. Whether there are control methods commonly employed for endemic pests and diseases, that may limit the establishment, spread and/or impact of the EPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Chemicals or cultural controls commonly in use in the affected area are likely to be effective at suppressing or controlling the EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extent to which establishment, spread and/or impact of the EPP may be limited through common use of control methods for endemic pests and diseases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 6. The likelihood of repeated introductions | • Ability to identify pathway of entry into Australia or out of a defined area of containment within Australia  
• Whether likely pathway is regulated or non-regulated (e.g. entry through natural means)  
• Effectiveness of controls in place to mitigate re-entry |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| 7. The recommended response strategy is acceptable to stakeholders and the general public | • Direct impacts on industry  
• Flow on effects to allied /downstream industries  
• Impacts on health, community and lifestyle (e.g. cultural and social impacts, amenity and landscape impacts)  
• Environmental, non-target impacts  
• Stakeholder consultation and support |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| 8. Any legislative impediments to undertaking an emergency response | • Impediments to use of control methods e.g. environmental impacts  
• Ability to effectively apply legislation  
• Ability to access properties/land |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| 9. The resources e.g. chemicals, personnel etc. required to undertake an emergency response are accessible or available | • Chemicals/traps etc. available  
• Permits can be obtained  
• Expertise available  
• Work health and safety impediments  
• Logistical impediments (e.g. sufficient personnel available/accessible) |
**Development of the Response Plan and indicative budget**

If the recommendation of the CCEPP is that eradication should be attempted and a Response Plan is required, the Chair of the CCEPP may prepare a preliminary report to the NMG to enable the NMG to make their determination. However, generally if the CCEPP is recommending a Response Plan be implemented, a draft Response Plan will accompany the recommendation.

The draft Response Plan should be prepared by the Lead Agency in collaboration with Affected Industry Parties and reviewed by the CCEPP. The Lead Agency, with the assistance of the CCEPP Secretariat, may request personnel from other Affected Parties or PHA to assist with the initial drafting of the Response Plan (including the indicative budget). An indicative budget for response activities must be included in the draft and must provide sufficient transparency in allocation of costs proposed for Cost Sharing and normal commitments. The Lead Agency should engage with PHA early during the development of the Response Plan budget to assist with this process.

Development of the Response Plan must comply with the requirements of the EPPRD (clause 6) including required content (EPPRD part 1 of schedule 4). Refer to the Response Plan development guideline and Response Plan for eradication template for additional guidance on the development of Response Plans.

**Phased responses**

The draft Response Plan may include a phased approach to response activities and in the first instance may propose eligible expenses for Cost Sharing for the first phase of the response only. This phased approach would be relevant for an Incident in which there are uncertainties in the response strategy, or further information needs to be gathered to fully determine the extent of activities that will be required throughout the response. This approach facilitates rapid decision making and would increase the certainty of funding arrangements during the early stage of an Incident, including to enable Cost Sharing to be put in place early for eligible costs such as ORCs, to minimise the impact to affected property Owners and jurisdictions. As with any Response Plan, the development of robust trigger points for review of the response strategy and agreed funding limits (consistent with the EPPRD provisions) will be crucial to effectively manage the uncertainty or unknowns in a response.

The Response Plan development guideline provides additional guidance on the minimum requirements of a phased approach Response Plan.

**Response Plan trigger points**

The Response Plan should specify clear and robust trigger points for the review of the response strategy and associated activities under the Response Plan. The trigger points are used to monitor the effectiveness of the strategy and its delivery as well as address any uncertainty and/or external factors that might suggest the response strategy will not achieve its objectives. The trigger points will depend on the particular EPP response. Trigger points could relate to matters such as:

- The extent of expenditure of the approved response budget.
- Any additional EPP detections.
- Operational matters.
- Program management performance indicators.

The only trigger point mandated under the EPPRD is the Trigger Point for review of the Agreed Limit (limit to Parties Cost Sharing obligations in respect of a Response Plan; EPPRD clause 9.5). This expenditure Trigger Point is an amount proposed by the CCEPP to the NMG and must be no greater than 90 per cent of the Agreed Limit (EPPRD clause 9.5.6). If Response Plan expenditure reaches this Trigger Point, the NMG will meet to determine if the
Agreed Limit will be revised and to review the funding arrangements and the continuation of the EPP response (EPPRD clause 9.5.7 and 9.5.8).

