



Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Plan

Version 2.0

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Emergency preparedness and response
guidelines for Australia's agricultural industries

Plant Health Australia (PHA) is the peak national coordinating body for plant health in Australia, and has wide government and industry representation. PHA was formed in April 2000 as a non-profit public company to identify and coordinate activities to address current and emerging national plant health issues that impact on Australia's plant industries.

For more information about Plant Health Australia

Write to Plant Health Australia
Level 1, 1 Phipps Close
DEAKIN ACT 2600

Phone +61 2 6215 7700

Fax +61 2 6260 4321

E-mail admin@phau.com.au

Visit our website www.planthealthaustralia.com.au

An electronic version of this report is available for download from the PHA website. Print copies may be obtained by contacting PHA using the details above.

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Preface

PLANTPLAN provides nationally consistent guidelines covering management and response procedures for Emergency Plant Pest Incidents affecting the Australian plant industries.

Authority for the development and maintenance of PLANTPLAN rests with Plant Health Australia (PHA). PLANTPLAN is to be endorsed by all signatories to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD).

PLANTPLAN will be reviewed annually and updated as a result of activation of the plan or testing in exercises and workshops. Recommendations for amendment from EPPRD Parties may also be forwarded to PHA for consideration. Recommendations for amendments should be forwarded to:

Attention: PLANTPLAN Coordinator
Post: Plant Health Australia
Level 1, 1 Phipps Close DEAKIN ACT 2600
Phone: (02) 6215 7700
Email: plantplan@phau.com.au

The latest version of PLANTPLAN and related information is available from the PHA website (www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/plantplan).

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Revision history

Version	Date issued	Amendment Details	
		Section(s)	Details
1.0	5 Dec 2013	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separation of main PLANTPLAN document and appendices into supporting documents. • Alignment with BIMS. • Full reformat.
2.0	17 Dec 2014	All	<p>Full review of entire document. Key sections/topic areas edited:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement restrictions • Communication and public information • Feasibility of eradication (including incorporation of technical feasibility criteria from NEBRA) • Response Plan trigger points • Accounting and reporting • Abbreviations (new table added) • Terms and Definitions (acronyms column removed, definition source added)

Acknowledgements

Many people and organisations representing the members of Plant Health Australia (PHA) and staff of PHA have contributed to the development and review of PLANTPLAN.

The main resource documents used in the historic development of the original PLANTPLAN document were the Australian Government Department of Agriculture's *Emergency Management Plan*, the PHA and Department of Primary Industries Victoria commissioned report *Generic Incursion Management Plan for Plant Industries*, and the PHA commissioned report, *Optimising the Decision Making Process*.

Foreword

Plant Health Australia (PHA) is a public company, with members including the Australian Government, all state and territory governments, and a range of plant industry organisations. The company was formed to address high priority plant health issues, and to work with all its members to develop an internationally outstanding plant health management system that enhances Australia's plant health status and the sustainability and profitability of plant industries.

Australia's agricultural industries are fortunate to experience relative freedom from many pests that adversely affect plant industries worldwide. Maintaining this freedom is vital for the ongoing productivity, sustainability and quality of Australia's agricultural industries. The introduction of pests can cause serious production losses to plant industries, jeopardise exports of plants and plant products, and have a significant impact on the environment and economy.

Australia's geographic isolation and lack of shared borders have in the past, provided a degree of natural protection from exotic threats. Australia's national quarantine system also helps prevent the introduction of pests that can harm agricultural industries and the environment.

However, no quarantine system can guarantee complete protection from the introduction of exotic pests. Rapid increases in overseas tourism, imports and exports, mail and changing transport procedures (e.g. refrigeration and containerisation of produce), as well as the potential for pests to enter via natural routes, mean that relying on quarantine measures is not enough.

A nationally coordinated system of surveillance, inspection and control using pre-border, border and post-border measures is required to prevent the establishment and spread of unwanted pests that may have a deleterious effect on humans, plants, animals or the environment. These activities are the responsibility of the Australian Government, state and territory governments, plant industries and the wider community.

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1. Introduction

Australia is fortunate to be free of many of the world's most destructive plant pests that are common elsewhere; a benefit that confers significant advantage to Australian agriculture. An Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) Incident could cause serious production losses, jeopardise exports of plant and plant products or have serious implications to the environment, amenity values or regional communities.

To effectively respond to an EPP Incident, a formal and legally binding agreement – the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) – has been agreed between Plant Health Australia (PHA), the Australian Government, all state and territory governments and national plant industry peak body signatories (EPPRD Parties). The EPPRD covers the management and funding of responses to EPP Incidents, including the potential for Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORCs) for Owners, and formalises the role of Parties in decision making as well as their contribution towards the costs. Under the EPPRD, beneficiaries of the eradication of an EPP pay an appropriate and equitable proportion to the costs of mounting a response, based on an assessment of the relative and public benefits of eradication (refer to section 2.4).

PLANTPLAN is the generic national response plan underpinning the EPPRD primarily concerned with the eradication of EPPs which pose a potential threat to Australia's agricultural industries.

1.1 Purpose of PLANTPLAN

PLANTPLAN provides nationally consistent guidelines for managing a response to an EPP Incident at national, state/territory and local levels, describing the national procedures, management structures and information flow systems. Each phase of the response (Investigation and Alert, Operational, and Stand Down) and key roles and responsibilities of Industry and government Parties during each of these phases are specified.

PLANTPLAN is also consistent with contemporary incident management systems which are widely recognised and used throughout Australia for managing incidents. This includes the application of the *Biosecurity Incident Management System* (BIMS) developed by the Biosecurity Emergency Preparedness Working Group (BEPWG) and endorsed by the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) for use when responding to biosecurity incidents. Further information and copies of the BIMS document are available from the Australian Government Department of Agriculture website (www.agriculture.gov.au).

1.2 Scope and application

PLANTPLAN must be used by all Parties to the EPPRD (Industry and government) in the management of a response to an EPP Incident. As a Schedule to the EPPRD (incorporated by reference), PLANTPLAN is legally binding on all Parties. Specific terms used in PLANTPLAN are defined under the EPPRD (Clause 1.1). Furthermore, where there is any conflict between the terms and conditions contained in the clauses of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN, the clauses of the EPPRD will take precedence (EPPRD Schedule 1).

Application of PLANTPLAN is triggered by a detection of an EPP and all Response Plans must conform to PLANTPLAN unless otherwise agreed by the National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (NMG) (EPPRD Clause 6.2).

The steps of a response outlined in PLANTPLAN may occur in a slightly different order depending upon the type and scale of the response. Some steps may also occur concurrently. It may be possible to merge some of the roles described in PLANTPLAN, depending on the nature and size of the response, the availability and capability of personnel, and the progress of the response.

1.2.1 Clarification of the enactment of the EPPRD at the border

The EPPRD will be used where the EPP Incident occurs post-border. That is, where the detection is not contained within the originally imported goods.

The EPPRD will not be used if:

- An EPP is detected in a consignment of goods at the border or in a consignment of goods that are not under quarantine control (i.e. has passed through the border) and the EPP remains within the imported items.
- An EPP is detected and is contained within a Post-Entry Quarantine (PEQ) facility.

In these situations, the detection is considered to be “at the border” and the Australian Government will manage any required response. Materials held in PEQ facilities are considered to remain “at the border” until the material has been officially released. Furthermore, pests of timber that are detected when contained within the imported goods (e.g. an imported piece of furniture) will be considered as part of an intact consignment and therefore, the EPPRD will not apply.

Where there is a trace-forward from the goods which contained an EPP and where there is a clear risk that an EPP may have spread from the originally imported goods, the EPPRD may be used.

1.3 EPP biosecurity documentation

The EPP biosecurity documentation framework is a hierarchy of documents that enables a uniform response to EPP Incidents. The EPPRD formalises the management, funding and the role of Parties; while PLANTPLAN directly supports the operational implementation of the EPPRD and is a Schedule to the EPPRD. The application of PLANTPLAN is in turn supported by a series of documents, which directly or indirectly support the implementation of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN.

1.4 Supporting documents under PLANTPLAN

Underpinning PLANTPLAN are supporting documents agreed to by EPPRD members which assist with the implementation of PLANTPLAN. Most of the supporting documents were previously appendices to archived versions of PLANTPLAN. Some elements of the supporting documents are generic in nature, so it may be necessary for government and Industry Parties to develop specific work instructions to add support to these. All supporting documents are available from the PHA website (www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/PLANTPLAN).

The various types of supporting documents are described below and a register of supporting documents is presented in Appendix 1.

1.4.1 Manuals

Manuals describe specific elements of a response to an EPP and are toolkits for specific operational areas. Manuals may comprise a number of separate elements, including standard operating procedures (SOPs), job cards, guidelines and forms/templates.

1.4.2 Standard operating procedures/job cards

SOPs provide task specific guidance to response personnel and provide a platform for consistency in the completion of specific tasks within an organisation, between jurisdictions and from one EPP response to another. Job cards are a written list of tasks to be carried out under specific roles.

1.4.3 Guidelines

Guidelines provide general assistance to response personnel in understanding and implementing procedures or policies. For example, the guidelines for urban/peri-urban issues provide points for the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP) and Lead

Agency to consider when developing and implementing a Response Plan within that type of environment.

1.4.4 Forms and templates

Forms and templates provide a consistent and agreed format for response personnel to use. This permits a focus on the activity being performed or the information being collected, rather than the manner in which the information is then presented. Forms and templates also ensure that the required minimum information or data is collected in a consistent and harmonised manner.

1.5 Management of PLANTPLAN and supporting documents

To ensure that PLANTPLAN and its supporting documents continue to represent best practice in emergency management, they are updated regularly to incorporate new information or address gaps identified by the outcomes of reviews. PHA coordinates the development and review processes for both PLANTPLAN and supporting documents. New supporting documents may also be developed where a need is identified.

1.5.1 Review of PLANTPLAN

Authority for the development and maintenance of PLANTPLAN rests with PHA. PLANTPLAN will be reviewed annually and updated as a result of activation of the plan or testing in exercises and workshops. Recommendations for amendment from EPPRD Parties may also be forwarded to PHA for consideration.