All the trigger points for the review of the Response Plan must be measurable and be monitored by the Lead Agency and CCEPP throughout the duration of the operational phase of the response.

**Approval of Response Plan and budget by the NMG**

The NMG is responsible for making the final decision on the action to be taken following confirmation of an EPP (refer to Figure 4). The NMG will consider the Response Plan provided by the Lead Agency and the CCEPP and will review the indicative budget. If the NMG approves the Response Plan, the Response Plan will be implemented and Cost Shared, and the Incident will move into the operational phase.

The Response Plan indicative budget is an approximation of the likely costs of implementing the Response Plan, including the breakdown of normal commitments of the Lead Agency and shared costs. There is implied flexibility in the indicative budget so long as the Lead Agency spends the amount implementing the Response Plan and the amount spent is eligible for Cost Sharing. When approving the Response Plan and budget the NMG must set an “upper limit on expenditure”, which may be the amount set out in the indicative budget or another specified amount, however it must not exceed the Agreed Limit for the response (EPPRD part 2.1 of schedule 10). The NMG must monitor expenditure throughout the course of the response.

**4.1.7 Incident termination process during the investigation and alert phase**

Based on the outcomes of the investigation and alert phase, either the operational (refer to section 4.2) or stand down (refer to section 4.3) phase of PLANTPLAN will be activated.

As indicated in previous sections, the investigation and alert phase can be terminated and the stand down phase activated by the following occurrences:

- If the Incident relates to an uncategorised Plant Pest that is not reasonably believed to meet the definition of an EPP, or
- If the eradication of an EPP is not considered feasible, or
- If the investigation and alert phase indicates the EPP is no longer present (e.g. single pest find).

In the above instances, the CCEPP will advise the NMG, providing relevant and reasonable justification, that either:

- the Incident does not relate to an EPP (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(b)(i)), or
- the Incident does relate to an EPP but eradication of the EPP is not feasible (EPPRD clause 5.1.2(b)(ii)).

For the situation in which the investigation and alert phase indicates that the EPP is no longer present (e.g. single pest find), the CCEPP will provide a recommendation to the NMG that is worded specifically for the particular Incident. The recommendation should include that the Incident relates to an EPP and provide reasonable justification for why the CCEPP considers that the EPP is no longer present (e.g. as the EPP has not established).

The NMG will then make its determination (in accordance with the voting procedure outlined in part 1 of schedule 8 of the EPPRD). The resolution should include the relevant reasons for termination as identified above.

A new Incident of the same EPP would have to be considered against the criteria for the definition of an EPP. If in a previous Incident, an EPP was determined to be widely distributed and endemic, the Plant Pest would no longer meet the definition of an EPP.
Party to the EPPRD could request, through PHA, for it to be removed from schedule 13, if listed there, to remove any ambiguity.

4.2 Operational phase
The aim of this phase is to eradicate the EPP. The operational phase commences once the Response Plan is endorsed by the NMG.

The operational phase in PLANTPLAN aligns with the Emergency Response Phase in the EPPRD and where the response is successful, is also inclusive of the Proof of Freedom Phase in the EPPRD (refer to Figure 3). Operational expenses incurred by undertaking activities required by a Response Plan during this phase are eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD, subject to the specifications of part 4 of schedule 6 (Determination of Costs) and as specified in the NMG endorsed Response Plan.

Broadly, during the operational phase:
- The Lead Agency will implement the NMG agreed Response Plan.
- The Lead Agency will provide regular written and verbal situation reports to the CCEPP.
- The Lead Agency will provide regular expenditure reports to the CCEPP and the NMG.
- Proof of freedom activities will occur.
- The NMG will declare the EPP eradicated (where the Response Plan is successful).
- The NMG may appoint an Efficiency Auditor to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a Response Plan.

The activities undertaken during the operational phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.

4.2.1 Response Plan implementation and progress
The CPHM of the Lead Agency(s) will be responsible for overall management of the Response Plan and will lead the implementation of the plan under direction from the CCEPP. The office of the ACPPO will coordinate the national consultation and decision making in addition to any international aspects of the Incident and response.