Revision of PLANTPLAN is considered a process pursuant to the EPPRD so formal amendments to PLANTPLAN are conducted in accordance with Clause 16 of the EPPRD. PHA will seek consideration of proposed changes from PHA members, generally at an EPPRD Parties' meeting. Following consultation and if Parties endorse the amendments, formal notification of the amendments will be sent to all Parties in writing and a copy of the new version of PLANTPLAN will be made available on the PHA website (EPPRD Part 1 of Schedule 5).

1.5.2 Development and review of supporting documents

Supporting documents are reviewed periodically, generally following a response to an EPP Incident or evaluation through exercises and workshops. EPPRD Parties may at any point request a review or propose the development of a new supporting document.

The process for review or development of supporting documents is co-ordinated by PHA. Existing technical working groups (such as the Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics (SPHD) for diagnostics) are expected to have a lead role in the development and review of relevant supporting documents. However, if no technical committee exists to develop or review a supporting document PHA will either:

- Coordinate the formation of a small working group with nominees from interested PHA members, or
- Use internal expertise (if and where available).

EPPRD Parties will be asked to endorse new or amended documents either during meetings of the Parties or out-of-session. Unless otherwise clearly specified, endorsement of these documents will be by Consensus, with nil response taken as abstention rather than objection.

1.6 Resource documents

PHA and its government and industry members produce a number of resources that are designed to assist with Australia's planning and preparedness for EPPs but are not a formal component of the EPPRD. These resources are produced to assist PHA members, EPPRD Parties and other relevant stakeholders to actively mitigate the entry of EPPs, minimise any

potential impacts, as well as assist the implementation of strategic and operational activities during an EPP response.

Resource documents may provide information about Parties' responsibilities under the EPPRD. They are identified here to provide a broader understanding of the resources available to manage biosecurity issues along the entire biosecurity continuum. However, the responsibility for developing, managing and amending these documents varies and resides outside of the scope of PLANTPLAN.

1.6.1 Industry biosecurity plans

Industry Biosecurity Plans (IBPs) are industry specific documents that identify and prioritise biosecurity risks and provide a framework for risk mitigation and preparedness activities. These are high level documents used to identify current and future biosecurity challenges for the industry. Each IBP describes how a specific industry operates in Australia and formally identifies exotic plant pests that have the potential to negatively impact on that industry. An IBP also guides the implementation of future biosecurity activity and post response recovery to prevent or minimise the impact of an EPP Incident.

IBPs are developed for each member industry as a collaborative effort between representatives from that industry, government agencies, other relevant stakeholders and PHA. When completed, IBPs are endorsed by government members through the Plant Health Committee (PHC) and the relevant peak industry body. IBPs are developed for PHA industry members and also upon request, subject to additional funding, for non-member peak industry bodies. IBPs are reviewed every 4-5 years to ensure they are current. Copies of specific IBPs may be requested directly from the relevant industry body or PHA.

1.6.2 Farm biosecurity manuals

Farm Biosecurity Manuals are industry or region-specific and are designed to raise awareness of exotic plant pests at a producer level. These documents are designed to enhance pest awareness and recognition, to increase the likelihood of early reporting. They provide basic information regarding hygiene practices, movement of people and machinery, factsheets for the high priority pests of the industry and templates for producers to use (such as a visitor register, pest surveillance data sheets and biosecurity checklists). Farm Biosecurity Manuals are developed by PHA in collaboration with the relevant industry. Further information and copies of Farm Biosecurity Manuals are available from the Farm Biosecurity website (www.farmbiosecurity.com.au).

1.6.3 Pest-specific contingency plans

Contingency plans provide background information on the biology of a specific pest and the control measures currently available to assist with preparedness activities in the event of an EPP Incident, along with guidelines and options for steps to be considered and undertaken when developing a Response Plan. Contingency plans are developed by PHA, government and industry and a number are available from the PHA website (www.planthealthaustralia.com.au/pidd).

1.6.4 Nationally approved standard operating procedures

Nationally Approved Standard Operating Procedures (NASOPs) have been developed for use by jurisdictions during responses to biosecurity incidents. Further information and copies of current NASOPs are available from the Animal Health Australia (AHA) website (www.animalhealthaustralia.com.au).

1.6.5 National diagnostic protocols

National Diagnostic Protocols (NDPs) are standard methodologies for the accurate identification of specific pests or groups of pests. These protocols provide information on the collection of samples, diagnostic techniques and often include detailed images. NDPs are developed by the SPHD, validated by independent specialists and endorsed by PHC.

2. National arrangements for responding to an EPP

A number of arrangements are in place and a range of activities undertaken prior to and during an EPP Incident. These activities ensure that Australia is prepared to respond as well as possible to an EPP and can do so effectively to significantly reduce the impact of the EPP.

2.1 Biosecurity legislation

Australia's biosecurity system operates under both Commonwealth and state/territory legislation administered and managed by the respective agricultural and environmental agencies. The legislation covers a range of activities involving domestic and international movement of people and goods into and around the country, and the export of agricultural commodities. Also contained within the legislation are other relevant functions relating to biosecurity emergency response and reporting.

Regulatory authority for biosecurity controls at Australia's borders is vested in the Australian Department of Agriculture. Each state and territory has responsibility for post-border biosecurity, including prevention, detection, response and eradication of EPPs within its borders, and administers its own plant protection legislation.

The plant protection legislation in the states and territories provide powers for emergency containment and eradication actions, enabling state and territory agencies to undertake such actions as:

- Declaring pests of concern and making orders for the purpose of eradication.
- Entering properties to survey for pests including EPPs.
- Inspecting and taking samples of plants or plant products.
- Establishing and maintaining quarantine zones.
- Restricting movement of plants, plant products, equipment, vehicles and other potential sources of plant pests.
- Issuing orders for the destruction of infested plant material.

2.2 Biosecurity awareness and training

Effective preparedness against EPPs requires activities to support early detection and diagnosis, known reporting lines, contingency planning, agreed decision-making processes and coordinated incident management procedures. Each Party to the EPPRD has acknowledged the need for a program of risk reduction measures to reduce the risk of the entry and spread of EPPs and have committed to an on-going process of risk mitigation. These principles are reflected in Parties' Biosecurity statements, completed in accordance with Clause 13 requirements under the EPPRD.

Biosecurity planning provides a mechanism for industry, government and other relevant stakeholders to determine pests of high priority, analyse the risks they pose and put in place procedures to reduce the chance of pests becoming established. IBPs (as outlined in section 1.6.1) are an important aspect of biosecurity planning and provide the high level risk mitigation and preparedness policies required by industry.

PLANTPLAN provides a basis for developing national standards for the defined functions and tasks required of individuals responding to EPPs. Competency based and non-accredited training for government officers, plant industry members, plant health specialists and workers is available to maintain the necessary levels of skills to perform roles effectively.

PHA works with government and industry members to develop and deliver the National EPP Training Program. The training program is an ongoing and proactive approach providing up to date information, education and training to meet the needs of producers, plant health

specialists, extension service providers, government officers, researchers, agribusinesses, and other stakeholders across Australia's plant industries.

2.3 Roles and responsibilities in a response under the EPPRD

There are a number of formal committees under the EPPRD which are responsible for making decisions relating to an EPP Incident. These committees and their roles and responsibilities are detailed below. An overview of the key decision points for CCEPP and NMG during the Incident Definition Phase of an EPP response are highlighted in Figure 1.

2.3.1 Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests (CCEPP)

The CCEPP is the technical committee that makes recommendations to the NMG on suspect and confirmed EPPs and their response arrangements (EPPRD Clause 11.2). Representatives from government and Affected Industry Parties constitute the CCEPP (EPPRD Part 3 of Schedule 8). Further detailed information for CCEPP members and observers on the operations of the CCEPP is described in the *Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines* and the *Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests* job card.

In discharging its responsibilities, the CCEPP must develop a rational process to assess the grounds for eradication. Quality technical advice is essential for sound risk management decision making. At any stage of an EPP response, the CCEPP may determine that eradication cannot be justified and will recommend to NMG that eradication is not technically or economically feasible and will recommend to the NMG that eradication should either not be attempted or should cease. The costs of eradication, overall benefits and technical feasibility of removing the EPP from the Australian landscape are all factors to be considered here.

2.3.2 Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP)

The CCEPP may appoint a Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) when additional information or advice is required by the CCEPP to assist them in their deliberations. The role of the SAP is to provide expert advice on various aspects of the EPP response, including pest biology, diagnostic methods, surveillance systems, pest epidemiology and management options that could be incorporated into a Response Plan.

Further information is described in the *Scientific Advisory Panel* job card.

2.3.3 National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group (NMG)


The NMG has primary responsibility for decisions with regards to responses to EPP Incidents (EPPRD Clause 11.1). Representatives from government and Affected Industry Parties constitute the NMG (EPPRD Part 1 of Schedule 8). The group will approve or not approve a Response Plan and the consequent application of Cost Sharing and will manage the national policy and resourcing needs of a Response Plan on behalf of the Affected Parties.

Following a meeting of the CCEPP, the NMG will receive a recommendation on the technical and economic feasibility of eradication, review the CCEPP recommendations and make a decision on further action. Cost Sharing of an EPP response will not commence until the NMG approves a Response Plan under the EPPRD (refer Figure 1). The NMG may also decide to cease the EPP response based on a recommendation by the CCEPP that an EPP is no longer technically or economically feasible to eradicate (EPPRD Clause 5.2).

2.4 EPP categorisation

Pest categorisation is a process under the EPPRD (EPPRD Clause 7) based on science, public policy and economics, and takes into account the impact of the EPP on the public and private sectors (including impact on human health, environment, amenities and production). EPPs are assigned to one of four categories according to the extent to which eradication would benefit the public or private sector (Table 1). The category of the EPP determines the Cost Sharing ratio between Affected Industry and government Parties if an EPP response occurs.

Figure 1: Flow diagram highlighting key decision points for CCEPP and NMG during the Investigation and Alert Phase of a response to an EPP Incident.