Guidance for operational planning and implementation for eradication is outlined in the Planning eradication at affected properties SOP.

The CCEPP will be convened as required during the implementation of the Response Plan and will monitor the progress of the response, provide input into communications where necessary and prepare reports for the NMG.

The NMG will be convened promptly as required, particularly during the operational phase, to make decisions based on the recommendations provided by the CCEPP, or as otherwise necessary.

Situation and expenditure reporting
The Lead Agency must provide regular written and verbal reports to the CCEPP (via the Secretariat) throughout the EPP response. At each CCEPP meeting, the Lead Agency must provide a written report in the form stipulated in schedule 10 of the EPPRD which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure under the Response Plan to date (EPPRD clause 12.2.1).

Situation and expenditure reporting by the Lead Agency will ensure the CCEPP and the NMG receives appropriate notice and information in order to evaluate the progress of the EPP response and make appropriate recommendations and determinations.
The Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan guidance document is available to assist the Lead Agency(s) to meet these reporting obligations.

**Evaluating the progress of the EPP response**

In addition to considering the progress of the response through situation and expenditure reporting by the Lead Agency(s), if any of the specified trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the CCEPP will review the Response Plan and consider whether the response strategy is still appropriate and whether eradication of the EPP continues to be feasible. Depending on the outcome, the Response Plan may be amended and resubmitted to the NMG for approval, or alternatively a recommendation made to the NMG that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP.

If key elements of the response strategy are being proposed for revision, the CCEPP should actively consider the need for expert review by a SAP or other means.

External reviews of the eradication program (Efficiency Auditing – EPPRD clause 12.3) may take place as determined by the NMG.

In monitoring the progress of the response, the CCEPP will determine if the emergency response activities set out in the Response Plan have been successfully completed and if the response should enter the Proof of Freedom Phase under the EPPRD (clause 5.3.3). There will often be a set minimum length of time between the end of emergency response activities and declaration of area freedom from the EPP. Proof of freedom activities may therefore continue for some time until eradication can be declared. Refer to Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans (available from planthealthaustralia.com.au/biosecurity/risk-mitigation) for further considerations on proof of freedom strategies.

### 4.2.2 Coordination of Cost Sharing

Each Affected Party must initially meet its own costs arising from involvement in the implementation of a Response Plan (EPPRD clause 10.2). Additionally, during the course of the Response Plan, all Affected Parties must abide by the Cost Sharing principles under the EPPRD (clause 10.3). PHA is responsible for coordinating, verifying and collating claims for Cost Sharing and will contact all Affected Parties within 1 month of the implementation of a Response Plan reminding them of their responsibilities in regard to claims. PHA will provide the appropriate template to assist Affected Parties to provide the required information.

The Cost Sharing principles require claims to be submitted by all Affected Parties for eligible costs (EPPRD clause 9.6.1 and part 4 of schedule 6) incurred implementing an approved Response Plan to PHA quarterly (unless otherwise agreed by the NMG) (EPPRD paragraph 2.1.2 of schedule 7). If an Affected Party has not incurred any costs during the claiming period they must still notify PHA that they will not be claiming costs for that claiming period. Once all claims have been received and verified by PHA, PHA will notify all Affected Parties of the relevant amounts payable and receivable (EPPRD paragraphs 2.1.4, 2.1.5 and 2.1.7 of schedule 7).

Not all costs of responding to an Incident are eligible to be Cost Shared between Affected Parties. For further information on normal commitments refer to the Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed guidelines.

For further guidance on cost claiming refer to the Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan guidance document.

### 4.2.3 Communication and public information

The broad considerations regarding effective communication and the management of communication at all levels during an Incident are outlined in section 3.5. The national communication strategy drafted and implemented during the investigation and alert phase will also provide guidance. All communication material must be developed according to the
confidentiality requirements of the EPPRD (clause 29) and be consistent with nationally agreed messages endorsed by the ACPPO.

**Advice to property owners**

The CPHM, Incident Manager or other authorised personnel will advise affected property owners of the decision to implement a Response Plan and will provide updates on the progress of the Response Plan as necessary.

**National talking points and media**

National talking points will need to be reviewed and updated during the course of the eradication response to ensure the information remains up to date and supports the changing communication needs of Affected Parties. The timely revision of the national talking points and inclusion of sufficiently detailed information will be critically important in supporting on the ground engagement in the response. The Department of Agriculture (through the NBCEN Chair/Secretariat) and the Lead Agency will continue to coordinate the development/review of draft national talking points either prior to, or immediately following CCEPP meetings, which will then be considered by the NBCEN (and CCEPP members through their NBCEN representative) and Affected Industry Parties, prior to being finalised in accordance with the process provided at section 4.1.5. If a CCEPP meeting has not been scheduled, an Affected Party may request, at any time, that the talking points are updated, and may put forward proposed changes for consideration. Where agreed, the NMG will also issue its own communiqués in the course of a response.

**Plant Pest factsheets**

As part of the communication strategy, a factsheet covering Plant Pest biology, impact, regulatory arrangements, what to look for and who to contact should be prepared as soon as possible and provided to all Affected Parties and published on any Incident related website. The factsheet should also contain any safety issues for consumers and possible frequently asked questions. These Plant Pest factsheets are often for the purpose of informing and engaging the broader community as well as growers and property owners.

In addition to Plant Pest factsheets, information updates on any biosecurity requirements for the response, additional detections and the progress of the response will be developed. A template (*Emergency Plant Pest Alert*) is available to guide the development of a media EPP alert.

**4.2.4 Finalisation of an eradication program**

An eradication program will be finalised when the NMG agrees that the EPP has been eradicated and proof of freedom has been demonstrated, or that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP. The stand down phase will then commence.

When implementation of the Response Plan is successful and objectives are being met, there will be a progressive wind down of response activities towards the end of the operational phase and the LCC(s) and SCC will require fewer resources.

**The CCEPP recommends the EPP successfully eradicated**

When proof of freedom activities have been successfully completed, the Lead Agency will present a report to the CCEPP (and subsequently to the NMG) and seek endorsement that the criteria for successful eradication of the EPP have been met. A proof of freedom framework is available to facilitate the documentation of evidence to support successful eradication. Guidance on completing the framework is provided in the *Proof of freedom framework* guidelines.

The CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG to formally determine that the Response Plan has been successfully completed and the EPP has been eradicated (EPPRD clause 5.3.4(a)). Where agreed, the NMG will issue a communiqué.
The CCEPP recommends that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible

If during the course of an eradication program the CCEPP concludes that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible, the CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG that eradication of the EPP is not feasible and either:

- the emergency response should come to an end, in which case the Response Plan will be terminated (EPPRD clause 5.2.4 (b)(i)), or
- the emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase (EPPRD clause 5.2.4(b)(ii)).

If the NMG (on advice from the CCEPP) determines that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP then the CCEPP have the option to recommend that the Response Plan be revised to incorporate activities for Transition to Management. The CCEPP will only take this step if they believe that a Transition to Management Phase is necessary to transition the EPP from the stage of eradication to normal business, and if it considers that Transition to Management is achievable within a defined time frame (up to 12 months). Transition to Management must have a clear end date and will not include any ongoing actions after completion of the revised Response Plan.

Refer to 4.5 for a description of the Transition to Management Phase. The Transition to Management guidelines, Response Plan development guideline and Response Plan for Transition to Management template provide additional guidance on possible inclusions to the Response Plan.

4.3 Stand down phase

The aim of this phase is to provide guidance for moving from emergency response arrangements to normal business.

The stand down phase is activated by one of the following:

- The NMG agrees (upon advice from the CCEPP) that the Incident does not relate to an EPP (refer to section 4.1.6 and 4.1.7).
- The investigation and alert phase indicates the EPP is not present (refer to section 4.1.7).
- The eradication of an EPP is determined by the NMG (upon advice by the CCEPP) not to be feasible (refer to section 4.1.6 and 4.1.7).
- Following implementation of a Response Plan, the NMG declares that the EPP has been successfully eradicated (refer to section 4.2.4).
- Following implementation of a Response Plan, the NMG formally declares that eradication is no longer considered feasible and a Transition to Management Phase is not considered appropriate (refer to section 4.2.4).