Where an Incident has been reported to the CCEPP in respect of an uncategorised Plant Pest believed by the NMG to be an EPP and the NMG determines that a Response Plan is to be implemented prior to the categorisation of the Plant Pest, the costs will initially be shared on a 50:50 (Category 3) basis between Affected governments and Industry Parties until the pest is categorised by a Categorisation Group and agreed to by Relevant Parties. In the case where the NMG determines that there are significant public health issues associated with a previously known but uncategorised Plant Pest, the Plant Pest will be treated as a Category 1 (EPPRD Clause 9.3).

Table 1: Categories of EPPs and their Cost Sharing proportions (EPPRD Schedule 3)

Category	Cost sharing	Description
1 Very high public benefits	100% Government: 0% Industry	<p>These are EPPs which if not eradicated would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • cause major environmental damage to natural ecosystems; and/or • potentially affect human health or cause a major nuisance to humans; and/or • cause significant damage to amenity flora; and • have relatively little impact on commercial crops. <p>This category also covers situations where the EPP has a wide range of hosts including native flora and there is considerable uncertainty as to the relative impacts on Crops. In short, it is almost impossible to properly determine which cropping sectors benefit from eradication and to what extent, and in any case the incursion primarily affects native flora and/or amenity plants, and/or is a major nuisance if not a health risk to humans.</p> <p>The eradication of Category 1 EPPs would have very high public benefits.</p>
2 High public benefits	80% Government: 20% Industry	<p>These are EPPs which if not eradicated would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • cause significant public losses either directly through serious loss of amenity, and/or environmental values and/or effects on households, or indirectly through very severe economic impacts on regions and the national economy, through large trade losses with flow on effects through the economy; and • impose major costs on the affected cropping sectors such that the cropping sectors would benefit significantly from eradication. <p>The eradication of Category 2 EPPs would have high public benefits.</p>
3 Moderate public benefits	50% Government: 50% Industry	<p>These are EPPs which if not eradicated would primarily harm the affected cropping sectors but there would also be some significant public costs as well (that is, moderate public benefits from eradication). The EPP could adversely affect public amenities, households or the environment, and/or could have significant, though moderate trade implications and/or national and regional economic implications.</p> <p>The eradication of Category 3 EPPs would have moderate public benefits.</p>
4 Mostly if not wholly private benefits	20% Government 80% Industry	<p>These are EPPs which if not eradicated would:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have little or no public cost implications and little or no impacts on natural ecosystems. The affected cropping sectors would be adversely affected primarily through additional costs of production, extra control costs or nuisance costs; and • generally there would be no significant trade issues that would affect national and regional economies. <p>The eradication of Category 4 EPPs would have mainly if not wholly private benefits.</p>

3. Managing an EPP response

A response to an EPP Incident is a complex operation requiring rapid mobilisation of resources and coordination of a diverse team of people. Strong management and coordination systems ensure that those involved in emergency management have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, know who the relevant stakeholders are, and who to contact in each organisation. It is essential that each Party (government and Industry) to the EPPRD maintains an up to date list of people who would occupy relevant key positions during a response to an EPP Incident.

3.1. Roles and responsibilities of Parties

3.1.1 Australian Government responsibilities

The Department of Agriculture has responsibility for activities relating to biosecurity in Australia and is the lead Australian Government agency responsible for managing the response to EPP Incidents. Broadly, the Department of Agriculture provides national leadership and coordination for responses to biosecurity incidents. The nature and extent of this role will vary depending on the incident, but may require the Department of Agriculture to undertake its role at an organisational, national or international level.

The main responsibilities of the Department of Agriculture, on behalf of the Australian Government are as follows:

- Notify CCEPP of an EPP Incident via the Australian Chief Plant Protection Officer (CPPO).
- Convene, chair and provide the secretariat support of CCEPP and NMG.
- Meet Australia's international reporting obligations.
- Undertake negotiations with trading partners and address market access issues.
- Contribute to, and coordinate the dissemination of public information.
- Provide policy advice on national and international issues.
- Liaise with other Australian Government agencies that are impacted by or who can assist during an emergency.
- Invoke Commonwealth legislation when necessary to assist with EPP eradication operations in states and territories.

In satisfying Australia's international reporting requirements, the Department of Agriculture will report relevant changes in national pest status to trading partners and through the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). During an EPP response, the Department of Agriculture maintains a high level of interaction with Australia's overseas posts and trading partners to provide relevant updates to minimise the impact of the Incident and response on market access for affected Australian product(s).

The Department of Agriculture is responsible for tracing plants and plant products that have been exported prior to or since the initial report of the Incident, and those that have entered the country which are suspected of having a role in the Incident. In addition, the Department of Agriculture will negotiate and implement any revisions to export and import certification arrangements required as a result of the EPP Incident.

3.1.2 State and territory government's responsibilities

State and territory government authorities have constitutional responsibility for operations within their jurisdictional boundaries in response to incidents involving plant, animal or aquatic animal diseases or pests, animal welfare, introduced marine pests, and food residue or other food safety or agricultural threats.

During an EPP response, the relevant biosecurity agency within each jurisdiction will manage their responsibilities in accordance with relevant biosecurity and emergency management arrangements. In the jurisdiction where the Incident has occurred, this may include the establishment of a State Coordination Centre (SCC) to coordinate activities across the state/territory, and a Local Control Centre (LCC) to manage operational aspects of the response (refer section 3.2.2).

The main responsibilities of the jurisdictions are:

- Provide notification to the Chair of the CCEPP via the Chief Plant Health Manager (CPHM) in accordance with the EPPRD and work to confirm diagnostics for the EPP.
- Notify and advise affected property owner(s).
- Determine the extent of the Incident through delimiting surveillance and trace forward and back activities.
- Adopt precautionary quarantine measures.
- Identify and implement control strategies.
- Develop and implement an approved EPP Response Plan.

Lead Agency

The Lead Agency is the government agency of the state or territory which is responsible for leading the conduct of a Response Plan due to the occurrence of an Incident within their state/territory. In a multi-jurisdiction Incident, there will be more than one Lead Agency and major decisions such as when to declare the emergency and when to change phases of the response will be made jointly through the CCEPP.

The CPHM of the Lead Agency(s) will have primary carriage of a response to an EPP Incident; and will activate PLANTPLAN and make follow-up decisions on pest control measures in consultation with the CCEPP and report to the CCEPP, as required, on the situation and expenditure of a response. Refer to the *Chief Plant Health Manager* job card for additional information.

3.1.3 Industry responsibilities

During a response to an EPP Incident the Affected Industry Parties will be the key contact point for the Affected Industry Parties and producers and will have roles at a number of different levels, specifically:

- Industry Party Delegates: Industry Liaison Coordinator (ILC) / Officer (ILO) in the SCC/LCC respectively
- Industry Party Representatives: national representative on the CCEPP and NMG

Close cooperation is required between relevant government Parties and industry(s) for effective management of an EPP Incident and to provide consistent and timely public information.

The main responsibilities of the Affected Industry Parties are:

- Undertake reasonable steps to ensure industry members and other relevant stakeholders report suspect EPPs to the relevant state/territory department.
- Provide advice on the affected industry (such as size, distribution, sources of supply, marketing practices, industry organisation and other factors which may affect the eradication program) and the Response Plan.
- Provide ILC and ILO personnel as required.
- Implement relevant aspects of the approved EPP Response Plan.

- Participate in the Biosecurity Incident National Communication Network (NCN) to ensure nationally consistent information and implement agreed communication strategy.

Industry liaison roles

The industry liaison roles (ILC and ILO) will consult with industry and be involved in development and implementation of the EPP Response Plan. These roles are vital to the EPP response. The SCC and LCC industry representatives must work closely with each other. The SCC includes delegates at state/territory and national levels (ILC). The LCC includes delegates at the local level (ILO).

The responsibilities of the industry liaison personnel are:

- Participate in the development and implementation of the EPP Response Plan.
- Assist in the identification of operational resources.
- Keep industry informed of developments in the response.
- Consult with industries to determine likely methods of disease spread, options for pest control, the effect of pest control policies and programs on industry, and gather feedback on the progress of the response.
- Seek and encourage industry endorsement of pest control policies, cooperation with control activities and dissemination of information to their members.

ILOs liaise with the Affected Industry(s) and interstate counterparts where an EPP response crosses state/territory borders. Refer to the *Industry representatives* job card for additional information.

3.1.4 Plant Health Australia

PHA is the custodian of the EPPRD and the national coordinator of the government-industry partnership for plant biosecurity in Australia. During a response to an EPP Incident PHA assists Parties' compliance with the provisions of the EPPRD and provides advice to members on actions in relation to the EPPRD.

More specifically, the main responsibilities of PHA are:

- Provide advice regarding potential Affected Parties for a specified Plant Pest.
- Assist in the development of Owner Reimbursement Cost frameworks if these have not been developed for the Affected Industries.
- Ensure that Confidentiality Deed Polls are signed by all Party Representatives and others participating in EPPRD activities as required.
- Calculate proportional splits for distributing the costs of the Response Plan.
- Coordinate and collate Shared Costs of a Response Plan.

PHA attends all meetings of the CCEPP and NMG as a non-voting standing member to ensure all response activities are consistent with the EPPRD. PHA also chairs any meetings of the SAP and the Categorisation Group.

Following the finalisation of an EPP Incident, PHA will contribute to the Incident debrief and will coordinate the finalisation of Cost Sharing arrangements (EPPRD Clause 10.6.1).

3.2 Structure and management of an EPP response

During an EPP response, the Australian Government and Affected states/territories will manage their responsibilities in accordance with relevant biosecurity legislation and emergency management arrangements. PLANTPLAN is aligned with the BIMS (refer section 1.1) which sets out the incident management system used for managing the national response to biosecurity incidents.

Areas of alignment include the organisational structure and the management principles:

- **Management system flexibility:** establishing coordination, control and command centres at the national (refer to section 3.2.1), state/territory and local level (refer to section 3.2.2) according to the needs of the response as structure and staffing may vary considerably between emergency responses and during the course of a single response.
- **Management by objectives:** a process of consultative management where the Incident Management Team determines the objectives and then communicates these to those involved.
- **Span of control:** acknowledges the number of people or groups which can be effectively supervised by each person involved in the response.
- **Functional approach:** specific functions are identified and used to manage the response. PLANTPLAN aligns these functions with BIMS (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Incident management functions (adopted from BIMS)

Importantly it is also recognised that biosecurity incidents can vary in scale, complexity, degree of delegations required, duration and the number of individuals, groups, agencies and resources involved. Therefore the classification or level of the biosecurity incident is identified and communicated to ensure effective coordination, resources and support during a response. These levels are described within BIMS.