While a stand down phase is addressed in PLANTPLAN, it is not specifically addressed in the EPPRD. Activities carried out during the stand down phase are outside of EPPRD process and are therefore not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD. However, a decision made to enter the stand down phase does not prevent jurisdictions and relevant industries from responding to a Plant Pest outside the EPPRD. The relevant states/territories in conjunction with the relevant industries may consider alternative strategies to adopt (such as long-term control methods) following stand down, however these activities are outside of the scope of the EPPRD. The one exception is the undertaking of an external financial audit of the Response Plan ledger following the completion of a Response Plan (EPPRD clause 12.4.1).

The activities undertaken during the stand down phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.
4.3.1 Review of intra and interstate quarantine arrangements
If the eradication campaign is unsuccessful or the Response Plan is terminated prior to completion, the SDQMA will consider the most effective methods to support national and international trade.

If the EPP is declared eradicated then all intra and interstate quarantine arrangements should be lifted.

4.3.2 Communication and public information
If the eradication campaign is successful, the Department of Agriculture will:
- Advise relevant international trading partners.
- Provide IPPC notification.
- Negotiate arrangements to reinstate trade if necessary.

4.3.3 Finalisation of Cost Sharing, financial audit and determination of total costs
All Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the operational phase and provide information to enable the total cost of responding to the Incident to be determined. This includes all Affected Parties providing an estimation of the normal commitments incurred/ in-kind contribution towards implementing the Response Plan and other activities associated with responding to the Incident (e.g. CCEPP/NMG/SAP meetings etc). PHA will provide the appropriate template to assist Affected Parties to provide the required information. All necessary information must be provided to PHA within six months of the Response Plan Completion Date (date of the NMG determination that the Response Plan be terminated or should come to an end or that Transition to Management has been completed). Affected Parties can provide the total costs incurred by their Party on a quarterly basis to PHA as an alternative to providing it within six months of the Response Plan Completion Date.

Further information is provided in the Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan guidelines.

The Lead Agency must also arrange for an external audit of the Response Plan ledger account following completion of the Response Plan where the total Cost Shared amount is equal to or exceeds $500,000 (as at 2011/2012 to be indexed annually using the Consumer Price Index at 30 June each year and applying from 1 July each year – EPPRD part 2 of schedule 11). A final audit report must be provided to all Affected Parties within 60 days of the Response Plan Completion Date (or such other date as agreed by the Affected Parties). The cost of the financial audit is a Cost Sharable item and should be specified in the Response Plan budget.

4.3.4 Incident debriefs
Incident debriefs are a critical component of the stand down phase as they provide an opportunity for participants to highlight areas of concern as well as positive outcomes.

Incident debriefs will be held at local, state and national levels following termination of the EPP response. It is essential that relevant personnel involved in the response are included in the debriefing process.

PHA and the ACPPO will coordinate a debriefing in regard to the operation of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to help inform any appropriate changes to PLANTPLAN or the EPPRD.

Other committees (non EPPRD) engaged in the response including the NBCEN and SDQMA should conduct a debrief of their operation and activities during the Incident and report their findings to PHA for incorporation into the national debrief outcomes.

Further information on the EPPRD Incident debriefing process is provided in the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed debriefing guidelines.
4.4 Relief and Recovery

Relief and recovery is the coordinated approach of supporting affected individuals and communities both during and following an emergency response. Activities occur from day one and whilst some will continue throughout and following stand down of the Incident (e.g. social support/assistance services), others will be implemented directly under a Response Plan (e.g. ORCs). Each jurisdiction has a responsibility to provide these aspects throughout an Incident and has systems and processes in place to support their delivery. Relief and recovery activities will also be delivered through industry and local communities.

4.5 Transition to Management Phase

The EPPRD includes provisions for Cost Sharing of Transition to Management activities in the circumstance where eradication has been attempted under a Response Plan and the NMG has determined eradication is no longer feasible. Not all circumstances in which eradication is determined no longer feasible will require a nationally coordinated program of activities to Transition to Management. The need is considered on a case by case basis and will depend on the circumstances of the EPP and the stage and nature of the unsuccessful eradication program.

Transition to Management under the EPPRD can be viewed as a means to orderly stand down response activities nationally. The aim is to transition from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP to management of the EPP outside of the EPPRD. The Transition to Management Phase will only occur if the NMG determines (on advice from the CCEPP) that it is necessary and that Transition to Management (under a revised Response Plan) is achievable within a defined and reasonable timeframe of up to 12 months. Some EPP responses will only require a short period of Transition to Management activity (e.g. 3 or 6 months).

4.5.1 Commencement of the Transition to Management Phase

The Transition to Management Phase commences when the NMG agrees (upon advice from the CCEPP) that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP, and that the emergency response should enter a Transition to Management Phase. In its recommendation to the NMG, the CCEPP will provide advice on:

- Why Transition to Management is appropriate/required (the gap that needs to be addressed to enable effective management of the EPP).
- The potential scope and objectives of Transition to Management.
- The proposed activities to be incorporated into the revised Response Plan.

4.5.2 Revision and approval of the Response Plan

Engagement and collaboration between the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties will be important to the success of Transition to Management and should occur early to clearly define the scope, objectives and expectations. The respective roles and responsibilities of the Lead Agency and Affected Industry Parties in developing and implementing the revised Response Plan should also be clearly defined through this process.

The CCEPP may also assist in identifying the scope of Transition to Management and the proposed activities required to achieve the intended objectives. The Transition to Management guidelines, Response Plan development guideline and Response Plan for Transition to Management template include information on the possible additions to the Response Plan.

The revised Response Plan will be provided to the NMG for approval, on the advice of the CCEPP.

4.5.3 Response Plan implementation

Implementation of the revised Response Plan will continue in the same manner as under the operational phase (refer to section 4.2.1).
If trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the CCEPP will review the Response Plan and consider whether the Transition to Management Phase is still appropriate. Depending on the outcome, the Response Plan may be amended and resubmitted to the NMG for approval, or alternatively a recommendation made to the NMG that the Transition to Management Phase should end, in which case the Response Plan will come to an end.

4.5.4 Finalisation of the Transition to Management Phase
On completion of the Transition to Management activities under the Response Plan, the Lead Agency will present a report to the CCEPP detailing the activities completed under the Response Plan. The CCEPP will then formally advise the NMG that Transition to Management is complete. Once the NMG agrees that Transition to Management has been completed (as the activities in the Response Plan have been successfully completed) the Transition to Management Phase will end.

The Transition to Management Phase may also be finalised if the NMG determines (on advice from the CCEPP) that the Transition to Management Phase should end, in which case the Response Plan will come to an end (for example if the Response Plan has been triggered as described at section 4.5.3 above).

4.5.5 Coordination of Cost Sharing
As Transition to Management will be part of an existing Response Plan, there are no changes to the Cost Sharing provisions. Cost Sharing arrangements will occur as described in section 4.2.2.

4.5.6 Finalisation of Cost Sharing, financial audit and determination of total costs
Finalisation of Cost Sharing arrangements, requirements for a financial audit and determination of total costs will occur as described in section 4.3.3.