The way in which the incident management system is implemented during a response to an EPP Incident and their relevant responsibilities at the national, state/territory and local levels are described below.

3.2.1 National management

The centre from which the Department of Agriculture manages its responsibilities is known as the National Coordination Centre (NCC). The NCC's role is to provide national leadership and coordination in managing an emergency such as an EPP response.

3.2.2 State/Territory management (coordination / control / command)

There are three different types of centres which may be established during a response to an EPP Incident to manage the response at the state/territory, local and field levels. The structure and staff of these centres will vary according to:

- Nature of the pest incursion.
- Location of the incursion.
- Size of the incursion.
- Stage of progress of the response.

All personnel and contractors appointed to positions within the EPP response must be trained in the specifics of the role they will be performing and must go through a response specific induction process. Training is provided by a number of organisations including PHA and jurisdictions. Supporting documentation to PLANTPLAN including SOPs, job cards and jurisdictional specific materials should be used during training and induction as appropriate.

The SCC will have primary responsibility for the coordination of activities across the state/territory and generally should not become involved in the management of on ground activities. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to combine state/territory and local operations in one centre. Refer to the *Functions of the SCC section* and *State Coordination Centre Director* job cards for additional information.

The LCC will have primary responsibility for planning, conducting and supporting all operational activities within its jurisdictional borders. Depending on the complexity or extent of the response it may be necessary to establish more than one LCC. The LCC Incident Management Team will identify what needs to be achieved by the LCC, how this will be achieved and allocate responsibilities. These arrangements will normally be documented in an incident action plan which is approved by the Incident Manager at the local level and disseminated to those with responsibility for implementing activities. Refer to *Functions of the LCC section* and *Local Control Centre Controller* job cards for additional information.

Forward Command Posts (FCP) may be established under the control of the LCC in order to manage specific field level activities.

3.3 Laboratories dealing with EPPs

During an EPP response it is essential that each laboratory involved in processing response related samples has documented standard procedures that ensure biological security during normal operation. Manuals containing these procedures should be readily available to all laboratory staff at all times.

3.3.1 Laboratory standards

Laboratories handling suspected EPP samples will be either Class 5.2 (Quarantine Containment Level 2) or Class 5.3 (Quarantine Containment Level 3) Quarantine Approved Premises (QAP), as appropriate to the pest in question. The Australian Government approves a QC2 or QC3 facility based on national Quarantine Approved Premises criteria and Australian/New Zealand Standards.

Quarantine Containment Level 2 (5.2 Class) laboratories are used for work on biological materials including micro-organisms, animals and plants (and their products) that pose a risk of causing disease in animals, plants and humans, but are unlikely to be a serious hazard to facility workers, the community, livestock or the environment. The facility must include all laboratory design and construction requirements to meet QC2 status as specified in Australian/New Zealand Standards AS/NZS 2243.2:2006 (Safety in laboratory – chemical aspects) and AS/NZS 2982.1:1997 (Laboratory design and construction – general requirements).

Quarantine Containment Level 3 (5.3 Class) laboratories are used for work on biological materials including micro-organisms, animals and plants (and their products) that pose a higher risk of causing serious disease in animals, plants or humans. These materials present a serious hazard to laboratory workers and may present a risk if spread to the community or the environment. The facility must include all laboratory design and construction requirements to meet QC3 status as specified in Australian/New Zealand Standards AS/NZS 2243.3:2006 (Safety in laboratory – chemical aspects) and AS/NSZ 2982.1:1997 (Laboratory design and construction – general requirements).

3.3.2 Control of access to and movements within the laboratory

The number of people allowed access to the laboratory should be tightly controlled. A log of every person entering an area and records of training given during an EPP response should be kept (both as legal defence and as a matter of good practice).

Depending on biology of the EPP there should be an exclusion period for people who have visited an infected area before being allowed to access the laboratory. Similarly, there should be an exclusion period for people exiting the laboratory before they are allowed access to a production area.

3.3.3 Recording of data from diagnostic tests

The following (minimum) key points must be addressed:

- Results must record the unique sample identification number.
- Data (inclusive of such items as photographic records of gels, host symptoms from pathology tests, records from automatic analysis and sequence information) should be entered in an approved data recording system.
- All relevant data should be linked to the sample and to personnel who entered the data.
- Results should be entered into the data recording system by approved staff, checked for errors and verified by the diagnostic specialist.

3.3.4 Communication for laboratories during an EPP response

During an EPP response, the lines of communication outlined in Figure 3 will be used by laboratories and control centres. Results from initial and confirmatory diagnostic tests may only be disclosed to the CPHM.




Figure 3: Lines of communication for diagnostic laboratories during an emergency response.

3.4 Information management systems

Information management systems and procedures for managing information relevant to an EPP response must be simple and easily understood by response staff who may not have experience in using such systems as part of their normal duties.

During an EPP response, it is critical that information relevant to the response is recorded, filed appropriately and is retrievable when required. During and following a response there may be a requirement to provide information to government enquiries or audits. An efficiency or financial audit, for example, may be required under the EPPRD. These audits must comply with Australian Auditing Standards (EPPRD Schedule 11) so all information should be of an auditable nature.

The information management system selected for use by agencies must allow for the collection of:

- Owner and location.
- Case number.
- Area status.
- Frequency of visits.
- Statistics for surveillance and tracing activities.
- Staff movement details.
- Reports or information provided by the public or industry.
- Records of expenditure.
- Owner Reimbursement Cost (ORC) valuations.
- Market access status of the Affected premises.

Information Management Systems may also allow for:

- Tracking of samples and diagnostic progress.
- Generation of progress reports on destruction and decontamination.
- Computerised tracing models.
- Generation of forms for scheduled property visits.

3.5 Communication and public information

Public information is time-critical information that audiences need so that they can respond appropriately during and after an EPP Incident. Information is disseminated to, and received from, affected industries, the public/communities, the media, stakeholders and within an agency/organisation.

During an EPP response, both government and industry have a responsibility to communicate the Incident and response quickly and effectively. A communications strategy should be developed which includes consideration of communication to all levels ranging from ministers, industry executive officers, growers and the wider community. The nature and extent of the communications strategy will depend on the Incident.

Appropriate information helps the community and affected stakeholders prevent the spread of EPPs and aids containment and eradication efforts. Public information also plays an important role in informing media and the public about invoked laws, such as movement restrictions and controlled quarantine areas. Keeping the public informed improves the perceived effectiveness of a response and can assist with recovery.

3.5.1 Biosecurity Incident National Communications Network

The Biosecurity Incident National Communications Network (NCN) is an intergovernmental network which assists in EPP responses by enhancing risk mitigation and response activities through ensuring nationally consistent and timely communication and engagement activities. The NCN is tasked with producing and disseminating nationally consistent public information in response to biosecurity incidents.

Standing members of the NCN comprise of communication managers from agricultural health organisations (including PHA) and Australian, state and territory government agencies responsible for biosecurity. During a response to an EPP Incident, the NCN chair may invite communication managers from Affected Industries to participate in the NCN.

In order to guide effective communication during an EPP response, the NCN has developed a *Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual* (BIPIM) which aligns to the public information function within BIMS. This manual guides the activities of public information personnel appointed to LCC, SCC and NCC and includes job cards/role descriptions and templates specific to the public information functions carried out in control and coordination centres.

In addition to the BIPM, the NCN uses the *National Biosecurity Engagement and Communication Framework*, which has been endorsed by the NBC. The nationally agreed framework helps government agencies and industry to engage their stakeholders in various levels of biosecurity activities.

4. Phases of an EPP response

Responding to an EPP Incident is broken down into three Phases in PLANTPLAN:

- Investigation and Alert Phase
- Operational Phase
- Stand Down Phase.

The PLANTPLAN Phases are operational in nature and describe the actions which must be taken to successfully respond to an EPP Incident. In contrast, the phases outlined in the EPPRD (Clause 5) are legal terms relating to the actions taken to meet the legal requirements of the EPPRD and the Cost Sharing. The relationship between the PLANTPLAN and EPPRD Phases is illustrated at Figure 4.




Figure 4: Relationship between PLANTPLAN and EPPRD Phases.

The following should be noted:

- While the Phases of PLANTPLAN are depicted as separate events, they should all be viewed as part of a continuous process.
- Due to the potential urgency and evolving timeline of an EPP Incident and response, the Operational Phase can be commenced prior to all activities in the Investigation and Alert Phase being completed.
- The actions described in these Phases are not a definitive list and the course of an EPP response may require fewer or additional actions to be performed.

4.1 Investigation and Alert Phase

The aim of this Phase is to complete a detailed scoping of the EPP Incident to determine the extent of the emergency and the appropriate course of action. The Phase is activated when the Australian Government or relevant state/territory government (Lead Agency) is notified of the report of a suspect EPP and the detection is investigated. Key issues to be addressed include:

- Whether the Incident relates to an EPP or not.
- Whether the EPP can be effectively contained and eradicated.
- The potential for the incursion to spread rapidly.
- The potential to lead to significant industry or wider economic and trade losses.
- The potential environmental consequences.

The Investigation and Alert Phase in PLANTPLAN aligns with the Incident Definition Phase in the EPPRD (refer Figure 4). Activities carried out during this phase are considered normal commitments for all Parties and are not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD unless specifically agreed to by the NMG (EPPRD Clause 9.1.1(b)). Refer to the *Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed* guidelines for further information on agreed normal commitments.

Broadly, during the Investigation and Alert Phase:

- The Lead Agency will provide Formal Notification to the CCEPP as required under the EPPRD.
- A CCEPP will be convened via email, teleconference or face-to-face.
- A NMG may be established.
- Confirmation of the diagnosis will occur.
- Key response staff will be placed on standby to respond if necessary.
- Precautionary measures will be adopted.
- The extent of the EPP Incident will be determined and control measures identified.
- The appropriate course of action will be determined and preparation of a Response Plan may occur (if required).