4.5.7 Transition to Management debrief
A debrief should be held either during, or at the finalisation of the Transition to Management Phase. The outcomes of this debrief can then be fed back into any future use of the Transition to Management Phase and to help inform any appropriate changes to PLANTPLAN or the EPPRD.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABARES</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences</td>
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<td>ACPPO</td>
<td>Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer</td>
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<td>AHA</td>
<td>Animal Health Australia</td>
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<td>BIMS</td>
<td>Biosecurity Incident Management System</td>
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<td>BIPIM</td>
<td>Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Biosecurity Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPHM</td>
<td>Chief Plant Health Manager</td>
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<td>CCEPP</td>
<td>Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Contact Premises</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Control Area</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Emergency Plant Pest</td>
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<td>EPPRD</td>
<td>Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILC</td>
<td>Industry Liaison Coordinator</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>Industry Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>IMT</td>
<td>Incident Management Team</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Infected Premises</td>
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<td>IPPC</td>
<td>International Plant Protection Convention</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Local Control Centre</td>
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<td>NASOP</td>
<td>Nationally Approved Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Biosecurity Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBCEN</td>
<td>National Biosecurity Communication and Engagement Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Diagnostic Protocol</td>
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<td>NMG</td>
<td>National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (National Management Group)</td>
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<td>ORC</td>
<td>Owner Reimbursement Costs</td>
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<td>PEQ</td>
<td>Post Entry Quarantine</td>
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<td>PIDS</td>
<td>Preliminary Information Data Sheet</td>
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<td>PHA</td>
<td>Plant Health Australia</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Restricted Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Scientific Advisory Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>State Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDQMA</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPHD</td>
<td>Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Suspect Premises</td>
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## Terms and Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Definition source</th>
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| Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer | The individual, holding the position of the Chief Plant Protection Officer of the Commonwealth of Australia.  
Note: the individual will be responsible for undertaking national coordination and emergency management of plant health issues.                                                                 | EPPRD             |
| Biosecurity                               | A set of measures designed to protect a Crop, Crops or sub-group of Crops from Plant Pests at national, regional and individual farm levels.                                                                | EPPRD             |
| Categorisation Group                      | The group convened under part 4 of schedule 8 of the EPPRD that will advise on the categorisation, re-categorisation or removal from the categorised list of a Plant Pest or the Funding Weight of a categorised EPP. | EPPRD             |
| Chief Plant Health Manager                | The individual, holding the position of plant health manager, or his/her equivalent, of a state or territory.  
Note: The individual will be the plant health manager of the state/territory plant health authority that has prime responsibility for plant pest control in that state or territory. | EPPRD             |
| Consensus                                 | In respect of a decision to be taken on an issue, that none of those persons present when the decision is taken are opposed to it, although:  
(a) persons present during the discussion may have expressed contrary view;  
(b) achieving consensus may have required a measure of compromise to ensure a workable outcome; and  
(c) some entitled to be present may not be present and some may abstain from participating in the decision. | EPPRD             |
<p>| Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests | A committee of technical representatives of the EPPRD Parties established in accordance with clause 11.2 of the EPPRD.                                                                                       | EPPRD             |
| Contact Premises                          | Premises (or locality) containing susceptible host plants which are known to have been in direct or indirect contact with an Infected Premises.                                                             | Consistent with BIMS glossary |
| Control Area                              | An area around the restricted area where movement is controlled but not restricted. The area is intended to reduce likelihood of the Plant Pest spreading beyond the Restricted Area.                                      | Consistent with BIMS glossary |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Definition source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost Sharing</td>
<td>The process of government Parties and Industry Parties proportional funding of the Shared Costs arising from the implementation of a Response Plan, as described in the EPPRD.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>debrief</td>
<td>A meeting at the end of an operation with the purpose of assessing the conduct or result of an operation.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decontamination</td>
<td>A combination of physical and/or chemical processes that kills or removes infectious agents from media, water, equipment and people. Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delimiting surveillance</td>
<td>Surveillance conducted to establish the boundaries of an area considered to be infested by or free from a Plant Pest.</td>
<td>International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>Australian Government Department of Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Containment</td>
<td>A set of measures implemented by the Lead Agency as part of an EPP response. It is intended to restrict the EPP to a defined area, and may include the use of quarantine measures, in order to prevent further spread of the EPP and preserve the opportunities for eradication of the EPP.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Plant Pest</td>
<td>Refer to definition in clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Command Post</td>
<td>A field operations centre, subsidiary to a Local Control Centre.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
<td>The occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an uncategorised Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry Party Delegate</td>
<td>Person who represents each Affected Industry Party at an EPP Control Centre.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infected Premises</td>
<td>Premises (or locality) at which an EPP is confirmed or believed to exist.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Agency</td>
<td>The agency(s) of the state(s) or territory(s) which are responsible for leading the conduct of a Response Plan (because of the occurrence of an Incident within their state(s) or territory(s).</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Definition source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Control Centre</td>
<td>The operations centre from which all field operations aimed at containing and eradicating the EPP are managed in a defined area.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Coordination Centre</td>
<td>The centre established by The Department of Agriculture and Water Resources to coordinate national and international activities and resource support to jurisdictions.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group; (National Management Group)</td>
<td>The group which will approve or not approve a Response Plan and the consequent application of Cost Sharing (following advice from the CCEPP) and which will manage the national policy and resourcing needs of a Response Plan, on behalf of Affected Parties.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Reimbursement Costs</td>
<td>Valuation principles for the destruction of crops or other assets during the conduct of a Response Plan as specified in the EPPRD.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peak industry body</td>
<td>Organisation representing an industry and which is a member of PHA and signatory to the EPPRD.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pest free area</td>
<td>An area which a specific pest is known not to occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant Pest</td>
<td>Any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest or pathogen injurious to plants or plant health provided that it is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable, but excludes Genetically Modified Organisms.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td>Means restraints upon activities on an affected property imposed pursuant to a Response Plan designed to prevent the spread of a Plant Pest. Includes restrictions on access to and removal of materials from an affected property, and movement controls on plants, plant products, people, machinery and other items except as approved pursuant to the Response Plan.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Plan</td>
<td>An integrated plan for undertaking a response to an EPP that is developed by one or more state or territory CPHM(s), endorsed by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG and which is subject to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD. The Response Plan may include Emergency Containment actions so as to enable the payment of Owner Reimbursement Costs and Cost Sharing if considered appropriate by CCEPP and approved by the NMG.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Definition source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Plan Completion Date</td>
<td>Refer to definition in clause 1.1 of the EPPRD.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Area</td>
<td>A relatively small area (compared to a control area) around an infected premises that is subject to intense surveillance and movement controls.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Advisory Panel</td>
<td>A panel of experts which may be appointed by the CCEPP to provide specific technical information on matters relating to an Incident.</td>
<td>PLANTPLAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Costs</td>
<td>Those costs that are shared by the Parties as described in clause 9 of the EPPRD and which are incurred in the course of implementing a Response Plan.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Coordination Centre</td>
<td>The emergency operations centre established at a state level, that coordinates the EPP control operations to be undertaken in that state or territory.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surveillance</td>
<td>Activities to investigate the presence or prevalence of a Plant Pest in a plant or plant product(s) (including bees and their hives) or in the environment.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Premises</td>
<td>Premises (or locality) containing plants which may have been exposed to an EPP and which will be subject to quarantine and intense surveillance.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tracing</td>
<td>The process of locating plants, plant material, persons, or things which may be implicated in the spread of an EPP.</td>
<td>Consistent with BIMS glossary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition to Management</td>
<td>The undertaking of activities for transitioning the management of an EPP from seeking to achieve eradication of the EPP during an Emergency Response Phase to management of the EPP outside of the EPPRD.</td>
<td>EPPRD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendices

#### Appendix 1 Register of supporting documents¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guidelines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan</td>
<td>in draft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorisation Group operating guidelines</td>
<td>in draft</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17 December 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>30 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimiting surveys</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1 December 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disinfection and decontamination guidelines</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1 December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed debriefing guidelines</td>
<td>in draft</td>
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<td>Determining if an established Plant Pest is an Emergency Plant Pest</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>27 May 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>under subclause (d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National talking points</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>30 November 2018</td>
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<td>Normal commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3 June 2016</td>
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<td>Proof of freedom framework</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>26 November 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Response Plan development</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>30 November 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stakeholder engagement to build a collaborative response to biosecurity Incidents</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>29 November 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition to Management</td>
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<td>30 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban and peri-urban biosecurity guidelines</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5 December 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Operating Procedures</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chain of evidence</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5 December 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning eradication at affected properties</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5 December 2013</td>
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<td><strong>Job Cards</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Plant Health Manager</td>
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<td>5 December 2013</td>
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<td>Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26 November 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry Liaison functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Control Centre Controller</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>National Management Group</td>
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<td>30 November 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plant health officer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Advisory Panel</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>30 November 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Coordination Centre Director</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5 December 2013</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ Issued documents are available from the PHA website (planhealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan)
## Title | Version | Issued
---|---|---
Emergency Plant Pest Alert template | 1.0 | 5 December 2013
National talking points | 1.1 | 30 November 2018
Preliminary Information Data Sheet (PIDS) | 5.0 | 30 November 2018
Response Plan for eradication | 1.1 | 30 November 2018
Response Plan for Transition to Management | 1.1 | 30 November 2018
Situation report template | *in draft* | |

**Other**

*Functions of the LCC* | *in draft* | |
*Functions of the SCC* | *in draft* | |