The activities undertaken during the Investigation and Alert Phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not in the sequence of events.

4.1.1 Notification of an Incident

The initial report of an Incident will most likely be received by a local departmental officer or diagnostic laboratory who must report it to the relevant CPHM promptly. Reports may also be received directly from the public via the Exotic Plant Pest Hotline (1800 084 881) which must then be investigated. The CPHM will coordinate the collection of all relevant information and investigation of the initial report.

Where there are grounds for suspicion of an EPP, the CPHM will:

- Coordinate collection of initial details and any urgent trace backs or trace forwards.
- Take immediate steps and adopt precautionary measures to limit spread of the suspect EPP by putting into place appropriate interim quarantine measures on affected properties. Quarantine measures may include:
 - Restrictions on the movement of vehicles, equipment and plant material/products on and off the affected property.
 - Interim control or containment measures.
 - Establishment of buffer zones around affected properties.
- Ensure sufficient preliminary information regarding the EPP Incident is collected and documented, and samples collected are forwarded to an appropriate laboratory for diagnosis.

Plant Health Officer(s) would generally be tasked with undertaking a number of these activities. Refer to the *Plant health officer* job card for additional information.

All information pertaining to the EPP Incident must be treated as confidential and communicated only on a 'need to know' basis.

Formal Notification to the CCEPP

Under the EPPRD (Clause 4.1.1), the CPHM must notify the Chair of the CCEPP within 24 hours of becoming aware of an EPP Incident. Failure to notify within this timeframe may lead to a situation where the jurisdiction receives no payment for their actions in relation to the detection (EPPRD Clause 4.2). Notification from the CPHM may initially be provided verbally however, any verbal advice must be confirmed in writing using the form agreed by Parties (EPPRD Clause 1.1 – definition of 'Formal Notification to the CCEPP'); the *Preliminary Information Data Sheet* (PIDS) form.

The CPHM in the Lead Agency will advise relevant senior Industry Party Representatives of the detection.

Preparation of the Preliminary Information Data Sheet

The PIDS is a document which details information relevant to the Incident and is completed by the CPHM of the relevant jurisdiction. It must be provided as part of the overall notification process. However, convening a CCEPP meeting can occur prior to the PIDS being submitted to address factors including urgent information or action requirements relating to the EPP Incident.

The PIDS should include all currently available information to help inform CCEPP considerations as well as the identification of potential Affected Industry Parties.

Notifying CCEPP Representatives

The CPPO must immediately notify CCEPP representatives of the EPP Incident following receipt of the formal notification. This will generally be done by email distributed by the CCEPP Secretariat. PHA will provide advice to the CCEPP Secretariat regarding the potential Affected Industry Parties that will form part of the CCEPP. This advice is based on the host list of the Plant Pest in question as provided to PHA.

Convening the CCEPP

The CPPO will arrange a meeting of the CCEPP as soon as practical after receipt of the formal notification. Prior to the meeting, the CPHM of the Lead Agency will provide a CCEPP situation report to the CPPO for distribution to the CCEPP. A template for this is available (*Situation report template*).

It is not expected that all information will be available for this first meeting, however all available information must be presented. The CCEPP may provide:

- Assistance to the Lead Agency with advice on aspects of diagnostics, delimiting surveillance, extent of industry and industry impacts, and quarantine.
- Assurance to other Parties that necessary actions are occurring while diagnostics and other information are finalised and collated.
- Advice to all Parties on international and interstate trade implications.
- Advice to industry on actions and information that can be discussed with their members.
- Communications as necessary for the Lead Agency and the Affected Industry Parties to enable a common message to be given to industry and the media.

Regular situation reports should be provided during the course of the EPP response to inform the CCEPP and NMG.

Information that should be presented and issues that should be covered at the meeting is outlined in the *Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines*. Specific considerations such as urban and peri urban biosecurity issues, and disinfection and decontamination are available in the *Urban and peri urban biosecurity guidelines* and *Disinfection and decontamination guidelines* respectively.

4.1.2 Diagnostics

Required laboratory standards for diagnostics are outlined in section 3.3.1. Results from initial and confirmatory diagnostic tests may only be disclosed to the CPHM.

Refer to the *Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and *Diagnostic team* job card for further information on diagnostics.

Initial diagnostics

Following the report of a suspect EPP Incident, the CPHM or Incident Manager will arrange for a diagnostic or sampling team to be dispatched to the Suspect Premises (SP). The diagnostic or sampling team must ensure the endorsed sampling protocol is adhered to and that information associated with the suspect EPP Incident is appropriately recorded. Refer to the *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and the *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines for directions.

Chain of evidence requirements for collection of samples must be met. An unbroken chain of evidence must be maintained for results to be admissible in court. This requires that appropriate security measures and documentation procedures are followed at all times. Refer to the *Chain of evidence* SOP for directions.

Confirmatory diagnosis

The initial diagnosis of a suspect EPP must be confirmed by a second independent laboratory to mitigate opportunities for legal action. The CCEPP may assist in determining the most appropriate laboratory to be used in confirming a diagnosis. International laboratories may be utilised for confirmatory diagnoses as positive controls may not be available in Australia for many EPPs. Samples must be sent as per the *Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines and the *Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests* guidelines.

The CPHM of the Lead Agency will notify the CPPO immediately once the identification of the suspect EPP is confirmed.

The CCEPP will meet to review the situation following confirmation of the Incident. The CPHM of the Lead Agency must provide an updated written situation report to the CCEPP secretariat for distribution to the CCEPP prior to the meeting. After consultation with the CCEPP, the CPPO will formally declare the detection at a national level concurrently with the Lead Agency.

Information required for the meeting and issues that should be covered are outlined in the *Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines*.

4.1.3 Determining the extent of the EPP Incident

The CPHM or Incident Manager will coordinate delimiting surveys of the area to determine the extent of the distribution of the EPP and inform the extent of necessary quarantine zones (refer section 4.1.4). These activities provide important information on the potential movement of the EPP and inform CCEPP discussions regarding feasibility and economic benefit of eradication and assist development of a Response Plan if required.

Minimum standards for surveillance will be specified by the CCEPP in order to determine the extent of the incursion with a reasonable degree of confidence. Further guidance on delimiting surveys is outlined in the *Delimiting surveys* SOP.

The CPHM will coordinate survey teams to conduct trace backs to determine where the EPP may have originated from and trace forwards to identify where the EPP may have spread. Survey teams must consult with property owners or managers in order to identify:

- Movement of plant materials and products that may assist in the spread of the EPP.
- Equipment which is shared between properties.

- Personnel or contractors that may have moved from affected to unaffected properties.
- Linkages from and between affected properties.

Decontamination and disinfection practises are critical to restrict movement of the suspect EPP. Refer to the *Disinfection and decontamination guidelines* for further information.

4.1.4 Emergency Containment measures

In the event of an EPP incursion it is important to implement precautionary quarantine measures as soon as possible. Control procedures, including the establishment of quarantine zones, may be implemented by the Affected state/territory to contain the EPP while the feasibility of eradication is investigated.

Establishing quarantine zones

Outcomes from delimiting surveillance will inform the establishment of quarantine zones and identify the Restricted Area(s) (RA), Control Area (CA) and the Pest Free Area (PFA). The size of quarantine zones will be determined by a number of factors, including:

- Location of the incursion.
- Climatic conditions.
- Biology of the EPP.
- Proximity of an Infected Premises (IP) to other IPs.

Restricted Area – Data collected from surveys and tracing will be used to identify the first quarantine zone known as the RA, which comprises all properties where the EPP has been confirmed (Infected Premises or IP), properties which have come into direct or indirect contact with an IP or infected plants (Contact Premises or CP) and properties which may have been exposed to the EPP (Suspect Premises or SP). Trace back and trace forward information will be considered in defining the RA.

Control Area – A buffer zone or CA is established around an RA to control the movement of susceptible hosts and other regulated materials until the extent of the incursion is determined. There may be multiple RAs within one CA.

When the extent of the EPP Incident has been confidently defined, the RA and CA boundaries and movement controls may need to be modified, and where possible reduced in size commensurate with appropriate controls.

Establishing movement restrictions

The CCEPP will consult with the Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access (SDQMA) regarding the development and modification of movement controls out of the CA to ensure that the least restrictive conditions required to achieve successful Emergency Containment are applied. Interstate movement restrictions of risk items, such as host plants, plant products and machinery, should be risk-based, applied consistent with those restrictions applied to the CA and ideally be nationally consistent.

Where interstate movement restrictions are enacted by a jurisdiction(s) a notification must be provided to the CCEPP Secretariat as soon as practicable for circulation to all Affected Parties.

Control strategies

The Lead Agency will coordinate an investigation to identify chemical controls or other control procedures which may be available for use during an EPP response. This may involve gaining permits for emergency use of unregistered products or for off-label use of registered products from the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA).

The Lead Agency will also coordinate investigation of non-chemical control and monitoring strategies. Refer to *Technical guidelines for development of pest specific Response Plans* for further considerations on control strategies.

4.1.5 Communication and public information

Broad considerations regarding effective communication and the management of public information at all levels during an EPP response are outlined in section 3.5. The Department of Agriculture will take responsibility for the national coordination of public information where an EPP is present in, or spreads to more than one jurisdiction. The Department of Agriculture is also responsible for IPPC notifications where necessary. All communication material must be developed according to the confidentiality requirements of the EPPRD (EPPRD Clause 29). Specific communication issues relating to the Investigation and Alert Phase are described below.

Advice to property owners

In the early stages of the Investigation and Alert Phase, the CPHM, Incident Manager or other authorised personnel will provide necessary information regarding the situation to property owners or managers. This information should include advice:

- That diagnostic tests have identified a possible EPP that may require quarantine controls.
- That all staff working on the EPP Incident have been instructed to maintain strict confidentiality.
- About the need for cooperation in applying voluntary movement control on plants, plant products and personnel. If cooperation is not offered it should be explained that a quarantine order can be placed on the property.
- What will happen in respect of national recommendations on eradication and containment.
- About availability of counselling services to assist with social, economic or other issues.
- That they will be advised of the outcome of final diagnostic tests.

When appropriate, affected property owners should be provided with a comprehensive explanation of the intended survey and response actions. Property owners may also be advised of the potential for Owner Reimbursement Costs (ORCs) to be paid as part of a Response Plan, noting that such payments are not guaranteed and are dependent on the NMG agreeing to invoke national Cost Sharing arrangements under the EPPRD and approving a Response Plan.

Communication strategy

When an EPP is present in one jurisdiction, the Lead Agency in collaboration with the Affected Industry Parties will draft a communication strategy to guide public information activities. Where there are multiple jurisdictions affected, the Department of Agriculture will coordinate a national communication strategy and provide it to the CCEPP for endorsement. CCEPP members can liaise with their NCN member to provide relevant technical input into the communication strategy (see section 3.5).

Guides and templates for talking points, media releases and communication strategies are in the BIPIM (see section 3.5.1).

Talking points and media releases

National talking points must be drafted to ensure messages are nationally consistent, are pitched correctly to the affected audiences and can be used by media spokespeople. The development and approval of talking points must be managed quickly to meet tight media deadlines. Communications with the media will be restricted to the delegated media contacts within Affected Parties.

The Department of Agriculture and the Lead Agency will jointly coordinate the development of draft talking points immediately following CCEPP meetings. Key points to be covered in the talking points should be raised at the CCEPP meeting. Draft talking points will be distributed by the CCEPP Secretariat for immediate comment by CCEPP members with a view to distribution and use on the same day as the meeting.

Each Affected Party should use the approved talking points when developing media releases, website content and other public information materials. Media releases should be shared with Affected Parties prior to release.

International trade impact

The Department of Agriculture will consider potential international trade implications, notify relevant trading partners and commence any necessary negotiations for the continuation of trade. CCEPP members should be informed of the implications of the EPP Incidents for export trade in the Affected Crop(s).

4.1.6 Decision on eradication or alternative action

A central aspect of implementing a response to an EPP Incident is that it is feasible to eradicate the EPP (EPPRD clause 5.1.1(a)(i)). The CCEPP must be satisfied that it is both:

- (a) technically feasible to eradicate the EPP; and
- (b) cost beneficial to eradicate the EPP;

before making a recommendation to the NMG. Further details on these two elements are provided below.

In making an initial recommendation on eradication or alternative action, some assumptions may need to be made by the CCEPP, including whether:

- The diagnosis (especially strain identification), biology, dispersal and host range information is correct.
- Effective control treatments have been identified and are available.
- The cost/benefit considerations are accepted as an appropriate economic risk assessment summary.
- Survey data represents a realistic and up-to-date summary of the distribution of the incursion for risk management decisions.

The CCEPP will meet to review the situation, following confirmation and declaration of the Incident, to determine and make recommendations to the NMG regarding the feasibility of eradicating the EPP.

Technical feasibility

The CCEPP will meet to consider if it is technically feasible to eradicate the EPP given the information available at the time. Guidance regarding information and issues that should be presented and covered at the CCEPP meeting is provided in the *Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines*.

Table 2 lists the factors that should be considered when determining technical feasibility of eradication. CCEPP should consider all of the criteria, however not all the criteria need to be fulfilled for eradication to be feasible.

Cost-benefit analysis

In addition to an EPP being technically feasible to eradicate, it also needs to be cost beneficial to undertake the eradication. The CCEPP will consider the cost-benefit of proposed eradication options to assist decisions on response activities.

If necessary the CCEPP and/or NMG can request, at any stage during an EPP Incident, that a formal cost-benefit analysis to be completed by a recognised provider of economic analysis services, such as ABARES, to provide assistance with a determination of whether it is cost-beneficial to eradicate the EPP.

Table 2: Factors to consider regarding the technical feasibility of EPP eradication
a) the capability to accurately diagnose or identify the EPP.
b) the effectiveness of recommended control technique options, which are likely to be the most cost-effective in eradicating the EPP.
c) the ability to remove or destroy all EPPs present by the recommended control techniques.
d) the ability to remove the EPP at a faster rate than it can propagate until proof of freedom can be achieved.
e) the recommended control techniques are publicly acceptable (taking into consideration cultural and social values, humaneness, public health impacts, non-target impacts and environmental impacts).
f) whether Emergency Containment measures have been put in place by the Lead Agency(s).
g) whether there are controls methods, commonly employed for endemic pests and diseases, that may limit or prevent the establishment or impact of the EPP.
h) any legislative impediments to undertaking an emergency response.
i) the resources e.g. chemicals, personnel etc. required to undertake an emergency response are accessible or available.
j) the ability to delimit the known area of infestation.
k) the ability to identify the pathway for entry into, and trace the spread of the EPP within Australia.
l) the ability to determine whether the likelihood of further introductions is sufficiently low.
m) the dispersal ability of the EPP (that is, whether the EPP is capable of rapid spread over large distances).
n) the capability to detect the EPP at very low densities for the purpose of declaring freedom, and that all sites affected by the EPP have or can be found.
o) the ability to put in place surveillance activities to confirm Proof of Freedom for sites possibly infested by the EPP.
p) whether community consultation activities have or will be undertaken.

CCEPP recommendations to the NMG

Following analysis of both technical feasibility and cost benefit, the CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG regarding eradication. The CCEPP may make the recommendation to attempt eradication and implement a Response Plan, continue with current quarantine controls pending further information being obtained or take no further action and close the EPP Incident.

The recommendation to the NMG needs to take into account, among other things, reliability of diagnostic tests, impact on productivity and domestic/international trade and many of the other factors listed in Table 2.

Figure 1 (Section 2.3) presents an overview of the key decision points for CCEPP and NMG during the Investigation and Alert Phase, including the course of action resulting from acceptance or rejection of CCEPP’s recommendations.

Development of the Response Plan and indicative budget

If the recommendation of the CCEPP is that eradication should be attempted and a Response Plan is required, the Chair of the CCEPP may prepare a preliminary report to the NMG to enable the NMG to make their determination. However, generally if the CCEPP is recommending a Response Plan be implemented, a draft Response Plan will accompany the recommendation.

The draft Response Plan will be prepared by the Lead Agency in collaboration with Affected Industry Parties and reviewed by the CCEPP. An indicative budget for response activities should be included in the draft. The recommendation to the NMG must demonstrate that the EPP has been confirmed and that eradication is both technically feasible and cost beneficial. The Lead Agency, with the assistance of the CCEPP Secretariat, may request personnel from other Affected Parties or PHA to assist with the development of the Response Plan and indicative budget. Development of the Response Plan must take into consideration the requirements of the EPPRD (Clause 6) including required content (Part 1 of Schedule 4). A *Response Plan template* is available.

Guidance to assist with planning the eradication is outlined in the *Planning eradication at affected properties SOP*.

Response Plan trigger points

The Response Plan should specify clear trigger points for the review of response activities. The trigger points will depend on the particular EPP response. Trigger points could relate to matters such as:

- The extent of expenditure of the approved response budget.
- Any additional EPP detections.
- Operational matters.
- Program management performance indicators.

The only trigger point mandated under the EPPRD is the Agreed Limit Trigger Point on the total cost of an eradication effort. The expenditure Trigger Point must be no greater than 90 per cent of the Agreed Limit. If this Trigger Point is met, the NMG will meet to review the funding arrangements and the continuation of the EPP response (EPPRD clause 9.5.6 and 9.5.7).

All the trigger points for the review of the Response Plan must be measurable and be analysed by the Lead Agency and CCEPP as long as necessary throughout the duration of the Operational Phase of the response.

Approval of Response Plan and budget by the NMG

The NMG is responsible for making the final decision on the action to be taken following confirmation of an EPP (refer Figure 5). The NMG will consider the Response Plan provided by the Lead Agency and CCEPP and review the indicative budget. If the NMG approves the Response Plan, response activities may commence and the Incident will move into the Operational Phase.

The Response Plan indicative budget is an approximation of the likely Shared Costs of implementing the Response Plan. There is implied flexibility in the indicative budget so long as the Lead Agency spends the amount implementing the Response Plan and the amount spent is eligible for Cost Sharing. When approving the Response Plan and budget the NMG must set an "upper limit on expenditure", which may be the amount set out in the indicative budget or another specified amount, however it must not exceed the Agreed Limit for the response (EPPRD Part 2.1 of Schedule 10). The NMG must monitor expenditure throughout the course of the response.

4.1.7 Incident termination process during the Investigation and Alert Phase

Based on the outcomes of the Investigation and Alert Phase, either the Operational (section 4.2) or Stand Down (section 4.3) Phase of PLANTPLAN will be activated.

As indicated in previous sections, the Investigation and Alert Phase can be terminated and the Stand Down Phase activated by two occurrences:

- If the Investigation and Alert Phase fails to confirm the presence of an EPP, or
- If the eradication of a confirmed EPP is not considered feasible.

In both instances, the CCEPP will advise the NMG, providing relevant and reasonable justification, either:

- (a) the Incident does not relate to an EPP (EPPRD Clause 5.1.1(b)(i)), or
- (b) the Incident does relate to an EPP but the EPP is not capable of being eradicated or contained (EPPRD Clause 5.1.1(b)(ii))

The NMG will then make its determination (in accordance with the voting procedure outlined in Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD). The resolution should include the relevant reasons for termination as identified above.

A new Incident of the same EPP would have to be considered against the criteria in the EPPRD. If in a previous Incident, an EPP was determined to be widely distributed and endemic, the definition of an EPP is no longer met. A Party to the EPPRD could request it to be removed from Schedule 13 to remove any ambiguity.

4.2 Operational Phase

The aim of this Phase is to eradicate the EPP. The Operational Phase commences once the EPP Response Plan is endorsed by the NMG.

The Operational Phase in PLANTPLAN aligns with the Emergency Response Phase in the EPPRD and where the response is successful, is also inclusive of the Proof of Freedom Phase in the EPPRD (refer Figure 4). Operational expenses incurred by undertaking activities required by a Response Plan during this Phase are eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD, subject to the specifications of Part 4 of Schedule 6 (Determination of Costs) and as specified in the NMG endorsed Response Plan.

Broadly, during the Operational Phase:

- The Lead Agency will implement the NMG agreed Response Plan.
- The Lead Agency will provide regular written and verbal situation reports to the CCEPP.
- The Lead Agency will provide regular expenditure reports to the CCEPP and NMG.
- Proof of freedom activities will occur.
- The NMG will declare the EPP eradicated (where the Response Plan is successful).
- The NMG may appoint an Efficiency Auditor to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a Response Plan.

The activities undertaken during the Operational Phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.

4.2.1 Response Plan implementation and progress

The CPHM of the Lead Agency(s) will be responsible for overall management of the Response Plan and will lead the implementation of the plan under direction from the CCEPP. The office

of the CPPO will coordinate the national consultation and decision making in addition to any international aspects of the EPP Incident and response.

Guidance for operational planning and implementation for the eradication is outlined in the *Planning eradication at affected properties SOP*.

The CCEPP will be convened as required during the implementation of the Response Plan and will monitor the progress of the response, approve communications where necessary and prepare reports for the NMG.

The NMG will be convened promptly as required, particularly during the Operational Phase, to make decisions based on the recommendations provided by the CCEPP, or as otherwise necessary.

Situation and expenditure reporting

The Lead Agency must provide regular written and verbal reports to the CCEPP (via the Secretariat) throughout the EPP response. At each CCEPP meeting, the Lead Agency must provide a written report in the form stipulated in Schedule 10 of the EPPRD which sets out the budgeted, committed and actual expenditure under the Response Plan to date (EPPRD Clause 12.2.1).

Situation and expenditure reporting by the Lead Agency will ensure the CCEPP and the NMG receives appropriate notice and information in order to evaluate the progress of the EPP response and make appropriate recommendations and determinations.

A Situation report template and Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan guidance document are available to assist Lead Agency(s) to meet these reporting obligations.

Evaluating the progress of the EPP response

In addition to considering the progress of the response through situation and expenditure reporting by the Lead Agency(s), if any of the specified trigger points for review (as agreed by the NMG and outlined in the Response Plan) are met, the CCEPP will review the Response Plan and consider whether eradication of the EPP continues to be feasible. Depending on the outcome, the Response Plan may be amended and resubmitted to NMG for approval, or alternatively a recommendation made to the NMG that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP.

External reviews of the eradication program (Efficiency Auditing – EPPRD Clause 12.3) may take place as determined by the NMG.

4.2.2 Coordination of Cost Sharing

Each Affected Party must initially meet its own costs arising from involvement in the implementation of a Response Plan (EPPRD Clause 10.2). Additionally, during the course of the Response Plan, all Affected Parties must abide by the Cost Sharing principles under the EPPRD (EPPRD Clause 10.3). PHA is responsible for coordinating, verifying and collating claims for Cost Sharing and will contact all Affected Parties within 1 month of the implementation of a Response Plan reminding them of their responsibilities in regard to claims. PHA will provide the appropriate template to assist Affected Parties to provide the required information.

The Cost Sharing principles require claims to be submitted by all Affected Parties for eligible costs (EPPRD Clause 9.6.1 and Part 4 of Schedule 6) incurred implementing an approved Response Plan to PHA quarterly (unless otherwise agreed by NMG) (EPPRD Paragraph 2.1.2 of Schedule 7). If an Affected Party has not incurred any costs during the claiming period they must still notify PHA that they will not be claiming costs for that claiming period. Once all claims have been received and verified by PHA, PHA will notify all Affected Parties of the relevant amounts payable and receivable (EPPRD Paragraph 2.1.4, 2.1.5 and 2.1.7 of Schedule 7).

Not all costs of responding to an EPP Incident are eligible to be Cost Shared between Affected Parties. For further information on normal commitments refer to the *Normal Commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed* guidelines.

For further guidance on cost claiming refer to the *Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan* guidance document.

4.2.3 Communication and public information

The broad considerations regarding effective communication and the management of communication at all levels during an EPP Incident are outlined in section 3.5. The national communication strategy drafted and implemented during the Investigation and Alert Phase will also provide guidance. All communication material must be developed according to the confidentiality requirements of the EPPRD (EPPRD Clause 29).

Advice to property owners

The CPHM, Incident Manager or other authorised personnel will advise affected property owners of the decision to implement a Response Plan and will provide updates on the progress of the Response Plan as necessary.

Talking points and media

Talking points will need to be reviewed during the course of the eradication response. The Department of Agriculture and the Lead Agency will continue to coordinate the development/review of draft talking points immediately following CCEPP meetings, which will then be considered by the CCEPP prior to being finalised. Where agreed, NMG will also issue its own communiqués in the course of a response.

Pest factsheets

As part of the communications strategy, a factsheet covering pest biology, impact, regulatory arrangements, what to look for and who to contact should be prepared as soon as possible and provided to all Affected Parties and published on any Incident related website. The factsheet should also contain any safety issues for consumers and possible frequently asked questions. These pest factsheets are often for the purpose of informing and engaging the broader community as well as growers and property owners.

In addition to pest factsheets, information updates on any quarantine requirements for the response, additional detections and the progress of the response will be developed. A template (*Emergency Plant Pest Alert*) is available.

4.2.4 Finalisation of an eradication program

An eradication program will be finalised when the NMG determines that the EPP has been eradicated and proof of freedom has been demonstrated, or that it is no longer feasible to eradicate the EPP. Once NMG agrees that the EPP Incident is over, the Stand Down Phase will commence.

When implementation of the Response Plan is successful and objectives are being met, there will be a progressive wind down of response activities towards the end of the Operational Phase and the LCC(s) and SCC will require fewer resources.

The CCEPP recommends the EPP successfully eradicated

The Lead Agency will present a report to the CCEPP (and subsequently to the NMG) and seek endorsement that the criteria for successful eradication of the EPP have been met. There will often be a set minimum length of time between the end of an eradication program and declaration of area freedom from the EPP. Refer to *Technical Guidelines for Development of Pest Specific Response Plans* for further considerations on proof of freedom strategies.

The CCEPP will make a recommendation to the NMG to formally determine that the Response Plan has been successful and the EPP has been eradicated. Where agreed, the NMG will issue a communiqué.

The CCEPP recommends the EPP unable to be eradicated or eradication unsuccessful

If during the course of an eradication program the CCEPP concludes that eradication of the EPP is no longer feasible, the CCEPP will meet and make a recommendation to NMG to agree termination of the EPP response.

4.3 Stand Down Phase

The aim of this Phase is to provide guidance for moving from emergency response arrangements to normal business.

The Stand Down Phase is activated by one of the following:

- The Investigation and Alert Phase fails to confirm the presence of an EPP.
- The eradication of a confirmed EPP is determined by the NMG (upon advice by the CCEPP) not to be feasible (refer section 4.1.6 and 4.1.7).
- Following implementation of a Response Plan, the NMG formally declares that the Incident has ended as:
 - a) the EPP has been successfully eradicated (refer to section 4.2.4); or
 - b) eradication is no longer feasible (refer to section 4.1.6).

While a Stand Down Phase is addressed in PLANTPLAN, it is not specifically addressed in the EPPRD. Activities carried out during the Stand Down Phase are outside of EPPRD process and are therefore not eligible for Cost Sharing under the EPPRD. The relevant states/territories in conjunction with the relevant industries may consider alternative strategies to adopt (such as long-term control methods) following stand down, however these activities are outside of the scope of the EPPRD. The one exception is the undertaking of an external financial audit of the Response Plan ledger following the completion of a Response Plan (EPPRD Clause 12.4.1).

The activities undertaken during the Stand Down Phase and the organisations responsible for them are further detailed below. These activities are grouped according to function and not necessarily in the sequence of events.

4.3.1 Review of intra and interstate quarantine arrangements

If the eradication campaign is unsuccessful or the EPP Response Plan is terminated prior to completion, the SDQMA will consider the most effective methods to support national and international trade.

If the EPP is eradicated then all intra and interstate quarantine arrangements should be lifted once eradication is declared.

4.3.2 Communication and public information

If the eradication campaign is successful, the Department of Agriculture will:

- Advise relevant international trading partners.
- Provide IPPC notification.
- Negotiate arrangements to reinstate trade if necessary.

4.3.3 Finalisation of Cost Sharing and financial audit

All Parties must finalise the Cost Sharing arrangements that were implemented during the Operational Phase. This includes determining the total cost (shared costs) of implementing the Response Plan as well as the wider costs (not shared costs) incurred by them in responding to the EPP Incident. PHA will provide the appropriate template to assist Affected

Parties to provide the required information. Affected Parties must provide all necessary information to PHA within six months of completion of the Response.

Further information on the Cost Sharing process can be found above at section 4.2.2.

The *Accounting and reporting for a Response Plan* guidance document provides specific guidance on Cost Sharing arrangements and the process for determining wider costs following the completion of a Response Plan.

The Lead Agency must also arrange for an external audit of the Response Plan ledger account following completion of the Response Plan where the total Cost Shared amount is equal to or exceeds \$500,000 (as at 2011/2012 to be indexed annually using the Consumer Price Index at 30 June each year and applying from 1 July each year – EPPRD Part 1 of Schedule 11). The cost of the financial audit is a Cost Sharable item and should be specified in the Response Plan budget.

4.3.4 Incident debriefs

Incident debriefs are a critical component of the Stand Down Phase as they provide an opportunity for participants to highlight areas of concern as well as positive outcomes.

Incident debriefs will be held at local, state and national levels following termination of the EPP response. It is essential that relevant personnel involved in the response are included in the debriefing process. PHA and the CPPO will coordinate a debriefing in regard to the operation of the EPPRD and PLANTPLAN to help inform any appropriate changes to PLANTPLAN or the EPPRD.

4.4 Relief and Recovery

Relief and recovery is the coordinated approach of supporting affected individuals and communities following an emergency response. There are no defined relief and recovery actions or responsibilities outlined in PLANTPLAN and activities are not subject to Cost Sharing under the EPPRD. These activities occur outside of an EPP Response Plan and are the responsibility of jurisdictions, industry and local communities.

Abbreviations

Acronym	Term
ABARES	Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences
AHA	Animal Health Australia
BIMS	Biosecurity Incident Management System
BIPIIM	Biosecurity Incident Public Information Manual
CPHM	Chief Plant Health Manager
CPPO	Chief Plant Protection Officer
CCEPP	Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests
CP	Contact Premises
CA	Control Area
EPP	Emergency Plant Pest
EPPRD	Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
FCP	Forward Command Post
IBP	Industry Biosecurity Plan
ILC	Industry Liaison Coordinator
ILO	Industry Liaison Officer
IP	Infected Premises
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
LCC	Local Control Centre
NASOP	Nationally Approved Standard Operating Procedures
NBC	National Biosecurity Committee
NCC	National Coordination Centre
NCN	National Communication Network
NDP	National Diagnostic Protocol
NMG	National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group
ORC	Owner Reimbursement Costs
PIDS	Preliminary Information Data Sheet
PHA	Plant Health Australia
PHC	Plant Health Committee
PHO	Plant Health Officer
RA	Restricted Area
SAP	Scientific Advisory Panel
SCC	State Control Centre
SDQMA	Subcommittee on Domestic Quarantine and Market Access
SPHD	Subcommittee on Plant Health Diagnostics
SP	Suspect Premises

Terms and Definitions

Term	Definition	Definition source
Biosecurity	A set of measures designed to protect a Crop, Crops or sub-group of Crops from Plant Pests at national, regional and individual farm levels.	EPPRD
Categorisation Group	The group convened under Part 4 of Schedule 8 of the EPPRD, that will advise on the categorisation, re-categorisation or removal from the categorised list of a Plant Pest or the Funding Weight of a categorised EPP.	EPPRD
Chief Plant Health Manager	The individual, holding the position of plant health manager, or his/her equivalent, of a state or territory. <i>Note: The individual will be the plant health manager of the state/territory plant health authority that has prime responsibility for plant pest control in that state or territory.</i>	EPPRD <i>Additional note:</i> Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Chief Plant Protection Officer	The individual, holding the position of the Chief Plant Protection Officer of the Commonwealth of Australia. <i>Note: the individual will be responsible for undertaking national coordination and emergency management of plant health issues.</i>	EPPRD <i>Additional note:</i> Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Consensus	In respect of a decision to be taken on an issue, that none of those persons present when the decision is taken are opposed to it, although: (a) persons present during the discussion may have expressed contrary view; (b) achieving consensus may have required a measure of compromise to ensure a workable outcome; and (c) some entitled to be present may not be present and some may abstain from participating in the decision.	EPPRD
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests	A committee of technical representatives of the EPPRD Parties established in accordance with clause 11.2 of the EPPRD. <i>Note: the CCEPP provides the link between the Australian Government, state/territory governments, Industry, PHA and NMG for EPP incursions. The CCEPP makes recommendations to the NMG on incursion management response.</i>	EPPRD <i>Additional note:</i> Already contained in PLANTPLAN
Contact Premises	Premises (or locality) containing susceptible host plants which are known to have been in direct or indirect contact with an Infected Premises.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Control Area	An area around the restricted area where movement is controlled but not restricted. The area is intended to reduce likelihood of the Plant Pest spreading beyond the Restricted Area.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary

Term	Definition	Definition source
Cost Sharing	The process of government Parties and Industry Parties proportional funding of the Shared Costs arising from the implementation of a Response Plan, as described in the EPPRD.	EPPRD
debrief	A meeting at the end of an operation with the purpose of assessing the conduct or result of an operation.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
decontamination	A combination of physical and/or chemical processes that kills or removes infectious agents from media, water, equipment and people. Includes all stages of cleaning and disinfection.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
delimiting surveillance	Surveillance conducted to establish the boundaries of an area considered to be infested by or free from a Plant Pest.	International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures 6
Department of Agriculture	Australian Government Department of Agriculture	
Emergency Containment	A set of measures implemented by the Lead Agency as part of an EPP response. It is intended to restrict the EPP to a defined area, and may include the use of quarantine measures, in order to prevent further spread of the EPP and preserve the opportunities for eradication of the EPP.	EPPRD
Emergency Plant Pest	See definition in the EPPRD.	EPPRD
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	Government and Plant Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Plant Pest Responses.	EPPRD
Forward Command Post	A field operations centre, subsidiary to a Local Control Centre.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Incident	The occurrence of a confirmed or reasonably held suspicion of an EPP or of an unclassified Plant Pest which is reasonably believed to be an EPP (not including a Plant Pest investigation where the provisional finding or diagnosis is that the Plant Pest is established).	EPPRD
Industry Party Delegate	Person who represents each Affected Industry Party at an EPP Control Centre.	EPPRD
Infected Premises	Premises (or locality) at which an EPP is confirmed or believed to exist.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Lead Agency	The agency(s) of the state(s) or territory(s) which are responsible for leading the conduct of a Response Plan (because of the occurrence of an Incident within their state(s) or territory(s)).	EPPRD
Local Control Centre	The operations centre from which all field operations aimed at containing and eradicating the EPP are managed in a defined area.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary

Term	Definition	Definition source
National Coordination Centre	The centre established by The Department of Agriculture to coordinate national and international activities and resource support to jurisdictions.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group	The group which will approve or not approve a Response Plan and the consequent application of Cost Sharing (following advice from the CCEPP) and which will manage the national policy and resourcing needs of a Response Plan, on behalf of Affected Parties.	EPPRD
Owner Reimbursement Costs	Valuation principles for the destruction of crops or other assets during the conduct of a Response Plan as specified in the EPPRD.	EPPRD
peak industry body	Organisation representing an industry and which is a member of PHA and signatory to the EPPRD.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
pest free area	An area which a specific pest is known not to occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Plant Pest	Any species, biotype or strain of invertebrate pest or pathogen injurious to plants or plant health provided that it is discrete, identifiable and genetically stable, but excludes Genetically Modified Organisms.	EPPRD
Quarantine	Means restraints upon activities on an affected property imposed pursuant to a Response Plan designed to prevent the spread of a Plant Pest. Includes restrictions on access to and removal of materials from an affected property, and movement controls on plants, plant products, people, machinery and other items except as approved pursuant to the Response Plan. <i>Note: These restraints may be compulsory or voluntary and should be imposed in accordance with relevant state or territory legislation.</i>	EPPRD <i>Additional note:</i> Already contained in PLANTPLAN
Response Plan	An integrated plan for undertaking a response to an EPP that is developed by one or more state or territory CPHM(s), endorsed by the CCEPP and approved by the NMG and which is subject to Cost Sharing in accordance with the EPPRD. The Response Plan may include Emergency Containment actions so as to enable the payment of Owner Reimbursement Costs and Cost Sharing if considered appropriate by CCEPP and approved by NMG.	EPPRD
Restricted Area	A relatively small area (compared to a control area) around an infected premises that is subject to intense surveillance and movement controls. <i>Note: Movement out of the area will, in general, be prohibited, while movement into the area would only be by permit. Multiple RAs may exist</i>	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary <i>Additional note:</i> Already contained

Term	Definition	Definition source
	within one Control Area.	in PLANTPLAN
Scientific Advisory Panel	A panel of experts appointed by the CCEPP to provide information on various aspects of the EPP response, including pest biology, diagnostic methods, surveillance systems and pest epidemiology.	EPPRD
Shared Costs	Those costs that are shared by the Parties as described in clause 9 of the EPPRD and which are incurred in the course of implementing a Response Plan.	EPPRD
State Coordination Centre	The emergency operations centre established at a state level, that coordinates the EPP control operations to be undertaken in that state or territory.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
surveillance	Activities to investigate the presence or prevalence of a Plant Pest in a plant or plant product(s) (including bees and their hives) or in the environment.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
Suspect Premises	Premises (or locality) containing plants which may have been exposed to an EPP and which will be subject to quarantine and intense surveillance.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary
tracing	The process of locating plants, plant material, persons, or things which may be implicated in the spread of an EPP.	Consistent with BEPWG's BIMS glossary

Appendices

Appendix 1 Register of supporting documents

Title	Version	Issued
Guidelines		
Collection of suspect Emergency Plant Pests	2.0	17 December 2014
Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests Operating Guidelines	1.0	2 September 2014
Diagnosis of suspect Emergency Plant Pests	2.0	17 December 2014
Disinfection and decontamination guidelines	1.0	5 December 2013
Normal commitments for Parties to the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed	1.0	2 September 2014
Transport of suspect Emergency Plant Pests	2.0	17 December 2014
Urban and peri-urban biosecurity guidelines	1.0	5 December 2013
Standard Operating Procedures		
Chain of evidence	1.0	5 December 2013
Delimiting surveys	1.0	5 December 2013
Planning eradication at affected properties	1.0	5 December 2013
Job Cards		
Chief Plant Health Manager	1.0	5 December 2013
<i>Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests</i>	<i>in draft</i>	
Diagnostic team	1.0	5 December 2013
Industry representatives	1.0	5 December 2013
Local Control Centre Controller	1.0	5 December 2013
<i>National Emergency Plant Pest Management Group</i>	<i>in draft</i>	
Plant health officer	1.0	5 December 2013
<i>Scientific Advisory Panel</i>	<i>in draft</i>	
State Coordination Centre Director	1.0	5 December 2013
Forms and templates		
Emergency Plant Pest Alert template	1.0	5 December 2013
Preliminary Information Data Sheet (PIDS)	1.0	5 December 2013
Response Plan template	1.0	5 December 2013
<i>Situation report template</i>	<i>in draft</i>	
Other		
<i>Functions of the LCC</i>	<i>in review</i>	
<i>Functions of the SCC</i>	<i>in review</i>	

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Spotted anything unusual?

EXOTIC PLANT PEST HOTLINE
1800 084 881



Improving national biosecurity
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Contact us:

Plant Health Australia
Level 1, 1 Phipps Close
Deakin ACT 2600

Phone +61 2 6215 7700

Fax +61 2 6260 4321

Email admin@phau.com.au

www.planthealthaustralia.com.au

